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
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The Late Principal Girish Chandra Bose

Born—29 October, 1853.

Died—1 January, 1939.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

JANUARY, 1939

AGRICULTURAL PROPAGANDA AND DEMONSTRATION

PROFESSOR H. C. MOOKERJEE, M.A., PH.D., M.L.A.
Calcutta University

THE Agriculture Department has always tried its best to popularise departmental crops and to enlighten the peasantry regarding the value of its recommendations and suggestions. Officers deliver lantern lectures in different districts as well as at many of the cinema shows organised by the Publicity Department. Here they show the utility of the improved crops recommended by the Agriculture Department and attend, as far as practicable, the agricultural exhibitions and fairs held in different parts of the province making it a special point to send exhibits there. Addresses on agriculture through the Indian Broadcasting Station, Calcutta, are also delivered. The results of all these efforts are to be seen in the number of applications for the improved strains of seeds evolved by the Department. Leaflets describing the recommendations of the Agriculture Department on the making of *gur*, cattle breeding, destruction of water hyacinth, on fungoid diseases of betelvine and their treatment have been printed and distributed among those interested in these matters.

Propaganda work, as carried on for the benefit of the cultivator, normally covers practically the whole art of agriculture, its aim being to convince him of the value of certain fundamental improvements made in agricultural methods. The subjects dealt with chiefly are as follows: proper method of tillage, practical demonstration with improved agricultural implements, such as ploughs, hoes, etc., selection

and preservation of seeds, conservation of farmyard manure in covered pits, manufacture of artificial manure with weeds, farm refuse, etc., green manuring, directions for prevention of fungus and destruction of insect pests, care of cattle, making of high class *gur*, the use of recommended varieties of seeds of paddy, jute, linseed, tobacco, pulses, ground nut, etc., the introduction of improved sugarcane, Napier grass and other green fodder.

Besides addresses on these and a variety of kindred subjects, the Demonstrators have to show by actual work that the recommendations made by them are worth following. This is done in the following way. As a rule, Demonstrators are expected to select suitable plots on land belonging to the cultivators, to instruct them how to cultivate departmental crops, to supply the seeds free of cost. After sowing, they have to inspect the different plots, to give instructions as regards the necessary agricultural operations such as weeding, earthing, inter-culture, etc. As soon as the harvest is gathered, it is threshed or retted separately and the products weighed, after which comparison is made with the weight and quality of the local products and thus the superiority of the departmental variety is proved beyond all doubt. The task of persuading the peasant is a long, laborious and an unpleasant one. The work of making him carry out the suggestions offered when there is, according to him, but little pecuniary inducement to do so, and lastly, to overcome the suspicion with which the average cultivator regards every innovation, is no light one. It is because of the exacting nature of the work that the Demonstrators should not be expected to devote their time to any other matter.

A suggestion regarding the policy which might be followed in propaganda of this type is that in each suitable locality, a plot about 10 to 12 bighas in area should be selected and on this demonstration should be carried on for a term of say five years after which it may be given up. A comparatively long period has been recommended so that the cultivator may be convinced that the outturn—whether there is insufficient or excessive rain, and whether in other matters the circumstances are favourable or not—is always higher than with land cultivated according to ancestral methods. Then again, the ordinary cultivator nearly always labours under the impression that the results in Government farms are satisfactory because costly manure is used and the ground levelled, drained and so forth—ideal conditions which he will never be able to attain. It appears therefore that if he sees the

gratifying results of improved agricultural methods carried on under the identical circumstances under which work has been done in his area for generations, he will be induced to carry out the suggestions of the officers of the Agriculture Department quite willingly.

In 1933-34, in the Eastern Circle, there were 35 Demonstrators of whom 20 were employed in the districts of Dacca and Faridpur. In the Western Circle, there was a still smaller number of Demonstrators the result being that the success attained was due to their endeavours supplemented by the whole-hearted support of the owners of various private farms. In the Northern Circle, out of 35 Demonstrators, only 19 were engaged in actual propaganda work, these being scattered in seven districts. The other officers who were not engaged in direct propaganda in the different circles could do a little work on land situated in the neighbourhood of their headquarters. As a matter of fact, their activities in this direction were not calculated to produce tangible effects to any appreciable extent.

In 1934-35, owing to retrenchment, the number of Demonstrators was reduced, the figures being as follows: Eastern Circle 35 Demonstrators of whom only 14 were engaged in propaganda and demonstration, Western Circle 28 about 14 of whom were supposed to cover 11 districts, Northern Circle of whom about 19 were engaged in propaganda and demonstration.

It has to be stated in this connection that the districts of Dacca and Faridpur had the largest number of Demonstrators and, as is only natural, it was found that the most marked progress was achieved in these two districts. In 1933-34, propaganda work in the case of animal husbandry was carried on more intensively in the districts of Rajshahi and Malda in the Northern and in the districts of Hooghly and Nadia in the Western Circle than in other parts of Bengal and here only satisfactory progress was made. This conclusively points to the fact that demonstration and propaganda cannot, by any means, be left to the ordinary officers who have to do more work than they can manage easily.

In 1935-36, besides 10 temporary there were in all 90 Demonstrators on the permanent staff of whom 30 were posted in the Eastern, 28 in the Western and 32 in the Northern Circle. About 50 out of these 90 were engaged in district work. There were also 50 Demonstrators employed for four months for jute restriction work. These conducted propaganda for introduction of *rabi* and other substitute crops. Govern-

ment sanctioned Rs 20,000 for the campaign. The Demonstrators of the Agriculture Department were relieved of this special work which had been thrust on them in previous years and could thus pursue their normal activities. The work of propaganda was helped by District Boards, Khas Mahals, Court of Wards Estates, Rural Reconstruction Societies and private landlords who, between them, maintained no less than 70 to 75 Demonstrators. Various sums were also spent by them for introducing agricultural improvements, supplying departmentally improved seeds and cuttings free of charge.

In 1936-37, besides about a dozen temporary men, there were 94 Demonstrators on the permanent staff of whom about 55 were engaged in district work, the rest being attached to one or other of the 24 Government Farms. As in the previous year, 50 temporary Demonstrators were also employed for 4 months for jute restriction propaganda and 4 temporary Demonstrators for cotton propaganda in the districts of Bankura and Midnapur. In addition to maintaining Demonstrators, contributing money to meet the cost of distributing free seeds and cuttings, about 60 small farms, a majority measuring one acre, were started in different parts of Bengal by District Boards and landlords. The last movement was probably due to the step taken by Government for starting Union Board farms.

There is not much doubt that what progress propaganda work has made through the efforts of the officers of the Agriculture Department has been partly due to the loyal support they have received from officers connected with Khas Mahals, Court of Wards Estates, District and Local Boards and Co-operative Banks. It is not perhaps generally known that an amount, not of course large, is always set apart for agricultural improvements in Khas Mahals. In some places, this amount is utilised for supplying departmental seeds free. The Jessore, Contai and Howrah Khas Mahals are each maintaining small demonstration farms whence free seeds, cuttings, etc., are distributed. Similarly, larger Court of Wards Estates as those of Bhawal in Dacca district, of Majidpur in Tippera district, of Banjitia in Murshidabad district, of Junglepara in Hooghly district, and Mahisadal in Midnapur district are maintaining farms which are managed under the supervision of Demonstrators recommended by the Agriculture Department. These are utilised for multiplication of departmental seeds, cuttings, etc., and are useful centres for propaganda. Then again, Co-operative Banks too are doing their part. The Raipura Central

Co-operative Bank (Dacca), the Jamalpur, Madanganj and Sarishabari Banks (Mymensingh), the Feni Co-operative Bank (Noakhali) and similar other concerns have purchased and distributed to their members about $3\frac{1}{2}$ lakh cuttings of C. O. 213. Full credit should also be given to the public-spirited members of certain District Boards such as Nadia, Howrah, Hooghly, Jessore, Birbhum and Bankura in West Bengal and of Noakhali and Mymensingh in East Bengal, who have assisted the Agriculture Department in various ways. The funds of these self-governing bodies practically consist of the cess realised from the agriculturists which money should, as far as possible, be spent for their benefit. They ought to be congratulated for the recognition and practical application of this principle. After all, money spent on agricultural improvements such as introduction of improved seeds, of cheap labour-saving agricultural implements, of artificial manures, etc., should be regarded as an investment tending to the economic prosperity of the district and the province.

The latest development in propaganda work consists of the establishment of Union Board farms. It was in 1936-37 that the first Government of India grant for rural uplift was received and the following schemes for the purpose put into operation. These were (1) establishment of farms in 450 Union Boards, (2) improvement of cattle and fodder crops and (3) improvement of poultry. Some reference has already been made to the working of the last two schemes. So far as the first scheme is concerned, the preliminaries started in 1935-36 consisted of selecting 450 Union Boards in 25 districts of Bengal. Some difficulty was experienced at the beginning in certain parts of this province in inducing the owners to allow their land to be used as Union Board farms. As many of them are uneducated and on account of oppression and exploitation suspicious of both Government officials and the *bhadralok*, they at first thought this a new trick to deprive them of their land. Still another difficulty was to secure compact plots of land 8 acres in area. The writer's information is that these difficulties were at last overcome partly by persuasion and partly by pressure by the end of 1935-36. Each such 8-acre farm generally contains both high and low land and serves as both a seed and a demonstration farm. In each, 5 acres are devoted to the multiplication of paddy seeds and 3 acres for demonstration purposes. In the latter, *khurif* and *rabi* crops suitable for the area in which the farm is situated were cultivated. In a majority of cases, crops new to the locality such as linseed, tobacco,

groundnut, gram, potato, English vegetables and Napier grass were introduced. In many cases, part of the area was double cropped, *aus* and jute being followed by *rabi* crops. The seeds used were all departmentally improved varieties. Six such farms were supervised by one Demonstrator. Generally, all these were within a radius of 5 miles from headquarters. Seeds, cuttings and limited amounts of manures and fertilisers were supplied free from Government grant.

As the result of one year's working, the kind of useful work done by these Union Board farms may be summarised as follows. Propaganda aimed at the introduction of recommended varieties of crops and improved agricultural methods has been carried out in isolated areas in practically all parts of this province. In many places, the agriculturist has enjoyed the unique opportunity of seeing with his own eyes the pecuniary benefits accruing from the cultivation of substitute economic crops. Indirectly, part of the responsibility for the multiplication of improved paddy seeds and cuttings of sugarcane, Napier grass, etc., has been thrown on the cultivators themselves. Peasants living in places close to these farms have not only seen the demonstrations but improved seeds and cuttings have been placed within their reach. Those desirous of following the departmental methods can now obtain these improved seeds and cuttings without much difficulty and, in this way, their rapid distribution has been greatly stimulated. Much is expected from this automatic expansion. It is also hoped that the increase in the amount of improved seeds grown in these farms will have the effect of lowering their price so as to bring them within the reach of the poorest cultivator. The necessity of using manures and fertilisers suitable to the crop on the ground has been taught to them. This should have the effect of popularising their use. Again, the introduction of crops like English vegetables has had the two-fold effect of increasing the cash income as well as of adding variety to the diet of the ordinary cultivator. The writer who paid a flying visit to Rungpur in March, 1937, had an opportunity of seeing among other things the exhibits of vegetables sent in by the Union Board farms to the local Exhibition which was being held at that time in the district headquarters. It was a delightful surprise for him to see the varieties of English and country vegetables and their high quality. He was informed that the growing of high class vegetables specially English vegetables has been greatly stimulated by these Union Board farms.

Much has been said about the economic aspect of this scheme. We have to remember that these farms are not to be judged from this point of view only. As paddy seed farms, provided all the paddy is really used as seed, and also as centres of demonstration for new crops, the utility of the Union Board farms is not to be judged by the immediate profit in cash achieved by each of them. In a sense, they are more or less laboratories where practical agriculture is sought to be taught to the masses and hence cannot be expected to be profitable institutions. It is enough if the actual cultivators learn their lessons at these places and then apply them in their own fields. Then again, with the prevailing depression in the prices of agricultural produce and with the chain of middlemen between the producer and the ultimate consumer coupled with the absence of any marketing facilities on the co-operative basis, it is enough if, for the present, the peasant can make enough to pay rent and to maintain himself just above the starvation level.

It is to be hoped that these Union Board farms, which, even the most adverse critics cannot deny, have already done some good work in certain directions, should continue to be maintained for some time to come. The cultivators living near these 450 centres have seen the beneficial results of following departmental recommendations. But on account of want of education and, let it be added, of a sufficient modicum of intelligence, these lessons have to be driven home, the way of doing which is to give them an opportunity of seeing the improvement in both the quantity and quality of produce in these model farms for not less than five to six years. It has already been stated that only 450 Union Boards have been provided with these combined seed multiplication and demonstration farms. Unless Government wishes to be accused of unfairness, it will have either to change the locality of these farms from year to year which, the writer holds, will, not only greatly detract from their utility but also throw very heavy work on an already inadequate subordinate staff, a matter to which reference is made hereafter, or, in the alternative, to start similar farms in other Union Boards. If the latter proposal is accepted, Government might offer to meet part of the cost incurred by the free supply of seeds, cuttings, manure and fertilisers. Public co-operation, if solicited in the right manner, ought to be obtainable. It has already been stated how, within the last two years, various local bodies as well as landlords have started nearly 60 small farms which, the writer understands, are modelled as these Union Board farms.

It only remains to induce the public to start these in places not served by the Union Board farms as well as to point out that they should not be less than 8 acres in area in which case their utility would be greatly circumscribed. In the case of a majority of the Union Board farms, Government has the supervision done by its own agents in the shape of agricultural demonstrators each of whom is in charge of six of these farms. It would be too much to expect that in case similar farms are started by the people themselves, they should be expected to meet the salary of the supervisors. It therefore seems only natural that the entire cost of supervision should be met out of the funds allotted for this purpose to the Agriculture Department of Government.

In connection with this scheme in actual operation we have to face one unpleasant fact. In 1936-37, not less than 2,100 acres were under paddy and the primary intention was that the improved paddy seeds produced in them which, according to the latest available report, was approximately 36,000 maunds, would be used for sowing purposes only. This amount would have been sufficient for 48,000 acres. What was actually found at the time of sowing was that only 9,000 maunds or 25 per cent of paddy seeds were available, the balance amounting to 27,000 maunds having been used in other ways. There is no record as to how much had been consumed and how much exchanged with local paddy growers as seeds. This failure to make proper use of the imperial grant for the popularisation and distribution of departmentally improved seeds is lamentable indeed. Recognising and allowing as we must for the improvidence and the poverty of the ordinary cultivator, we must say that this waste could never have taken place if proper and close supervision had been exercised by the Demonstrators.

The writer, however, does not hold that the unsatisfactory supervision which led to this waste of valuable material was caused by wilful negligence or laziness on the part of the agricultural Demonstrators. It is quite possible that in certain cases, these reasons were responsible for the regrettable state of affairs to which reference has just been made. We should not, however, forget that under the Union Board farm scheme, the work of supervising them was added on to the normal work of the Demonstrators. In fact, these people have all along played the part of maids of all work to the Agriculture Department. In the past, when the Jute Restriction propaganda

was started, these agricultural Demonstrators were entrusted with this task. It was only at a later stage, when the importance of this work was realised and when perhaps it was felt as the result of actual experience that separate staff was really necessary, that new staff was entertained for this purpose. The Deputy Directors of Agriculture, of both the Northern and the Western circle, pointed out, in their reports for 1936-37, that the staff of Demonstrators is inadequate even for carrying on the normal work and that whatever success has been achieved in the Union Board farms scheme within their jurisdiction is exclusively due to their whole-hearted devotion to duty and the cheerful way in which they took up the additional burden placed on them. In the Eastern Circle, many Union Board farms could not be supervised by the departmental agricultural Demonstrators. These had therefore to be placed in charge of Demonstrators maintained by Khas Mahals, District Boards and Rural Reconstruction Committees. The fact that the authorities were compelled to deviate from the original scheme under which the work of supervision was to have been entrusted to the permanent Demonstrators of the Agriculture Department and had to rely on outside help proves beyond the slightest shadow of doubt that the staff maintained at present is inadequate. Support is lent to this view by the fact that even before the Union Board farms scheme was thought of, the Director of Agriculture, Bengal, in his report for the year 1935-36, observed that his Department was "severely handicapped by the lack of staff in districts."

It has to be remembered that the value of the work done by the Agriculture Department will ultimately have to be judged by its practical utility to the actual cultivator. An expensive staff has been maintained for years and no one denies the value of the work done by it. But information about improved seeds, agricultural implements and methods will have to be conveyed to our agriculturists, nearly all of whom are not only illiterate but also very conservative in their outlook. It is therefore absolutely necessary that efficient arrangements should be made to bridge the gap between the research worker and the cultivator. This humble but very important work is being done by the Agricultural Demonstrators. Without their co-operation, the results obtained from the different experiments conducted by the higher staff will possess nothing but an academic value. The first thing necessary therefore for putting the agriculturist in touch with

this valuable material is to provide the whole province with properly trained and enthusiastic Demonstrators who will do the work in the spirit of national service. Their number must be increased till every part of Bengal is covered thoroughly. The ninety odd Demonstrators we are maintaining now is so pitifully small as to excite neither laughter nor contempt but regret at the failure of Government to recognise the importance of this elementary factor in the agricultural regeneration of this province. With an overwhelmingly agricultural population of more than ten million cultivators, the number of cultivators per Demonstrator works out at about 1 lakh 11 thousand. With about 24 million acres under crops, the number of acres per Demonstrator works out at about 27,000. Then again, according to the final budget estimates for 1938-39, out of a sum of 16½ lakhs proposed to be spent on the Agriculture Department, about Rs. 30,000 only represented the salary of the Demonstrators.

Looked at from this point of view, the amount spent on demonstration and propaganda from Government funds is ridiculously low, specially when we remember that nearly 90 per cent of the population of Bengal is supported either directly or indirectly by agriculture. It therefore appears to the writer that one of the first steps which should be taken to improve the condition of the agriculturist is to increase the number of Demonstrators. Further, all of them should be appointed on a permanent basis, of course, after a period of probation. To employ such men for a few months in the year may be good economy but there is not the slightest doubt that it is bad policy. Constituted as we are, we can never put in our best work when we know that our responsibility ends after a short time. Another fact which is militating against the usefulness of agricultural propaganda as carried on now is that all permanent Demonstrators have to confine their work within a radius of five miles from their headquarters. It is admitted that it is quite possible to find sufficient scope for activity within this area. At the same time, the higher supervising staff ought to be given discretionary powers to enlarge, as well as to modify in all ways, the area put in charge of Demonstrators. In order that they may be in a position to move about freely within this enlarged or modified area, funds ought to be provided to meet their travelling expenses. This will be necessary till Government is in a position to employ a sufficient number of Demonstrators to equip the whole province thoroughly.

THE INDIAN CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY¹

DR. S. C. CHATTERJEE, M.A., PH.D.

Lecturer, Calcutta University.

ONE of the distinguishing features of Indian philosophy is its moral and spiritual outlook. For all the systems of Indian philosophy, excepting the Cārvāka, the world including physical nature is a moral stage for the education and emancipation of individual selves. The system of reality is not completed by the spatio-temporal world of physical nature. Behind this visible world of phenomena there lies a transcendent world of reality, an invisible and eternal spiritual order. For common sense and the sciences, and also for some systems of philosophy, the world may be a play of physical things and beings which for some time interact with one another in time and space, according to blind mechanical laws, and then disappear from the arena of the world, leaving no track behind. But for the Indian thinkers, with the solitary exception of the Cārvāka materialists, individual beings are enduring selves which are distinct from all physical objects and have a life-history of their own extending backward into the past and forward into the future. What ultimately governs the ordinary lives of these selves as well as the operations of nature is the moral law of *karma*, according to which every individual being enjoys or suffers in this life because of his own good or bad deeds in the past or the present. All that we get in this life—our body and mind, our social and economic position, our moral and religious character—are just what we have earned and deserved by the actions of our previous life. The ultimate cause of the sufferings of our life is ignorance of the truth about ourselves and the world in which we live. Liberation in the sense of freedom from suffering is to be attained through right knowledge of reality, *i.e.* self and the world (*tattvajñāna*). But this saving knowledge is not merely an intellectual understanding of the truth, nor a matter of blind faith and unsteady belief. It is a direct knowledge or clear realization of the truth. For almost all the Indian thinkers, philosophy is the direct experience or vision of the truth (*darśana*). They agree also in holding

¹ Presidential Address at the Fourteenth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Section of Indian Philosophy, Allahabad, 1938.

that the method of realizing philosophic truth is rational study and devout contemplation of it (*sādhana*). The truths of philosophy are not and cannot be known by mere reasoning. If these are to be known and properly understood, one must go through some amount of spiritual training technically called *yoga* or *sādhana*.

The conception of philosophy as direct experience of the self or reality, which is to be attained through contemplation, is found in all the orthodox schools as well as the Bauddha and the Jaina system of Indian philosophy. That there is a transcendent world or an eternal moral order, and that the individual self's emancipation lies in the realization of the true nature of the self and the world, is a doctrine common to the Bauddha and the Jaina system. Although the conception of self and reality is different in the two systems, yet they agree in holding that the self has a life beyond the present and that its liberation lies through a strenuous life of moral disciplines. Both the systems hold that philosophic insight into the truth requires self-control and self-purification, meditation and concentration. The Yogācāra school of Bauddha philosophy owes its name to the emphasis it laid on the practice of *yoga* as a necessary means of attaining the absolute truth. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is a realistic philosophy which combines pluralism with theism. The atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not ignore the moral and spiritual principles governing the world as a whole. On the other hand, it looks upon the world as a moral order in which individual souls have to realize their destiny through right knowledge of reality. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system we have a philosophy of dualistic realism which bears a clearer and deeper impress of spiritualism than the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. These systems are, like the Bauddha and the Jaina, rationalistic in the sense that they have given full play to man's power of thinking and reasoning in the province of philosophy. But they make it perfectly plain that the absolute truth of philosophy is attainable only by those who supplement reasoning by a course of moral training and constant contemplation of the self as a transcendent reality. The necessity of meditation and concentration in philosophy led to the development of an elaborate technique, fully explained in the Yoga system. The Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta are pro-Vedic systems in the sense that they arise directly out of the Vedas and may be regarded as the direct continuation of Vedic culture. In the Mīmāṃsā we have a realistic philosophy of life which justifies the ritualistic side of the Vedas. In the Vedānta

one finds a sublime idealism based on the speculative side of the Vedic culture. Although based on the authority of the Vedas, regarded as infallible, these systems are not less critical and rationalistic than any other system of Indian or Western philosophy. While starting from the authority of the Vedas, they support their theories by such strong independent arguments that, even if the support of Vedic authority be withdrawn, it is by no means an easy task to confute or controvert them. Both of these systems are spiritualistic in their outlook in so far as they view this world as the manifestation of an eternal, infinite reality which transcends the physical world of spatio-temporal reality. For both, liberation from bondage to the flesh is the highest good of the individual self and it comes through a life of purificatory works, rational study and constant contemplation. There is no doubt some difference in the distribution of emphasis on these means of liberation in the two systems. While the Mīmāṃsā lays great emphasis on the disinterested performance of obligatory duties, the Vedānta stresses more the need of rational knowledge and direct experience of the self or Brahman through constant meditation. So we see that the Indian systems of philosophy, barring the Cārvāka, agree in holding that philosophy is the direct knowledge of absolute truth, which is to be attained through a life of rational study, moral purity and devout contemplation.

There are philosophers, both Indian and Western, who opine that Indian philosophy has been stunted and reduced to a non-rationalistic dogmatic system by its reliance on religious authority and consequent moral and spiritual outlook. In his article in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*,¹ Dr. S. N. Dasgupta subscribes to this view when he says: "Indian philosophy, in spite of its magnificent outlook, thoroughness of logical dialectic, its high appreciation of moral and religious values, is closed all round by four walls of unproved dogmas: (1) the dogma of the infallibility of the Vedic wisdom, (2) the dogma of emancipation and bondage, (3) the dogma of the law of Karma, (4) the dogma of rebirth. Of these, the first is the primary dogma which is associated with the corollary that reason is unable to discover the truth—a creed which is almost suicidal to any philosophy in the modern sense of the term." 'The assumption of the unconditioned,' he remarks, 'made it difficult to explain change or the return from the change to the changelessness, and that a more rational explanation might have been effected, if the dogma of

¹ Vide *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp. 177-80.

emancipation had not fettered the systems in this way.' Proceeding further, he says that extraneous assumptions of the kind mentioned here "are bound to hamper the progress of philosophical speculation and blur the philosophical outlook." There seems to be no consistency between these statements and others made by Dr. Dasgupta in other places of his writings here and elsewhere. I need not dwell on this just now, for that would be out of place here. But I must say that what he stigmatizes as the dogmas and assumptions of Indian philosophy have not been really left like these by the ancient Indian thinkers. These have been supported by the ancient sages by certain strong independent arguments, and may, I beg to submit, be even now supported by us in this modern age of critical speculation. In this paper, however I would like to concentrate on the Indian conception of philosophy, for an examination of all the fundamental doctrines of Indian philosophy will require a voluminous treatise.¹

Analysing the Indian conception of philosophy we get the following points: (i) Philosophy is the knowledge of reality as distinguished from appearances, (ii) this knowledge is not a matter of intellectual understanding, but a direct experience or vision of absolute truth, (iii) it requires indeed the help of a rational study of all experiences, but cannot be completed by mere reasoning, (iv) it is to be attained through a life of moral purification and constant contemplation. Let us now examine these points and consider if they vitiate the Indian conception of philosophy and render it infructuous. For this I propose to discuss some important Western conceptions of philosophy. This will help us to find out the respective merits and defects of the Indian and the Western concept of philosophy, and finally to accept the one and reject the other.

One of the widely current conceptions of philosophy in the West is that it is 'the synthesis of the sciences.' Philosophy is the universal science which interprets and unites the results of the special sciences into a consistent system. "Science," Spencer observes, "is partially unified knowledge, philosophy completely unified knowledge; the generalizations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of science; philosophy is knowledge of the highest degree of generality." It is here held that the task of philosophy is to

¹ For a justification of the so-called dogmas of Indian philosophy the reader may be referred to *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* by S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Dutta (Calcutta University Press).

put together the results of the special sciences into a consistent world-view.

This same conception of philosophy reappears in a different form in the modern schools of realism. The modern realist's pet aversion to an absolutely systematic philosophy of the world as a whole, prevents him from accepting the old view of philosophy as the systematization of all the sciences. For him, philosophy is the 'logical study of the foundations of the sciences.' Impressed with the importance of modern mathematical logic for clear and precise thinking, and dissatisfied with the comparatively uncertain and hypothetical character of the great philosophical systems of the past, modern realists content themselves in their philosophy with the formulation of the structural concepts of science by the method of logical analysis. What philosophy needs is, therefore, the sciences as its data, and formal logic as its canon. As some American neo-realists tell us, 'philosophy is distinguished from the sciences by the breadth of its generalization, the refinement of its criticism, and the ultimate character of its special problems. But, even so, the task of philosophy is not radically different from that of the special sciences. It lies on the same plane, or in the same field. It is a difference of degree and not of kind; a difference like that between experimental and theoretical physics, between zoology and biology.'¹ So also Bertrand Russell observes: 'Philosophical knowledge does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; and the results obtained by philosophy are not radically different from those obtained from science. The essential characteristic of philosophy, which makes it a study distinct from science, is *criticism*. It examines critically the principles employed in science.'² The critical method of philosophy is latterly explained by Russell as the logical-analytic method and is considered by him as adequate, in all branches of philosophy, to yield whatever objective scientific knowledge it is possible to obtain.³

Professor Alexander,⁴ another renowned British neo-realist, voices the same opinion with regard to the nature of philosophy, although it be in a faltering tone and in uncertain words. He says: "Philosophy, by which I mean metaphysics, differs from the special sciences, not so much in its method as in the nature of the subjects with which it deals." It is an attempt to study such very comprehensive topics as the

¹ *The New Realism*, p. 42.

² *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 233.

³ *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. v.

⁴ *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I, Introduction.

ultimate nature of existence if it has any, and the ultimate categories of experience like space, time and causality, substance and quantity, the individual and the universal. Philosophy does but carry the scientific enterprise to bring system and connection into the haphazard facts of experience to its furthest limits, and its spirit is one with the spirit of science. The method of philosophy is, like that of the sciences, empirical. It will proceed like them by reflective description and analysis of its special subject matter and bring its data into verifiable connection. The subject matter of philosophy is, in a special sense, non-empirical, while that of the sciences is empirical. But the distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical is only a distinction between the variable and the pervasive characters of experienced things.

With regard to the above conception of philosophy, what would strike one first is that it is a bold attempt to reduce philosophy to science or, at least, to make it fall into line with the sciences. It tries to show how philosophy is the same as science in its spirit, its method, and also its problems, with a certain qualification indeed. As Prof. Alexander puts it, "philosophy is thus itself one of the sciences, delimited from the others by its special subject-matter." Following the lead of these Western philosophers, many Indian thinkers are prepared to renounce the Indian conception of philosophy and accept the view that philosophy is a universal science. 'Philosophy,' says Dr. Dasgupta, 'is a growing science; the method of philosophy is that of science; a philosophy like that of the Vedānta, which merely occupies itself with dealing with one or a few special kinds of experience, does not deserve the name of philosophy in our sense of the word.'¹ But it is one of my growing convictions that the conception of philosophy as a science does justice neither to science nor to philosophy, and is eventually found to be indefensible. Let us see how.

The first formulation of this conception of philosophy as 'the synthesis of the sciences' is as ambitious as it is monstrous. A synthesis of all the sciences—past, present and future—is an impossible task for any man of the world. For, even if it be possible for a man to acquaint himself with the entire body of present scientific knowledge, it does not lie in him to know the sciences that are yet to be formulated by posterity. Supposing that a synthesis of all sciences can be effected, it will have none of the characters of universality and necessity that

pertain to philosophy, or ought to belong to a universal science. The truths of science and the laws of nature discovered by scientists are subject to change and modification from time to time. So long as no finality regarding the results of the special sciences can be attained, the prospect of a universal science must remain as gloomy as ever. Further, a world-view resulting from a synthesis of the sciences is neither scientific nor philosophic knowledge. It is not a scientific view because it cannot be theoretically demonstrated like other scientific truths. And it is not philosophical knowledge inasmuch as it can claim no more necessity and universality than the sciences themselves possess.

The neo-realist formulation of the conception of philosophy as the logical analysis of the ultimate concepts of science is somewhat corrective of the previous one. It gives up the hopeless attempt to synthesise the sciences into an absolutely coherent system. Still, it is no more acceptable to us than the first formulation of it. It makes a confusion between science and philosophy. If philosophy be but a logical analysis of scientific knowledge, we do not see how a real distinction between them can be maintained. Science is a study of empirical facts, and it makes as much use of the method of logical analysis as any other study. If it can thus study the facts of experience and formulate their less general laws and concepts, there is no reason why it should not be allowed to formulate the most comprehensive and fundamental ones, provided they are genuinely scientific. Or, if a philosophy is necessary to study the ultimate concepts of science, why not allow the same philosophy to study and discover its less ultimate laws and concepts, and have it done with science altogether? As a matter of fact, however, many of the so-called scientific concepts revealed by the neo-realist's method of logical analysis are not genuine scientific concepts at all. The whole world of subsistent entities, containing not only universals and logical propositions, but also the false and the unreal which contradict the spatio-temporal system, is, as the neo-realist himself admits, a world of Platonic ideas, independent of all experience by mind. None of the special sciences with its insistence on empirical verification can embrace these concepts as its proper objects. So, too, the 'neutral entities' which some neo-realists consider to be the ultimate stuff of both the physical and mental worlds, are far removed from empirical facts which constitute the proper subject matter of science. In the absence of some neutral experience which

transcends alike the objective and subjective levels of experience, the neo-realist's world of 'neutral entities' should be treated as an object of philosophical faith which has nothing of the character of scientific truth about it. If there is any such experience in us, then we may be said to have a knowledge of the ultimate reality as really neutral, *i.e.* neither material nor mental, neither one nor many. But even then we cannot speak of it as scientific knowledge in any legitimate sense, since it would transcend all sense-experience to which science is limited.

Prof. Alexander's definition of philosophy appears to be a travesty of the above conception in more than one way. He makes a futile attempt to reconcile two apparently incompatible concepts of philosophy. By philosophy he means *metaphysics* and yet maintains that it is one of the *sciences* delimited from the others by its special subject matter. Within the subject matter of philosophy he includes the pervasive characters of *experienced* things, which he calls *non-empirical*, as distinguished from their variable characters, which are said to be *empirical*. But if these two kinds of characters are 'in experienced things,' there is no reason why science should be incompetent to deal with them both. Some sciences are more comprehensive than others and, as Prof. Alexander himself says, "the more comprehensive a science becomes the closer it comes to philosophy." So it will not be unreasonable for us to think that the most comprehensive science should be able to study the pervasive characters of the world of experience, leaving nothing more for philosophy and philosophers to think and study. But there is another aspect of Prof. Alexander's conception of philosophy, which seems to be in the right direction. This is expressed by him with some misgiving when he says that 'metaphysics is an attempt to describe the *ultimate nature of existence* if it has any, or is the science of *being as such* and its essential attributes.' These stand for what is really non-empirical or metaphysical reality which, though not certainly given in sense perception, must be apprehended in some form of experience which may be called spiritual experience or, following Prof. Alexander, 'an enjoying consciousness of the self itself.' This is clearly seen in the case of his deity which is a non-empirical reality in so far as it is no part or aspect of the actual world of sense-experience. How do we know anything about God or deity? Prof. Alexander says: "However immediately we may be aware of God in the religious

sentiment, in philosophy there is no short road to deity." ¹ Since, however, he takes it "as self-evident that whatever we know is apprehended in some form of experience," we are to say that deity as a non-empirical reality is apprehended through religious experience even in the sphere of philosophy. It would thus appear from the foregoing discussion that if philosophy is to be a body of knowledge distinct from science, it must be a study of non-empirical or metaphysical reality directly apprehended in the form of religious or spiritual experience.

Another conception of philosophy which we find in Kant, who is undoubtedly the greatest critical philosopher of the West, is that it is a metaphysic of experience. Philosophy, according to Kant, should not be speculative metaphysic which indulges in futile theories about ultimate realities like God and the self. If philosophy will only cease from the pursuit of such ultimate and unknowable realities and limit itself to the world of experience, then we will have metaphysics as an exact science. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is such a philosophy which professes to give us certain and *a priori* knowledge of the world of experience, but strictly limits the human reason to this world and closes the possibility of its going beyond. Kant's argument is briefly this. We can have *a priori* (i.e. universal and necessary) knowledge of things only so far as what we know about them is determined by the nature of our powers of knowing, namely, intuition and understanding. From this it follows that our *a priori* knowledge is knowledge of things, not as they are in themselves, but as they appear to our minds. What things are in themselves we cannot possibly know, for we have no means of having a pure intellectual intuition of them, the only intuition of which we are capable being sensuous. The reason in us is, of course, under the necessity of *thinking* of things-in-themselves or of noumenal realities. But it gets involved in hopeless contradictions when it tries to have a *knowledge* of noumena by the application of our human categories. In the absence of any intellectual intuition, noumenal realities like God and the self must be treated as objects only of moral faith. Since, however, reason is incompetent to deal with their objects, morality and religion may be allowed, so thinks Kant, to live safely in the realm of faith.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

Although Kant's philosophy is almost unparalleled in history as a type of critical thinking, yet it appears to me to be another instance of the confusion between philosophy and science. So far as the world of appearances or empirical objects is concerned, it is science and science alone that should be entrusted with the task of a systematic study of its facts, the discovery of its laws and the formulation of its ultimate concepts. What Kant actually did in his *Critique* was just a deduction of the postulates or fundamental concepts of science from the *a priori* principles of synthetic knowledge. So Kant's philosophy is at its best a transcendental logic of the sciences. It may be called metaphysic, but a metaphysic like this is indistinguishable from science or a logic of the sciences. The negative side of the Kantian metaphysics is, however, more in the direction of a right conception of philosophy. Here Kant shows how the self as a noumenal reality is a necessity of thought, although it cannot be known as an object of thought. He is perfectly right when he says that the self is not an object of thought, for "the object which we think through the categories must be given as a manifold of (sense) intuition and combined by the transcendental synthesis of imagination in one time and space."¹ The self, being the transcendent subject of experience, cannot be thought in this way. Yet we must admit the possibility of knowing the self somehow independently of thinking. Kant repeatedly tells us that the self is the synthetic unity of apperception presupposed in all experience of objects. But how do we know any self at all as the ground of our experiences of objects, unless we directly see them grounded in the self? But for a direct experience of the self as the experiencing subject, the thought or idea of the self would not have at all arisen in our mind. It is really because we have no experience excepting what is found to be in the self, that we think of it as the necessary synthetic unity of experiences. If, therefore, we have no sensuous intuition of the noumenal self, we must admit a non-sensuous or intellectual intuition of it. That there may be knowledge which depends, not on sensuous, but on intellectual intuition, is admitted by Kant as both conceivable and logically possible. Prof. Paton goes so far as to say that "it does not appear that Kant argued from the existence of the given to the reality of things-in-themselves as its necessary cause.

¹ Cf. H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, Vol. II, p. 448. The account of Kant's philosophy given here is based on this book.

Rather he would seem to regard the thing-in-itself as *immediately present* to us in all appearances." ¹ If philosophy is to be distinguished from science or a logic of the sciences, it must, I venture to think, be primarily a study of noumenal reality based on some kind of immediate and non-sensuous (i.e. spiritual) experience of it.

The conception of philosophy I have been trying to defend so far, has been rudely shaken by the 'Viennese circle' of philosophers who are commonly known as logical positivists. According to them, philosophy as metaphysics or the study of transcendent reality is a huge nonsense. Following the lead of David Hume, the logical positivist divides all genuine propositions into two classes—those which concern 'relations of ideas' and are, like the *a priori* propositions of logic and mathematics, necessary because they are analytic and tautologous; and those which concern 'matters of fact' and are, like the truths of science, empirical hypotheses which can be probable but never certain. For an empirical hypothesis to be genuine or significant, means to be, in principle, verifiable in sense-experience. Since the so-called metaphysical propositions about transcendent realities like God or the immortal self, are neither tautologies nor empirically verifiable, they are nonsensical. Kant also denied all *knowledge* of the transcendent world of things-in-themselves, but he believed in it on moral grounds and admitted the possibility of an intellectual intuition of it. The logical positivists are ultra-critical and condemn metaphysical knowledge as not only unattainable by the human understanding but as senseless. They also go beyond the neo-realists who take philosophy as the logical analysis of the fundamental concepts of science and believe in many 'neutral particulars' as the ultimate stuff of reality, in which logical analysis terminates. According to the logical positivist, philosophy is concerned neither with metaphysical propositions nor with the discovery of the speculative truths and ultimate concepts of science. The function of philosophy is 'to clarify the propositions of science by exhibiting their logical relationships, and by defining the symbols which occur in them.' Philosophy is the logic of science, not in the sense that it formulates the basic concepts and speculative truths or hypotheses of science, but in that it defines the symbols occurring in scientific hypotheses, and exhibits their logical relationships.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 70.

² The account of Logical Positivism given here is based on Mr. A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*.

I shall make no attempt to enter on a detailed examination of logical positivism.¹ That is here neither necessary nor possible. What I am directly concerned with is the positivist's condemnation of all metaphysics as nonsensical. When the positivist says that propositions concerning empirical matters of fact must be verifiable in some possible sense-experience, we have no ground of quarrel with him. It is almost a truism to say that an empirical fact must be somehow open to sense-perception. We may go further and say that all objects or reals, be they empirical or non-empirical, must be given in some experience, sensuous or non-sensuous. It is because Kant could not be sure of 'intellectual intuition' as a possible form of human experience that he had to leave the reality of God, freedom and immortality on the insecure basis of the incompetence of theoretical reason in such matters. But for the logical positivist, all matters must be empirical matters of fact, and all verification must be in terms of sense-experience. It is true that a logical positivist like Mr. A. J. Ayer admits that 'one cannot overthrow a system of transcendent metaphysics merely by criticising the way in which it comes into being. For, the metaphysician may claim to be endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which enabled him to know facts that could not be known through sense-experience.' But when he asserts that metaphysical statements have no sense because they cannot be verified in sense-experience, he virtually denies the possibility of intellectual intuition and the reality of facts which cannot be known through sense-experience. We also may admit that what are known as *facts* are objects of sense-experience and that such objects are really matters of fact. In this sense metaphysical realities are not matters of fact because they transcend the limits of all possible sense-experience. But then we have to ask two questions: (i) Are there other forms of experience than that of sense-perception, and (ii) are there other matters than matters of fact? It will be seen that the two questions are inter-related, in so far as non-sensuous experience gives us no facts and a real that is not a fact must be given through non-sensuous experience.

With regard to the first question, it will be admitted by all but the crude materialist that we have certain experiences which are

¹ For this I may refer to the following: W. T. Stace, art. "Metaphysics and Meaning," *Mind*, Oct., 1935; D. M. Datta, Presidential Address, "The Revolt against Metaphysics," Indian Phil. Congress (Sec. of Indian Phil.), 1936; M. Lazerowitz, art. "The Principle of Verifiability"; A. C. Ewing, art. "Meaninglessness," *Mind*, July, 1937; C. D. Hardie, art. "Logical Positivism and Scientific Theory," *Mind*, April, 1938; H. Reja, art. "The Logic of Logical Positivism," *Journal of Philosophy*, July 16, 1936.

intrinsically different from sense-perception. Our moral, aesthetic and religious experiences are anything but sense-experiences of given facts. Value judgments are not existential propositions which relate to facts. They are the expressions of our feelings of appreciation of the values which facts possess for us, the values themselves being no facts. All this is also admitted by the logical positivist when he holds that our moral or aesthetic or religious experience does not relate to matters of fact, but is only a kind of feeling or emotion or sentiment. What is the status of these feelings and sentiments? Obviously, they are not sense-experiences, because they do not relate to any fact, to which all sense-experience, according to the positivist, does relate. They may not be, as the positivist contends, cognitive experiences. None the less, they are experiences. So we have to admit that there are certain forms of non-sensuous experience. What are the objects of these experiences? We answer negatively that their objects are not matters of fact given in sense-experience. This leads us to the second question: Can there be matters which are not matters of fact? That there are such matters is implied in the logical positivist's account of sense-contents. 'Sense-contents,' we are told, 'are neither mental nor physical; the distinction between what is mental and what is physical does not apply to sense-contents; it applies only to objects which are logical constructions out of them.'¹ Now the question is: How are such sense-contents known by us? They may not, as the positivist warns us, be material things or even minds, and it may be advisable to speak of their 'occurrence' in preference to speaking of their 'existence.' But if sense-contents are neither mental nor physical, we have no means of verifying or knowing them. They cannot be known introspectively, for that would make them 'one's own mental states.' Nor can they be externally perceived, since that would reduce them to physical facts. So they seem to be non-empirical matters (or 'occurrences') which are either nonsensical or given through non-sensuous experience.

The necessity of admitting a transcendent reality becomes all the more apparent in the case of the self. According to the logical positivist, the self is 'a logical construction out of the sense-experiences which constitute the actual and possible sense-history of a self; for

¹ Vide Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

two sense-experiences to belong to the same self, means to contain organic sense-contents which are elements of the same body ; all that is involved in self-consciousness is the ability of a self to remember some of its earlier states, and to remember is to have some sense-experiences which contain memory images that correspond to sense-contents which have previously occurred in the sense-history of the individual.' Thus the positivist 'defines personal identity in terms of bodily identity,' and holds that 'bodily identity is to be defined in terms of the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents.' 'This procedure,' he thinks, 'is justified by the fact that whereas it is permissible, in our language, to speak of a man as surviving a complete loss of memory, or a complete change of character, it is self-contradictory to speak of a man as surviving the annihilation of his body.'¹ This analysis of the self appears to me to be the strongest evidence of failure of the logic of logical positivism. If the self be a logical construction, we must explain how or by whom this construction is made. Sense-contents cannot by themselves effect it, because they are neither material things nor conscious beings endowed with the causal efficacy and logical brain that are necessary to make logical constructions. Nor can we understand how the sense of personal identity can be explained by bodily identity. It requires no reasoning to convince a man that his body does not remain the same thing at different ages. Even if it be true that bodily identity means the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents, it is a travesty of the truth to say that sense-contents which are only 'occurrences' can maintain the continuity or know their resemblance. If that were so, a series of similar sounds could as well know itself as a continuous note. Supposing that the body remains the same in some sense or other, we are to observe that bodily identity will not explain the sense of personal identity which does not refer directly to the body. When I say that I am conscious of myself as the same person who wrote a book ten years ago, I do not find in me, nor do I intend to convey to others, any sense of my bodily identity. If the identity of a person were really constituted by the identity of his body, a maimed soldier would not be the same person that he was before he received the injury. So the self is not the body, nor is it constituted by bodily contents. Nor again can we follow the positivist's analysis of memory into memory images which correspond to previously experienced sense-contents. Memory does

¹ *Vide Ayer, op. cit.*, pp. 120-22.

not consist simply in *having* memory images which correspond, but in *knowing* that they do correspond, to past experiences of the same self. For this it is necessary to admit that the self is a permanent reality which remains the same in the past and the present, observes all the occurrences in the sense-history of the individual and yet transcends them all. If in spite of the severance of a limb, or a complete loss of memory, or a complete change of character, we speak of a man as remaining the same person, it must be because we believe that the man's self is not his body or his mind or their functions and dispositions. The self, therefore, must be admitted as a transcendent reality. If it be asked: 'Can the reality of the transcendent self be verified?' we reply that it is in principle verifiable through intellectual intuition and the method of verifying it is, according to the ancient Indian philosophers, the method of moral purification and contemplation. It may be contended by the positivist that so long as the self is not verified in practice, all propositions concerning it must be nonsensical. But the truth of this contention will render insignificant many empirical propositions which we could not verify even if we chose, *e.g.* "the proposition that there are mountains on the farther side of the moon."¹

From the foregoing discussion we see that there are certain forms of non-sensuous experience and a certain type of transcendent reality. We are thus in a position to say that it is possible for philosophy to be a metaphysic of reality and yet not nonsensical. If philosophy be, as the positivists think it is, a logic of science, then it is in no way distinguishable from science. As Mr. Ayer² points out, we may distinguish between the speculative and the logical aspect of science, which are concerned respectively with the formulation of hypotheses, and the explication of the logical relationship of these hypotheses and the definition of the symbols which occur in them. If this be so, we need not go beyond science and formulate a duplicate logic of science in philosophy. Mr. M. Schlick, the leader of the positivists, was more consistent when he predicted a future era in which there would be no philosophy but only philosophicalness.³ To this, I am only to add that if philosophicalness persists in spite of logical positivism, that is because there are certain experiences in man which take him

¹ Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 248.

³ *Vide The Journal of Philosophy*, July, 16, 1936, p. 408.

beyond the sensuous and the physical, and link him up with the supersensuous world of transcendent reality. Philosophy or philosophicalness, if it is to be anything different from science or scientificity, must be concerned with this transcendent reality.

The conception of philosophy which we find in Absolute Idealism closely approximates to the Indian conception of it. Defining philosophy as 'the science of the absolute idea,' Hegel says: "Philosophy is not a wisdom of the world, but is knowledge of what is not of the world; it is not knowledge which concerns external mass, or empirical existence and life, but is knowledge of that which is eternal, of what God is, and what flows out of His nature."¹ While the modern tendency in philosophy is to identify it with science, it was Hegel's firm conviction that philosophy is identical with religion, for, like religion, it occupies itself with God. The distinction between the two lies merely in the peculiar way in which they both occupy themselves with God. While religion is an apprehension of God through faith and feeling, philosophy is the knowledge of God through thought and reason. In the one, reality is apprehended in immediate self-consciousness, in the other, through the speculative reason.

Although there seems to be substantial agreement between the Hegelian and the Indian conception of philosophy, yet there are certain important points of difference between the two. What the Hegelians try to accomplish in their philosophy is to find out a universal principle of explanation, a single fundamental reality that adequately determines and explains everything. Dialectic as metaphysical logic is the method adopted by the Hegelians in the investigation of absolute truth, and the result is that they arrive at a speculative conception of the absolute reality. For the Indian philosopher, on the other hand, philosophy is a search for the ultimate reality within the self and an attempt to realize it through contemplation. He firmly believes that mere reasoning or logic cannot give us a knowledge of absolute truth. It is only by meditation and concentration that we can expect to have any knowledge of the absolute. Reasoning or logic is necessary in philosophy only so far as it helps us to examine and establish the truths given by direct experience, to exhibit their inner harmony and to defend them against the sceptic's attacks. As Kant very rightly observes, 'logical criticism is concerned, not

¹ Vide Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 19.

with truth, but with formal validity. All that logic can give us is a formal or negative criterion of truth. In this way logic is a *canon*, not an *organon*. It can be used only for criticism, not for purposes of extending knowledge.¹ If this be true, then the dialectical method of Hegelian philosophy must be considered as illegitimate. It makes an improper use of logic for purposes of extending or producing knowledge, while logic is of help only for the purpose of criticising knowledge. No amount of logical argument would enable a man who is born blind to acquire a knowledge of light and colour. What is absolutely necessary and quite sufficient for this is to restore his eye-sight, if possible, and thereby put him in possession of the relevant experiences which alone would give him the knowledge of light and colour. It is because Kant fully realized the futility of theoretical reason in the matter of the knowledge of transcendent reality that he had recourse to moral faith to tell us anything about it. Hegel's speculative conception of the absolute is not, although it claims to be, really anything more than this moral faith. This conception, we are definitely told, is not given by the theoretical reason which we call the understanding. Far from this being so, the 'understanding' has an inherent tendency to destroy the religious faith in God or the absolute. The reason which functions in philosophy is opposed to the understanding and is "the Reason of the Universal, which presses forward to unity."² That there is a Universal Reason we may *believe*, but do not certainly *know*. So long as we have not realized it in some actual experience, it remains a matter of moral faith for us. What the speculative conception seeks to know is just 'the Reason of the Universal.' So we observe that, instead of giving us any knowledge of the Universal Reason (*i.e.* the absolute), Hegel's speculative conception itself depends on a sort of moral faith in it. What is necessary to transform this faith into knowledge is, as Kant pointed out clearly, some kind of *intellectual intuition* which is not governed by the laws of space, time and causality. This would verily be the experience of the transcendent self as free immortal spirit. Kant, however, was content to leave it as a logical possibility, because he found no way of realizing it.

Mr. F. H. Bradley seems to give us the substantial truth of the whole matter when he defines 'philosophy or metaphysics as an attempt

¹ Cf. Patten, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 189.

² Vide Hegel, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 29-31.

to know reality or the absolute as against mere appearance,' and mentions, as sources of our knowledge of the absolute, the experiences which are involved in mere feeling or immediate presentation, and in the ideas of goodness and of the beautiful. From these he derives the knowledge of a unity which, like the absolute, transcends and yet contains every manifold appearance. But then he tells us that even these 'supply not an *experience* but an abstract idea of the absolute, and that if we can realize at all the general features of the absolute and see that somehow they come together in a way known vaguely and in the abstract, our result is *certain*.'¹ This plainly means that, according to Bradley, certain knowledge of the absolute requires a realization of it in some transcendent experience, call it spiritual experience or intellectual intuition, just as you please. Bradley, however, does not suggest any practical way of attaining this much-needed experience. It is here that the Indian philosophers recommend the method of *yoga*, in some form or other, as a necessary means of realizing the transcendent reality. It is by means of moral purification, constant meditation and concentration that we are to have a direct experience of absolute truth. As Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya has put the matter in his inimitable way: "Metaphysics, or more generally, philosophy, is not only not actual knowledge, but is not even literal thought; and yet its contents are contemplated as true in the faith that it is only by such contemplation that absolute truth can be known."² This, however, should not give one the impression that Indian philosophy is only mystical or anti-rational. Far from this being so, we see how every Indian system of philosophy makes as much use of logical criticism as any other system of Western philosophy, to establish its theories and defend them against all possible attacks. It is true that the Indian systems depend ultimately on some experience for a knowledge of the truths which have been logically examined and validated by them. But this is as it should be, for, as we have already indicated, experience is the only source of our knowledge of truths, whereas logic is concerned with the formal validity or the criterion of truth. Here then we seem to vindicate the Indian conception of philosophy. If philosophy is to be a study distinct from science or logic, it must be a metaphysic of reality, which is ultimately based on some intellectual intuition or spiritual experience, attained through contemplation, and is validated by logical criticism.

¹ Vide Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 1, 16-12 (*italics mine*).

² Vide *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 66.

SHELLEY'S EPIPSYCHIDION—A STUDY *

DR P. N. ROY, M.A., D.LITT.

Benares Hindu University

THE two dramas, *Prometheus Unbound* and *The Cenci*, illustrate the poet's appreciation of beauty in a setting of terror. The figure of the hero, Prometheus, "a writhing shade, mid whirlwind-peopled mountains," undergoing the terrible tortures of the "almighty Tyrant," together with the phantasm of Jupiter, the horrible forms of furies, and that awe-inspiring, shapeless mass of darkness called Demogorgon, affects our mind with a sense of dread. In a contrary manner are we affected by the benign spirits and the gentle figures of Ione, Panthea and Asia as also by the loveliness of the nature of the Indian Caucasus. I do not wish to speak of the thought allegorised in the drama, but much of its mere aesthetic effect proceeds from a commingling and contrast of these two elements of beauty and terror, of gentleness and fierceness, of the forces of light and darkness. The language in many parts of the drama is so designed as to carry the sense of dread. The description of the hideous Furies with hydra-tresses, definitely suggested by the Medusa picture of Da Vinci, is full of imaginative horror:

They come, they come,
Blackening the birth of day with countless wings.
And hollow underneath, like death.

The whole atmosphere of the scene at the cave of Demogorgon is uncanny. A weird feeling is produced with the first line of the scene and it is sustained till the end not only by the mysterious replies of Demogorgon, uttered in an awful voice, but also by such words and phrases in the speeches of Asia and Panthea as "terror, crime, remorse," "Hell or the sharp fear of Hell," "the shape of Death," "If the abyss could vomit forth its secrets," "A spirit with a dreadful countenance," "ghastly charioteer," "the shadow of a destiny more dread than is my aspect," "That terrible shadow floats Up from its throne, as may the lurid smoke of earthquake-ruined cities," "the coursers fly terrified."

This scene is followed by another scene which is full of light and love, forming a strong contrast with its weird gloom.

* Continued from the last issue.

The terror-motive is found again in the beginning of the third act when Jupiter, seated on his throne in heaven, and anxious to crush the soul of man, speaks bow

Even now have I begotten a strange wonder,
That fatal child, the terror of the earth,
Who waits but till the destined hour arrive,
Bearing from Demogorgon's vacant throne
The dreadful might of ever-living limbs
Which clothed that awful spirit unbeheld
To redescend, and trample out the spark.

The dreaded Demogorgon again appears and throws upon the scene a solemn and mysterious effect. As Jupiter cries out—"Awful shape, what art thou? Speak!" he replies:

Eternity. Demand no direr name.
Descend and follow me down the abyss.
I am thy child, as thou wert Saturn's child.
Mightier than thee: and we must dwell together
Henceforth in darkness.

As we read these lines, we seem to lose confidence in life that comes to us from observing the constant shooting up of things on the surface of the earth which lies solid beneath our feet, and we feel terror-stricken like an infant lost in darkness.

In the beginning of the fourth act, which is vibrant with joy and brightness, we are presented with a macabre picture in the procession of the dark forms passing confusedly and singing the dirge of Time:

Here, oh, here:
We bear the bier
Of the Father of many a cancelled year
Spectres we
Of the dead Hours be,
We bear Time to his tomb in Eternity.
Strew, oh, strew
Hair, not yew!
Wet the dusty pall with tears, not dew!
Be the faded flowers
Of Death's bare bowers
Spread on the corpse of the King of Hours!

The act ends with the re-appearance of Demogorgon who once more strikes a sense of awe into our heart. As the dreadful figure approaches, the bright singing spirits pale into insignificance and the earth trembles like a drop of dew that dies, and the moon is shaken like a leaf. At last Demogorgon utters a solemn speech (the voice of eternal Justice) in which he indicates the principles of heroic conduct.

In *The Cenci* Shelley descends for once from the heights of his ethereal world to the real world of history, but the choice of the theme reveals the peculiar cast of his mind. In this drama he has got rid of his metaphysical speculation and the obsession of Godwinian socialism, and has tried to handle the past with as much "historic-mindedness" as he could, but he could not get rid of his pre-romantic proclivities. The aesthetic basis of the play is the old one of loveliness and terror, contrasted and combined. "A tragic union of loveliness and death, like that of Medusa, is the heart of the poem."¹ Beatrice, the heroine, a lovely being, whose portrait by Guido Reni at the Barberini Palace in Rome fired the imagination of Shelley who considered it as "a just representation of one of the loveliest specimens of the workmanship of nature," is a tragic figure that may be said to be woo'd by death itself, whose dark shadow hangs heavily on the whole drama from the beginning to the end. She is put in the midst of a gloomy antagonistic world and is crushed by the chain of circumstances unloosened by one mistake committed by her. In contrast to this tragic womanhood, we have the figure of Count Cenci, an historical personage embodying all those aspects of character which go to the making of the pre-romantic gloomy and egotistical tyrant of the terror novels.

The pivot of the play is the terrible incest theme which some of the pre-romantics so much delighted to handle. "Incest," Shelley wrote to Mrs. Gisborne in 1819, "is like many other incorrect things, a very poetical circumstance. It may be the excess of love or hate. It may be the defiance of everything for the sake of another, which clothes itself in the glory of the highest heroism; or it may be that cynical rage which, confounding the good and bad in existing opinions, breaks through them for the purpose of rioting in selfishness and antipathy." The incest theme is as old as literature. It is found in *Iliad*,

¹ Kurtz, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

in the Oedipus-theme of Sophocles, in Euripides (*Hyppolytus*), in Seneca. It is present in some of the Elizabethan dramas:—in *Pericles* of Shakespeare, in Beaumont and Fletcher (*A King and No King*, *Woman Pleased*, *The Fair Maid of the Inn*), in Ford (*It's Pity She is Whore*). But the terrible theme was given a new æsthetic currency in the pre-romantic period by Walpole who treats of it in its most revolting form in *The Mysterious Mother* in which the mysterious mother secretly becomes the mistress of her own son and presents him with a daughter whom her son afterwards marries. When the secret is revealed, the mother commits suicide, the daughter enters a convent and the son meets with death in war. The theme is also present in *Romance of the Forest* and *The Italian* by Mrs. Radcliffe and *The Monk* by Lewis. The saner romantics like Scott, Wordsworth and Southey pass it over in silence, but Byron handled it in several of his poems and Shelley hinted at it in *The Revolt of Islam* and *Rosalind and Helen*, but in the drama in question everything hinges on this motive, and the effect produced is that of "fear and compassion for the misfortunes of a guiltless and magnanimous heroine."¹

The play abounds in passages about the mystery of death and is strewn with the phraseology of terror-romanticism.

The great *Ode to the West Wind* is again another illustration of how susceptible Shelley was to the loveliness of and in terror. The tempestuous wind is conceived by the poet as both destroyer and preserver. It is not only the breath of Autumn's being, robbing nature of her sweet manifestations of life by its wild touch, but is also the harbinger and distributor of new seeds of life. The very first stanza lands us into the macabre world which appears repeatedly in Shelley's poems:

O wild West Wind, thou breath of Autumn's being,
Thou, from whose unseen presence the leaves dead
Are driven, like ghosts from the enchanter fleeing,
Yellow, and black; and pale, and hectic red,
Pestilence-stricken multitudes:

The entire imagination of the poet is here seen to be set in motion by the motive of terror which is struck into our heart by the cumulative effect of the use of words like "unseen presence," "ghosts,"

¹ Kurtz, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

"enchanter," "yellow, black, pale, hectic red, pestilence-stricken." The simile is taken from Dante and inverted here. In the third canto of *Inferno*, Dante compares Adam's evil brood to the light dead autumnal leaves:

Come d'autunno si levan le foglie
l'una appresso dell' altra, fin che 'l ramo
veda alla terra tutte le sue spoglie,
Similmente il mal seme d'Adamo
gittansi di quel lito ad una ad una,
per canni come angel per suo richiamo. (ll. 112-157)

Dante's simile is a most happy one, and is intended not to strike terror but to show the lightness of the spirits. Shelley on the contrary at once strikes a macabre note by comparing the leaves to ghosts and he goes on intensifying this note by weird suggestions of the subsequent adjectives. This note is continued in the third stanza where seeds are compared to corpses lying within their graves. In the second part of the poem, this note is again struck in the following lines:

Thou dirge
Of the dying year, to which this closing night
Will be the dome of a vast sepulchre
Vaulted with all thy congregated might
Of vapours, from whose solid atmosphere
Black rain, and fire, and hail will burst:

In the third part the poet brings before us the sunlit soft beauty of the bays of Naples and Baiæ bearing on their bosom the quivering reflections of old palaces and towers. But even in this peaceful haunt of beauty we are made to hear the note of terror. As the West Wind passes over this bland Mediterranean coast, all the sea-blooms and oozy woods

know
Thy voice, and suddenly grow gray with fear,
And tremble and despoil themselves.

The last two parts of the poem, however, form a sharp contrast to the earlier parts in their general tone, but the terribleness of the

West Wind is emphasised by such apostrophes as "O uncontrollable"
 "Spirit fierce," "Impetuous one."

The little known poem called "Medusa" also shows how Shelley was fascinated by the combination of beauty and terror. Its theme is the painting of the same name by Leonardo da Vinci which he saw at Florence. Da Vinci's painting is a marvellous presentation of the union of grace and it is a significant fact that, of all the paintings and sculptures which Shelley studied every day for some time at the galleries of Florence, it was this terrible picture that affected him so deeply as to draw forth these no less terrible verses. No quotation can give an adequate idea of the terribleness of the poet describing the tempestuous loveliness of terror which he found in "A woman's countenance, with serpent-locks, Gazing in death on Heaven from those wet sockets" (st. v). It should be read as a whole, and should be re-read after having a look at Da Vinci's picture. As poetry it is usually considered by the critics to be a thing of minor importance. But its importance increased when considered as a great poet's rendering of a great artist's aesthetic expression and as an illustration of a peculiar trait of Shelley's mind.

II

But we have deviated from the subject and let us resume the thread of our argument. When Shelley addressed Emilia as "Thou beauty and thou terror," he expressed a different psychological attitude than the one that we have tried to indicate above. It may be Beauty is here considered by Shelley as terrible because it has the power of upsetting the mental equilibrium and throwing the intellect into confusion. Perhaps to make our meaning clear, we can compare with this a similar, almost the same expression, used by Shelley in *The Cenci*. In the second scene of the first act of the drama, Count Cenci addresses his daughter Beatrice as "Fair and yet terrible." But the force and significance of the word "terrible" here is made clear by the context and by the words immediately preceding and following it:

Thou painted viper !
 Beast that thou art ! Fair and yet terrible !
 I know a charm shall make thee meek and tame,
 Now get thee from my sight !

Beatrice is fair to look at and her character ought to have been gentle and meek in agreement with her beauty, but on the contrary she has an untameable spirit which does not hesitate to expose her father and put him to shame in the presence of the princes and the nobles gathered on the occasion of the feast given by Count Cenci at the reported death of his sons. The expression is almost a prophecy of the dreadful crime she is to commit, i. e., the murder of the count. Emilia, on the contrary, is described as too gentle to be human and yet she is a terror. Evidently she is a "terror" in a sense different from the one in which Count Cenci uses the word. Her beauty is terrible because it suggests for the lover the tragic menace of death or which tantamounts to the same thing, the threatening sense of life. I say threatening sense of life because on certain occasions when mundane beauty is looked *sub specie aeternitatis* or contemplated with too profound emotion, one's whole being may be so deeply and thoroughly stirred that the sense of the vastness and greatness of the beauty of life and the universe may be too excessive and overpowering for us. To throw further light on the attitude of Shelley as we have tried to explain, it may be mentioned that an analogous psychological condition can be met with even in a modern poet like Rainer Maria Rilke. This poet, in one of his poems called *Die Weisse Fürstin*, expresses the notion that life threatens and beauty terrifies us when we realize its greatness and divineness in the intensest moments of our existence. Every angel, for this poet, is terrible because he is the shadow of the Divine Being and because he brings death to our mind by his superhuman beauty and splendour. Gentle Emilia was a terror to Shelley in the same way as God's gentle angels are to Rilke :

All shapes look glorious which thou gazest on!

(l. 32)

This is obviously a reminiscence of what Dante says of Beatrice :

Negli occhi porta la mia donna Amore :

Per che si fa gentil ciò ch'ella mira. (V. N. XXI)

(All that she looks upon is made pleasanter)

I never thought before my death to see

Youth's vision thus made perfect.

(ll. 41-42)

These lines seem to us to contain an echo of Dante's

Vede perfettamente onne salute
chi la nica donna tra le donne vede (v. iv.)

Art thou not void of guile
A lovely soul formed to be blessed and bless ?
(ll. 56-57)

Cf. Dante :

Credo che in ciel nascesse esta soprana
E venne in terra per nostra salute :
Dunque beato chi i'è prossimana.

the brightness
Of her divinest presence trembles through
Her limbs—— (ll. 78-80)

This brightness emanating from an æthereally light body recalls to mind Cavalcanti's lines :

Chi è questa che vien, ch'ogni uom la mira,
Che fa di clarità l'aer tremare ?
(Who is she that comes making the air tremble with light ?)

And from her lips, as from a hyacinth full
Of honey-dew, a liquid murmur drops,
Killing the sense with passion.....
(ll. 83-85)

Prof. Ackermann draws our attention to the similarity of this passage with Dante's

Ogni dolcezza, ogni pensiero umile
Nasce nel core a chi parlar la sente.¹

But whereas Dante brings out the purifying effect of the words uttered by his beloved, Shelley seems to lay more stress on the sensuous element of the voice :

The glory of her being, issuing thence,
Stains the dead, blank, cold air with a warm shade
Of unentangled intermixture, made
By love, of light and motion. (ll. 91-94)

¹ Quellen, Vorbilder, Stoffe zu Shelleys poetischen Werken by R. Ackermann, 1890.

This again seems to be an elaboration of the idea contained in Cavalcanti's lines already quoted. But the passage is followed by other lines which show a strong mingling in Shelley of spirituality and sensuousness in love:

One intense

Diffusion, one serene Omnipresence

Whose flowing outlines mingle in their flowing,
Around her cheeks and utmost fingers glowing
With the unintermitted blood, which there
Quivers, (as in a fleece of snow-like air
The crimson pulse of living morning quiver)
Continuously prolonged, and ending never,
Till they are lost, and in *that Beauty furled*
Which penetrates and clasps and fills the world ;
Scarce visible from extreme loveliness.
Warm fragrance seems to fall from her light dress
And her loose hair ; and where some heavy tress
The air of her own speed has disentrined,
The sweetness seems to satiate the faint wind...

The tonality of the underlined passages and that of the rest of the extract is not the same. The thought moves here in two planes, the physical and the metaphysical, but they are placed side by side and the two coalesce so that the descent and ascent of thought takes place smoothly. But what does Shelley do here? Does he intend to spiritualise the sensuous or to add sense to spirit? No close reading of the piece is necessary to perceive that it is the sensuous world that invades here the austere world of the spirit. This was recognized by a keen student of the poet, Prof. Woodberry, who thought that this emphasis on the sensuous element detracted from the ideality of the poem. Emilia is depicted in a much more sensuous way than Beatrice who is almost an abstraction, because Dante ruthlessly suppressed all sensuous reference to her body. But Emilia is presented to us with all the wealth of flesh and blood. We not only feel her presence, but also the voluptuousness of her body. The poet refers to her cheeks, her fingers, her loose hair and even her light dress. And yet we cannot say what exactly her features are, as the momentum of the poet's imagination here does not come from a clarity of observation but from the intensity of voluptuous delight.

It has been said in defence of Shelley that in this fusion of the metaphysical and the physical, of the sensuous and the supersensuous, he resembles Dante in whom also the ideal and the real worlds exist side by side and spiritual experiences are given sensuous embodiment. But the quality of the imagination displayed by the two poets seems to be quite different. Dante's ideas and experiences receive sensuous embodiment because he intends to visualize them before his readers. Abstruse and abstract things are made by him as concrete as possible with the help of similes and imageries taken from the ordinary human experience and the common sights and scenes of the world. A strange thing is made most familiar to us with daring realism. Take an example :

They each one eyed us, as at eventide
 One eyes another under a new moon ;
 And toward us sharpened their sight, as keen
 As an old tailor at his needle's eye, (Inf. XV)

The poet is speaking of a troop of spirits looking at him and the whole has been rendered most vivid by a simile taken from a matter of fact aspect of life. Such concrete rendering of poetical truth is a common feature of Dante's poetry. Here is another example :

like a troop of bees,
 Amid the vernal sweets alighting now.
 Now, clustering, where their fragrant labour glows
 Flew downward to the mighty flower, or rose
 From the redundant petals, streaming back
 Unto the steadfast dwelling of their joy, (Paradise, XXX-XXXI)

This simile has been used to give us an idea of the blissful motion of the saintly multitude round Christ by rivetting our attention upon a picture which is clear in every detail. Dante does not merely think and feel his ideas, but he sees them as concrete entities and he is not satisfied till he can make us see them with as much concreteness as he does. His keen faculty for visualization always leads him to definiteness and minute accuracy in expression, without however, losing that high quality of poetry—suggestion. It is in order to produce this definiteness that, in his search after realistic similes, he sometimes even descends into the grotesque.

Dante concentrates his ideas, similes and imageries. Shelley on the contrary dilates them. Very frequently he expands an idea or an emotion into several lines, even several stanzas, by an accumulation of an abundant number of dazzling adjectival phrases and comparisons, till we forget the original idea or the original emotion, or if we do not entirely forget it, till it becomes somewhat distant and vague. Definiteness is not an article in which Shelley deals, and though he has his own pictorial way of thinking and though he renders into likeness of form his emotions and inward experiences, he can seldom give to his corporealized abstractions that touch of realism and definiteness which we find in Dante. Dante always saw with a sense of fact, even when he was moving in the highest of the ethereal regions. Shelley's genius was a solvent of reality. As Prof. Paul de Reul observes, Shelley's "images are not connected by an organic link with some living spot in our memory. They are often too vague to have either life or plastic beauty. They may also be very precise, but of a precision no more vivid than in an hallucination, a dream or a nightmare."¹

In Shelley we miss not only the realism and definiteness of Dante but also the asceticism of his spirit. Sensuous embodiment of abstractions is present in both, but in Shelley there is moreover, a delight in voluptuousness as against the ascetic control of the other poet. The utmost that Dante would say with reference to the physical charms of Beatrice is the splendour of her eyes—*lo splendor degli occhi suoi ridenti*—but he sanctifies the eyes. Beatrice's eyes are *occhi santi*, they are the abode of spirituality and they engender feelings which are of infantine purity and freshness rather than passionate. In Shelley, on the contrary, passionate voluptuousness is a strong note. We have noticed it in the passage quoted above. Towards the end of the poem we again detect it in a much more accentuated form, so accentuated that the cry of the body mingles with the cry of the soul:

Our breath shall intermix, our bosom bound,
And our veins beat together; and our lips
With other eloquence than words eclipse
The soul that burns between them, and the wells
Which boil under our being's inmost cells,

¹ The Centenary of Shelley. Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature of the U. K., New Series, Vol. III, 1923.

The fountains of our deepest life, shall be
Confused in Passion's golden purity.

But by this carnationed idealism Shelley distinguished himself from Dante not so much as an individual, as the inheritor of the ideals of a different age. When Dante wrote, the monastic ideal was predominant and Dante, as the child and representative of the mediaeval Catholic culture, allegorized his passion, not with any strain upon his moral and intellectual inclinations, but in a perfectly natural manner. For him the transition from love to theology was a smooth one. But his age was soon followed by mighty changes in the outlook of man. The brilliant epoch of the Renaissance, by its pagan humanism, threw the claims of Heaven into the background and the Catholic monastic ideal had to yield place to the new morality of the senses. Very instructive, in this respect, is the study of the transformation which the ideal of love undergoes from the time of Dante to the Italian poets of the sixteenth century. It becomes increasingly difficult for the poets of the epoch to remain faithful to the ideal of celestial love, and with the passing of the years we find them succumbing more and more to the attraction of physical sensuousness.¹

Modern world has been the legatee of this new Renaissance morality of the senses and in judging a poem like *Epipsychidion* this fact must be borne in mind. There is no denying the fact that as Prof. Woodberry says, the emphasis on physical sensuousness attenuates the idealism of the poem, but to consider it as a blemish in comparison with Dante's poem, is to forget the six centuries which intervene between and separate Shelley from Dante.

It is only in the earlier part of the poem, containing the compliments to Emilia, that we feel the accent to be in the manner of the "dolce stil nuovo," but soon the subjectivism of the modern romanticist asserts itself and towards the close the voice of the romantic passion is blended with the intonations of the Renaissance poets of the *voluttà idillica* (idyllic voluptuousness). The desire of Shelley to elope with Emilia to an Eden-like island situated in the Aegean seas and to enjoy love there in the midst of rural bliss, untrammelled

¹ A brief discussion of this transformation of the ideal of love is to be found in my essays on "Michael Angelo's great Love," *Calcutta Review*, July, 1937 and "The Poetry of Chivalrous Love," *Calcutta Review*, March and April, 1938.

by social conventions, is the same Arcadian longing which animated Lorenzo dei Medici, Poliziano, Sannazzaro, Molza, Tansillo, Guarini, Tasso and a host of other poets and made them sigh for the "bella età d'oro" and the "liete dolcezze dell'amorose grege" in the lap of nature. In fact, if the nature of the poetic inspiration is to be judged not only from where it starts, but also by the direction of its movement then it seems evident to me that, when writing the poem, Shelley had in mind as much the amorous attitude of Dante as of the later poets. Lines such as

It is an isle under Ionian skies,
Beautiful as a wreck of Paradise,
And, for the harbours are not safe and good,
This land would have remained a solitude
But for some pastoral people native there,
Who from the Elysian, clear and golden air
Draw the last spirit of the age of gold,
Simple and spirited ; innocent and bold.

and the rest that follow, with their indescribable grace and suggestions, are tremulous with the voluptuous idyllic feeling which we discover, for example, in the fragrant verses of Poliziano, and the whole poem with its glorification of the woman, its Platonic ideas, the sensuousness of certain descriptions, and the idyllic note, is the product of a state of soul which is perceptible in the Dantesque imitations of a Boccaccio, in his *Ameto*, and of the fifteenth century poets like Lorenzo dei Medici, in his *Selve*, who transferred their poems of Platonic love into the idyllic world.

The idyllic conclusion of the poem and its sensuous note definitely puts the *Epipsychidion* into a category different from that of the *Vita Nuova*. If the *Vita Nuova* be taken as the point of departure of the poet's inspiration, the *volutta idillica* of the Renaissance poets should be considered as the point of arrival. In fact, the poem is representative of all the amorous attitudes from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. In some parts we have the spiritual attitude of Dante, in other parts the sensuousness of Petrarch, and towards the end the idyllic motive of the later Renaissance poets. The end of the poem in an idyllic note was inevitable, because in Shelley's mind the problem of love was connected with the problem of happiness and the problem of happiness with the age of gold. Human mind in all ages have found

happiness in the past and poets and dreamers have dreamt of a reign of Saturn when life was blissful and carefree, when jealousies and rivalries, passions and animosities social conventions and legal trammels did not exist. A description of the innocent and free life in the age of gold is found in Plato, Hesiod, Virgil and Ovid. A conception parallel to the Golden Age is found in the legend of a distant blissful island lost in the Western seas, *e. g.*, the pagan Atlantis and the Hesperides and the mediaeval Earthly Paradise. At the time of the Renaissance the two conceptions became blended together, and, reinforced by the pastoral ideal depicted in the idylls of Theocritus and the Eclogues of Virgil, generated anew the longing for the Golden Age and the happy Arcadian life. This love of primitivism was also anticipated by the mediaeval Christian saints like St. Francis who had a distrust of bookish culture and preferred to receive wisdom and knowledge by direct communion with nature. Developed successively by Boccaccio, Poliziano and Lorenzo dei Medici, the reborn pastoral ideal reached its period of mortal ripening in the sixteenth century when the poets, tired of culture and court-life and disgusted with city-pleasures, sighed for the bliss of the shepherd's life in rural surroundings.

Shelley's mind was always haunted by the ideal of the Golden Age. A born hater as he was of human institutions as the sources of the misery of the world, it was natural for him to be attracted by this ideal. Its knowledge may have been derived by him from his classical studies, or it may have come to him through his studies of the philosophers like Locke and Hume. In his treatise on Government Locke speaks of the Golden Age not as a poet's dream, but in an historical way. According to him man lived in an ideal state when he lived in a state of nature. His doctrine was also supported by the philosophical school of Shaftesbury according to whom the essential instinctive goodness of man was both a gift of God as well as a law of nature. The doctrine of natural goodness of man was further developed by Hume who made feeling the basis of morality, pleasure the accompaniment of virtue and pain that of vice. There was thus a gradual melting of the Arcadian ideal into the romantic ideal through the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As further probable sources of Shelley's knowledge of the ideal of the Golden Age, mention may be made of Thomas Burnet's *The Theory of the Earth*, Milton's *Paradise Lost* (Bk. x, ll. 668ff.), Thomson's *Spring* (ll. 800ff) and Newton's *Return to Nature* and Cabanis's *Rapports du Physique*

et du Moral de l'Homme.¹ Shelley had also read the Italian idyllic poets like Tasso, Guarini, Lorenzo dei Medici and Boccaccio.

The motive of the Golden Age is found scattered in more than one part of Shelley's works. An ideal climate was connected in the poet's mind with the Golden Age. There is a picture of this ideal climate in *Queen Mab* (viii, ll. 107-118).² A similar picture is to be found in *Prometheus Unbound* (Act iii, scene iii, 115-123). At the end of the drama *Hellas* occurs a brilliant lyrical evocation of a vision of the Golden Age of the future. As to the idyllic picture at the end of *Epipsychidion* in which the pastoral and island motives are combined, a difference, however, is to be noted between it and the pastoral world of the Renaissance poets like Lorenzo dei Medici. The love which men of the Golden Age experience in an idyllic surrounding in a Platonic poet like Lorenzo is without any tinge of sensuality. It is a love without passion, hope and jealousy:

D'amore accesi senza passioni,
speranza o gelosia non gli accompagna:
un amor sempre, qual il ciel dispone
e la natura, ch'è senza magagna.
Con questa simil di complessione
soletti e lieti van per la campagna:
l'età non mai o puerile o grande.
I panni son le fronde, e i fior ghirlande.
(Selva II, 103).

But in Shelley the idyllic world is disturbed by the cry of passion. The cry is so sharp and so loud that it eclipses the voice of the soul. The poet himself feels this and says:

Woe is me!
The winged words on which my soul would pierce
Into the height of Love's rare universe,
Are chains of lead around its flight of fire
I pant, I sink, I tremble, I expire!

This is the stamp of passionate nineteenth century romanticism upon the quietude of the Renaissance idyllism.

We remarked before that the influence of Dante is very marked on *Epipsychidion*. We have given many illustrations of the same.

¹ & ² Shelley and Coleridge by Israel James Kaptein in PMLA, March, 1937.

Two more examples are given here. In lines 250 to 255 and again in line 321 of the poem Shelley speaks of life as a forest. This is evidently a recollection of the first lines of Dante's *Inferno*. In line 321 Shelley even makes verbatim use of Dante's phrase "selva oscura." The influence does not end with the words. There is a similarity in idea. Dante says that in the middle of his life after the death of his beloved, he had strayed into an obscure forest (symbolising the wild life of the senses) from which he was led out by Virgil through the loving interference of Beatrice. Shelley also says that in his dreamy youth, in course of visioned wanderings, he had often met a Being whom he afterwards lost, and, "feeding his course with expectation's breath," he entered into the forest of life in order to discover a form resembling Hers. He sought the shadow of that idol of his thought in many mortal forms, till

At length, into the obscure Forest came
The Vision I had sought through grief and abame.
... ..
I knew it was the Vision veiled from me
So many years—that it was Emily.

The second example in which Dante's influence is noticeable is the boat motive of the poem. Shelley invites Emily to take the boat which is lying at the harbour and to float over the "sea's azure floor" till they reach the blessed island under the Ionian skies. A longing for a somewhat similar amorous excursion is expressed by Dante in his sonnet to Guido Cavalcanti:

Guido, vorrei che tu e Lapo ed io
Fosimo presi per incantamento,
E messi ad un vascel, ch'ad ogni vento
Per mare andasse a voler vostro e mio;
Sicche fortuna, od altro tempo rio
Non ci potesse dare impedimento,
Anzi, vivendo sempre in un talento,
Di stare insieme crescesse in disio.
E monna Vanna e monna Bice poi,
Con quella ch'è sul numero del trenta,
Con noi ponesse il buono incantatore:
E quivi ragionar sempre d'amore;
E ciascuna di lor fosse contenta,
Siccome io credo che saremmo noi.

The influence was already indicated by Prof. Ackermann. Considering the fact Shelley had already translated this sonnet as early as 1814,¹ the suggestion is highly probable.

A minor influence of Dante may also be found in the envoy to the poem which is in the manner of the poets of the "dolce stil nuovo." Mention of the three names in it, Marina, Vanna and Primus seems to be suggested by the three ladies mentioned in Dante's sonnet—monna Vanna, monna Bice and quella ch'è sul numero del trenta.

We have already quoted Shelley's letter to John Gisborne in which he says that he cannot look at *Epipsychidion* and that the person whom it celebrates was a cloud instead of a Juno. What happened in the meantime that led to the attenuation of Shelley's sympathy for Teresa Viviani? Some of the biographers of Shelley have fallen upon a sentence in a letter by him to Clara to find out the cause for his disillusion: "Her moral nature is fine but not above circumstances." The writer of the article on Shelley in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* says that "Emilia's character developed less favourably in the eye of her Platonic adorer." Mrs. Mary Shelley would have us believe that Teresa acted like a vampire woman in regard to Shelley because she took not a very small sum from him and did not pay it back. We cannot put as much weight upon her statements regarding Teresa as they deserve, because they were sometimes actuated by jealousy.² Mary's charge has been refuted by the biographer of Teresa. She did indeed once ask for money from Shelley, but it was not for herself but to help another person in distress and in order to remove the possibility of any doubt upon her, she requested him to hand over the money to a third person who would transmit the money to the distressed lady. The letter was written by her on 3rd September, 1821, and she left Pisa for good five days later. If this be the sum of which Mrs. Shelley speaks, then it cannot explain the diminution of Shelley's sympathy for the girl. As to Shelley's remark to Clara that her moral nature was fine but not above circumstances, it may also have been made in order to smooth matters with Mrs. Shelley as appears from the context. "There is no reason that you should fear any admixture of that which you call love. My conception of Emilia's talents augments every day. Her moral nature is fine—but

¹ Helen Richter, Shelley (p. 213).

² Mrs. Helen Rossetti Angelelli has shown in her book how much Mrs. Shelley suffered from *Epipsychidion*.

not above circumstances ; yet I think her tender and true—which is always something." Mrs. Shelley did not like Shelley's Italian platonics, and it is very natural that she may have tried to create an unfavourable impression about Teresa in his mind. This becomes apparent from letters which Shelley wrote after the marriage of Teresa.¹

The real reasons for the diminution of Shelley's sympathy, if there was any, are different. In the first place, it is known that all the idols of Shelley were sooner or later dethroned—Hogg, Southey, Harriet, Godwin, Elizabeth Hitchener, Mrs. Mason the inspirer of *The Sensitive Plant*, Sgricci, Pacchiani, Prince Mavrocordato. The higher was the exaltation, the greater was the fall of his friends. It is no wonder therefore that the inspirer of the *Epipsychidion* should also meet with the same fate. The idealisation was the greatest in her case and when the inspiration was over, when the spell was at an end, in the light of reaction the object of worship perhaps appeared to him as an ordinary mortal, more ordinary than she really was. Secondly, a new idol soon appeared in the poet's horizon in the form of Jane Williams who was introduced to him by Medwin in January, 1821. Shelley soon became interested in this new Antigone and produced some of his finest lyrics of the year under her influence, in which "attentive students may perceive that the thought of Emilia was already blending by subtle transitions with the new thought of Jane."² A third reason perhaps lay in the difference in character between Shelley and Teresa. Shelley was a born rebel and he perhaps expected that Teresa, who was eager for liberation from the tyranny of her parents, would be able to revolt against them. But instead, she bent to her destiny and agreed like a meek lamb to enter into a matrimony of her father's choice. This must have been very odious to Shelley who considered the institution of marriage as barbarous, particularly the institution of marriage in Italy which he considered to be much more cruel than in England.³ Teresa's decision to enter into an arranged match may therefore have thrown cold water upon his enthusiasm for her.

But did Shelley really feel disgusted with the girl? The degree of his enthusiasm may have become lower, but we are disinclined to

¹ For a full discussion of the subject see *Vita di una Donna*.

² *Shelley* by J. A. Symonds, 1887, p. 168.

³ Letter to Clara, August 17, 1821.

believe that it reached the freezing point. That he continued to feel some interest in her, seems evident from the fact that he continued to visit her in the convent and to have correspondence with her till she was finally married. There is also a poetical testimony to this interest in the poem *Ginevra* which undoubtedly symbolises the fate of Teresa, "poor, sacrificed Emilia." The poem was perhaps inspired by the marriage of the girl. There are indications in the poem which make one think that Shelley had the vision of Teresa before him in writing the poem.¹ The description of Ginevra in the beginning of the poem is reminiscent of the features of Teresa:

And so she moved under the bridal veil
Which made the paleness of her cheek more pale,
And deepened the faint crimson of her mouth,
And darkened her dark locks, as moonlight doth,—

There is also a distinct reference to the facts of her life in the following lines:

Friend, if earthly violence or ill,
Suspicion, doubt, or the tyrannic will
Of parents, chance of custom, or terror, or revenge,
Or wildered looks, or words, or evil speech,
With all their stings and venom can impeach
Our love,—we love not:²

If to this poem we add the testimony of the letter which Teresa wrote to Shelley on 3rd September, 1821, how can we doubt that Shelley continued to have a soft corner for her in his heart?

In this letter, which is a reply to one which Shelley had written, Teresa says: Quando sarò maritata, se vuoi scrivermi, mi farai piacere, ma bada d'essere molto circospetto in tutte le tue espressioni, e tratta mi col voi. It means that till then Shelley had been using warm expressions to her. Again when Lord Byron, Shelley and their party had the trouble with Sergeant Masi (March 24, 1821), Shelley with Pietro Gamba, a member of the party, went directly to Teresa's father as Governor of Pisa to settle the matter, which would not have happened if Shelley had really felt any disgust for the girl.

¹ According to Mrs. Shelley *Ginevra* is based on "L'Osservatore Fiorentino" (sugli edifici della sua patria, Firenze, 1821).

² "The tyrannic will of parents" needs no comment. As regards "evil speech" all students of Shelley know that there were gossip stories current at Pisa about his intimacy with Teresa.

Dalle fantasmi che dal memoria vengon
 Inspirando sogni dal presente ora
 O dalle ombre che il futuro anno
 Getta davanti
 Dalla morte moriendo.

Così vestiva in barbari accenti
 Il vero affetto.....un'armonia.
 Oh non piango, s' io pianger devo
 Il refluxo della sua onda in un
 Dove si prepararebbe fabricarci
 Un quieto asilo, lontan da ogni pena
 Scioglero un.....sul purpureo Oceano cielo
 un quieto asilo, che...quando

La tua venuta nelle isole eterne
 Non pianger no.....
 la refluxante stretta
 Mi porto a quel porto dove si aspettamo
 In questo asilo.....

Non mi fu concesso qui

 La rapida Peora
 Non ci fu concesso
 dato d'aggiungere il voto

Non cercherei
 Il cielo
 Non mai avremo al di là di morte
 Così arato al di là di morte
 Un Paradiso, dove tu non stai

THE IDEA OF SUPERPOSITION AND THE SPHERE OF MIND

DR. P. T. RAJU, M.A., PH.D. (Cal.), SASTRI

PHILOSOPHICAL interpretation may be said to lie in the discovery or rather the formulation of new concepts or categories by the help of which the complexity of existence is grasped. The higher the level of existence to be understood the more inadequate become the concepts which suit lower levels. When attempts are made to reach higher unities, which naturally refuse to conform to the concepts of the lower, the need is felt for the formulation of new concepts. These are like scientific hypotheses or formulae newly discovered to cover new cases, repeatedly undergoing modification until a stage is reached when they appear completely different from what they were. Sometimes the discovery of a concept practically revolutionises scientific or philosophical explanations. In philosophy such a concept and its application give the system its peculiar character and become its label and trade mark. For instance, the concept of identity in difference or of the synthesis of the opposites, which has been systematically used by Hegel, is distinctly associated with his philosophy. Many others use it in one way or another without that association; yet the credit of having seen the full significance of that idea belongs to Hegel.

Does Indian philosophy contain any such key-ideas? A comparative study of Indian and European philosophies reveals to us that the former does contain some. Professor S. N. Dasgupta has recently formulated the idea of "Dependent Emergence."¹ It has been pointed out by some critics and reviewers that the idea is the same as that of *pratityasamutpada* of Buddhist philosophy. It is certainly one of the fundamental concepts of philosophy,² and offers a clue to a clear understanding and appreciation of many of its

¹ Presidential Address delivered at the Logic and Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1933.

² See his contribution to *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, edited by Professor S. Radhakrishnan and Professor J. H. Muirhead.

³ See Paul Dehulke : *Buddhism*, p. 166, Eng. Tr.; and Mrs. Rhys Davids : *Buddhism*, p. 92. See also Scherbatowsky : *Buddhist Logic*, 2 vols.; see indices.

doctrines. Every system that treats the whole as posterior to, and dependent on, the parts should regard the whole as something like a dependent emergent from the parts. The concept thus supplies one side of the universe and its processes in general. Those who read Indian philosophy in the light of the Western sometimes hold that Indian philosophy can supply us with no new concepts. It is true that man is man and thought is thought everywhere. But in his interpretation of the universe he usually starts from a view-point of which he is not fully conscious ; and this view-point colours his whole interpretation. When this view-point is clearly formulated, the concept that forms the key to the whole system is disclosed. It is also true that some concepts of Indian philosophy have certain associations which are easily liable to criticism. This vulnerability may be wrongly attributed to the inherent absurdity of the concept itself. But it is open to us to free the concept of its associations and use it in its pure logical or cosmological significance. This point is, of course, a subject matter for interpretation and development of our philosophy.

II

The key concepts owe their uniqueness to the peculiarity of the outlook concerned. Unless we keep before our minds the difference in outlook between European and Indian philosophy from the very beginning, we are apt to miss the peculiarity of the latter when we compare it with the former. Western philosophy has its origin in Greek thought in which reasoning apart from considerations of existence begins. Mathematical reasoning is predominantly of such nature. The Greeks were attracted by the mathematical harmonies,¹ which are really due to the mutual implications in mathematical wholes* of every part by every other, of parts by the whole, and of the whole by the parts. The Greeks bequeathed this ideal of reasoning to the subsequent logicians and philosophers of the West. Whatever in existence did fit in with that ideal was treated by the Greeks as unreal. Northrop tells us that by the Greeks " mathematics was considered a natural science. The modern conception of it as a subjectively created subject which deals only with the possibles had not yet arisen. Instead it was regarded as the basis of the actual and necessary in nature. " ²

¹ A. N. Whitehead : *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 34-35.

² *Philosophical Essays*, by Whitehead, p. 2.

But when it was found that nature as we perceive it did not exhibit mathematical harmony, the distinction was drawn between the real which was conceptual and exhibited mathematical harmony and the sensuous which did not exhibit it and so was treated as unreal. This distinction we find in most of the Greek philosophers in one form or another.

The influence of this reasoning upon science has been repeatedly acknowledged. J. W. N. Sullivan writes : " Scientific method, as we have seen from the work of its founders, Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, began by quite consciously and deliberately selecting and abstracting from the total elements of experience. From the total wealth of impressions received from nature, these men fastened upon some only as being suitable for scientific formulation. These were those elements that possess *quantitative* aspects. Between these elements mathematical relation exists, and these men were convinced that mathematics is the key to the universe." ¹ Further, " Kepler had supposed that non-mathematical qualities actually did belong to bodies, but that they were somehow less real. Galileo went further than this, and stated that non-mathematical properties are all entirely subjective." ² Mutual implication, inferability or deducibility of one element from another, and quantitative measurement—this was the ideal of this method of enquiry. For a long time it was supposed that the method could be safely followed in every science ; and certainly it was used with great advantage in sciences dealing with inorganic matter. But of late complete determinism and precise predictability have been found to be absent in some spheres of even inorganic being ; so that the presence of universal determinism is not admitted by some great scientists. Schrödinger tells us that " it can never be determined experimentally whether causality in nature is ' true ' or ' untrue.' " ³ He says : " According to the new theory, identical conditions at the beginning do not invariably lead to identical results ; all that they lead to is identical statistics (relative frequency of various possible events) ; indeed this is peculiarly what we mean by indeterminateness." ⁴ " In a very large number of cases of totally different types, we have now succeeded in explaining the

¹ *Limitations of Science*, p. 203.

² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

³ *Science and the Human Temperament*, p. 94—English Translation.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

observed regularity as completely due to the tremendously large number of molecular processes that are co-operating. The individual process may, or may not, have its own strict regularity." That is, where the individual is concerned, prediction is not possible; so that even physics refuses to be pressed into mathematical formulae.

But, on the whole, the ideal of mathematical reasoning worked well in the realm of inorganic being. To the realm of mind it is inapplicable. Between the inorganic and the mental there is the realm of life or organism. But the concept of organism, according to which the whole depends on the parts and the parts on the whole more closely than according to the concept of mechanism, is really the concept of the ideal of mathematical reasoning fully realised in existence. Inorganic nature does not answer completely to the mathematical ideal. It can at the most be a mechanism in which the parts exhibit independence of the whole for existence, while the whole is absolutely dependent on the parts. The concept, therefore, falls far short of the mathematical ideal.

That the method of mathematical reasoning cannot be applied to the study of mind has been recognized by thinkers like Whitehead, Sullivan etc., though, curiously enough, Whitehead's attempt to apply the concept of organism to the whole world is in essence the application of that method. Sullivan quotes from Whitehead: "The brilliant success of this method is admitted. But you cannot limit a problem by reason of a method of attack."² If the mathematical method were to be applied in its rigour to ethical and other enquiries in which each human being has to be studied as an independent agent, either the facts have to be distorted in order to fit them to the method, or they have to be regarded as incapable of being studied. Extreme determinists take the former course, and explain away our freedom and responsibility. For, according to them, to explain an event means to point out how it is determined, that is, to point out its causes. It is true that the character of the agent can be treated as the cause of his action. But the extreme determinist can have no place in his philosophy for the agent. The agent is regarded by him as an automaton, and each of his actions is explained in terms impersonal. Even Russell takes a very guarded view of the matter. He writes:

² I have dealt with this subject in my paper on "The Need for Transcending the Concept of Organism as a Principle of Explanation," published in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, January, 1938.

³ *Limitations of Science*, p. 108.

"In fact we have no reason to adopt either alternative. But we have no reason to suppose that the truth, whatever it may be, is such as to combine the agreeable features of both, or in any degree determinable by relation to our desires." Where we should not *a priori* pronounce upon questions, we should depend upon our experience. Where consciousness supervenes, and the individual begins to reflect, his experience of himself should be given weight. It is the peculiarity of mind that it can set himself over against his own body. If we treat the mind as a whole, of which ideas, emotions, etc., are parts, then in mind we have an instance of a whole which can distinguish itself from the parts, and make the parts its own object. Herein lies the freedom of mind. The relation between mind and its parts (elements) is not organic in the sense of mutual dependence for existence or of mutual implication or entailment. Any idea, so long as it is known, implies the existence of the mind in which it is an idea. That is, the idea can have no existence without that mind. But the mind need not imply that idea. It may have that idea now and then may once for all forget it. The dependence between any idea and mind is one-sided; and so the implication too is one-sided. Mind certainly must have some percept, concept, feeling or emotion before it. But it cannot be regarded as an organic unity of all these; it is a unity that faces all these. Bradley tells us that psychical ideas or images have existence only so long as they are before mind and then cease to exist.¹ Along with many other idealists he concedes eternality only to universal ideas. Whether we regard mind as eternal or not, we have to admit that, in most cases, it has fairly long continuous existence, and must have a tremendously large number of feelings, sensations, emotions, etc., which are of very short duration. And it seems absurd to think of mind as an organic unity of all these or as simply their mechanical unity. Besides, mind often has before it only one idea, sensation or feeling; in which case, the concept of organic unity or of mechanical unity is irrelevant to it. Even if we admit for argument's sake that the universal ideas are eternal, an organic or mechanical unity of these cannot be an *existent* mind; for pure eternal universals, as understood by Bradley and other Western idealists, cannot have existence. Nor can mind be regarded

¹ *Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 306.

as an organic unity of both conscious and subconscious or unconscious ideas, feelings, etc. Freud and others who uphold the theory of the unconscious do not expound a specific doctrine of unconscious organic unity. Such a doctrine is not tenable. We are here speaking of the conscious mind; and if some of its ideas, feelings, etc., do not enter into the organic unity of mind, we have enough evidence to disprove the doctrine. Hence this peculiarly one-sided relation that exists between mind as a whole and its parts must be acknowledged. To see mechanical or organic relation in this sphere is to distort facts.

Now it is open to question whether mind can be called a whole if its parts or elements are so evanescent. But we have agreed to call it a whole only because the so-called parts have no other place to rest in than mind. They are born, remain, and die in mind, and they belong to mind. So long as the peculiarity of this relation is recognised, it is of secondary importance what terms we use. We use the word whole for want of a more suitable one. If one likes, the word integrality may be used, but it sounds rather abstract.

Where the relation is so one-sided, we have transcended the spheres to which mathematical reasoning is applicable. As the whole does not imply the parts, the parts cannot be said to determine the whole completely. We find a large number of men guided by ideals which are not the mere products of the physical body and environment. It may be said that they are the products of education, that is, of the ideas they received from society. Not only this, but also that the body and the physical environment influence mind to some extent may be admitted. But the important fact is that mind in a very important sense can show independence of all of these. It can view itself as something apart from all. Their influence is limited, and depends on the individual allowing himself to be influenced. This characteristic is what differentiates mind from mere organism. And wherever any independence is found between the whole and the parts, mathematical reasoning is inapplicable. Human affections, feelings, etc., frustrate our attempts at calculation and are incapable of prediction and strict generalisation.

(II)

So far we have found that the interpretation of mind in Western philosophy is inadequate, because on that interpretation its peculiar

individuality and freedom cannot be given adequate recognition. There are certainly philosophers in the West, like Royce, who in one way or another tried to emphasize this individuality and freedom. But their method of approach was the mathematical with the Greek ideal of harmony or mutual implication. So somewhere in their system a clash appears. There are again thinkers like Bergson who revolted against this method of philosophical investigation and the intellectualism of the Greek tradition. But they do not so far belong to the general tradition of Western philosophy.

The Indian or the Vedāntic way of approaching this problem is different. Its point of view is that of the whole individual. It sees the human mind as an individual and its object too as an individual. It does not start with the parts or aspects into which an individual can be analysed, and then find itself at a loss to reconcile the claims of the whole and of the parts to priority. Not that the Indian philosophers did not exhibit analytical or dialectical skill; but that they did not treat abstractions obtained by analysis as the starting point. It is only Buddhism—that too mostly the Hinayānist schools—that treated the parts into which the whole is analysed as not only prior, but also as real. But the Vedānta on the whole takes the opposite course. The individual is not regarded as a synthesis of the parts, but as somehow true and real on its own account. And in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, we can find the view that the whole is not merely not a synthesis of the parts, but the parts are superimposed on the whole. This is the cosmological import of the concept of *adhyāsa*,¹ which is generally translated by the word superimposition. In the Advaita this concept has its origin in epistemology. The illusory snake which one wrongly sees in the rope is said to be *adhyasta* or superimposed on the rope. The tendency of Western philosophy is to analyse this experience of illusion and treat the snake as a synthesis, by imagination, of some elements taken from the rope and some from past experience; so that the snake seen in front loses its individuality and is understood in terms of elements imaginatively brought together. Thereby the snake really becomes an object of imagination, and not of perception. But the

¹ The derivation of the word is *adhi*+*√as* (to throw), that is, throwing upon something.

Advaita views the snake as an individual that is perceived.¹ Now this concept of *adhyāsa* has threefold significance. First, the snake seen in illusion depends for its existence on the underlying rope ; for a stone, for example, cannot be mistaken for a snake. But the rope does not depend for its existence on this illusory snake. Secondly, the existence of the rope is unaffected by the snake even during the time of illusion. That is, what is superimposed does not affect that on which it is superimposed. In the third place, even during the time of illusion, and of the ignorance of the presence of the rope, the rope is present and is waiting for our recognition. In other words, what is real is present even during the time of its appearance.

This concept the Advaita tried to apply systematically to the Absolute and its appearances. The Absolute is the eternal whole and the phenomenal world constitutes its appearance. A relation with the above threefold significance has to be found between the Absolute and the world. Therefore the Advaita says that the world is *adhyasta* or superimposed on the Absolute. In thus translating the concept of *adhyāsa* from the empirical illusion to the Absolute and its appearance, the Advaita has turned an epistemological concept into a cosmological one. The *adhyāsa* of the world upon the Absolute is not done by the human mind ; for this itself is *adhyasta* or superimposed on the Absolute. Nor can we say that the finite mind deliberately superimposes the snake on the rope. It is not done *by* it, but *for* it. Here too *adhyāsa* has objectivity. Yet the empirical *adhyāsa* arises in the epistemological situation of a subject facing an object. But the Absolute is never an object of the finite mind ; and the epistemological situation is transcended here.

In thus applying the concept of *adhyāsa* to the Absolute and its appearances, the Advaita laid itself open to one criticism, namely, that it gives the same status of unreality to the phenomenal world as it gives to the illusory snake. But this criticism is really due to misapprehension of the Advaita ; for it distinguishes between various levels of unreality. When we borrow this concept from the Advaita

¹ The theory of Gestalt and the principle of perceptual individualisation (see Henri Piéron : *Principles of Experimental Psychology*, p. 104) may be referred to in support of this theory, of course, with certain modifications and reservations. But the Advaitin's theory need not stand or fall with these psychological doctrines, as his chief concern is epistemological and logical.

in order to apply it to mind and its parts or elements, we are free to divest it of its associations and use it in its purity. While rendering it into English I prefer the word 'superposition' to 'superimposition'; for the latter word is used with the undesirable association. The mind is a whole in which ideas, emotions, etc., come and go without its being organically related to them. Even when they go, the wholeness of mind is not impaired. The so-called parts may, therefore, be best regarded as superposed on mind. Here, certainly, the question of the reality or unreality of the ideas, etc., should not be raised; and if raised at all, the parts should be regarded as real, though less enduring than mind. It may be objected that the snake seen in the rope is not a part or element of the rope, just as an idea is a part or element of mind. True, but the idea too is not a part or element of mind in the ordinary sense. It only exists in mind. The concept is to be borrowed in the cosmological, not in the epistemological, sense. The world that is superposed on the Absolute, though it is not really part of the Absolute, which is *akhanda* or undivided, still has no other place to exist in than the Absolute.

We wish to borrow this concept from the Advaita, because it is only such a concept that can do justice to the freedom and individuality of minds. The concept is a key-concept of the Advaita, and a full understanding of the Advaita depends on a clear grasp of the concept. It is the result of a peculiar outlook and understanding the world in which the individuality of things seems to be treated as all-important. The concept disclosed itself as *adhyāsa* through gradual clarification of the outlook through centuries, and has been quite definitely and logically formulated in some of the later polemical works of the Advaita.¹ We should agree with Max Müller in that the Advaita successfully ventured to reach heights not reached by any other system either Western and Indian. In its epistemology it started with existences with all their individuality and concerned itself with concrete existence and not with harmonies that could be obtained only through abstraction. The method has its own disadvantages; but it certainly has its own advantage. It cannot be fruitful in the natural sciences; but in all sciences where the human individual has to be treated as an agent, its importance cannot be denied.

¹ E.g., *Advaitariddhi*.

It is said above that the concept best expresses the relation between the Absolute and the world. Some interpreters of the Advaita may object to this expression ; for the Advaita denies every relation between the Absolute and the world. I too have said the same in my book, *Thought and Reality*, for no relation either organic or physical can be conceived between the two.¹ But the meaning of the word relation may be extended to cover its peculiar situation. *Adhyāsa* or superposition can be interpreted, in its cosmological sense, as the dependence for existence of the parts or elements on the whole, and may be treated as a peculiar relation.² The point is, however, a question of terminology.

There is nothing absurd in the idea of superposition. We need not fight shy of borrowing a concept from a system, which is generally dubbed as other-worldly, in order to apply it to mind which belongs to this world. It is after all the logical significance of the concept that counts ; and our logic should be a logic of facts. The concept of organism, however well it satisfied the ideal of ordinary logic, is inapplicable to mind, simply because the fact here is not an organism and refuses to accept the concept. Sir James Jeans tells us that the creator must be a mind like ours, for nature which he created is mathematically designed and we too think mathematically. But he has not considered this peculiarity of mind. If he had he would have said that, the creator must be a free being who superposes nature upon himself. In fact, wherever the existence of a whole is given priority, we find the rigour of the concept of organism slackened. For example, according to McTaggart, even a stone can be an organic unity ; for a stone cannot exist as such if any of its parts or aspects is lost.³ But certainly this is to deprive the concept of its peculiarity. The orthodox upholders of the concept of organic unity would express surprise at McTaggart's idea. But there is some truth in what he says. Taking any fact as seen, we should admit that it cannot be what it is if it loses any of its parts. And every aspect, as an aspect of that particular thing, depends for its nature upon the rest. McTaggart could say that this is an organism because he started with existence and not with certain universals and their

¹ Cf. Bradley : *Appearance and Reality*, p. 322, footnote.

² Cf. the idea of *visarita* as a peculiar causal relation between the Brahman and the world.

³ *Nature of Existence*, Vol. I, p. 157.

mutual implications, and then attempt to find out whether these can be found in existent things. So far as we are dealing with existence, implication should be treated as dependent and based upon existence and not *vice versa*. Then it reduces itself to co-existence. Mutual implication implied in the orthodox conception of organic unity means that it is contradictory if one of the parts of an organism does not exist when others exist. That is, when the existence of one is assumed, it would be contradictory to think of the non-existence of the others. Thus the concept of organism is an application of the law of contradiction. But as regards actual things it is admitted even by Western idealist logicians¹ that whether two predicates are contradictory or not, whether they are opposed or not, can be known only by actual experience. But experience can never give us a universal law; a universal can be true only if it is *a priori*; so that pure organism like a pure mathematical figure becomes an abstraction.

McTaggart himself has overlooked one important point. The cognitive or logical analysis, on the basis of which he can regard a stone as an organism, never loses sight of the individuality or integrality of the whole, and makes divisions in it which certainly can never be exhaustive, so that the analysis is into a whole and a part superposed on it. The relation between one part and another is treated by him as organic because what we see together we cannot see otherwise. But this is not generally said to be organic. To say that it is organic will only lead to confusion.

IV

Now, when we come to mind, greater difficulties have to be faced; for here we do not have all the parts at once, though the whole is always available. This whole has to be treated as higher than the organic whole. It may be called the supra-organic whole or, in negative terms, a non-dualistic whole, not in the sense that there are no such other wholes, but in the sense that there is no internal division in it. It is, however, better to call it supra-organic and keep the word non-dualistic for the Brahman, as the latter word is used generally in the

¹ Bradley : *Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 115; and Creighton : *An Introductory Logic*, p. 351.

sense of 'without a second.' The parts of the supra-organic whole are really its manifestations. It is the subject in the Hegelian sense, for this manifestation is due to the subject's own activity, and so a predicate put forth by the subject itself, and is not what is attached to it from outside. It is, of course, to be admitted as a fact that the demand of Hegel is not satisfied in the finite mind in each of its actions, but in many it is ; and that the Advaitin's Absolute is beyond any activity we can think of. But if the world has to be regarded as due to its activity, then this activity must be that of superposing the world upon itself. This activity is certainly not the manifestation of what is already contained in some form.

Below the organic comes the mechanical whole. In this though the parts depend upon each other and the whole functionally, yet for their existence they are independent of each other and of the whole. But the whole is dependent upon the parts for its existence. This kind of one-sidedness is not found in the organic whole. Both functionally and existentially the parts and the whole depend upon each other. Below all these comes the mere aggregate, in which both the whole and the parts are independent of one another functionally and existentially.

V

This relation of the individual and the superposed on it is not to be confused with that between substance and attribute or the thing-in-itself and its appearances. The thing-in-itself is completely inaccessible to us. Between the substance and the attribute the relationship is certainly closer, for the attribute is certainly the substance as it appears to us.¹ But that which is superposed is not the individual on which it is superposed. Yet the existence of the former is really the existence of the latter. For instance, the physical image has no existence except that of the mind ; but the image is not really the mind.

The truest type of judgment, according to Bradley and Bosanquet, in spite of their polemic against the scientific method that it deals with abstractions, is the scientific one, namely, the universal or hypothetical.² They did not realise that they themselves have before them

¹ See H. H. Joachim : *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 15, 16.

² See C. B. Macris : *Idealistic Logic*, p. 163 ; and H. H. Joachim : *The Nature of Truth*, p. 168.

the same abstract ideal of explanation as that of science, namely, the mathematical. Their logic ended with the construction of individuals out of universals,¹ and consequently the singular is placed on the level of the universal. But if the discussion is true, the highest judgment should not be the scientific judgment, but the individual judgment. In the universal judgment, which is abstract, the subject has no more weight than the predicate, and is as abstract as that. So the relation between the two can well be regarded as organic, pointing to a whole that goes beyond the subject and the predicate. And the relation between the whole and the subject and the predicate too would be organic, because the whole is a system of such universal judgments. Naturally a logic in which the universal or the hypothetical judgment is the highest cannot be an adequate instrument for explaining a situation where individuality is concerned. If we admit, after the above discussion, that mind has a peculiar nature of its own and that it must be so recognised, and that mind is the highest type of existence we know, then the individual judgment should be given the highest place. Even the disjunctive judgment does not suit it. For the disjunctive judgment,² Bosanquet tells us, is a combination of the generic and the hypothetical, and is fully expressive of organic unity between the alternative predicates and the subject. Even if we grant what Bosanquet says, this judgment is not applicable to mind because of the infinite possible predicates that the latter can manifest. But the alternatives are exhaustive in the disjunction of Bosanquet, and unless they are exhaustive and exclusive, disjunction cannot express organic unity. The judgment about mind may be treated as a disjunction if the alternatives are necessarily neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Even then the above one-sided relation has to be emphasized and the subject treated as an individual.

Now, on whatever mind looks it sees an individual, and the judgment it makes of everything is expressive of the idea of superposition. Not only in such judgments as "He is good" but also in judgments like "The rose is red" it sees an individual and something superposed on it. But it is possible to make abstractions from what we actually see, and perceive between those abstractions new kinds of relations, and these relations may be not only organic but also mechanical and accidental. The ideal of logic, therefore, is not that of an

¹ Cf. Pringle-Pattison : *The Idea of God*, pp. 266.

² B. Bosanquet : *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 327.

organic unity or of a closed system of judgments, but of a unity that remains unbroken in spite of differences. As this unity is prior in the sphere of mind it can have scope for infinite possible differences. And because these differences are never exhausted, the unity is never their organic unity. All that logic has to do is to treat this unity as prior and see that it is never broken by conflicting differences.

VI

Hence not only as expressive of mind and its so-called parts, but also as expressive of the nature of judgments made by mind, the idea of superposition is significant. This idea has been worked out with rigorous consistency in the Advaita of Śaṅkara, which is the crowning phase of Indian philosophical thought. What place can we give to that idea in the world of metaphysics to-day? We find that it is especially expressive of the nature of individuality that is mental. In this significance it is a concept that seems to be completely new to Western thought. It has been unfairly criticised by some both in India and outside without understanding its true significance. It gives us a new kind of whole and part, a whole higher than the organic. It cannot be well appreciated unless we set aside our bias towards a particular method of philosophical explanation, and see existence as such. After observing a particular aspect of existence and making an extensive abstraction, we should not expect that every existence should conform to this abstraction. If, as Wittgenstein tells us, existence itself is a mystery,¹ it would be highly preposterous to press all forms of existence into one. Nor can we say why there are so many of its forms. All that we can and should do is to understand and recognise each form and its peculiarities, and point out the relations and differences, if any, between them. Logical positivism, as a system of philosophy, is destined to failure if it claims to tell us about existence. Russell says that "pure mathematics can never pronounce upon questions of actual existence: the world of reason, in a sense, controls the world of fact, but it is not at any point creative of fact, and in the application of its results to the world in time and space, its certainty and precision are lost among approximations and working hypotheses." When the attempt is made to make logic as formal as mathematics, logic loses

¹ *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, 6.4321.

² *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 69.

touch with existence. Such a logic, as it deals with only possible in abstraction, has no right to dictate to existence. Its pronouncements upon existence would, therefore, have to be taken with caution. Eaton tells us that Russell has changed his view and holds that mathematics is based upon existence.¹ Even then it is an abstraction from existence, and idealised, and the whole existence cannot be made to fit into it. Logical positivism, if we take Mr. A. J. Ayer's book, can really have no place for the genuine individual. And the admirers of this virulent school of contemporary thought which Mr. Ayer represents may not be able to appreciate the idea of superposition and may treat it as metaphysical and so without sense. But the scope of this school of philosophy is very narrow, and it is not a wonder if any idea that falls beyond its scope be treated as unphilosophical and illogical by it. Mr. Ayer tells us that the function of a philosopher is "to clarify the propositions of science by exhibiting their logical relationships and by defining the symbols which occur in them."² We cannot enter into a detailed criticism of this school of thought now. But the fundamental question is whether the definitions of symbols have to be based on the nature of existence, and, if they are not, whether the various forms of existence exhibit the relationships which are deemed logical by this school. The propositions of logic and of mathematics, Mr. Ayer writes, are *a priori*, and are expressive of relations of ideas. If these propositions are not based upon existence, and if sciences deal with existence, what guarantee is there that the propositions of science would exhibit logical relationships? Are we to regard those sciences as true sciences which exhibit these relationships and treat the rest as metaphysical? Or to put the whole as one question, what is the relation between the empirical and the *a priori*? In Mr. Ayer's book we do not find a solution of this. He says: "I require of the empirical hypothesis, not indeed that it should be consciously verifiable, but that some possible sense-experience should be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. If a putative proposition fails to satisfy this principle, and is not a tautology, then I hold that it is metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false, but literally senseless."³ But

¹ *General Logic*, p. 23.

² *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

are not all metaphysical propositions, even those of the highest speculative systems, based upon and start from our sense-experience, and so extensions of generalisations based upon it? These extensions may not be made by the same logical method as that which the school of logical positivism adopts. But who is to decide and how to decide between the two logics? If our logic is to be the logic of fact, then the *a priori* should somehow be connected with the empirical, that is, with existence. But how this can be done Mr. Ayer has not shown. Further, are we to treat all those experiences which are not sense-perceptions as incapable of scientific study? Is not imagination to be scientifically studied by psychology? If it is, why should an exception be made in this case? There seems to be no other reason why any experience should be excluded from scientific study than that of some pre-conceived narrow conception of logic and science. The ordinary logical and scientific methods may be extended, and sometimes should be modified, to cover all our experiences and all forms of existence. There can really be nothing to prevent us from adopting the idea of superposition and applying it to the sphere of mind. We should not distort facts to fit them into our logic. Otherwise, we court disaster by making a misconstrued philosophy the guide of our lives.

The treatment of the subject is not psychological. So I have not referred to the psychological theories of mind. I have not raised even the question whether there is an entity called mind. I have not started with a definition of mind, because we are just enquiring into its nature from our own standpoint. Just like life, mind is an intuition and then an interpretation. One who questions the existence of mind can as well question the existence of life, as some materialists do. To him the only answer we can give is that if he were not a mind, he could not have questioned its existence. It is a unique type of existence, and this paper does not question it, but tries to point out its peculiarity when compared to the realms of organic and inorganic being. Further, I have not differentiated in this paper between the self and the mind. Nor is the word *mind* used in the sense of *manas* or *antaḥkāraṇa* of Indian philosophy. It is used in the general sense of the phenomenal self or *jīva*. The Advaita applies the concept of superposition in the relation between the Brahman and the world. This paper advocated its application to the relation between the mind and its so-called parts or elements. In the interests of the individuality of mind and its freedom this new way of regarding mind

is offered for consideration. If ever mind is to be considered an entity that initiates activity out of itself, its activity should be regarded as that of superposition. Gentile treats mind as a pure act of positing the world. In his system the difference between the finite and the transcendental mind is not made sufficiently clear. When we are dealing with the finite mind, we need not go the whole length with him. Taking the consciousness of the finite mind that it is all through having a continuous existence, we should say that it is a fact as well as an act which superposes ideas, etc., upon itself.



THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES IN INDIA

K. P. CHATTOPADHYAY

Head of the Department of Anthropology, Calcutta University

THE word anthropology conveys to the mind of the lay man a vision of skulls and measuring tools. The Germans, it is true, restrict the term to the study of the human body in its various aspects. But the English-speaking scientists define the two important aspects of the subject as Physical Anthropology and Cultural Anthropology. This last mentioned division includes within its scope a study of material culture of man—early, primitive as well as modern; of human society; and religion. Apart from the academic value of anthropological research, the applications of the knowledge gathered by the field-worker and analysed by the theorist, are manifold. For example, to illustrate our case, we need not go outside India.

The total aboriginal tribal population in our country is in the neighbourhood of forty millions. Their social and economic regulations are often very different from that of their Hindu or Moslem neighbours. The administrator has, however, to decide cases among such people, with the help of the existing codified laws, and such relaxations as are permitted in special areas. But how is he to use the discretion granted to him? There are of course the volumes on Tribes and Castes by Risley, Crooke, Thurston and others. But, although they help to a certain extent, their guidance is inadequate. Far more details are necessary for proper administration of justice. Again, some insight into the mental make-up of such people is necessary for smooth working of the machinery of administration itself.

At the last session of the Science Congress, Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Roy mentioned how in Chotanagpore a police officer had mistaken a genuine tribal organisation for an unlawful assembly. He mentioned also an instance when he succeeded in settling a very serious dispute over a flag among Oraons, through his intimate knowledge of that people.

A particular social group had taken a speedy modern vehicle of transport—a railway train or a car—as the symbol on its flag. Another similar group had infringed on this right and a riot was imminent at the gathering where the two groups met. The official wanted to strengthen the local police force and use it—against the assembled

and hostile groups. But Sarat Babu advised against this step being taken, and removed the cause of trouble by presenting a flag with an aeroplane painted on it to the aggrieved party.

Unfortunately, intensive field work, such as is needed, has been done only in Assam and Chotanagpore, with occasional work elsewhere. The primitive tribes of the rest of India have been studied very little.

At the present moment, especially, such study is very necessary. The Ministers in charge of Education in most of the provinces want to educate the masses. But, what system of general education and what kinds of handicraft are best suited to the people? There is no doubt available a general knowledge of the needs and requirements of the Hindu and Moslem peasantry, and city folk. But what is known about the primitive tribes? Practically nothing. They form, however, a large proportion of our population. One single large tribe, the Santals, number over two millions and a half. Yet all that is known about their economic and social organisation and religious ideas is to be found in a few papers by two missionaries and in several chapters of a popular book by a member of the Indian Civil Service. Undoubtedly they throw valuable light on their mental outlook. But the total amount of information available in all these works gives a very incomplete picture of the people and their mental make-up. In order to remove this deficiency with regard to this numerous tribe, a study of their manners, customs and condition has been recently taken up by the Anthropology Department of the Calcutta University. Some work has also been commenced on primitive tribes in other areas by the Lucknow University under the guidance of Dr. D. N. Majumdar and, quite recently, in Bombay. But the rest of the Indian Universities and administrative authorities have not so far taken any step to remedy this defect in our knowledge of our own people.

Take, again, the question of fusing the heterogeneous elements in our population into a common nationality. Federation is a catchword glibly used by many. But what are the kinds of units that you are going to federate? India may roughly be divided into a dozen more or less culturally homogeneous provinces. But even inside these provinces there are elements which differ. It is not sufficient to state that Great Britain itself has at least three people—the English, the Scotch and the Welsh, not to speak of the immigrant Jewish and other folks—in an area of the size of a province of India. The forces of disintegration that are inherent in such a complex population may

be held in abeyance by temporary common economic interests ; but real unity can be achieved only by a common cultural content and common economic interests. The problem of our nation builders is, therefore, to see how this can be attained in the case of the Hindu, the Moslem and the Christian population, as well as the primitive tribes. But how can a common cultural content or interest be aimed at if nothing or, at most, only a little is known of the culture or organisation of a good portion of the people whose outlook on life is to be modified ? Under such circumstances how can it be possible to employ any healthy and effective means to change the culture ? A blind attempt to " improve " such folk more often does greater harm than good. The destruction of the traditional basis of such societies may merely set the tribe or people drifting on to a state either of lifelessness or an acceptance of the pursuit of pleasure as the ideal in life. These are not idle fears, as every student of anthropology is aware. In Chotanagpore Rai Bahadur S. C. Roy, and in Assam Prof. Wm. Smith who is a missionary as well as a trained sociologist, have given instances, in their work, of the harmful effects of attempts " to improve " tribal customs in general, by administrators and missionaries. No one doubts the good intentions of these missionaries and administrators. But the result of their attempts has not been happy, to put it mildly. Mistakes were made, which a knowledge of the culture of the people and the mechanism of culture changes would have helped to avoid. The late Dr. Rivers pointed out long ago how well-meaning reforms by administrators have taken away the zest for life itself in certain areas in Melanesia. He noted that the islands where Europeans have not been able to leave any impress show signs of vitality in contrast generally to those influenced by Europeans. The only exception is where a powerful new interest has replaced the old interest. This psychological factor requires to be noted by those who would seek to improve and ameliorate the condition of primitive people in our country as elsewhere.

I have so far been referring to our primitive people and the need of studying them in their own interest from the point of view of nation-building. A study of the subject of anthropology is, however, of much greater importance for educational purposes. Students of the child-mind and child-behaviour have for some time been aware that there is among children a proportion who is definitely below the average in intelligence, though such children are by no means

mental defectives. Such children, who are known as of category B to those who employ intelligence tests, generally show themselves quicker in handwork than in intellectual studies and often can find self-expression easily through such media. Experience in schools has shown that educational handwork is also helpful in the earlier stages in school in stimulating the mind through hand and eye co-ordination not merely of these backward children, but of the average and the intelligent. At the present time we do not believe that the human child repeats in its infancy the history of its race; but the data from the best modern schools definitely suggest that the type of stimuli and activities which helped in the evolution of the brain of man, calls forth an appropriate response from the human-child more easily than those based on abstract knowledge gathered in historical times.

A careful study of the history of extension of neokinesis and organisation of neokinetic control in the human brain is likely to place educational theories on much firmer basis. They are likely to indicate lines on which really progressive schools may be built up, where the environment will be such as to ensure proper stimulation of the human brain and secure progressive development of the people and its culture. We in India have so far paid very little heed to this aspect of the study of anthropology.

Another branch of anthropology—the study of material culture and economic organisation of primitive peoples—may help greatly in such educational work. Handicrafts taught in the lower forms of schools for manual training are not linked up with social or intellectual work, even in the best modern schools. The result is a lack of integration between the two types of work done in school now-a-days. If, however, the handicrafts are learnt and practised against a background of primitive culture where they naturally belong, this defect can be removed. Each nation, it is needless to add, can do this well only with reference to primitive peoples best known to it. This requires, of course, a careful survey of the material culture and economic basis of the local primitive groups.

All the aspects of anthropological study are, therefore, of value in national welfare work. It is hoped that those who wish to look after the welfare of our people in India will realise the importance of such studies. It is also desirable that the Governments of the different provinces should realise the necessity of employing men trained in anthropological work as administrators in tribal and backward areas.

PHILOSOPHY IN JOHN KEATS

M. TAHIR JAMIL, M.A.

I

A DEQUATE homage has been paid by critics to John Keats, the youngest of the group of romantic poets, for his created "paradise of art and beauty," wonderful workmanship and witchery of words in which no one excelled him except Shakespeare. But his greatness does not depend upon his unusual "sensual receptivity," the creation of charming images, the powerfully realistic description of nature, and the felicity of expression. He too, like other great poets, reveals that inner vision with the help of which a genius enters into the life of things, and grasps the permanently deep meaning of the Universe. But unfortunately, Keats has suffered here most at the hands of his admirers. They regard him merely as a poet of sensuous perfection, intoxicated with the charm and appeal of the sensuous world. Even critics of distinction have committed the mistake of confining their attention to the most patent side of the genius of Keats, overlooking the wealth of philosophical thought that runs like an under-current in his works.

When we affirm this, we do not claim with Mr. Lynch that "Keats was a philosopher first, and a poet afterwards."¹ This is not only an over-statement of facts, but it places Keats in the second rank of poets with whom the Muse came as a subsidiary pursuit. On the contrary, Keats was a poet first and always. That was the chief passion of his heart, and he devoted all his powers and energies to that end. He can best be called, as Mr. Clutton-Brock calls him, "a philosophic poet" though according to the confession of the poet himself, as late as March, 1818—

"My flag is not unfurled
On the admiral staff, and to philosophise
I dare not yet."²

The attitude of Keats towards philosophy was not very enthusiastic in the beginning. There is no evidence to show that he ever read the works of abstract thinkers. They did not find a place in his

¹ The John Keats Memorial Volume, p. 128.

² "Epistle to Reynolds."

subjects of study. His predilection, at first, did not lie so much in the satisfaction of reason as in sensation and intuition upon which he placed the greater emphasis. The axioms of philosophy were to be proved upon the pulses before he would accept them as such. "O for a life of sensation rather than of thought," he wrote to Bailey in his letter of November 22, 1817, and till then that was his attitude towards knowledge. His growing zeal for the acquisition of knowledge, however, seems to have induced him to include metaphysics in his future programme of studies. The craving for philosophy is first expressed in the little poem, "*On Seeing a Lock of Milton's Hair*," where he patiently looks forward to the time when he might "grow high-rife"

" With old philosophy
And mad with glimpses of futurity."

By April of 1818 Keats found himself hovering "between an exquisite sense of the luxurious, and a love for philosophy," and wrote to Taylor: "Were I calculated for the former, I should be glad. But as I am not, I shall turn all my soul to the latter." Finally when his mind was made up on this point he wrote to Reynolds: "I . . . shall learn Greek and very likely Italian . . . and in other ways prepare myself to ask Hazlitt in about a year's time the best metaphysical road I can take." It was fortunate that he never took this step which, we believe, would have taken away from his poems the freshness that has made them popular, and would have substituted in its place a dogmatic and didactic tendency. We remember the tragedy that had befallen Coleridge the poet with the growth of Coleridge the philosopher. As things were, he was free from the narrow "specialistic" theories of schoolmen, and wanted poetry to be free from the taint of creeds, and systems of abstract reasoning. The substance of his own philosophy is not to be found in general philosophic doctrines but in the emotional results and spiritual intensification and refinement, "the fine thread (of which was) drawn from his ever-strengthening ego."¹ He put these in his utterances as naturally as they came, with no pretension to preach. He neither disputes nor asserts anything, but simply "whispers results" to his readers with the ease and naturalness of a bird singing. We are inclined to think that in the following lines in "*What the Thrush Said*" the poet intends to contrast the natural

¹ Amy Lowell: *John Keats*, II, p. 292.

case of a poet who sings purely through intuitive ecstasy, with the one who places before himself a definite didactic aim. He says:

" O fret not after knowledge, I have none,
And yet my song comes native with the warmth.
O fret not after knowledge! I have none,
And yet the evening listens."

While the one succeeds in his effort, the other fails by over-loading the wings of poetry with the richness of his lore. He was so averse to the doctrinaire in poetry that when he found Wordsworth "too doctrinal and pedagogic" in his poems, he raised his cry of protest in the following emphatic terms, notwithstanding the profound respect he had for the elder poet. He wrote: "For the sake of a few fine imaginative or domestic passages, are we to be bullied into a certain philosophy engendered in the whims of an egotist? Every man has his speculations, but every man does not brood and peacock over them till he makes a false coinage and deceives himself. Many a man can travel to the very bourne of Heaven, and yet want confidence to put down his half-seeing . . . we hate poetry that has a palpable design upon us, and, if we do not agree, seems to put its hand into its breeches pocket. Poetry should be great and unobtrusive, a thing which enters into one's soul."¹

It cannot, however, be denied that in many utterances of Keats there are deep philosophical thoughts that remind us of Plato amongst the ancients, and Kant and Hegel amongst the moderns. Colvin and Bradley are most emphatic when they deny any reading of Plato on the part of Keats, but it is an exaggeration to say that he did not even know that Plato "had written of beauty as well as truth."² He was thoroughly conversant with Spenser, and the influence of the "Four Hymns" of Spenser cannot be denied. That must have been his introduction to the creed of Platonic Beauty and Love. Then the circle of his friends included an ardent Platonist like Shelley, and he must have imbibed from him a good deal of Platonic philosophy, though his knowledge must have been entirely second-hand, picked up in the course of discussions and talks. In "Endymion," for example, there is much of Plato—the reaching to an ideal after passing through the various stages of perfection with the help of the real.

¹ "Letter to Reynolds," February, 1818.

² A. C. Bradley: *A Miscellany*, pp. 191-192.

He has also, in many places, referred to things as images or "shadows," and reality as a vast "Idea." It has led some critics to the belief that the poet's conception of Beauty, throughout, was that of an "Idea" of which the Universe and everything in it were symbols. In the beginning we find a very strong leaning in Keats towards this Platonic conception, but gradually he seems to be drifting closer towards the transcendental conception of the "Absolute" working in and through the real. He too conceived of the universe as a unit and suggested the existence of an unseen world which could be unlocked only with the help of imagination and intuition. It was through that faculty alone that man seized the truth about the supra-sensuous reality, and understood, to some extent, the inner plan of the Universe. The objects of the extraneous world he did not regard with Plato as reflection or prototype, but as the integral part of concrete Reality. Thus we find in him a nearer approach to the Hegelian theory of the Absolute which accepts the sensuously real as a part and a symbol of the Ideal, vitally important in the scheme of the Universe. He brings to us the finite with "the breath and spirit of the Infinite," and reveals to us the divine and eternal laws through the "visible and the present phenomena." The most complete and definite declaration of the metaphysical faith of Keats we have in his letter to his brother George where he speaks of the "Vale of Soul-making." We shall discuss that letter in some other place, but we may note here that it bears testimony to the fact that there was in him a growing expansiveness of sympathy, and that his genius had begun to rise beyond the senses "to the spiritual and more permanent elements of human nature."¹ He was reaching out for a philosophy that faced "fearlessly the problem of human destiny"² and shaped "its own interpretation of life,"³ but, being conscious of the imperfections of human nature, he always veiled his vision in order to conform to the standard of sanity of the worldings, and to make his message understood.

In religion, Keats shared the general scepticism of his contemporaries, but developing a non-militant temperament, he did not wage war against it as Shelley and Byron did. He possessed a strongly religious nature, but his attitude towards any particular form of it was

¹ F. M. Owen : *John Keats—A Study*, p. 2.

² Bernard Groos : *Selections from Keats*, Introduction, p. xv.

³ *Ibid.*

one of indifference. He neither had any quarrel with the Church, nor thought himself to be in a position to dogmatise. He smilingly passed it by in order to create his own world of Beauty and Loveliness which he believed to be the universal religion. This passive attitude of Keats is best expressed in his letter to Bailey where he wrote : " You know my thoughts on Religion. I do not think myself more in the right than other people, and that nothing in this world is proveable. As tradesmen say, everything is worth what it will fetch, so probably every mental spirit takes its reality and worth from the ardour of the pursuer—being in itself a Nothing. Ethereal things may at least be thus real, divided into three heads—Things real—things semi-real—and Nothings. Things real, such as the existences of sun, moon, and stars and passages of Shakespeare,—Things semi-real, such as love, the clouds, etc., which require a greeting of the Spirit to make them wholly exist,—and Nothings, which are made great and dignified by an ardent pursuit." The passage gives the various stages in one's intellectual growth, and Keats having passed from the first and the second stage seems to be standing on the threshold of the final stage when his career closed. Although he called the reality removed from the immediate knowledge of man as " Nothings," yet it was in that region that he pictured the ideal, and endeavoured to find " some stable spiritual ground where he may rest in peace." ¹ There is a diffused spirituality in " *Endymion* " and " *Hyperion* " which is not circumscribed within the narrowing creed of a religion. He was so taken up by the idea of the essence that he could not tarry to discuss its various form. His " far-reaching " power and " prophetic insight " enabled him, from time to time, to participate in a wider range of existence, and bring with him from that region " a breath as if from paradise."

In the poems, consequently, there is no reference to Christianity. He respected the ethical principles of the faith but he did not subscribe to its dogmas. In some of his poems, there are expressions of disgust at the current cant and hypocrisy of religious observances which blinded the followers to the real spirit of the faith they professed. His sonnet, " *The Church Bells Toll a Melancholy Round,*" shows his genuine resentment at religious practices that tear men away from the enjoyment of the glories of the earth, and subject them to " other gloominess " and " dreadful cares." With his fellow-bards he too

¹ Amy Lowell : *John Keats*, I, p. 601.

looked forward to the time when the institution of superstitious beliefs would die "like an outburned lamp," and men would be once more alive to the charm of "fresh flowers," "and many glories of immortal stamp." He could not think of a religion devoid of the sense of Beauty and unappreciative of loveliness wherever found.

Belief in the Deity is very clear in many of the poems of Keats. God is conceived not only as the Great Maker of the Universe, but also as a mighty Intelligence that gives unity to all. Human minds are sparks thrown out of that Intelligence, and their effort should be to perfect their identity "so as to approximate more closely to the Divine Essence." About Christ, he wrote in one of his letters: "He was so great a man that though he transmitted no writing of his own to posterity, we have his Mind and his sayings and his greatness handed to us by others. It is to be lamented that the history of the latter was written and revised by Men interested in the pious fraud of Religion. Yet through all this I see his splendour." The statement reveals the unprejudiced conviction of Keats as to the essentials of spiritual greatness, though it shows his growing alienation from sectarian doctrines.

The basic principles of his personal religion were "the principle of Beauty" and "the wisdom of virtue," beyond which he never cared to wander. Adoration of Beauty was his only guide of conduct and the only means of discerning the truth. A character that could once enter into this creed was, to Keats, immune from all temptations, evils, and wrongs. Its only impulse would then be to achieve the beauty of divine perfection which would serve as the most exalted and unerring law of conduct. He believed that humanity was slowly progressing towards that end with the help of the great intellectual evolution that was going on. Man, who stood midway between the divine and the brute, was to grow with the help of his superior intellect into a full divine being. He was to cultivate a disinterested and spontaneous taste for morality in order to make his nature harmonious and beautiful. Thus developed, he would be able to do away with the cold and calculating conscience and would unerringly do the right. It is the same kind of perfection that was dreamt of by Wordsworth in his "*Ode to Duty*," but while he called it by the name of Duty, Keats conceived it to be the intuitive perception of Beauty. It is not the "stern law-giver," something arbitrary, though it effects a similar triumph over the forces of evil. It makes its

appeal through its very loveliness, and brings about a complete purification of the mind by concentrating its attention upon the higher and eternal value of things, upon the " Idea " of Divine Beauty.

Keats wavered between faith and doubt with regard to the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul. His early leaning was towards that supporting belief. It approximated closely to Shelley's doctrine of the unreality of the world. In the little poem, "*On Death*," written in 1814, Keats definitely states that the moral life on earth is nothing but a vision which passes away with the close of earthly existence, and man awakens into Reality by the cold touch of Death. He says:

" Can death be sleep, when life is but a dream,
And scenes of bliss pass as a phantom by ?
The transient pleasures as a vision seem,
And yet we think the greatest pain's to die.
How strange it is that man on earth should roam,
And lead a life of woe, but not forsake
His rugged path ; nor dare he view alone
His future doom which is but to awake."

The poem assumes an immortal future destiny, and a continuity of existence both before and after the worldly career of the soul. Death is not a sleep but the real awakening into consciousness of the soul that has slumbered, with regard to spiritual things, during its sojourn upon earth. In the sonnet, "*As from the Darkening Gloom*," he definitely tells us about the flight of the soul to

" the realms above,
Regions of peace and everlasting love,"

and regards it as a great consolation for humanity against griefs and sufferings that " our joy impairs." But curiously enough, in his letter to Bailey, written in November, 1817, he says that the pleasures of the next world would be " what we called happiness on Earth repeated on a finer tone." These statements may be taken as definite expressions of the poet's conviction regarding the destiny of the human soul for which there awaited some kind of pleasurable existence. But we are not inclined to think that Keats very seriously believed those pleasures to be of a mundane nature though of a finer tone. It is the philosophy

of Sense-idealism which regards life as made up of material comforts, and Heaven as the prolongation of these for ever. It might have suggested itself to Keats at that early period of his life when the world of sensation attracted him most, but it never had a permanent influence over his thoughts.

The shock of his brother Tom's death in December, 1818, he withstood on the strength of this consoling doctrine, an indication of which we find in the letter that he wrote to his brother in America. There he states: "Sometimes I fancy an immense separation, and sometimes, as at present, a direct communication of Spirit with you. That will be one of the grandeurs of immortality. There will be no space and consequently the only commerce between spirits will be by their intelligence of each other—when they will completely understand each other, while we in this world merely comprehend each other in different degrees—the higher the degree of good so higher is our Love and Friendship." The soul is conceived here as an immortal essence which, after its release from the bondage of the flesh, will no more experience the limitations of space. It will be free to have direct spiritual communication with others, being unified in one intelligence. Even in this earthly career there are such moments of elevation when the spirit seems to transcend time and distance, and participate in the life and being of everything around it on account of its infinity.

However, with growing ill-health and despair of recovery the dark cloud of scepticism began to thicken, and Keats seems to have been uncertain about the doctrine of Immortality. He now longed for death which he regarded, if not as a haven of peace and rest, at least as the balm that would end his sufferings and sorrows. Some critics maintain that the belief in the immortality of the soul ebbed out of him gradually with the growing gloom, and refer to the lines in the "*Ode to the Nightingale*," where the poet says :

" Still wouldst thou sing, and I have ears in vain
To thy high requiem become a sod,"

as expressive of the poet's belief that death is the close of human existence. Such a distressingly uninspiring creed Keats could never entertain. It is evident that he is speaking here of the physical aspect of human existence, without any implication as to its spiritual future.

The belief seems to have been further fostered by the letter of Severn written from Rome, on January 15, 1821. It depicts the pitiable condition of Keats in the agony of death, and runs: "But above all, this noble fellow lying in the bed, is dying in horror,—no kind hope smoothing down his suffering, no philosophy—no religion to support him—yet with the most gnawing desire for it—yet without the possibility of receiving it." The picture seems to us to be overdone. That the mind of Keats was weighed down under the load of wretchedness cannot be doubted, that "I have coals of fire in my breast" is admitted by the poet himself, who was surprised at the wonderful capacity of the human heart to contain and bear so much misery. But the fact that the agony was due more to the shattered hopes of love and unrealised literary ambition than to the spiritual barrenness of the poet's mind is too patent to be missed. It was only two years previously that he had succeeded in formulating a definite philosophy of life which he expressed with full zeal and earnestness in his remarkable letter to George written in the spring of 1819. It postulates the continued existence of the soul after it finishes its earthly career, and an enjoyment of its well-earned reward by gaining identity with the Universal Soul. That, certainly, was not the passing mood of the poet, and there is no evidence to show that he modified the view at any later time. It was the anchor of hope for his troubled soul. As for the support of religion that Severn speaks of, it need only be pointed out that lying on his death-bed Keats frequently used to ask him to read aloud Jeremy Taylor's "*Holy Living and Dying*," and drew much peace and consolation from its Christian teachings.

Spenser kindled the dormant poetic genius of Keats which he was wasting as an apprentice for the medical profession. Himself a great votary of beauty and a disciple of Plato, he made direct appeal to the instinct for beauty in the young poet. He stimulated his imagination, and threw open to him the gates of a new world, of which he had been before but vaguely conscious. Once initiated into the delights of poetic composition, Keats began to write with growing ease, and published a collection of poems in 1817. It shared the fate of all juvenile attempts and met with much bitter and unjust criticism. The poet, nevertheless, remained undaunted, loyal in his devotion to his idol of poetic fame. "*Endymion*," a poetical romance, was, in the mean time, in the process of composition, and was given to the world a year later. It was followed by "*Isabella*," "*The Eve of St. Agnes*,"

"*Lamia*," "*Hyperion*," and the immortal "*Odes*," which were all published in 1820.

Nothing can be farther from the truth than to say that there is a complete "nullity of thought—worse, an insincerity of feeling"¹ in this first collection of poems. Of all men, Keats was the last person to feign what he did not feel. As to thought, we cannot expect a complete work of art from a young man of twenty-two. Nor can the wisdom of a sage be embodied in the words of a youth. Admitting frankly these shortcomings, the collection still reveals the birth of a child of poetic genius. The pieces reflect the many-sidedness of the poet's powers—from an artist in words in the school of Spenser, to the potential philosopher in verse, drawing his inspiration from Wordsworth and Coleridge.

Nature is the greatest topic in this volume that attracts the attention of the reader—Nature in her physical aspects, rich in beauty. Keats takes special pleasure in piling up images, and suffers on account of his over-luxuriance and somewhat childish over-earnestness. His study of Wordsworth had sharpened his early propensity for natural scenes. It has been voiced in the famous sonnet, "*To One Who has been Long in City Pent*," where he tells us what a joy and relief it is for one pent up in a city to enjoy the free sights of Nature when his heart would of itself feel delighted to breathe a prayer

"Full in the smile of the blue firmament."

In the presence of Nature Keats experiences the same genuine and unbounded joy as Wordsworth did in his earlier days. He holds his breath with a mixed feeling of wonder and delight, and seeks to enjoy her fully. From Wordsworth he had learnt the conception of Nature's silent harmony and strength, and finds in

"The songs of birds—the whispering of the leaves—
The voice of waters—the great bell that heaves
With solemn sound,"²

a "pleasing music and not wild uproar."³ To a casual passer-by they may be a jargon of confused notes, but in the very richness of their diversity Keats hears the symphony of a soul-stirring nature.

¹ Mary Suddard : *Keats and Shelley Studies*.

² Sonnet : "*How Many Bards Gild the Lapses of Time*."

³ *Ibid.*

Their apparent discord appeals to him as one sweet note of harmony. One so keenly sensitive to the music in Nature could not be satisfied only with the joyful aspect of it, because it ceases in the heat of the sun and in the chilly winter days, while Nature's beauty and charm should continue unabated and unbroken. Keats, accordingly, discovers to his great joy and satisfaction that "the poetry of earth is never dead," and explains to us in the sonnet, "*On the Grasshopper and Cricket*," and later in the "*Ode to Autumn*," how the music of Nature is maintained, without a break, at all times and in all seasons. In her there exists a principle of permanence, and though her expressions may vary, yet the thread of harmony and beauty is never broken.

In the first collection of poems, therefore, we have the unbounded delight of the poet in the freshness of the meadows, brooks, and copses, in the beauty of the blossoms, in the song of the minstrels of Nature. These are mostly pleasures that make their appeal through the senses. We also trace signs of this joy being superseded, though at rare moments, by a vague sense of oneness throughout the universe. A struggling ray of light streams in from above, and catches the eye of the reader. We realise that external beauty does not cover the entire range of his genius. It is only the starting point. It excites his imagination by appealing to his feelings, and he is overwhelmed with a sense of her vastness, majesty, and grandeur. He is uplifted far above the present world, and becomes blissfully oblivious of self and his immediate environments. The call of the eternal seems to be already stirring his heart, and it comes from Nature herself.

Parallel to this, there is another mood which should also be noted. It is a gloomy and discouraging undertone. The objects of Nature do not always produce an inspiring effect. In his "*Epistle to George*," Keats says that there are occasions when, in order to gain inspiration, he surrounds himself with the traditional aids to poetic ecstasy but the mood does not come:

"Full many a dreary hour have I past,
My brain bewilder'd, and my mind o'ercast
With heaviness; in seasons when I've thought
No spher'y strains by me could e'er be caught
From the blue dome, though I to dimness gaze
On the far depth where sheeted lightning plays;

Or, on the wavy grass outstretched supinely,
 Pry 'mong the stars, to strive to think divinely."

The passage has the same depressing note as Coleridge's "*Ode to Dejection*." Both lament the failure of external objects to arouse in them a wave of ethereal thoughts, but while in Coleridge it is the wailing of a man over the dried fountain of his imagination, in Keats it is the impatience of Youth for something that it ardently expects, but which is delayed. Keats, by this failure, learns the most important lesson, that inspiration does not depend exclusively upon the objects. To a great extent it depends upon the mind itself, which, acting upon the data supplied by the senses, "spiritualises" them into sources of unearthly joy. It must bring to bear upon Nature the feelings of love and sympathy, and not remain merely a passive observer. The joy of inspiration will descend upon the soul only when there is established an interpenetration of spirit between Man and Nature. When this union is achieved, there will come a sudden glow upon everything in Nature, and the commonest object will be touched with an unearthly light. Dwelling momentarily in that mood of transporting bliss the poet sings:

"Fair world, adieu!
 Thy dales, and hills, are fading from my view:
 Swiftly I mount, upon wide-spreading pinions,
 Far from the narrow bounds of thy dominions."¹

It is a state of complete emotional absorption when the poet flies in his dream-world, and the soul seems to be detached from the world of realities, with all its limitations and entanglements. But such a dissociating trance cannot last for a long time, and when the poet comes down to earth, he has advanced a step forward in his appreciation of Nature and the power of the human mind. In his next excursion into the fields, and over the lakes, he finds human emotions reflected in the various objects of Nature. She has now a half-human appeal, reciprocating the love and joy of Man. He has gone to her not only with the "eye prepared to scan Nature's clear beauty," but with a warm heart and a "healthful spirit eager and awake

"To feel the beauty of a silent eve."²

¹ "*Epistle—To My Brother George*."

² "*Calidore: A Fragment*."

And the reward is his. Without straining his senses uselessly, without any undue stretching of the imagination, in the poem "*I Stood Tiptoe*," the poet is unconsciously impressed by the peace and quiet in Nature around him, where "not the faintest motion could be seen." He lingers awhile to "watch intently Nature's gentle doings." His loving contemplation of objects, only casually observed before, makes him feel "a human joy, a human sorrow, throbbing through this newly-known beauty."¹ As the result of this appreciative perception there is established an unseen influx of "shapes from the invisible world," bringing into play man's power of imaginative creation, and works of abiding nature are achieved, such as the beautiful myths of ancient days and the utterances of great poets. It is Nature, therefore, whom Keats invokes in the following lines as the source of all inspiration:

"O Maker of sweet poets! dear delight
Of this fair world and all its gentle lovers;
.....
Thou must I praise above all other glories
That smile upon to tell delightful stories,
For what has made the sage or poet write
But the fair paradise of Nature's light?"²

The circumstances of this elevation of the spirit and the extent of its flight are, however, not inexplicable. Keats had wonderful powers of self-criticism. Perhaps his study of the sciences had engendered in him the desire to understand the inner workings of everything. Consequently, he analyses all his inward feelings, and explains their different stages in "*Sleep and Poetry*," a remarkable autobiographical poem contained in the first volume. Like the "*Tintern Abbey*" of Wordsworth, it is a chronicle of the development of the poet's mind, tracing it through the three stages of its growth. The divisions, as Mr. Bridges points out,³ are the same as in the elder poet, but we must note that the method is fundamentally different. Wordsworth, writing in the maturity of his intellect, was in a philosophising mood, while Keats is essentially objective in his treatment. Having only recently outgrown the first stage of the animal pleasures of boyhood,

¹ Mary Soddard: *Keats and Shelley Studies*, p. 25.

² "*I Stood Tiptoe*."

³ Robert Bridges: *An Essay on Keats* (in *The Poetical Works of John Keats*, edited by L. Binyon, pp. xvii ff.).

Keats reveals more interest and sympathy with them than the sage poet to whom they now appear as "coarse." The second stage is, what he calls in his letter to Reynolds (May, 1818), "the Chamber of Maiden-Thought," when "we become intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere, we see nothing but pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever in delight. However, among the effects this breathing is father of is that tremendous one of sharpening one's vision into the heart and nature of Man—of convincing one's nerves that the world is full of Misery, and Heart-break, Pain, Sickness and Oppression" Contrasted with the fine and serious note in Wordsworth, we have in Keats sweet and simple deliciousness with all the intoxicating joy of youth which he was then experiencing. Miss Lowell calls it superficial and materialistic,¹ but, as Keats points out in the passage quoted, it is a stage when "we see nothing but pleasant wonders," and the poet has given here one of the most remarkable descriptions of ecstatic feeling in the midst of the unadulterated beauty of physical nature, with

"no need of a remoter charm,
By thought supplied."²

Under its spell, the soul seems to gain a moment of liberty from its earthly bondage, and the poet thinks of "delaying there for ever in delight," resting

"in silence, like two gems upcurled
In the recesses of a pearly shell."³

This intense communion with Nature will lead the poet to the third and the final stage of progress, which, however, he has not yet experienced. While Wordsworth tells us, "I have felt a Presence," to Keats it was only a dim distant vision, a "vast idea" that ever rolled before his eyes and was only beginning to take proper form. Consequently, the description is vague, full of uncertain conjectures about the future. He was like one groping in the dark passages of the "Chamber," occasionally feeling the "burden of the mystery" and catching the glimpse of the ideal as revealed by Nature. But the vision is too short-lived, and he sinks back into "a sense of real

¹ Amy Lowell: *John Keats*, I, p. 290.

² Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey."

³ "Sleep and Poetry."

things " that threatens to bear his soul along to nothingness. He, however, grimly resolves that he " will strive

" Against all doubtings, and will keep alive
The thought of that same chariot, and the strange
Journey it went." ¹

The ambition set forth is a lofty one, and there is a restlessness in the poet's spirit. It feels the birth of " a wider and diviner growth " coming upon it, while it finds itself not yet fit enough to be " a glorious denizen " of that " wide heaven." Deep joy in sensuous reality has, nevertheless, prepared his soul for the perception of the spiritual. There have been moments when he has experienced a state of being different from ordinary life, and has heard the

" gentle whispering
Of all the secrets of some wondrous thing
That breathes about us in the vacant air," ²

and caught the " soft floatings from a faint-heard hymning." He also knows that when this higher life is reached, " a bowery nook will be elysium—an eternal book," the spirit will " discover vistas of solemn beauty " in humble and familiar things, and the bosom will be left " clean for his Great Maker's presence." It is the transcendental philosophy of life which places its real value and purpose in the realisation of such rare moments of being when the soul extends itself beyond phenomenal things and becomes conscious of the Absolute Reality. Keats was quick to realise the great potentiality of the soul, and determined not only to realise it for himself, but also to bring its truth home to his fellow-men, so that their spirits too might be awakened to " their native merit." It would " lift their thoughts " and open the windows of the magic casement, enabling them to behold beyond the provisional and conditioned universe into the realm of eternity. The task that the poet has set himself is gigantic and arduous, and though he is fully conscious of the necessity of patience and training, yet he cannot give it up:

" An ocean dim, sprinkled with many an isle,
Spreads awfully before me. How much toil!
How many days! what desperate turmoil!

¹ " Sleep and Poetry."

² *Ibid.*

Ere I can have explored its widenesses.
Ah, what a task! upon my bended knees,
I could unsay those—no, impossible!
Impossible! " "

In these words, Keats consecrated his genius to the positive task of serving humanity by teaching them the law of moral progress which was to be realised through aesthetic culture. That was to be the theme of his future musings, and he remained loyal to this determination till the end.

(To be continued)



DEMO-DESPOTOCRACY AND FREEDOM *

DR. BENQY KUMAR SARKAR, M.A. (CAL.),

Vidya-raibhava (Benares), Docteur en Géographie Honoris Causa (Tehran)

IN the formal logic of analytical political science it may be necessary and desirable to treat democracy as antithesis of despotocracy and despotocracy as antithesis of democracy. But in the normal *Gestalt* of living political forms and political relations democracy and despotocracy supplement and are really complementary to each other. These two groups of values constitute one socio-political complex. The recognition of this complex as a unit in the normal psychology of personality, both individual and collective, is indispensable at the present moment in the interest of clarification of political intelligence.

Among the *idols* of the nineteenth century which the world is called upon to demolish in the twentieth none is more widespread and conventional than the notion regarding the exclusive or dichotomic character of these two sets of political phenomena. But the data about the factual character-complex of individuals or groups cannot afford to justify the social psychology of politics as handed down since the last century.

THE LEVIATHAN AND CONTRAT SOCIAL OF EVERY POLITY

In a psychological analysis of interhuman relations with special reference to political phenomena the Leviathan of Hobbes should appear to be a stern reality. And this reality should have to be appraised also as eternal and universal, i.e., valid for all ages from the pre-historic epochs until today as well as for all ethnic races or human groups from the most primitive to the hyper-developed. Humanly speaking, it is nothing but force, which ultimately is translatable into sheer physical force, pressure, torture or power, that is at the bottom of the state, however crude, rudimentary, undeveloped or semi-developed, and its two great attributes, sovereignty and law. And wherever there is force there is despotocracy—even if it be on

* A paper for the First Indian Political Science Conference, Benares, December, 1933.

the moral or spiritual plane. For all practical purposes force and despotocracy are almost convertible terms. In other words, the state, sovereignty, law and the allied phenomena are by nature despotic. The *danda* (punishment, coercion, restraint or sanction) of which the old Hindu political theorists (Kautilya, Manu, Sukra and others) speak as identical in value with the *rājā* (the ruler or the state) is the basis of all societal existence. It is the instrument through which the Leviathan functions and furnishes the very life-blood of the *Staatsraison* (reasons or requirements of the state) as analyzed in modern times by Meinecke.¹

If despotocracy is to be accepted psychologically as the very foundation of ordered group-life as belonging to the very nature of things, the question may be asked: Where, then, is the place for liberty, individuality, initiative, free will and democracy in the relations between human beings as individuals, groups or communities? Can there be such an item of life as *swaraj* (self-rule) in a system of human relationships which by nature is a function of Leviathanic *danda*, sanction and *Staatsraison*?

The democratic element in every organization of human affairs is furnished by the consent of the individuals constituting its units. The consent is most frequently or rather virtually always tacit or undeclared. But it is impossible to imagine a social system in which consent of the members is not a factor. As soon as there is the play of consent there is the operation of interests, discriminations, selections and rejections. The psychological consent as inevitable in inter-human relations is objectively embodied in contract. As a social item contract may not be self-evident in every institution or express itself in a palpable or aggressive manner. But even in the most simple and primary group-formations, for instance, in the social relations between the individuals, however temporary or occasional they be, the consent of the one finds a *rapprochement* with the consent of the other partner as a matter of course. No contract (based as it is bound to be on consent), no group or no society. And once we are in a position to discern the existence of contract in a societal system, the presence of individuality, free will, liberty and democracy is to be admitted automatically.

¹ F. Meinecke: *Die Idee der Staatsraison* (Munich, 1925), pp. 319-64, 452; O. Koellreutter: *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Staatslehre* (Tübingen, 1933), pp. 54-57; B. K. Sarkar: *Political Philosophies since 1900* (Madras, 1928), pp. 105-66.

Democracy, therefore, is as stern, as eternal and as universal or ubiquitous a reality in societal organizations as despotocracy. The two polarities constitute a moral unit in the *zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen und Gebilden* (interhuman relations and forms), to use an expression from von Wiese,² of all denominations. Hobbes's Leviathan represents then but a partial, one-sided, erroneous and misleading view of the human nature in politics. It is as inadequate and incomplete as Rousseau's *Contrat Social* which presents almost the exact opposite picture of interhuman relations. In a realistic analysis of political forms or societal forms of other varieties we should be approximating the truth if we were to detect simultaneously the despotocracy of Hobbes as well as the democracy of Rousseau. Politics, political organisms, political institutions are in reality the functions of democracy as multiplied by democracy. In Indian terminology human nature in politics should be envisaged as implying a system of relations in which *danda* (exercise of sanction or punishment) is influenced, modified and multiplied by *dharma*³ (observance of duty and justice). An undemocratic state is as great a contradiction in terms as an undespotic state. Democratic and despotic tendencies operate together, at the same time and in modification of each other in every political form and relationship.

Democracy and despotocracy are never absolute. Like all other moral and societal phenomena these are conditional, conditioned, limited and relative. Democracy can grow, say, from one to infinity. In the same manner despotocracy also can grow from one to infinity. Infinity is to be taken in the mundane sense, however. Democracy and despotocracy are like sovereignty and freedom to be understood as substances that admit of doses or degrees. Every polity = democracyⁿ × despotocracy^m. Psychologically speaking, the "categorical imperative" of Kant, which is alleged to be universal and eternal, is untenable, however magnificent it be as a system of social norms or ethical duties. As against this universal imperative we have to be content with the factual relativities in norms and values. There are categorical imperatives and categorical imperatives. It is in the *milieu* of these moral relativities that we have to place the degrees

² L. von Wiese: *System der Allgemeinen Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 185, 384, etc.

³ For the doctrines of *danda* and *dharma* see B. K. Sarker: *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Leipzig, 1922).

or doses of democracy. An unalloyed democracy or an unalloyed despotocracy is like the universal imperative of the Kantian assumption or hypothesis to be looked for in a socio-ethical Nowhere.

On the other hand, the brutally sincere and factual psychology of Pareto's *Trattato di Sociologia Generale* (Florence, 1916) is acceptable which denies to human character a natural or necessary harmony, logicity or consistency. Exactly opposite principles may according to Paretian analysis co-exist in the individual or group life giving rise to contradictions and disagreements of all sorts. The presence of emotions, sentiments, passions and so forth in the same mental framework by the side of reason and intelligence is the most fundamental basis of the human *psyche*. It is because of such a discordant and incoherent as well as pluralistic mentality of individuals and groups that the coexistence of despotocracy and democracy finds its natural explanation.

DOSES OF FREEDOM IN THE BRITISH COLONIES AND DOMINIONS

In terms of human values democracy may be taken to be an expression of freedom. And freedom is objectively manifest in democracy. The doses or degrees of this freedom-embodied-in-democracy or democracy-as-a-form-of-freedom are nowhere more patent than in the different states constituting the British Empire or Commonwealth of Nations. The constitutions of the Dominions and the Colonies are undefinable in the simplicist categories of democracy pure and undefiled or of despotocracy pure and undefiled. Each one represents the permutation and combination of all sorts between these two polarities. The most varied types of demo-despotocracy are to be encountered from one end of this hemispheroidal museum of political anthropology and constitutional morphology to the other.

One extreme is represented by Bechuanaland Protectorate and Basutoland in Africa and Wei-hei-wei in North China as well as other Colonies, altogether ten in number, which are not provided with any legislative council. Then there are nine colonies like Hongkong in China, Uganda Protectorate, Northern Rhodesia and so forth in Africa where legislative councils are in existence but without election, all the members being nominated.

The islands of Fiji in the South Pacific and Jamaica and Trinidad in the Central Atlantic and the African Colony of Kenya are like eight

others furnished with legislative councils, of which membership is partly elective but the majority is compulsorily official. In the three Colonies, Ceylon, Cyprus and British Guiana, again, the legislative councils are partly elective but there is no obligation about the majority being official. Finally, the tiny Island groups, the Bahamas and the Bermudas off the East coast of the U.S.A. and the Barbados off Venezuela possess two houses each. The legislative assembly is elected but the legislative council is nominated.

All these 29 Colonies, peopled altogether by nearly 50 million inhabitants, roughly equal to the population of Bengal, scattered over an area of 2,000,000 square miles, are administered by the Colonial Secretary. In the formal logic of political science they are described as regions not possessing self-government. But evidently the Colonial Secretary representing as he does the Leviathanic principle is not the sole factor in these politics, and self-government is embodied in the assemblies and councils in some form or other.

The morphological varieties pointing as they do to the relativities, i.e., doses or gradations of freedom-in-despotism or despotism-in-freedom, are patent also in the regions like Malta which possesses responsible government in internal affairs but in external relations is controlled by the Secretary of State, and Southern Rhodesia where the government is responsible to the people but is subject to certain limitations regarding the indigenous Africans and is indeed described as a self-governing colony.

As for the full-fledged self-governing Dominions the limitations, however meagre, are embodied in the Secretary of State for the Dominions and the Statute of Westminster. It has to be admitted that charters of liberty, in so far as they are charters, are *ipso facto* documents of limitation, restriction and subjection. In other words, the freedom or sovereignty of the Dominions is not absolute but limited and relative.

THE CHAMBERLAIN-HITLER TÊTE-À-TÊTES AS EXPRESSIONS OF DEMO-DESPOTOCRACY

Equally obvious is the demo-despotic *Gestalt* in those states, which in external relations are hundred-per-cent. free, the so-called powers, great, medium or small. Contemporary political ideology chooses to describe Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as

totalitarian states. The creators of these states are proud to call themselves the destroyers of democracy. To be anti-democratic is in their own estimation not a vice but the utmost virtue conceivable. In common parlance these are known to be autocratic, authoritarian, dictatorial and despotic. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, France, the U. S. A., and a host of other states are by themselves appraised as democratic and by the rival system condemned as such.

Yet it should not be difficult to dive deep into modern Leviathans and detect their democratic foundations as it should be quite possible to be sure of the Leviathanic elements in the alleged democracies of today, as soon as we come down to their brass tags. In the last week of September, 1938 the dichotomy—democracy *vs.* totalitarian state—was very often in the air in connection with the Sudeten German problem of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain was alleged to represent the democratic spirit while the antithesis was supposed to be embodied in Hitler the totalitarian. But the orientations of Chamberlain to the British people may however be analysed under the same conditions of temperature and pressure as those of Hitler to the German people. The democratic spirit of Chamberlain was perhaps apparent in his flying to and fro between England and Germany in order to talk it over with the British people. Humanly speaking, what was Hitler doing all this time? Most probably he was likewise consulting the *vox populi*.

The manner in which Chamberlain was discussing the international situation with the "people" is not much known to the world. In the same way, nor has the world been vouchsafed to know of the manner in which Hitler was taking it over with the people. Then, again, it may be surmized that the number of British individuals (and possibly institutions?) with whom Chamberlain came into creative contact during this period was not more than that of the Germans with whom Hitler is likely to have conferred. The world is by all means formally convinced that its peace has been saved virtually by the *tete-à-tetes* of two individuals. The professional democrat or anti-despot and the professional totalitarian despot or anti-democrat should appear then to have been made of the same psycho-political *Gestalt*.

The Leviathan has not yet been thoroughly swept off the British constitution. Nor is the *contrat social*, individual liberty, general

will, people's voice, democracy or freedom of the people, entirely silenced in the totalitarian *Staatsraeson* of the Nazis.

In spite of his traditional British ideology Chamberlain is a despotocrat. In spite of his Nazi philosophy Hitler is a democrat. Chamberlain knows how to ignore the British Parliament when he wills it. The British Cabinet is indeed an organ of despotocracy. Hitler has deliberately abolished *Parlamentarismus*. But he knows how to serve *vox populi* and obey the popular will.

VOX POPULI IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA

India is neither an internationally free country like England, France, Germany or Japan, nor a Dominion of the British Commonwealth, nor even a Colony as understood in the British constitution. It is a dependency without camouflage of any sort, and the Indian polity is an embodiment of the total negation of freedom? Or, positively speaking, is it a specimen of the hundred-per-cent. *Leviathanic Gestalt*?

We ignore, for the time being, the relations of the British elements as operating in Indian with the British constitution in the U. K. We are interested in the rôle of the Indian people in the Indian polity. Let us psycho-analyze the Indian elements in the administration of India since, say, about the middle of the eighteenth century.

The power conferred on the British East India Company by the then Indian "Emperor of India" (1755) was registered in a *firman* or charter which was by all means a document of *contrat social*, general will and *vox populi*. Submission to the exigencies of the times was forced upon the people, no matter what the exact number of the responsible and creative persons, as a deliberate and freely willed course of action. The transfer of power was an act of free choice on the part of the Indian peoples or princes. The people, the folk, the demos did not revolt against the transfer of power from one hand to the other. Nor did it seek to create a new destiny for itself by organizing an alliance with the French East India Company as the rival of the British.

Not only tacitly but in so many words did the people accept the position which gradually grew into one of dependency. It was not before the Wahabi movement (1825-40) of the Mussalmans or the Hindu-Moslem united events of 1857 that the free choice, general

will, *vox populi* and *contrat social* tried to express themselves in a contrary direction. The orientations of the folk or *vox populi* subsequently took a new form in the Indian National Congress (1885), the glorious *swadesi* revolution of 1905 and the consequent movements for *swaraj* (self-rule). The establishment of the Congress Government in most of the Indian provinces in 1937 exhibits the latest *Gestalt* in the expansion of *general will* or folk-power in the political milieu.

Verily, even in a dependency it is possible to detect the march of the demos or the folk from point to point and achievement to achievement. Freedom, therefore, has been growing, expanding, nay, broadening down from precedent to precedent in a sub-continent which possesses neither external freedom nor a Dominion status and is not even a Colony of the British type.

The analysis may be carried to the constitutional and administrative regulations relating to the Indian possessions of the British people since 1757. Each one of the diverse legislative Acts during this period of eighteen decades down to the Government of India Act (1935) is a document which registers step by step, perhaps inch by inch, the processes by which the despotocrat of the Leviathanic *Gestalt* is being influenced, controlled and modified by the forces operating from the people's side, *vox populi*, freedom, self-determination, rights of the masses, the illiterates and the poor. Even in an internationally subject country freedom-in-democracy or democracy-in-freedom is a psycho-political and socio-moral reality, and this freedom or democracy is capable of growth, expansion and evolution. Since the establishment of the Congress-Raj in 1937 in the majority of Indian regions the demand for freedom, more freedom and still more freedom has not ceased however. Young India to-day as the Young Indias of 1905 and 1885 is crying still :

We have climbed a height indeed,
But, alas, the highest is yet to come.

Freedom-in-democracy or democracy-in-freedom is then not absolute. It is a phenomenon of doses and degrees, it admits of "more or less," it changes forms and external modes of expression, it implies relativities in value. The other side of the psycho-political *Gestalt*, the despotic factor, the Leviathanic element also automatically follows suit. Despotocracy may very often appear to be absent or it may seem to be the most prominent. It may be once in a while much

too outspoken or at times pretend to be non-existent. The constitutional forms may consciously or unconsciously seek to hide it from public gaze in order to give a sop to the *intelligentszia* of a particular brand. But the psycho-analysis of political *Gestalt* cannot be bamboozled into the conviction that despotocracy is a thing of the past anywhere on earth.

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AS EMBODIMENT OF DEMO-DESPOTOCRACY

The Indian National Congress itself, as a power, virtually an *imperium in imperio* to a certain extent, may be subjected to political psycho-analysis. Its constitution today in 1938 is factually almost as despoto-democratic or demo-despotic as it was when first called into being (1885).

The Congress High Command—the Leviathan of Indian freedom movement—has during the entire course of its history comprised from time to time just a few individuals or families, both Hindu and Moslem. These individuals or families are invariably those that represent Bodin's *les nerfs de la république*, the sinews of war, i.e., bullion. The bullion has in certain regions, e.g., Bengal, Bihar, U.P., etc., been mainly feudalistic-zamindari in origin. It has been derived to a certain extent from the upper rungs of the legal profession throughout India. The financial resources of the newly established industrial bourgeoisie—capitalistic individuals or families—have also been quite in evidence especially in Bombay.

Whatever be the source, it is this bullion and the power associated with it that have been lording it over the Congress movement from beginning to end. The power of the purse in Congress circles is manifest with equal force in the philanthropic activities of the millionaires who keep some of their favourite leaders and sub-leaders on the go not only with carriages and automobiles as well as travelling expenses but also with *dal-roti* and other paraphernalia of mundane existence and social efficiency or prestige. The moneyed individuals or families have known likewise how to utilize or exploit the idealists, the martyrs, the prophets, the poets, the novelists, the intellectuals, the so-called natural leaders, the journalists, and the youngmen in order to build up the despotic general staff of the Congress.

The loaves and fishes, whatever they be, the Council-memberships of the entire period or the ministerships of today as well as high-

salaried Government positions and titles of honour—have been enjoyed by the richer families among the Congress leaders at the cost, generally speaking, of the patriotic martyrs and self-sacrificing youngmen. This is one side of the shield,—the sinister aspect of Hindu-Moslem leadership in the Indian freedom movement. This analysis would be valid in regard to the Muslim League also.

Could the demos, the *vox populi*, general will, the masses, democracy, however, be at any time overlooked, ignored or entirely suppressed by the Congress institutions, the Congress High Command, or other nationalistic and semi-nationalistic associations of the Hindus and Mussalmans? Never. The very expediency of exploiting the intellectual and self-sacrificing poor men compelled the *Nabobs* of the Congress to cultivate *camaraderie* with the man in the street and enabled the man in the street to hobnob somewhat with the former. Even at the start, for instance, the democratic factors acted as a leaven in the Congress nucleus. Relatively poorer individuals were found useful and therefore acceptable as colleagues. Economic or financial upstarts, the *nouveaux riches* have always succeeded by hook or by crook in making themselves *persona grata* to the Congress oligarchy. Necessarily, therefore, persons with no traditional, hereditary or extraordinary family claims, men of non-higher castes and so forth have had to be taken into the Congress coteries. This is as true of the All-Indian as of provincial and district leadership, both Hindu and Mussalman.

The history of the Congress High Command is thus on a small but appreciable scale a record of class-upheaval and social revolution such as has been going on in the country at large. An outstanding constitutional and social fact is this *digvijaya* (world-conquest) of the demos within the Congress movement, the *charaiveti* (march on) of popular will in the nationalist institutions of India. The steady rise and intrusion of the poorer and inferior classes into the folds of the propertied and the superior have had to be tolerated by the Mussalman leaders as much as by the Hindus. Consequently the acquisition of power in the Congress and the Muslim League deliberations by the lower middle class, non-superior castes, non-dominant races, the Momins among the Mussalmans, and so forth, is a reality, however meagre, in recent times. Indeed, the impacts of the folk of all sorts on the higher and the richer constitute the veritable socio-political and ethico-spiritual background of the nationalist movement in India. This has been the

general feature of the movement especially under the influence of the *Swadeshi* "ideas of 1905."

During the last decade or so it is the expansion of the same popular, *contrat social*, democratic and mass power in Indian Congress and Muslim League circles that we have been encountering. This is being achieved because of the socialistic onslaughts on the Leviathan of the Congress High Command and to a certain extent of the Muslim League authorities. Socialism has invaded the Congress and other nationalist citadels from within and without, as well as from the right and the left, from Amsterdam, Geneva and Moscow. It is to be understood that psycho-socially and in terms of moral and spiritual values socialism, no matter of what brand, is but an intensification of democracy-in-freedom or freedom-in-democracy. Socialism as the cult of power for the unpropertied and the illiterate is the latest form of freedom for mankind in East and West. In India also the exercise and enjoyment of power—political, economic and cultural—not only by the lower middle classes but also by her artisans, workingmen, peasants, pariahs and depressed—whether scheduled or un-scheduled, both Hindu and Moslem, in a substantial and effective manner has grown into the demands of socialism within and outside the Congress institutions.

Contrat social, democracy or folk-power has then been advancing even in its latest and newest forms—although perhaps in homoeopathic doses—in the atmosphere of the Congress Leviathan. The Bastille of Congress despotocracy has never been and bids fair never to be safe from the *charivari* of the storm-troopers of the Indian demos.

DEMOCRACY IN SOVIET DESPOTOCRACY

The three notorious Leviathans of today are the formal and professed dictatorships in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Of these the first is known to be the dictatorship of the proletariat. The others are alleged to be capitalistic dictatorships. For the present we are not interested in the questions of socialism or communism vs. capitalism, the proletariat *vis-à-vis* the bourgeoisie, or class struggle as contrasted with class-solidarity. Our main interest is for the time being focused on the democracy-despotocracy dichotomy. We ask ourselves: Are these three despotocracies exclusively despotocratic or dictatorial? Or do even they also exhibit the *contrat social*, the folk-element, democracy?

The constitution of Soviet Russia as defined by the treaty or Act of July 1923 recognizes eleven autonomous republics and thirteen autonomous areas. The democratic features of an autonomy were unknown in Czarist Russia. The soviets or *sabhas* (i.e. assemblies or councils) are the fundamental features of the Russian dictatorship. Membership of these *sabhas* is elective. The suffrage admits one member per 100 inhabitants. And territorially speaking, wherever there is a group of at least 300 persons there is a soviet. Nobody can remain a member for more than one year at a time. The soviets meet twice a week. The meanest soviets of the smallest and poorest rural regions or villages have jurisdiction not only over general administration but also over the police. As for the towns or urban areas their soviets are entrusted with municipal administration. By the Act of 1935 secret ballot was inaugurated.

Evidently the peasants and workers—the poorer classes—of Soviet Russia have been introduced for the first time to methods by which they can know, feel, taste and exercise political power which even the middle and the higher classes of the Russia of the Czars could not dream of previous to 1917. Add to this that it is these primary soviets—rural, urban and factory—that elect the members of the “provincial” congresses. The members of the supreme congress are elected from the soviets and the provincial congresses.

It is clear that the folk, the masses, the demos can have their hands and poke their noses in everything from the lowest to the highest rung of the political system of Soviet Russia. In so far as suffrage and election are considered to be the keys to or foundations of the democratic philosophy and constitution, it is the height of absurdity to deny the existence of democracy in this dictatorship of the proletariat. Democracy will have to be pronounced to be a reality of Soviet Russian despotocracy. The constitutional developments in Czarist Russia from 1905 to 1917 pale into insignificance before the doses and kinds of freedom and democracy such as are being enjoyed by the Russian masses under the Soviet regime.

The latest constitutional measure of Soviet Russia, the Act of February 1938, has provided for a bicameral legislature in keeping with the traditional principles of “Western democracies.” Under the previous Acts voting was enjoyed exclusively by the poorer *mozjika* (peasants) and categorically denied to the *kulaks* (richer farmers), private traders and the bourgeois classes. They were disfranchized

because they were treated as "class enemies." But in 1938 even these class enemies have been enfranchized. Suffrage has become genuinely universal. Even non-communists have been admitted to suffrage.⁴

THE CORPORATION DEMOCRACY AND FASCIST ABSOLUTISM

Nor do the democratic elements in the Fascist Leviathan deserve to be lost sight of. As in all "Western democracies", in Fascist Italy also the pre-dictatorial Senate continues to function as the second chamber. The old tradition of liberalism may then be said to be preserved in a formal manner. The *Camera dei Deputati* (400 members) has not been formally abolished as yet although it has lost functional importance on account of the virtual hegemony of a new organ, the Fascist Grand Council (of 24 members) established in 1923. Elections are still in vogue. In 1934, the year of the last election to the *Camera*, over 10 million persons, i. e., nearly one-fourth of the entire Italian population, came to exercise their franchise out of the total number of nearly 10-12 million registered voters. In other words, democratic paraphernalia is quite in evidence.

In the meantime another new organ of a vital significance and influential character came into being in 1926. This is the *Consiglio Nazionale delle Corporazioni* (National Council of Corporations). This body has been modified and reorganized several times in order to cope with the diversities of the economic and social interests and is perhaps after some radical transformations and expansions going to replace the *Camera* itself in the course of the next year. Representation, election, group interests, professional interests, and other items of democratic ideology and polity constitute the very life-blood of these corporations and their National Council.

It is in the primary units of this National Council that *vox populi* or democracy is the most audible in the dictatorship of Fascist Italy. The primary units are the nine *sindacati* (syndicates) and twenty-two *corporazioni* (corporations). It is their representatives that constitute the National Council.

⁴ For the constitutions of Czarist and Soviet Russia see H. R. Barnes: *History of Western Civilization*, Vol. II (New York, 1935), pp. 985-99; B. K. Sarkar: "Stalin as the Manager of Leninism, No. II" (*Calcutta Review*, September, 1939).

How extensive and profound are the contacts of these representatives and of the National Council with the folk, the people and the demos, although Fascism is formally totalitarian and despotic, will be apparent from an examination of the syndicates. The nine syndicates can be tabulated as follows:—

A. In Agriculture: (a) workingmen: four categories, (b) employers: four categories.

B. In Industry: (a) workingmen: twenty categories (b) employers: twenty-five categories.

C. In Trade and Commerce: (a) workingmen: five categories, (b) employers: thirty-seven categories.

D. In Banking and Insurance: (a) workingmen: four categories, (b) employers: twelve categories.

E. In the Arts and Professions: twenty-two categories.

In the fifth branch there are no categories of workingmen. In the other four branches the syndicates of workingmen function independently of those of the employers. It is from each one of these syndicates, i. e., from those of the workingmen as well as of the employers, that representatives are sent to the National Council.

We shall now analyze the morphology of the twenty-two corporations.⁵ Each and every corporation is a joint body of workingmen and employers. Let us take, for instance, the corporation of chemical trades. It comprises the industry and trade in inorganic acids, fertilizers, explosives, pigments, soap, tanning products, pharmaceutical goods and the other chemical manufactures. The corporation has 68 members among whom the workingmen and employers are equal in number. It is from such corporations each representing the workingmen and employers in the most diverse agricultural, industrial, commercial and professional field that the National Council derives some of its members.

We are not interested in the economic aspects of the corporative organization for the time being. The conviction is, however, forced upon us from the political and administrative standpoint, that it is the power of the *popolo*, the masses, the workingmen, peasants and clerks, that is constantly shaping the destiny of totalitarian and dictatorial

⁵ G. Bortolotto: *Diritto Corporativo* (Milan 1934), pp. 67, 115-21, 159-75, 178, 535-43; B. K. Sarkar: "The Corporative State," "The Corporations and Syndicates of Italian Economy" (*Calcutta Review*, October, 1933, August, 1938).

Fascist Italy. This is but another instance of a constitution being democratic in spite of the philosophy of its founder. In other words, the *stato corporativo* of Fascist Italy is demo-despotic like so many other states and semi-states of today.

In case the *Camera dei Deputati* is replaced by the Chamber of Corporations next year it will be a parliament of a type not yet known to history as based on professional or occupational representation.⁶ And in any case the Corporative Parliament will serve to confer on the Italian people a democracy the like of which was never conceived by Italian thinkers or statesmen, not even by Mussolini's friend and philosopher, Rocco, in *L'Idea Nazionale* (Rome, May, 1914), or in *Rassegna Italiana* (Rome, 1930), and of course never tasted by the men and women of Italy.

It is worth while to recall that from 1904 to 1915⁷ the Giolitti Ministry did not furnish the Italian people with anything more than a "dictatorial parliamentarism." Thirty million people used in those days to be governed by some thirty persons for the benefit of three hundred thousand families. The Senate was a non-entity and the Chamber of Deputies apathetic. It is in that perspective that the doses of freedom-in-democracy as obtaining in *lo stato Mussoliniano* and in the corporative state of today and tomorrow are to be appraised.

While discussing the democratic or *contrat social* aspect of Fascist corporations attention may be drawn to the Italian scholar Giorgio Del Vecchio's interpretation of these law-making institutions as embodiments of *statualizzazione* (statalization) and as associations almost on a par with the state itself (*Saggi Interno allo Stato*, Rome, 1935). Del Vecchio's conception of these corporations is to a certain extent influenced by the German jurist Gierke's *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (1875). But the medieval guilds of Europe or the *srenis*⁸ of ancient and medieval India cannot be regarded as precursors of the Fascist *corporazioni*. The old guilds of artisans or traders were masters' associations whereas Mussolini has constructed solidaristic organizations in which employers, workingmen and government officials function together.

⁶ Benoit: *La Crise de l'Etat Moderne* (Paris, 1907); Lautaud and Poudeux: *La Representation Professionnelle* (Paris, 1927); B. K. Sarkar: *Political Philosophies since 1905* (Madras, 1928), pp. 181, 193, 197.

⁷ For the pre-War political thoughts and movements in Italy see G. Volpe: *L'Italia in Commisso* (Milan, 1931), pp. 33-113, 145-55, 205-08.

⁸ See the chapter on "Srenis (Guilds) of Peasants, Artisans and Merchants" in B. K. Sarkar: *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Leipzig, 1922).

THE PEOPLE'S WILL IN THE TOTALITARIAN FUHRERSCHAFT

The folk-factors, democratic elements and mass-features of the Nazi *Fuehrerschaft* (leaderocracy) are too obvious to be overlooked or ignored. In the first place, Hitler's Nazi Party is known as the *National-sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (National-Socialist German Workingmen's Party). It is as a workingmen's party and a socialist party that it was established in 1920. Its character as a labour organization and a socialistic movement has never been abandoned. In the second place, from 1920 to 1933 the Nazi Party was just a party among the numerous political parties of Germany. It had to fight its way slowly and tediously through the labyrinth of German economic, social and political vicissitudes. Every step that it took was no less legal and constitutional than that taken by the other parties. The methods by which the Nazi Party ultimately defeated the other Parties at the polls and succeeded in conquering the German people, so to say, were legitimate and popular or democratic. It is *vox populi*, the general will, *contrat social*, the plebiscite, the people's self-determination that raised the Nazi Party—first to the position of a power, then to that of a great power, and finally to that of the only power in the internal politics of Germany.⁹ In 1933 the Nazi Party was entitled to describe itself as the People's anointed, nay, almost identical with the people in ideology and number. It is in any case a striking instance of the survival of the fittest established as the result of a lengthy tug-of-war carried on in the open and under the free public gaze.

The character of the Nazi Party as the people's organization has not changed since its conquest of Germany. It is not a one-man show although very often it looks like that. The Nazi *Partei* (Party) is intensely diversified, multiform and hydra-headed. The *Fuehrer* (leader) has a tremendously vast *Gefolgschaft* (following) to attend to and this follower-group is as complex in age-composition, economic and social status, pursuit of interests and professions as the entire German nation. No human being on earth could ever advise, instruct, lead or command so many men, women and children from day to day without at the same time listening to, following and submitting to the wishes, requirements, nay, demands of all sorts and all grades. The impacts of *vox populi*, the mandates of the masses and the classes can under such

⁹ B. K. Sarkar: *The Hitler-State* (Calcutta, 1933); "The People and the State in Neo-Democracy" (*Calcutta Review*, July, 1933).

conditions influence, modify and control the ideals, ideas and ambitions of the leader in a regular manner as a matter of course. The agencies through which the leader is led by the masses are quite large, extensive and varied.

Some of the offices which belong to the *Partei* are those for schools, for professional organization, for civic life, for officials, for law and justice. The storm-troopers' organizations as well as the youth institutions likewise belong to the *Partei*. The automobile unions, the student federations, the women's organizations, the teachers' associations are also regarded as some of the *Partei* organs. Among the *Verbaende* (associations) legally affiliated to the *Partei* are those of medical men, lawyers, social welfare workers, engineers, and technologists. Last but not least there is the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (German Labour Front), est. 1933, which, comprising as it does the majority of the German people, is one of the organizations enjoying *Partei* affiliation.

The *Partei* is thus an epitome of the entire German *Volk* and is inextricably bound up with it in its morning-to-evening functions. The contacts between the people and the party in Nazi Germany are, besides, brought about by normal constitutional channels, as manifest in the existence of so many permanent offices and associations.¹⁰

The affiliation of the German Labour Front to the *Partei* (March, 1935) is of extraordinary importance as having assured the democratic and mass character of the Nazi state. In the first place, the head of the German Labour Front is the head of the entire organization of the Nazi movement, i.e., of the Nazi *Partei*. In the second place, the word "labour" as understood in the Nazi constitution is all-inclusive. It comprises brain and brawn activities of all denominations. The Front is the organization of all *schaffenden Deutschen* (creative Germans). It comprises every member of the pre-Nazi workingmen's unions, employees' unions and employers' unions. No worker, no clerk and no employer is permitted to stay outside the Front, and the rights of workers, clerks and employers as members of this organization are identical. In the third place, the intimate legal association of

¹⁰ G. Ruehle: *Das Dritte Reich*, Vol. II (Berlin, 1936), pp. 267, 277-79, 344 (*Volksabstimmung*); Vol. III (1935), pp. 64, 81, 141-53 (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*); O. Koellreuter: *Deutsches Verfassungsrecht* (Berlin, 1935), pp. 145-46, 143-52 (*Führerschaft*), 185-87; B. K. Sarkar: "The People's State as conceived by Van den Bruck and the Third Reich of Today" (*Calcutta Review*, February, 1937).

the Labour Front with the *Partei* renders the Nazi state a state of the people for the people and by the people.

Not the least striking feature of Nazi democracy is the *Volksabstimmung*, plebiscite, appeal to the people, referendum, or mandate from the people, which is resorted to on all questions of major importance.

A state like the Nazi state of Germany, although avowedly totalitarian and autocratic, could not have been conceived, created, or administered by the traditional despots of the world. In other words, neither the Hohenzollerns from, say, Frederick the Great to Wilhelm II, nor the Bourbons of France nor the Tudor and Stuart autocrats of England, can, strictly speaking, be regarded as the ideological forerunners of the *Fuehrer* of Nazi Germany. The doses and kinds of democracy to which the *Fuehrer* is used were unknown to the God's anointed of Germany, France and England of those days.

The Nazi demo-despotocrat of today has in his socio-political *Gestalt* hardly anything in common with the demo-despotocrats of history. The contents and forms of democracy in the Nazi Leviathan are *sui generis*.

A THIRD EMPIRE FOR REPUBLICAN FRANCE

In spite of all seeming *digvijayas* (world-conquests) of dictatorship the expansion of democracy is then the most outstanding fact of societal organizations and theories throughout the world. A verification of this standpoint may be found in the ideology of Professor Otto Koellreutter's *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Staatslehre* or Sketch of General Political Theory (Tuebingen, 1933) and *Deutsches Verfassungrecht* or German Law of the Constitution (Berlin, 1935).

The conceptions or rather hopes of a French author for his *patrie* may likewise be cited as another verification. In 1934 was published at Paris Professor Emile Lasbax's *La France ira-t-elle à un Troisième Empire ?* (Is France moving towards a Third Empire ?)

Entire social existence exhibits the rhythm of three items, and this rhythm repeats itself in history, says Lasbax. In the political domain the triad consists of royalty, republic and empire in succession. The regime of royalty is followed by that of republic and the regime of republic by that of empire. But royalty, republic and empire are to be taken as constitutional types of a very general character. Each is capable of denoting the most diverse varieties of political experience.

In this conception of the political categories it would be absurd according to Lasbax to take all imperialisms as nothing but Bonapartist imperialism. Each and every variety of imperialism is not to be taken as belonging ideologically to the "right" or as equivalent to putting republican legality to sleep. There is such a thing as *l'imperialisme démocratique* in Seillière's terminology.

The "balance of history" furnishes us today with *coup d'Etats* leading to authoritarian governments, bolshevism, fascism and national-socialism, such as involve the destruction of the liberty of individuals. A new "civism" has been developing which represents the philosophy neither of the "subject" of old monarchies nor of the "citizen" of modern republics. And this does not appear to be transient or transitory. These dictatorships have come to stay and cannot be regarded as constituting a danger to established order.

It is not in the irrational impulses of a crowd that the explanation of these phenomena is to be sought but in the vital processes of a social organism. Communism and reaction against communism—these two conflicting currents among the peoples have come to a common platform of mutual solidarity. One does not encounter here the caprices of individuals like Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler. Rather, it is the powerful collective forces operating in the depths and not on the surface of society that are incarnated by these individuals.

The cycle of royalty followed by republic and of that again by empire does not happen arbitrarily or by accident. It represents a vital rhythm corresponding to the rhythm of individual lives: infancy, puberty, youth, manhood, etc. In politics as in individual life every transition implies a crisis and this crisis can be "foreseen" and "treated" by the biologist, the hygienist or the medical expert. There is in this sense such a thing as the medicine of societies which should be able to declare that no regime of political life is destined to be eternal or that a regime which was necessary and valuable in the past is not likely to be useful in the future. The political regimes cannot be changed, postponed or prevented at one's own sweet will just as one cannot possibly alter the succession of infancy, adolescence, etc. The succession of the three political regimes has been seen in ancient Greece, ancient Rome as well as twice in French history down to 1789-1870.

From 1870 to 1875 the constitution of France was factually royalist, prepared as it was for King Henry V, Count of Chambord.

It was not before 1875 that the republic was formally proclaimed although the constitution continues to be republican only in name. Sociologically, then, the cycle is now ripe for an empire, believes Lasbax as prophet.

The dictators of today do not have to catch the imagination of the masses by riding a black horse in the uniform of a general with a hat of white feathers, says he. They are clothed in the daily dress of the ordinary citizens, the democratic costume of the parliamentarians. Indeed, they made bold to frequent the lobbies of Parliament. Nay, it is not to the "right" that they care to address their charms and sorceries but to the "left."

According to Lasbax, the progressive march towards the empire is already in evidence in France. The Senate is becoming more influential than the *Chambre des Députés*. The social conscience of the French people is getting used to ordinances, decrees, full powers, etc., of the government. The Legislature is being sacrificed inch by inch to the Executive.

The empire as conceived by Lasbax is an intermediate form of government. It is a mixture of royalty and republic. It is a synthesis of contraries.

The empire of Bonaparte was an original synthesis of the royalty of Louis XIV and the republican reforms of the Convention (1793). The Second Empire synthesized the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe and the plebiscite suffrage of the National Assembly (1848). Exactly in the same manner a new imperialism, when it makes its appearance in France, is bound to combine the parliamentary monarchism of Henry V (the original constitution of 1875) with the subsequent achievements of the present Third Republic after it has successively passed through conservatism, radicalism, radical-socialism and socialism.

The French people finds itself today in the *milieu* of the birth-throes of the Third Empire. And the pivot of this imperialism in France, in Germany under Hitler, is communism or socialism, the latest phase of economism,¹¹ not the forms, more or less monarchistic, of old spiritual sovereignties or theocracies. And it is here that the Third Empire encounters on a common ground the "neo-socialism"

¹¹ B. K. Sarkar: "The New Labour Laws and Socio-Economic Planning in France" *Calcutta Review*, June 1937; cf. R. de Feilbiers, *L'Impérialisme démocratique* (Paris, 1907).

of today which is trying to get itself relieved of Marxist extremism and the materialistic excesses of Marxian ideology.

Relativities in the Demo-Despotic Gestalt

The categories used in Lasbax's discussion are different from those in the present paper. But it is interesting to observe that while Koellreutter in his interpretations of the Nazi constitution is stressing the *Volk* (folk) basis of the *Fuehrerschaft* (leaderocracy), Lasbax's orientations incline him to the belief that the Leviathan is advancing and desirably advancing in his French democracy. The *rapprochement* between democracy and despotocracy is the common feature in the ideology of the German and the French scholars.

Inductively speaking, then, as analytically also we are led to the thesis that hardly anywhere on earth has there been ever a pure Leviathan or a pure *contrat social*. A realistic analysis of political structures and ideologies, forms and relations presents us invariably with an amalgam of the two. The political *Gestalt* of the groups, tribes, races, nations and so forth can be explained only by a new synthetic approach which could try to combine the conflicting principles of Hobbes and Rousseau and adapt the *rapprochement* to the diverse conditions of the regions and the ages.

The synthesis or juxtaposition of *danda* and *dharma* should be considered to be the fundamental key to the explanation of the diverse expressions of political life in the two Hemispheres and through all the epochs of human life.

There are men who are ashamed of despotocracy as there are men who are haters of democracy. On the other hand, the name of persons going mad over democracy is legion just as it is not difficult to come across persons who are frank in the eulogy of despotocracy. But in the realistic view of political psychology and political sociology democracy cannot do without despotocracy and despotocracy cannot do without democracy. The two polaristic categories constitute the irreducible minimum of the political *Gestalt* of mankind.

The co-existence of conflicting tendencies in the individual *psyche* and the so-called group-mind can be well illustrated objectively in the cycle of practically every revolution in the world's history. Revolutions as a rule have had their radical or extremist phases followed by con-

trary currents or movements.¹² The socio-political reactions do not take excessively long periods but make their appearance in a very few years, nay, few months, as in economic crises or industrial fluctuations. The waves of extremism and moderatism in the English revolution of 1640-60 as well as of the French revolution of 1789-1815 are well known. The extremist Leninism (1918) of Soviet Russia also had to cry halt at the New Economic Policy of 1922, *i.e.*, at the third or fourth year. Since then there has been going on a period of Leninism No. II., *i.e.*, a reaction towards moderatism which is being conducted with success under the Stalin regime.

It is the pluralistic *Gestalt* of the mind as understood by Ribot, Pareto, Freud, Thorndike, McDougall and other psychologists that should appear to be the *milieu* and foster-ground of diametrically opposite categories like mobocracy and autocracy, mass-rule and tyranny, liberty or license and restraint or coercion following each other in quick and short transitional stages. The human mind, individual or collective, may be said to be quite capable of assimilating the reaction almost as easily or swiftly as the revolution. The regime of reason and the regime of emotion, sentiment, instinct, the unconscious, etc., can be digested almost indifferently and simultaneously by individuals and groups. The naturalness and inevitable character of demo-despotocracy and despoto-democracy are to be oriented to this fundamental pluralism of the human mind.

But at this stage it is necessary to practise caution in regard to the universal application of the demo-despotic or despoto-democratic formula. Every polity has been found to be a function of democracy* multiplied by despotocracy*. But the values of x and y vary. They differ from region to region, group to group, race to race, as well as from age to age. The demo-despotic features may be universal and eternal. But the *Gestalt* of each polity is different from that of the others. Each is marked by an individuality, idiosyncrasy, "group-personal" equation. In terms of political morphology there are demo-despotocracies and demi-despotocracies. Demo despoto-cracy is relative and conditional. The individualities, divergences and relativities are occasioned by the differences in the doses and forms of the democratic elements as well as the difference in the doses and

¹² A. Jassain: "Le Succès des partis extrêmes dans les révolutions" (*Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, Paris, May-June 1936); P. Sorokin: *The Sociology of Revolution* (New York, 1926); B. K. Sarkar: "Prosperity and Depression" (*Indian Economic Journal*, Allahabad, July, 1938); W. E. Hocking: *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), pp. xi, 49-50.

forms of the despotic elements constituting each and every polity. The variations in the *Gestalt* are the results of diversity in the atoms, molecules or strains of the two orders of socio-moral values which go to form every constitutional amalgam.

The atoms, molecules or strains in each of the three Leviathans of today are so varied that morphologically it would be extremely difficult to trace any family likeness between the Russian soviets, the Italian corporations and the *Verbaende* (associations) of the German *Fuehrerschaft*. We have already noted likewise that neither the "new monarchy" of the British Tudors and Stuarts nor the "absolutism" of the French Louises, nor even the Hegelian authoritarianism of the Hohenzollerns can be cited in the same breath as the *Fuehrer* polity of the Nazis.

It would, again, be morphologically untenable to establish an equation between the democratic features of contemporary demo-despotic England, France, U.S.A., etc., and those of demo-despotic Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, or those of the British Colonies, the Government of India and the Indian National Congress.

The psychologic-analytical as well as inductive-realistic study of the political morphologies should convince us that the presence, survival or even expansion of the Leviathan, the *dayda*, should not blind anybody to the reality of the growth and expansion of *contrast*, *social*, *dharma*, folk-power, democracy and mass-energism. Despotism, absolutism, totalitarianism may persist and may change forms. But all the same, power, privileges, manhood, freedom, chances for initiative, individuality, self-assertion are descending all the time from the lap of the gods, the upper ten thousands, into the hands and feet of the pariahs, the slaves, the paupers, and the illiterates. The progress, expansion or world-conquest (*digvijaya*) of democracy and socialism as phases of individual and collective freedom is one of the most solid items in the balance of societal developments.

CREATIVE DISEQUILIBRIUM vs. STATUS QUO

In the interest of further progress in regard to the conquest of freedom it is for the energists, idealists and futurists¹³ of every

¹³ B. K. Sarkar : *The Science of History* (London, 1912).

region, group or race to exhibit their yearnings after New Heavens by initiating creative disequilibrium of all forms adapted to the socio-economic and ethico-cultural conditions of their conjunctures. *Nana-srantya srirasti*, as says the *Aitareya Brahmana* (VII, 15) of Vedic literature. Prosperity is not for the person that is not tired with wanderings and movements. It cannot be desirable for mankind to rest at any point in the path of progress or of freedom. The struggle for freedom is eternal in every nook and corner of the two Hemispheres. So is freedom-preparedness.

Not even Indians—whether Hindu or Moslem—can be expected to remain ignorant of the methodology of progress or the dialectic in the conquest of freedom. The process belongs to the very nature of power as an individual and social force. Privileges and rights have hardly ever been surrendered by the upholders of the *statuts quo* to new individuals, races, groups, castes, or classes. The world is used to climbing like corals grave by grave that have a pathway sunword. In India as elsewhere freedom has to be wrested from the powers-that-be, inch by inch or mile by mile, as the case may be. Methods of sweet-reasonableness or attempts at mutual understanding in the relations between the vested interests and the challenging individuals or groups are rare in the annals of freedom, democracy and socialism. The Indian people *vis-à-vis* the administration as well as *vis-à-vis* the natural leaders, the Congress and other nationalist and patriotic associations has been but repeating the cosmic processes of conflicts between individuals, families, groups or classes.

Mankind has never learnt anything from the past experiences nor seriously understood the lessons of history. Perhaps the only lesson of history that is worth while to be remembered points to the fact that sweet-reasonableness is generated among the superior races, ruling classes, High Commands and so forth, if at all, only under exceptional circumstances. It does not make its appearance until and unless the individuals or groups capable of producing creative unrest, disharmony and disequilibrium have effectively demonstrated to the world that they are strong enough to extort justice, fair dealing, powers and positions from unwilling hands. At every stage in the struggle for or conquest of freedom there is the eternal problem of creative disequilibrium *vs. statuts quo*, i.e., a challenge to the questions closed.

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS STATISTICS IN INDIA *

DR. H. SINHA, M.SC., PH.D.,

Lecturer, Calcutta University and Hon. Joint Secretary, Indian Statistical Institute.

FROM THE KNOWN INTO THE UNKNOWN

IN Statistics there has been almost a revolution since the beginning of the present century—more definitely from Karl Pearson's work on chi-square distribution in 1900. Ever since the days of *Arthashastra* in India and ever since the time in Europe when Statistics was merely the science of statecraft, or a matter of "Political Arithmetick," we concerned ourselves with data of complete investigations and their presentation in an appropriate manner with the help of averages, measures of dispersion, forms of frequency distributions, etc. We studied in detail the field actually surveyed and never ventured from the known into the unknown. This venture began with the beginning of the present century. From partial investigations we tried to get at reliable estimates of the results of complete investigations without undertaking such investigations at all. What is more important, we could in every case give the limits of error through which the estimates derived from partial investigations could possibly differ from the results of full investigations.

ECONOMY OF SAMPLE INVESTIGATIONS

Such generalisation is of great practical importance. For complete investigations, although yielding accurate results, are subject to two fatal defects. In the first place, such investigations are costly and cannot be lightly undertaken except when adequate funds and trained staff are available. In the second place, there is great delay. In these days of economic and political unsettlement, it may frequently happen that by the time the results of complete investigation are available, conditions have changed to such an extent that the results, although accurate, are of no practical use whatsoever in guiding

* Based on an Address given before the Andhra University, Waltair, on December 2, 1938.

national economic policies. A post-mortem examination is something very different from a diagnosis. As a matter of fact, a post-mortem examination is of use only in so far as it helps a subsequent diagnosis.

MODERN STATES AND STATISTICS

The days of *laissez-faire* are definitely gone. For good or for evil, the States throughout the modern world are concerning themselves more and more with economic questions. The stake involved is so great that it is impossible for them to depend on mere guess work. They must have definite answers to definite questions of urgent national importance. In days of free trade, or of halting and apologetic protection, we needed only an academic discussion in the approved debating style on the question, free trade *versus* protection. But a State now has to discuss not the general question but is called upon to decide about the levy of a particular protective duty. Economists and statisticians should be able to give accurate and quantitative estimates of the advantages and disadvantages. Administrators and legislators must then decide whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages or not. Thus economists and statisticians must play their rôle in shaping national economic policies as much as administrators and legislators.

BRIDGING THE GAP

Such collaboration must lead to useful results in other ways as well. Administrators and legislators have much to learn from economists and statisticians about the methods of collecting, analysing and interpreting statistical data. On the other hand, economists and statisticians have equally to know many details about the actual scope and nature of official statistical data. There is a wide hiatus, which must be bridged by a body such as the Indian Statistical Institute with the help of its branches in the various provinces and the Indian States.

STATISTICS IN BUSINESS HOUSES

Such collaboration is necessary not only for wide national problems but even for private business houses. We have long passed the stage of small individual firms, when the proprietor was able to look

into all the details of his business himself. He did not require the services of a trained auditor for checking his accounts and of an expert cost accountant for exploring possible economies. Units of business have now become much too big for one brain to handle efficiently. In our college days, we used to hear a good deal against Government carrying on business enterprises. We argued that public enterprises under bureaucratic administration were bound to be less efficient because they worked under set rules with little or no initiative and without the magic of private gain. Now-a-days, however, that distinction has largely disappeared. The distinction, if any, has become very thin indeed. It follows, therefore, that whatever is true about the rôle of statistics in national economic policies is also true *mutatis mutandis* about the policies of private enterprises and business houses of an adequate scale.

GENERAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

It may be argued that a businessman knows everything necessary about his own business. For instance, a dealer in jute knows the probable demand, the probable supply and the probable trend of prices of the commodity with which he is directly concerned. But is this quite correct? Is not his business affected by general trade activity? It stands to reason that if trade is brisk, there will be a keen demand for packing materials such as gunnies and hessians and therefore for raw jute. It is for this reason that various indices of business activity have been made available for businessmen. For instance, "Capital" of Calcutta, a journal run by businessmen for their own benefit and not for the sake of any academic interest, publishes every month an index of business activity.

ESTIMATION OF STANDARDS FOR COMPARISON

In trade, in industry and in finance, there is an insistent demand for more and better statistics. Unless and until a businessman has standards of measurement obtained after accurate statistical analysis, he cannot judge the relative efficiency or inefficiency of his own business. For instance, unless the executive head of a cotton mill knows the optimum capital of an enterprise, its appropriate allocation in preference and ordinary shares and debenture bonds, its proper division into block account and working funds and so on, he cannot run his mill

efficiently. Nor can he know whether he is spending more on overhead charges than he should, until he has analysed the costs properly and compared his own costs with standard costs.

HOW SECRECY IS SECURED IN ENGLAND

It may be argued how it is possible to have data from other competing firms so as to arrive at approved standards. This is not an insoluble difficulty. For instance, in the course of my last visit to England, I found that the numerous Departmental Stores of that country had devised an ingenious plan for improving their efficiency. Prof. Plant of the London School of Economics had prepared a detailed *questionnaire* covering nine pages asking for particulars about volumes of sales, sale prices, purchase prices, rent and establishment charges, advertising costs, etc. These replies did not bear any names but bore secret check numbers known only to the Incorporated Association of Retail Distributors, of which the Departmental Stores were members. These replies, however, were sent not to the Association where these check numbers were known, but to the Economics and Statistics Division of the Bank of England, who extracted the necessary data for studying the internal trade positions, and published those results in their monthly *Statistical Summary*. The check numbers on the replies were changed by the Bank of England into another set of numbers known only to them and the replies were then forwarded to the London School of Economics for final analysis. It was not possible for Prof. Plant or any of his assistants to know which Departmental Store had sent which reply. If they found any figure suspicious or had any inquiry to make regarding any reply, they had to write to the Bank of England in the first instance quoting the check number passed on to them. The Bank of England referred to their own register and found out the check number assigned by the Incorporated Association of Retail Distributors who finally wrote to their own member regarding the point raised by the London School of Economics. The system was made advisedly complex so as to ensure secrecy. But I found that the system was working very smoothly indeed.

PARTIAL AND COMPLETE INVESTIGATIONS

This was a case of complete enumeration, or an enumeration as nearly complete as possible. But partial investigations by means of a

study of samples also give reasonably accurate results. Mr. Keynes told me about a striking instance of this in connection with his work for the Macmillan Committee. During the course of the inquiry, it was necessary to study the details of Bank advances, such as their amounts, the purposes for which they were taken, their period, their rate of interest, etc. It was argued that these could be procured only by the expenditure of considerable time and money. Mr. Keynes, however, turned up every hundredth account of a Bank's ledger and on the basis of the data for those advances arrived at certain figures. A Bank manager, who was also a member of the Macmillan Committee, was highly suspicious of such quick results and employed his huge staff in his numerous branches all over the country to prepare a similar statement on the basis of all the accounts. To his surprise he found that his statement obtained after so much delay and labour yielded practically the same results.

As a matter of fact, if the samples are properly chosen, we can from the study of the samples generalise about the whole body, technically called the population, within any assigned limit of error. For instance, if we desire to improve accuracy so as to have half as much error now as before, we must have four times as many samples as before. If we know the money and time at our disposal we can always carry on investigations strictly within those limits and state the resulting error.

UNREPRESENTATIVE PARTIAL INVESTIGATIONS

This technique of random sampling has been revolutionised in recent years. Unfortunately we have not advanced in practice as much as in theory. Even at the time of the last Banking Committee, each Provincial and State Committee was asked to survey the economic condition of a number of "typical" villages and generalise on the basis of the data so collected. The procedure must necessarily defeat its own purpose. In selecting the villages, one must necessarily have a bias; he must necessarily be guided by his own ideas of what is typical. The result will be that the sample of typical villages of one investigator will yield results which are different from those obtained from a second sample of villages chosen by a second investigator. Such partial investigations are so unrepresentative that they are not worthy of any serious statistical consideration.

REPRESENTATIVE PARTIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Sample, then, to be of any practical use, must be representative. Such samples may be either purposive or random. Purposive samples are designed in such a manner as to represent the universe or population in the miniature. Random sample again may be chosen in two ways. Thus we may have ordinary random samples, that is to say, each item in the universe or population has the same chance of being included in the sample. Or, we may have stratified random samples, that is to say, we divide up the universe or population into a number of strata and choose our sample by taking up items from these different strata in a random manner. To fix our ideas, suppose we are investigating the family budgets of jute mill workers in Calcutta. We may choose any 500 families out of the total number in a perfectly random manner. Or, we may divide up the families into several groups within definite ranges of income, Rs. 50 to Rs. 60, Rs. 60 to Rs. 70 and so on. We may then choose our sample by selecting families out of these different income groups separately. Even this does not exhaust all the possible methods. For, in stratified random samples, we may either select the same number of families within each income group or varying numbers from the different groups in accordance with certain principles. I do not desire to go into these complexities here. My purpose here is to emphasize the obvious fact that if our investigation is to be of any worth, it must be carefully planned and executed.

POSITION IN INDIA

In India, it frequently happens that both planning and execution are defective and the results obtained are vitiated by this double error. I heard an amusing story about Indian Statistics from one of my friends, who was then a Deputy Superintendent of Police. On one occasion he was asked to count the number of donkeys in his Sub-division. The report was required by the Government of India and came through the usual official channel—from the Government of India to the Government of Bengal, from the Bengal Government to the Commissioners of Divisions, from the Divisional Commissioners to the District Magistrates, from the District Magistrates to the Sub-divisional Police Officers. The results had also to be communicated through the same official channel, and my friend had only two days

for counting the number of donkeys in his Sub-division. The orders of the Government of India were urgent and no extension of time was possible. Before the two days were out, my friend took his figure to the District Magistrate, an Englishman belonging to the Indian Civil Service, who at once said, "The figure is absolutely worthless. It cannot be incorporated in my statement." My friend pleaded, "Sir, you gave me only two days. I telegraphed to the officers-in-charge of all the police stations of my Sub-division, asked them to ascertain from all the washermen in their respective police stations the number of their donkeys and then send the figures on to me. I could do no better." The Magistrate then said, "Your figures are wrong no doubt, but not very wrong either. If you add two to your figure, it will be absolutely correct." My friend looked in surprise. The Magistrate said, "Don't you see that I am a donkey in giving you this senseless order for counting donkeys in a Sub-division in two days and you are another donkey in carrying out that idiotic order!"

OFFICIAL STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF THE INDIAN
STATISTICAL INSTITUTE

If the truth must be told, some of our official statistics are of this idiotic variety. They are not worth the paper on which they are written. Some time ago, the Indian Statistical Institute appointed a Committee, the Official Statistics Committee, to go into the defects of official statistics and to suggest remedies. A number of persons and institutions sent memoranda and suggestions which were carefully scrutinised by me as the Secretary of that Committee. Four principal defects were pointed out, with a number of illustrations, *viz.* (a) delay in publication, (b) lack of information in regard to the significance and scope of published statistics, (c) gaps and defects in existing statistics and (d) lack of co-ordination. I need not go into these details here as the report of the Committee is available in *Sankhyā*, Vol 2, Part 3. Several suggestions were made, some of which have already been accepted by Government. To give a notable instance, the current issue of the *Statistical Abstract for British India* is a great improvement on the previous issues. Most of the tables now show the sources from which the data are reproduced so that figures can be brought up to date without much difficulty, by referring to the sources indicated.

Several unimportant tables have been discarded and some new and important tables included in the current issue of the *Abstract*.

IMPROVEMENT OF OFFICIAL MACHINERY

It is not my purpose here to go into details, but merely to mention the fact that Indian official statistics have always been marked by a series of compromises, not only between "what is ideally desirable and what is actually obtainable," but also between statistical needs and administrative purposes. Statistical data now are, and must continue for many years to be, merely a bye-product of administrative departments. It is idle to suggest an independent body of reporters either purely voluntary or directly statistical. It is felt, however, that a substantial improvement may be immediately effected at a small cost if the staff which checks and interprets the primary data is strengthened in the provinces and the States on the one hand and at the centre on the other.

PUBLIC INTEREST

There also remains the question of public interest in Statistics. As the Royal Commission on Agriculture so aptly points out:

"The whole basis of Statistics in India urgently requires broadening. It should rest not on the work of a few government officials, however able, but on the support of the informed public, and, through them, on the recognition by the legislatures and by the general public that modern statistical methods are in a position to make an indispensable contribution to the successful development of social administration."

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION BY OFFICIALS AND NON-OFFICIALS

Not that there has been no non-official interest in Statistics. Nor is it correct to say that officials have merely collected facts without analysing and interpreting them. *The Review of the Trade of India* is a case in point. Here the dry bones of the statistics in the two bulky volumes of the *Annual Statement of Sea-borne Trade and Navigation* are made to live. The same is true of Census and Settlement Reports, some of which are extremely valuable. Several monographs

and village studies have been published either by officials or by non-officials with official help and patronage for throwing much-needed light on the obscurities of Indian economic life. Besides these, we have a number of articles embodying the results both of analysis and of interpretation. Probably the earliest of them were those bearing on the national income of India, beginning with Dadabhai Naoroji's *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*. All of these are not of equal value, for most of them are written with a definite bias and without a proper appreciation of the underlying theory and technique of estimation. It is a regrettable but an undoubted fact that the last twenty-five years have coincided with a strong nationalistic movement in India which has necessarily influenced most of the economic and statistical writings of the period, making them emotional and not scientific—nationalistic and not critical. It is only during the last decade that a school of writers has tried to make a dispassionate study of economic and statistical problems but their number is not large, as it must be, in such a period of political unrest, unfulfilled desires and vague expectations.

THE FUTURE

Such objective articles again may be divided into two broad categories, *viz.*, those which are mainly descriptive and do not employ any technical statistical method, and those by trained statisticians which push the work of analysis and interpretation farther with the help of technical devices. The number of this last group is extremely meagre and until and unless this is considerably increased, there can be no substantial improvement. For it is such analysis and interpretation that can lead to an improvement in the scope and nature of the primary data. On the other hand, with the improvement of primary data, the results of analysis and interpretation will be more and more incisive. We must break the present vicious circle of defective data and inaccurate findings. It requires untiring patience, sustained energy and co-ordinated effort. Even if the immediate results are not spectacular, we must work on with faith and hope—faith in ourselves and our work, and hope for the future and for our country. It is with this mission that the Indian Statistical Institute is charged.

News and Views

[A monthly record of News and Views relating to Cultural and Academic Institutions, Events and Movements in India and outside.]

University for Assam

A group of students were granted interview by the Hon'ble Sj. Gopinath Bardoloi, Prime Minister of Assam, at his residence. In course of the discussion the Hon'ble the Prime Minister is reported to have stressed the importance of cultural co-operation among the students of the two provinces, Bengal and Assam. He is reported to have said that there is no impossibility for starting an University in Assam whose main feature will be to deal with Assamese culture and the ancient history of the province.

About the educational scheme he is reported to have stated that his Government are going to take up mass literacy campaign shortly. The literacy move has already been taken up among the tribal population.

About the labourers in the Assam tea gardens the Hon'ble Premier is reported to have said that like other Congress Governments of other provinces he believed in improvement of their condition by gradual welfare work. He further narrated the pitiable condition of the labourers and is reported to have expressed the view that his Government are ready to support any organisation with necessary legislation if these organisations take up the work for their gradual welfare.

Hawaii University

Mr. Gregg M. Sinclair, Director of the Oriental Institute of the University of Hawaii, in course of an interview to the United Press said that he had been touring in India for the last two months in order to meet various leaders of Indian Philosophy and enlist their support to the creation of a Chair of Indian Philosophy in the Oriental Institute of Hawaii. Mr. Sinclair had already met Poet Tagore, Pandit Gangenath Jha and Babu Bhagawan Das and was going to meet Mahatma Gandhi at Wardha. Mr. Sinclair said that America was growing very anxious to have a knowledge of true Indian philosophy. As a result the Oriental Institute was prepared to take Indian students for training in Japanese, Chinese and Indian Philosophy for which arrangements have been made there. It had also been proposed to hold an Eastern and Western Philosophers Conference during the coming summer as a preliminary session. He felt glad that Mahatma Gandhi had repudiated the slogan of sectionalism "Asia for Asiatics." He said that no such fundamentally false doctrines should gain followers.

Osmania University

Efforts at a compromise between the Osmania University authorities and the students who are on strike on the Vande Mataram issue, started by a prominent official, having definitely failed, some students left for Nagpur to make boarding and lodging arrangements for the other expelled students who are expected to join classes in different colleges affiliated to the Nagpur University. The students have issued a detailed programme giving instructions to the students at Aurangabad and Warangal to reach Nagpur.

Arrangements for F.R.C.S. Examination

That closer association between India and England in the field of medical education would prove of immense benefit to the former country and that the purpose of holding the F.R.C.S. (Primary) Examination in various centres in India was to demonstrate to the authorities concerned how the teaching should be done to get better results here was the opinion expressed by Dr. R. S. Rew, Director of Examinations, Royal College of Surgeons.

Dr. Rew will conduct the F.R.C.S. Examination at Lahore. He said that permanent arrangements were being made to conduct the examinations by experts in India itself and added that the idea of holding the examinations was to save trouble and extra expenditure to Indian candidates for an examination which would in the usual course be held at the Royal College of Surgeons in England.

Dr. Rew opined that Indian students in general did not come up to the standard of English students. This he attributed to inadequate arrangements for proper teaching in this country.

Miscellany

FRENCH INDO-CHINA IN ASIAN POLITICS

In recent months reports from the territorial possessions of the Occidental Powers along the southern coast of Asia and in the South Pacific have indicated feverish defence activities against the expected extension of Japanese political influence into these areas. According to the *Far Eastern Mirror* the French, in particular, appear of late to have come down with a severe case of the jitters over the safety of their immensely profitable ownership of Indo-China. In part this has been an outgrowth of the present Sino-Japanese conflict, which has resulted in the landing, for "inspection" purposes, of Japanese marines on the strategic island of Hainan, threats to bomb the important Annam Yunnan Railway, and the recent capture of Amoy. However, particularly disquieting to French official circles has been the changing situation in Siam, which in late years appears to have come directly within the Japanese orbit to the exclusion of previous Occidental interests. The most recent evidence of this, from the French point of view, is the announcement of a contract award to a Japanese firm for enlarging the port of Bangkok to make it accessible to large ships now compelled to anchor outside. Further evidence is the announcement of Siam's intention to abrogate the existing treaty with France which has theretofore made possible a demilitarized border zone between Siam and Indo-China. A report made some years ago by a French writer is not without interest here. He stated that Siam itself was not a menace, but that on the day she entered into an alliance with Japan every safety to Indo-China would vanish.

Resources

French Indo-China has an area of some 285,000 square miles and a population of 23,000,000. Its foreign population numbers approximately 860,000, of whom 80,000 are French. The territory consists of the colonies of Cochina-China and Laos ruled directly from Paris, and the protectorates of Annam, Cambodia, and Tonkin. With the exception of a small concession in 1887, later abandoned, these territories were all acquired by France in the imperialistic heyday of the latter half of the nineteenth century. With their expert colonization technique, the French have since garnered a tremendous return from this rich store-house of the East which Sarraut, one of the territory's former administrators, has called "the most important, the most developed and the most prosperous of our colonies." Although rice cultivation is the basis of the country's economic life, it also possesses considerable possibilities in raw materials, which have been but partially tapped. These include large deposits of high quality coal, limestone, resources of wood, tin, zinc, phosphates, precious stones, gold and rubber.

Japanese Penetration

Japanese economic penetration had made comparatively little headway in Indo-China, due to severe restrictions imposed by the French

decree. These have not only applied specific quotas on Japanese cotton, but also have brought about the imposition of an exchange compensation surtax of 25 per cent. of the assessed duties on all other Japanese imports into Indo-China. Through this it has been hoped not only to curtail purchases from Japan, but also to exert a psychological influence in order to prevent possible extension of Japanese influence as the champion of the yellow race. This last, as a movement, had its inception in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War, and with varying fortunes has persisted to the present hope of Japanese support for an Annamite uprising against French control.

After conquest of Annam in 1885, the French desired to safeguard their interests with China to the effect that the three southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung would never be ceded to any foreign power. However, this failed due to the opposition of the British who at the time may have had in mind plans based upon their own control of Hong Kong.

Importance of Hainan

That the strategic value of the present much discussed island of Hainan was recognized is evident in an agreement of March, 1897, by which Britain compelled China to agree not to concede or lease this land to any country for the purpose of establishing a naval base or refueling station. It is this last possibility which so alarmed the French following the previously mentioned "inspection" visit, that their ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Charles Armand Henry, made enquiries of the Japanese Government as to their intentions.

A glance at a map will show the importance of this island. Its occupation by an ambitious or unfriendly power could seriously affect not only the French control of Annam but also of Kwang Chau Wan, acquired by lease in 1838. The island covers about 97 198 square miles and has a large bay at Yulingkang, which would make it an excellent naval base. The land is fertile and could also be cultivated with profit.

Up to late years the French attitude towards Japanese aspirations in China was one of benevolent neutrality. The main reason for this was a treaty between the two countries signed in 1907. In the well-remembered imperialistic phraseology characteristic of the period, this treaty defined France's potential territorial interests in China as the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, with Japan to have similar freedom of action in the provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Fukien. It is generally believed that this situation was instrumental in toning down the Lytton Report of 1902 condemning Japanese activities in Manchuria.

However, as possibilities inherent in recent Japanese activities have become clearer, the attitude of the French has been definitely modified and today France appears to have made common cause with the other Powers facing similar conditions with regard to their Asiatic possessions. Evidence of this is seen in the frequent rumour, although officially denied, that the latter has reached a definite understanding in a Tri-Power Agreement with British and Dutch authorities. In the event of attack the naval bases of Singapore and Sourabaya would be made available to the warships of all parties to the Agreement.

Defence Plans

France, on her own behalf, has also undertaken preparations for the actual defence of Indo-China. She had made a beginning as early as 1938 when she took possession of nine small islands to the east of the Indo-China coast. These are merely sand-bars and rock formations with no habitation and are used occasionally by fishing junks. However, they have considerable possibilities for coastal defence purposes and can be of use in sea and air navigation.

While it is at times difficult to sift the truth from the many unfounded rumours and reports which develop out of nothing more than possibility and wish fulfilment, there is little question but that, in view of the present situation in China, the French are making every possible effort to anticipate possible Japanese designs with regard to Indo-China. This has been clearly indicated by a number of circumstances—the rapidity with which French warships rushed to the South China Sea at the outbreak of present hostilities between China and Japan, and the extensive air manoeuvres held by the authorities in November and December, 1937 which tested lines of communication not only between France and her North African colonies but also between France and Indo-China. It is also generally believed that France contemplates the construction of a naval base at Cam-Ranh Bay, which is located approximately midway between Hong Kong and Singapore. From here it is intended to operate a modern submarine flotilla, fast destroyers, and a squadron of bombing hydroplanes. In Along Bay facing the Chinese island of Hainan, a series of secondary defences is to be constructed, and at Cape Saint Jacques, which controls the main entrance to Saigon, coastal defences are to be strengthened. Vulnerable openings along the 1,850-mile coast line of a territory half again the size of France are to be protected with heavy guns.

The French Government has also ordered the construction of military roads up to the Chinese frontier, built several modern air-fields, and, according to reports, is being urged by the military to store huge quantities of supplies to meet any emergency which might arise, since it would require weeks to secure them from Europe.

France's Increasing Interest

In the January 1st issue of *L'Europe Nouvelle* an indication of the increasing interest of the French in the future of their Indo-China provinces is reflected in the recommendation that their consuls and ambassadors in the Far East should keep in constant touch with one another to take measures for defence if the need should arise.

Needless to say, the British are pleased over these activities. Recent reports, which describe the Japanese as occupying numerous island groups along the South China coast for naval and air armament at a cost of 300,000 yen, have been particularly alarming. These islands include the Hopao Island near Macao, the Pratas Shoals near Hong Kong, and the fortification of the Kimoi Shoals just outside of Amoy Harbour. However, with the French arming not only will a measure of protection be assured for the sea-route from Hong Kong to Singapore, but on the continental side of Indo-China, the caravan route to the oilfields of Burma and through Yunnan into British-influenced Tibet will be defended.

British Opinion

Present activities are a far cry from the situation in 1936, when the Blum Government took office and it was rumoured that the French Socialists, averse to compelling any native population to remain under the French flag against its will, were contemplating withdrawal from Indo-China. British opinion immediately became apprehensive over the possibilities of Japanese infiltration into an independent Indo-China and the subsequent effect on the Strait Settlements and India. It was generally held in London diplomatic circles that "if and when a Government of the Left in France thinks it fit to surrender its rights in Asia, British preferential rights on the Indo-China coast must have been reserved in advance."

However, present French policy with regard to the defence of Indo-China would appear to dispel any possibility of this. Confirmation, if needed, can be found in the speech of Mr. Alexander Varenne, former Governor of Indo-China and Representative of Tonkin at the Supreme Council of Colonies, made on the occasion of his visit to China last year. In unequivocal terms he stated that France stood ready to defend Indo-China against attack. Undoubtedly the answer to this, in part, can be found in possibilities implicit in the Berlin-Tokyo axis, as well as in certain other circumstances of European origin. These have made for a solidarity of interests on the part of Great Britain and France in which of necessity their respective colonial interests in Asia must be a considerable factor.

BENOT KUMAR SARKAR

STATE AID IN WHEAT MARKETING

With a 1938 world wheat crop of record proportions in sight, widespread interest is again being manifested in what the governments of foreign wheat surplus-producing countries have done or are doing to protect growers from low prices, says L. J. Schaben in *The Agricultural Situation*.

Canada, the world's largest surplus producer and this year harvesting a crop expected to be the largest in 10 years, has already assured its wheat growers a minimum price of 80 cents per bushel for No. 1 Northern, delivered at Fort William. This guaranteed minimum, fixed by the Wheat Board early in August, will be paid for deliveries to the Board from the current crop. Canadian growers, however, are free to offer wheat in the open market at world prices.

Establishment of a Wheat Board with authorization to purchase all wheat grown in the four western provinces whenever growers cannot sell in the open market at or above a fixed minimum price was provided for in the Canadian Wheat Board Act which became law on July 5, 1935. To insure that the job of moving wheat into channels of trade would be established as the principal function of the Board a provision of the law states that it "shall market from time to time all wheat, or contracts for the purchase or delivery of wheat, which the Board may acquire, for such price as it may consider reasonable, with the object of promoting the sale and use of Canadian wheat in world markets."

In Argentina a system of guaranteed minimum prices was in effect for several years, the minimum during 1935-36, the last year of its existence, having been 10 pesos per quintal (0.90 per bushel). No announcement has been made as yet by the Argentine Government as to guaranteed prices for wheat from the coming crop. The Argentine harvest begins in December.

Under the Argentine minimum price scheme a Grain Regulating Board was created with authority to enter the market and purchase wheat at fixed prices whenever world prices as reflected in the principal ocean and river ports should fall below a minimum established by the Government. Any losses sustained in connection with the sale of wheat by the Board at less than the price paid for it, as well as the administrative expenses of the Board, were to be defrayed from a fund derived from the profits realized by the Argentine Government in its purchase and sale of foreign exchange bills.

In Australia direct production and internal marketing bounties and special relief payments to wheat growers, rather than export subsidies, have constituted the principal means taken by the Government in recent years to relieve the distress caused by low wheat prices. Such grants were financed by a flour tax and by direct disbursements from the Federal Treasury. A plan providing for a guaranteed "home consumption price" to growers through the mechanism of a compulsory marketing scheme was enacted by several of the state legislatures in 1935 but was never put into operation.

In Russia all foreign trade is a monopoly of the Soviet Government and is regulated and administered in the light of the general objectives of the Government's economic and financial policy. Exports of wheat, as of other commodities, are centered wholly in the hands of the Government. The latter determines the quantities to be exported each season in accordance with its yearly programme which are not publicly stated. In determining its export policy the Government takes into account such factors as stocks, crop conditions, world prices, the relative exchange value of wheat abroad compared with its value for consumption in the country, and the balance of international payments in general.

Romania not only maintains a minimum-price system for wheat but pays export premiums on shipments abroad. A tax on flour sold by commercial mills is used to cover export payments but when the flour tax is not sufficient the Government covers the deficit from other sources of revenue. At the present time a premium of 100 lei per quintal (0.20 per bushel) is being paid on all exports to countries with a regime of payments in freely convertible currency. In order to prevent a seasonal decline in prices, the Government will begin purchasing wheat for any needs as soon as harvesting is completed. Such purchases will be made direct from producers.

The Bulgarian Government Grain Monopoly will continue to purchase wheat from farmers at fixed prices. It has been reported that the initial basic price for 1938 crop wheat will be fixed at 400 leva per quintal as compared with 330 leva last year. In the past the monopoly has sold its wheat to domestic mills at prices considerably above world market levels. Its sales for the export market, however, are made to Bulgarian exporters at prices somewhat below those prevailing in foreign markets.

The Yugoslav Privileged Export Co. will continue to purchase wheat from farmers at prices well above export parity. The prices at which the Privileged Export Co. purchases wheat are fixed from time to time by the Government. Prices at which the company will purchase new crop wheat have been fixed at from 144-160 dinars per quintal. Private firms are at liberty to buy wheat in competition with the Privileged Export Co. but can export it only upon receipt of a Government permit only to countries making payment in freely exchangeable foreign credits, which must be delivered to the Yugoslav National Bank.

In Hungary export aids to wheat growers have long constituted an essential part of the Government's policy. Unique among such aids was the "grain ticket" system, which was in force between 1930 and 1934. This was in essence a bounty to producers financed by a processing tax and the revenue obtained by the sale of the "grain tickets" with the objective of maintaining the price to Hungarian farmers above the world parity while at the same time permitting exports at world market prices.

The "grain ticket" system was abolished at the end of the 1933-34 marketing year and the Government adopted a policy of making price stabilization purchases, for which purpose it uses mainly the "Futura" (the central marketing body of the Hungarian co-operatives). In that connection the Government establishes annual minimum prices at which wheat for Government account will be accepted. Such purchases are made only when the price on the free market falls below the fixed minimum. The Government has announced recently that it intends to set up a wheat reserve for the needs of national defence.

In addition to price stabilization measures practically all of the Danubian countries have negotiated special trade and clearing agreements with other European countries, notably with Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. In some cases these provide for export quotas, in others for barter arrangements, and in still others for a combination of both. These agreements enable the Danubian countries to market wheat abroad, in certain cases against full payment and in others with partial payment in convertible currencies.

Although normally an importer of wheat, France, in recent years, has on several occasions found herself with exportable surpluses. Various measures including export subsidies have been utilized by the Government to eliminate or reduce such surpluses. This year again the crop will be considerably in excess of needs probably to the extent of 50 to 60 million bushels. As a result, special measures will again have to be resorted to in order to handle the surplus. Among these will be provision for storage, reduced flour extraction ratios, denaturing of wheat and distillation of wheat into alcohol. Whether export subsidies will be resorted to during the 1938-39 marketing season has not been announced as yet. The National Wheat Board established by a law of August 15, 1936, has wide authority to regulate and control wheat marketing, prices, storage, and transportation. In fact, imports and exports of wheat are a Government monopoly.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INDIA IN ITALIAN *

A work that has comprehensively opened up economic India, both in statistical and factual data as well as in ideology, to non-English readers in Italian is Dr. Moni Moulik's *British Financial Policy in India* (Bologna, 1938, 250 pages). The treatment is realistic and the presentation marked by independent thinking.

Poverty and British rule are the two categories that constitute the economic ideology of this work written in lucid Italian. The author, a Research Fellow of the Bengali Institute of Economics, enjoyed

* *La Politica Finanziaria Britannica in India* (Zanchioli, Bologna).

for two years a stipend of the *Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente* (Italian Institute for the Middle and the Far East) for researches at the university of Rome, where he later obtained a doctorate in political science. The statistical data utilized for this work are quite recent and the author has not dwelt at length except when absolutely necessary on the older phases of British financial policy in India.

The commercial aspects of the Government of India Act have been analyzed. The author has not failed to bring out into bold relief the reactions of the Indian industrialists and commercial men as well as associations to the statutory guarantees and safeguards such as are considered to be prejudicial to the interests of India. Indian views on the "home charges" and the "economic tribute" paid to Great Britain have likewise been exhibited. He has done justice to the data and the opinions in this connection as well as in regard to the military and administrative finances. The historical treatment of the loans and public debt is an interesting feature. The tariff policy has been described in its repercussions on Indian industries. The chapters dealing with this and the previous topic are quite substantial in facts and enriched with critical comments and constructive suggestions. There is a short discussion on the transportation policy. Taxation, however, has been discussed somewhat elaborately and its bearings on Indian agriculture have been brought out in a judicious manner.

The chapter on Indian currency and exchange has been interestingly written. In the tenth and the last chapter the author has presented his readers with what may be described as his scheme of financial planning for India in which the constructive proposals in connection with the previous discussions have been placed as the planks of a futuristic programme. His statements are precise and well thought-out.

Dr. Moulik's work has made good use of Government publications and newspaper cuttings. He has tried to be objective in regard to his sources of information, utilizing the different schools of interpretation without bias. The several dozen works quoted by the author exhibit his scientific objectivity and open-mindedness. The work does credit to the economic Seminar of Professor De Stefani under whose directions it was planned and executed. Italian economists can take Moulik as a dependable guide on Indian economic developments and economic thought.

As a keen economic researcher and as a perspicuous writer on economic topics Moulik deserves appreciation. Besides, he has rendered an important service to Indian economists in general by introducing their contributions and methods of analysis to the milieu of Italian economists and statesmen.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

VITAMINS AND FOOD REFORM

The sociology of nutrition deserves greater attention in India than it has done up till now. During the early part of the last century, when modern chemistry began to flourish and when microchemistry or the chemistry of small bodies was in the early stages, research workers started to investigate the composition of those substances about which the only known facts were that, in almost unbelievably minute quantities, they exercised an enormous influence upon the health and well-being of human beings.

A number of facts of a general nature had inspired these research workers to investigate this problem. For instance, in the year 1884 the Naval Commander Takaki realised that the fighting abilities of the Japanese Fleet were very much impaired by a disease called beri beri which attacked the sailors and which he traced to the effects of a diet consisting exclusively of rice. He thereupon ordered that the crews' food should be more varied. But this discovery of his—like so many others—which could have paved the way to a solution of the problem, was lost sight of and forgotten for the time being.

Later in 1896 the Dutch doctor Eijkman, director of an Indonesian research station, had been occupied for years with the problem of this mysterious beri beri which appeared so frequently amongst the poorer elements of the populations of Japan, China and the Malay Peninsula as well as amongst those of South America. In particular, he studied the disease as manifested in chickens which he fed on the scraps from a hospital kitchen. But a change in the administration of the hospital ended his opportunities for feeding the chickens on these scraps.

It was then that an astonishing thing happened. The chickens which hitherto had manifested all the signs of beri beri were suddenly cured. They no longer suffered from that cramp of the muscles which is characteristic of the malady. Neither did they show any signs of the usual state of general inflammation of the nerves. Eijkman at once saw the connection which must exist between diet and disease and grasped the nature of the causes to which beri beri could be traced. For the hospital scraps had contained exclusively cereals which had been shelled. And he was now feeding the birds on grains of rice from which the husks had not been removed. It thus became obvious that the husks must contain the substance which cured the birds of the malady.

A quarter of a century after the observation on the part of the Japanese Commander which has been described above, two British scientists advanced the thesis that the human variety of beri beri resulted from erroneous feeding and was not an infectious disease as has previously been supposed by the experts. For beri beri made its appearance everywhere where rice as the staple food was eaten with the husks removed. And in those countries where rice constitutes the main food as in India, not only is the brown outer husk removed, but also the underlying silvery skin. But it is in just this inner silvery skin that the substance is contained which protects human beings from those degenerate manifestations in both the motor and sensory nerves, which are characteristic of beri beri.

In the year 1911, the German biochemist Funk succeeded in isolating the substance contained in the silvery skin of a grain of rice. He called this substance vitamin, or the stuff of life. And since then the name has been given to a whole series of food factors, of which the nature has, for the most part, been elucidated during the past 27 years. Some of the most famous research institutes in the world set to work to isolate the vitamin contained in a grain of rice and it was eventually produced in its pure form from yeast in the Bayer laboratories in Elberfeld (Germany) where the formula for its constituents was also discovered. Finally, for the first time in the spring of 1936 the anti-beri beri vitamin, Vitamin B₁, was synthesised.

In the interest of food reform in India, especially in Bengal, we have to counteract the polished rice fashion by all means. It is equally urgent to consider whether wheat consumption *per capita* may be augmented in order to diversify the rice dietary.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

Reviews and Notices of Books

Marcus Aurelius, by F. H. Hayward, D.Lit., M.A., B.Sc. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d. net.

The value of this monograph on the sixteenth Emperor of Rome will be appreciated not only by those who delight in reading biographies nor by those who put a premium on classical education, but also by men who seek in all things their cultural value. That culture is one-sided (and in that sense it is the negation of culture) which neglects the study of such men as Marcus Aurelius: that great man has a strong appeal because he corresponds more closely to our conception of flawless and angelic virtue than almost any other personage in history. Marcus Aurelius was a saviour of man and the author does not shrink from placing him even by the side of Jesus Christ, suggesting parallels on more points than one; he was a saviour by reason of his ideals, the ideals that he stood for and sought to realise in himself. He had fought the battle of humanity long before the rise of Christian thought could influence public judgment, and the author holds that the height of virtuous ambition would be no more than "desire in life and gentleness to be such a one as Marcus."

P. R. SEX.

Poems, by Eileen Duggan, with an introduction by Walter De la Mare. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1937. 5s. net.

A collection of 37 poems, some with a clear local colour and the rest more universal in tone, may not seem at first to be inviting enough; and the poet does not in this volume venture forth into experimentation of any sort regarding the technique of verses—she does not discard the old and ring in the new poetic measures. But if sincerity is the touchstone of poetry, then the reader will find here solid gold. These poems of Miss Eileen Duggan will never sound hollow. Her gesture in the first of her poems is generous, and she has no pretensions. Do we not all admit in our heart of hearts that 'we are but stumblers in the hinterlands'? Her poetic soul has been fed on nature and on the masters—the bees, the birds and the flowers form the background, and she is sufficiently of the old world (though accidentally belonging to the new) to be religious also. The poems reveal an understanding mind and a heart athirst for beauty, though the selective faculty of her art never sleeps; for she is a poet and

The poet sings—the saint is dumb for ever.

A tone of sadness enters into her song but the poet owns and in her own way communicates "the faith of a blind hound nosing the knee." A reading of the poems will fully corroborate De la

Mara's appreciation of the poet who deserves welcome of the fellowship of poetry all over the world.

PRIYARANJAN SEN.

ADYAR PAMPHLETS:—

1. **Dr. Besant and India's Religious Revival**, by Hirendra Nath Datta.

This is a lecture delivered by Mr. Dutt at the T. S. Convention of 1933. He first narrates how the Theosophical Society originated and developed into a world-wide organization from a small beginning. This preface to the theme of the booklet is all relevant; for the life of Mrs. Besant cannot be viewed in isolation from the Theosophical movement in this country. So Mr. Dutt giving a detailed account of her many-sided activities has to go into the whole question of the origin and spread of Theosophy. Mrs. Besant is doubtless one of the illustrious women who ever paced this earth of ours. By her vast erudition, deep sense of spirituality, rare eloquence, whole-hearted devotion and sacrifices for the land of her adoption, she made herself an object of adoration to us all. But it is too much to say that India owes her religious revival to her alone, though it cannot be denied that she had her own share in the making of the modern India.

A. C. DAS.

2. **The Purpose of Theosophy, Parts 1 & 2**, by Mrs. A. P. Sinnet.

In these two pamphlets Mrs. Sinnet tries to make us understand the aim of Theosophy. According to her, Theosophy is not a religion in the ordinary acceptance of the word. On the contrary, it teaches the fundamental truths of all religions, and directs the devotees to regulate their lives by the knowledge of the secret workings of Nature. Much of what she says relates to the different planes of the world, and, for that matter, of man, to the doctrine of Karma, re-incarnation and all that. She also details a practical course of training for moral and spiritual development. Those who are interested in occultism and yogic experiences of the subtler world will find these two manuals informative and instructive.

A. C. DAS.

Ourselves

[I. The Late Principal G. C. Bose.—II. Professor F. T. Brooks.—III. Primary and Adult Education Committee.—IV. Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute, London.—V. Stipend for Mohammedan Students.—VI. Islamic Academy of Research.—VII. Khau Bahadur Abdullah Abu Sayied.—VIII. The Annual Convocation of the University.—IX. University's Delegates.—X. Report of Preliminary Scientific, First and Second M.B. Examinations, November, 1929.—XI. Election of two Ordinary Fellows.]

I. THE LATE PRINCIPAL G. C. BOSE

Mr. G. C. Bose, who had been laid up with a carbuncle for about a month, died at his Calcutta residence on the 1st January, 1939, at the age of 86. By the death of Principal Bose Bengal has lost a great educationist, a true patriot, and a sincere friend of students.

The late Mr. Bose joined the Ravenshaw College, Cuttack, as a Lecturer in Science immediately after his graduation from the Calcutta University in 1876. In 1882 he proceeded to the United Kingdom as a State Scholar for higher studies in Agriculture. For the next two years he was a student of the Cirencester Agricultural College where he had a distinguished career. On return to India, he started the Bangabasi School in 1885, to which he added a College Department in 1887. The history of these two institutions is a record of immense personal sacrifice on his part and of a rare enthusiasm he evinced in the cause of education which no circumstance, however trying, could diminish. From 1906 till 1936 Principal Bose was associated with the Calcutta University as a Member of the Senate and, later on, as a member of the Councils of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts and Science.

His favourite subject was Botany, which he taught all his life. He wrote treatises on it not only in English but also in Bengali and was thus one of the pioneers who had laboured to enrich our language by making up its deficiency in scientific terminology.

He was remarkable for his active habits and vigour of mind even in old age. He was scarcely known to take a holiday from his work in his beloved College unless compelled by sickness.

We convey our sincere condolence to the members of the bereaved family.

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II. PROFESSOR F. T. BROOKS

Professor F. T. Brooks, F.R.S., Head of the Department of Botany, Cambridge University, has been appointed a Special Reader of our University. Professor Brooks has made important discoveries regarding the connexion of fungus with plant diseases. He will attend the Golden Jubilee of the Australian Association for the Advancement of Science. It is expected that Professor Brooks will be able to deliver his Readership Lectures by the end of January or early in February next on his way back from Australia.

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III. PRIMARY AND ADULT EDUCATION COMMITTEE

The Primary and Adult Education Committee, constituted under Government order in July last year, has invited the co-operation of the University in answering a questionnaire which it has prepared to assist its deliberations. The matter has been referred to a committee consisting of the following members for favour of a report:—

Rai Babadur Khagendranath Mitra, M.A.

Professor M. Z. Siddiqi, M.A., B.L., PH.D. (Cantab.).

S. P. Chatterjee, Esq., M.SC., PH.D. (Lond.), T.D. (Lond.),
F.G.S.

* * *

IV. HEALTH CONGRESS OF THE ROYAL SANITARY INSTITUTE,
LONDON

The Health Congress of the Royal Institute, London, will be held at Scarborough from July 3rd to 8th, 1939. Dr. C. A. Bentley, M.B., D.P.H., D.T.M. & H., D.SC., has been appointed a delegate of this University to the Congress.

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V. STIPEND FOR MOHAMMEDAN STUDENTS

Mr. Kazi Eusofali has offered to this University $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. G. P. Notes of the face value of Rs. 4,100 for the annual award of a stipend to deserving Mohammadan students of the Naogaon

Sub-Division. The stipend will be granted on the results of the Matriculation examination.

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VI. ISLAMIC ACADEMY OF RESEARCH

The Idara-i-Ma'arif-i-Islamia (the Islamic Academy of Research) held its third session in the last week of December, 1938, under the presidency of the Hon'ble Sir Shah M. Sulaiman, Judge of the Federal Court and Vice-Chancellor of the Muslim University, Aligarh. The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur M. Aziz-ul Huque, C.I.R., B.L., M.L.A., Vice-Chancellor, was appointed a representative of this University on the Academy.

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VII. KHAN BAHADUR ABDULLAH ABU SAYIED

Khan Bahadur Abdullah Abu Sayied, M.A., M.L.A., whose term of Fellowship expired on the 18th November, 1939, has been re-nominated an Ordinary Fellow of this University.

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VIII. THE ANNUAL CONVOCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY

The Annual Convocation will be held at the Presidency College Ground on Saturday, the 11th March, 1939.

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IX. UNIVERSITY'S DELEGATES

Dr. P. N. Banerjee, M.A., D.SC., BARRISTER-AT-LAW, M.L.A., and Dr. Satis Chandra Chatterjee M.A., PH.D., were appointed delegates to represent this University at the First Indian Political Conference at Benares and Indian Philosophical Congress at Allahabad respectively.

Mr. Anathnath Bose, M.A., T.D. (Lond.), was appointed a delegate of this University to the All-India Educational Conference held in Bombay last December.

* * *

X. REPORT ON PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC, FIRST AND SECOND
M.B. EXAMINATIONS, NOVEMBER, 1938

The number of candidates registered for the Preliminary Scientific M.B. Examination was 55, of whom 41 passed, 14 failed, no one being absent.

The percentage of passes is 74.5.

The number of candidates registered for the First M.B. Examination was 150, of whom 109 passed, 40 failed and 1 was absent.

Of the successful candidates no one obtained Honours.

The percentage of passes is 73.2.

The number of candidates registered for the Second M.B. Examination was 103, of whom 78 passed, 23 failed and 2 were absent.

Of the successful candidates no one obtained Honours.

The percentage of passes is 73.6.

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XI. ELECTION OF TWO ORDINARY FELLOWS

Mr. Pragnathanath Banerjee, M.A., B.L., BARRISTER-AT-LAW, M.L.A., who sought re-election to the Senate for another term from among the Registered Graduates, has been declared duly elected an Ordinary Fellow of the University, subject to the approval of His Excellency the Chancellor. Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A., has also been elected an Ordinary Fellow from the same constituency, subject to His Excellency the Chancellor's approval. Both Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Mitra were returned unopposed as the only other candidate for election withdrew from the contest.

We offer our congratulations to Mr. Banerjee, and to Mr. Mitra, who is the Joint-Secretary of the *Calcutta Review*.

NOTIFICATION

EXTERNAL RESEARCH SCHOLARSHIP, EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

A Research Studentship of the maximum annual value of £150 will be awarded by the Governing Body of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in July, 1939. It is normally held for two years but may be extended beyond that period on evidence of exceptional merit. The studentship is not tenable by a woman or by a member of Cambridge University. Candidates for the studentship will have to apply to the Master, Emmanuel College, Cambridge, not later than June 30, with the following certificates:—(1) a birth certificate; (2) two certificates of good character; (3) a statement, as precise and full as possible, of the proposed course of research; (4) evidence of general ability and of special fitness for the proposed course of research, supported by letters from not more than two professors and other teachers under whom the applicant has studied; (5) a statement of emoluments or awards, already granted, or likely to be granted, from other bodies or persons, and tenable by the applicant at Cambridge.

MOHSIN OVERSEAS SCHOLARSHIP

A scholarship of the value of £240 per annum from the Mohsin Fund will be open to Moslem candidates domiciled in Bengal in the current year. The scholarship may be enjoyed for a term of two years outside India by an Honours Graduate in Arts or Science. The candidate who is less than 25 years old will be preferred although the maximum age is fixed at 28. If no suitable candidate is available no award will be made this year. Candidates are required to apply to the Assistant Director of Public Instruction for Mohammadan Education, Bengal, Writers' Buildings, Calcutta, on forms that will be supplied to them by the Assistant Director or by the Personal Assistant to the Director of Public Instruction, Bengal.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

FEBRUARY, 1939

REALITIES IN WORLD POLITICS OF THE PACIFIC

DR. TARAKNATH DAS

The College of the City of New York.

I

WE cannot understand the true significance of the present Sino-Japanese War (the undeclared war), if we be swayed by mere sentiment or by our sense of justice and liberty. Let us admit at the outset that the Sino-Japanese War, on the one hand, is the effect of *Power Politics of great Powers* and the efforts of the Chinese, *although disunited and less efficient*, to preserve their national independence, on the other. It may be further asserted that the significance of Power Politics is so great that China may be regarded as a mere pawn in the game, while Japan, Russia, Great Britain, the United States of America, Germany, France and Italy are the principal players. It is quite probable that China will be sacrificed by her so-called friends—supposed democratic powers and Soviet Russia—as Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to Germany and Ethiopia was abandoned to the mercy of Italy.

Secondly, it should be also kept in mind that the present Sino-Japanese conflict is the continuation of the Sino-Japanese War of

1895. Until the root cause of the conflict between China and Japan be removed this conflict will continue in some form or other.

In 1895 Sino-Japanese War was fought on the issue of Korea. China wanted to re-assert her sovereignty over Korea and she was encouraged by Great Britain, which thought that Chinese control over Korea will check any possible expansion of Russia in the Pacific. At that time Japanese statesmen were conscious of Chinese military weakness; yet they thought that through a Sino-Japanese co-operation—military alliance and common foreign policy—Russia could be checked from penetrating into Korea. When they found that a whole hearted co-operation between Japan and China was an impossibility, because the late Li Hung Chang was more interested in humiliating Japan and establishing full control over Korea, Japanese statesmen decided to follow an independent foreign policy with one object—*Korea must not fall into the hands of any nation which may be opposed to Japan's national interests including expansion in the Asiatic continent.*—At the outset the Japanese authorities knew that China at the end of the nineteenth century—before the Sino-Japanese War—was not strong enough to fight successfully either against Japan or Russia. They also realised that unless steps be taken to check Russian expansion into Korea, Russia would some day oust China from Korea. Therefore Japan's great concern was not to allow Russia to absorb Korea. To gain this end, Japanese statesmen tried to come to an understanding with Russia on the basis of Russian recognition of Japanese sphere of influence in Korea, while Japan was willing to recognise Russian interests in Manchuria. But Russia ignored Japanese suggestions and entered the arena of diplomatic intrigue in Korea with the hope of reducing Korea to a Russian protectorate. Thus Korea became a pawn in the diplomatic chess-board while China, Russia and Japan were the three contestants for gaining their end in Korea, Japan fought China in 1895 and not only eliminated China from Korea, but checked Russian expansion to the Pacific through Korea. Or, in other words, in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Japan not only defeated China but Russia also. By the first treaty of Simonesaki, Japan secured control over a part of Manchuria—Liaotung peninsula—which was coveted by Russia.

The net result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 was that China decided to form an alliance with Russia (secret treaty of alliance was concluded in 1896), while Russia with the aid of Germany and France

ousted Japan from Manchuria. China had to pay heavily for this aid of Russia and her friends. Russia secured the concession of building the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as virtual control over large part of Manchuria including the very Liaotung peninsula which was returned by Japan to China.

Japan formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (in 1902) to face Russia and oppose her expansion in Manchuria. Japan won again over Russia by defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and replacing the latter in Manchuria. During the Russo-Japanese War and the World War, there was complete co-operation between Japan on the one hand and the Triple Entente group of Powers—Russia, France and England—at the expense of China.

During the World War, Japan through her Twenty-one Demands and other methods strengthened her hold over Manchuria also eliminated Germany in China and became the most dominant factor in the Pacific—the Far East.—Anglo-American statesmen tried to check Japanese expansion in China through the Washington Conference; but Japan through her alliance with France and marvellous ability to adjust her own situation emerged victorious. This victory was manifested by Japanese occupation of Manchuria and establishment of Manchukuo in spite of the opposition of all the important Great Powers and the League of Nations. In this connection it should be noted that *China lost her fight against Japan regarding Manchuria for the following reasons:—1. China's military weakness, 2. Civil War among various Chinese factions, 3. China depended upon the help of the League of Nations, the United States of America, and possibly Russia and Great Britain which did not materialise.*

There was no doubt that General Chiang Kai Shek, during the Manchukuean conflict, was not willing to fight Japan and was anxious to preserve his strength for future assertion against the Chinese Communists and his Chinese rivals. In fact, we know definitely that if General Chiang Kai Shek was free to act, he would have avoided a conflict with Japan, even after the incident of Sino-Japanese clash in Peking in 1937. Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, there were distinctly two forces operating in the internal and international politics of China. Marshall Chiang Kai Shek is the one factor and the other factors were his rivals—the Chinese Communists, the Manchurian party led by Marshall Chang Tso Liang and the Cantonese party. After the Manchurian incident, Japanese victory

over the League of Nations and other nations, Marshall Chiang Kai Shek at least showed his inclination to come to an understanding with Japan. His rivals were opposed to this policy. They advocated that China should form an United Front of all political parties and with the support of Soviet Russia, America, Great Britain and other Powers should fight Japan who will be defeated not by China, *but by the active military and naval support of Great Powers.*

One year before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1937, I warned the Chinese and Japanese statesmen through my articles to the effect that China should abandon the policy of isolating Japan through the aid and co-operation of Soviet Russia and other Powers, whereas Japan should do her best to promote Sino-Japanese friendship. But owing to short-sightedness of Chinese leaders opposed to Marshall Chiang Kai Shek, Sino-Japanese conflict was precipitated. When Marshall Chiang Kai Shek was kidnapped by Marshall Chang Tao Liang in December, 1936, Marshall Chiang Kai Shek was forced to agree to a programme of war with Japan. That was the price he had to pay for his life and political future in China. Japan tried to dissuade Chiang Kai Shek from making a common cause with the Chinese Communists (under the virtual direction of Soviet Russia) and others who were fanning anti-Japanese propaganda and wanted to fight Japan. But Japan's efforts of Sino-Japanese understanding on Japan's terms failed. This being the case the so-called Sino-Japanese conflict began. For argument's sake it may be even acknowledged that the Japanese militarists started the Marco Polo bridge incident and used it as a reason for their war against China. In that case, the Japanese militarists argued that as it was definite that Marshall Chiang Kai Shek had already made a common cause with the Chinese Communists, Manchurians and others opposed to Sino-Japanese co-operation, then it was wise for Japan to strike at China as soon as possible and win a quick and decisive victory as was the case with the Japanese conquest of Manchuria.

II

From the standpoint of Japan, Chinese opposition to Japan and Sino-Soviet Russian co-operation against Japan was a real menace to Japan's international programme. Therefore at the very outset of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese did their best to conquer that part

of North China which might be used against Soviet Russia and which would result in cutting off China from Mongolia which is really a protectorate of Soviet Russia. It is needless for me to go into the details of the military operations of the Sino-Japanese War. But I must mention that Japan found China, somewhat united China (there is no real unity in China as yet), to be stronger than she expected her to be. The war has lasted longer than Japan has expected to be. But China found that she could not get real support—military support—from any nation, even Soviet Russia. Japan with her superior military power and control of the sea has established her supremacy over a very large part of China. Today Italy and Germany are allies of Japan and thus they are not in a position to aid China and displease Japan. The United States is buying Chinese silver and thus furnishing foreign exchange and credit for China to be used for the purchase of war materials from abroad; but the United States would not go to war for China against Japan. France is in no position to displease Japan. Great Britain does not want to help China against Japan; because at the present time Chinese are under the influence of Soviet Russia and a Chinese victory will mean a Sino-Soviet Russian alliance which will be detrimental to British interests in the Far East, in Tibet, in India. Britain is apprehensive of Soviet Russian penetration in Sinkiang bordering India and Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy is to isolate Russia in world politics.

The principal issue of the Sino-Japanese conflict is this: Can China, *without effective outside aid*, defend herself against Japan? It is my opinion that General Chiang Kai Shek may retire further from Hangkow and may carry on sporadic war-fare against Japan; but Japan with the full control of the Chinese sea ports and possible understanding with Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany—the members of the new Four Power Pact—will be able to maintain her authority in the most important part of north and central China, by creating a Chinese Government which will co-operate with Japan and oppose Chiang Kai Shek and his allies, specially Soviet Russia.

Soviet Russia's penetration into China is no less objectionable to Great Britain than it is to Japan; and thus to check any possible Sino-Russian military alliance, Britain would support Japan. In fact, to bring pressure on Soviet Russia penetrating into China, Britain would support German march towards Ukraine and Japanese march towards the Amur region or the maritime provinces of Soviet Russia.

Because of her military weakness, internal chaos and inability to secure international support, China is carrying on a losing fight. China today is facing the same situation as India faced during the early part of the nineteenth century. India was once a pawn on the military and diplomatic chess board of Western powers—especially France and Britain—seeking control over India. India lost out, because of her civil wars, national disunity and military weakness. China is a pawn in the international chess board; and the great powers, specially Russia, Japan and Great Britain, are contesting over the control of China. Japan is now really fighting Russia which stands behind China. Great Britain will be very happy if both Japan and Russia be weakened by fighting amongst themselves, so that when the fight would be over Britain would be the real victor among the three contestants. However Britain now prefers Japan to Russia and there is no question about it.

It is hard for any one to advocate that a nation should give up a fight for national independence against an invader and make a compromise peace with the enemy. But, as it would have been better for China to settle the Manchuria issue without fighting Japan, as it would have been better for Ethiopia to come to terms with Italy instead of depending upon the help of England, as it is my firm conviction that if Czechoslovakia would have dealt with Germany directly as Poland did, and did not depend upon her friends, Britain, France and Russia who deserted her, she could have received better terms from Germany, similarly, it is my conviction, as a friend of China, one should advise China to come to terms with Japan now. It is also my belief that in that case Japan would be happy to end the war with saving her face and offering moderate terms to China. Continuance of the Sino-Japanese war is suicidal for both Japan and China; it should be brought to an end, through the influence of some statesmen as President Roosevelt. However if the Sino-Japanese war comes to an end today and yet China continues to pursue a policy of bringing about a combination of powers against Japan, Japan would fight again. There cannot be peace while diplomatic wars continue to be waged by statesmen. There has been hundred years peace between the United States and Great Britain, because diplomatic wars between Great Britain and United States has never been so serious as to lead to a real war. *So long as Japan and China continue to follow Foreign Policies opposed to one another there cannot be real peace between*

these two nations. Those who talk about peace in the Far East and yet foment Sino-Japanese diplomatic discords are not friends of China in the true sense of the word. Just as there cannot be peace in Western Europe without a Franco-German understanding, just as there cannot be any peace in the region of the Mediterranean without an understanding among the Mediterranean Powers—Great Britain, France and Italy as well as Spain and Turkey—similarly, there cannot be peace in the Pacific unless there be an understanding among the Pacific Powers—Japan, Russia, China, the United States, Great Britain and France. I am convinced that Japan will not tolerate the condition which would mean control of China by any other Power, nor would she tolerate naval inferiority with any nation in the Pacific. There should be amicable understanding among Powers in the Pacific recognising the realities of the situation in the Pacific region.



THE BOROUGH ELECTIONS IN ENGLAND

DR. NARESHCHANDRA ROY, M.A., PH.D.

IN the beginning of this month election to one-third of the seats in the different borough councils of England was held. The area under the London County Council was of course excluded from this election. The members of the metropolitan borough councils are all returned at the same time and elections are consequently held once in three years. The system provided for in the mufussil boroughs is however different. The law lays down that these borough councils will consist of two classes of members—the councillors and the aldermen. The aldermen are one-third of the councillors in number and are co-opted to a council by the council itself. The aldermen are, in other words, the nominees of the councils and not the representatives of the general body of voters in the different wards. The tenure of office of the aldermen is six years and half of them retire every three years. The councillors are however, elected for a period of three years but are not returned at the same time. One-third of them retire each year, so that there is not a single year in which one-third of the councillors is not elected afresh by the local voters.

By the arrangement of having aldermen the framers of the municipal constitution in England had two objects in view. In the first place, by this method it would be possible to have on the municipal councils men of considerable experience, wisdom and reputation—men who either might not entertain the idea of undergoing the stress of a popular election or might not sufficiently appeal to popular imagination, so as to be acceptable as candidates for elections from any ward. The councils, however, consisting of picked men may appreciate their qualifications and regard them as an acquisition to the borough councils. Accordingly, it was laid down that the aldermen would not be elected by the general voters but would be co-opted by the councils themselves. Secondly, the term of office of the aldermen was made twice as long as that of a councillor. By this arrangement the continuity of the council was ensured to a great extent. Although the councillors were responsible for a particular policy might be out of the council after some time, their tradition would still be partly at least

upheld by the aldermen who had wroked with them. There would be no risk of any violent break with the old arrangement and principles of administration.

It was partly to maintain this continuity and partly to provide for constant touch with the general body of the electorate that the system of renewal of members every year was also adopted. If all the councillors were returned at the same time and went out at the same time, there would be risk of a violent break with the past tradition. Of course the aldermen with longer term of office would be there. But still to ensure the continuity of policy to a greater extent it was arranged that the councillors would not be returned at the same time. Every year one-third would retire. By the adoption of this method an opportunity was also held out to the people every year to approve or disapprove of the lines of action which the municipal council might be pursuing. The administration of the local bodies was pre-eminently the field in which the people should have greater opportunity of asserting themselves. In the National Government there was not much scope for so much of popular will being directly brought to bear upon the executive and the legislature. There once the general elections were held, the representatives would be more or less free to run the government in their own way. But the local administration provided greater scope for the general voters to make their influence felt. If of course at the present time the constitution of the municipalities could be written on a clean state, we need not be sure that an arrangement for annual renewal would have been provided for. But in the 19th century democratic principle was cherished more dearly and more confidently. It need be referred to here that even for the national parliament the system of annual election was proposed and advocated with the favour of religious votaries. The gibe of Rousseau that the English people were free once in seven years had gone deep into the heart of many worshippers of King Demos in England. They wanted to make democracy real in their country and accordingly carried on an agitation for the election of the House of Commons every year. Now although they failed in this agitation, although their efforts in the national field proved to be abortive, their ideas were accepted in some form in the constitution of the municipal councils. It was laid down that one-third of the councillors would retire every year and in their place fresh elections would be made. The general people would not be required to wait for three years for expressing their opinion one way or another regarding the

methods of administration pursued during this period. They would now have an opportunity of expressing their approval or disapproval every year. Although an expression of disapproval and even indignation by the electorate in any given year may not necessarily change the colour of the administration or alter the principles and policy followed at the time. Those responsible for running the municipal government may still be in the majority. But all the same popular disapproval expressed in any year has its effect. Those in power immediately take the warning, and try to mend their principles and improve their methods.

There are in England two kinds of boroughs—those which are counties by themselves and known as county boroughs and those which are included in the area of an administrative county and are known only as boroughs. The number of country boroughs at present is 83 and that of non-county boroughs is 306. For purposes of election and representation the boroughs are divided into a number of wards. This division into electoral wards is determined neither by a parliamentary statute nor by any municipal by-law or resolution. It is determined by an Order in Council. Practically every borough is divided into wards. The wards are not literally single member constituencies each of them returns three members. But these three members are not elected at the same time. Each year one is elected. So, though not literally, the wards are actually single-member constituencies. There is not a single ward in any municipal borough where there is no election in any year. Of course this election may be uncontested as we shall soon see and in that case votes are not cast and without any hubbub the only candidate is returned to the council. But apart from this uncontested return, every year every ward in every municipality sees an election.

The borough councils are not very small bodies. Some of them may really be called large with as many as 140 members. The city council of Manchester has this numerical strength. As three-fourths of the total membership are councillors and as one-third of these councillors are elected every year, the annual election is not a small affair. It has been calculated that the number of vacant seats early this month was more than 1,550 (actually 1,568). It is true a large proportion of these seats was filled uncontested. Near about five hundred candidates were returned without any contest. This is of

course a phenomenon which may appear surprising in our country. It may even be put down as indicating a lack of sufficient interest in local politics on the part of the British people. But it may be explained this way. In a moment we shall see that even local elections are held here on party lines. Individuals without any party support cannot take the risk of contesting any election. He cannot have either the financial or the organisational facilities without this party label. Now there are wards in which a particular party has created an unassailable position. Necessarily, the other parties and groups do not like to waste their energy and funds by any contest in such wards. It may be said that for elections to the House of Commons also some constituencies from the standpoint of one party may be safe and from the standpoint of another may be hopeless. But even these hopeless constituencies are contested very often. This is done because while the temper of a small ward may be gauged at once that of a large parliamentary constituency cannot be so surely fathomed. Secondly, even if by a contest the majority of the winning party may be reduced, that is regarded as a distinct gain by the opponents. In local elections, however, this consideration does not come in. So, as in some wards, the contest is not regarded as wise by some parties and groups, their representatives are returned unopposed. In our country this is hardly possible. Even if a recognised party does not like to contest a seat mushroom candidates immediately crop up in their individual capacity and some of them stick to the last and contest the seat. So while unopposed returns are very few in India, they are large in England. Of course in regard to elections to councils of administrative counties, such unopposed returns have been too many. In fact in some councils there have been times when there was hardly any contest for any seat. This certainly indicates indifference on the part of the British people to their responsibilities for local administration. But in borough elections unopposed returns are usually the result of wise decision on the part of the opposite groups.

All the three national parties now practically participate in local elections. The labourites have, from the very beginning, taken up a distinct attitude of their own in elections to all the local bodies. They have pinned their faith to a programme of socialisation of many of the services upon which the health and comfort of the local people so largely depend. And what is more as they have never expected that this

programme will be taken up by any other group, they have fought elections on a party basis so that by securing a majority in the borough and other councils they may carry out their programme. The conservatives and liberals, however, for long dallied with the idea of running local administration on a non-party basis. Local Government was in their eyes administration pure and simple and was not politics. So it should be run in the only way in which administration might be efficient—i.e., without any partisan bias. Of course neither the liberals nor the conservatives were ever consistent in this attitude. In London, for instance, after the establishment of the County Council under the Local Government Act of 1888, the Liberals stole a march upon the Conservatives in the first election and retained their majority until 1907. The Conservatives were practically caught napping they were under the illusion that elections to the County Council would be on non-party lines and were accordingly without any arrangement. The Liberals, however, under the name of Progressives proceeded with organisation apace and secured the return of their candidates. Even such a conservative stronghold as the London City was won over by the progressives and it elected Lord Rosebery to the County Council. But although the Liberals and the Conservatives have never been consistent in their attitude towards local elections, they did not cease until recently to preach the gospel of non-partisan local administration. Even now the conservatives would say that they fight local elections not really as a national party. They have of course to contest the seat in the borough and county councils in order that they may not all be occupied by the labourites. But they contest them not as members of the National Conservative Party but as the opponents of rank socialism in local administration as anti-socialists. But whether they call themselves anti-socialists or by any other name, really they are no other than Conservatives pure and simple. In fact, now-a-days local elections are not only run on party lines but they are regarded as a barometer of the attitude of the people towards the different national parties. From the results of the local elections you draw your conclusions as to the trends of public feeling.

In the last election the conservatives and also liberals raised mainly two objections to labour rule. It should be observed in passing that in about one-fourth of the boroughs the labourites were and are in a majority. It was canvassed about that labour rule was too expensive and was drawing too much out of the pocket of the rate-payers.

In those places where they were in a majority, they had added considerably to the municipal services and thereby added very largely also to municipal expenditure should be reduced and in other places it should not be indulged in. But if reduction in expenditure was to be accomplished it was essential that the voters should refuse to support the labour candidates. The labour candidates and their supporters of course defended themselves to the best of their ability. It was true, they would say, that rate was going up. But the higher the rate the wealthy people must not grudge to pay as they had enough and to spare and the poor people also should pay as it was largely in their interest that it was imposed. The health and comfort of the poor people were never properly looked after before the socialist party became a force in the country. It was only because of the support which they enlisted among the voters that gradually the health services became efficient, that housing schemes became formulated and applied and other amenities were brought to the door of poor homes. By arguments such as these and by reference to the records of work they had to their credit, the labourites held their own in many places but in other localities the people continued to be shy. No body likes to be taxed very much. Even poor people who have to part with little but get much more in return from the local bodies are not cheerful about the increase in rates. This explains why the labourites could not make much of an impression in wards which they did not hold already.

Secondly, an issue which is a new one and which would appear to many as rather an extraneous one, was raised and it was this which must have cost the socialists the seats which they had lost in the last election to their opponents. This was the issue of the A.R.P. (Air Raid Protection). It may be asked as to how this could be a matter of local administration. But although it is pre-eminently a matter of the national Government to tackle, the local bodies also have been given certain responsibility in this regard. In December, 1937, an Act was passed by the Parliament. This provided for certain measures to be taken by the Government in collaboration with the local authorities. It was only since January last that the Act has been in operation. But last September when war was thought imminent, it was discovered that nothing had practically been done during the last few months towards organising protection against air raids. The anti-socialists in those boroughs where the labourites were in the majority fastened the

responsibility upon them. It was pointed out and rather glibly accepted and true that the labour majority in the councils had willfully neglected this work. The labour candidates of course pertinently asked as to what the conservatives had done in those areas where they were in a majority in the municipal councils. In fact to where any effective arrangement had been made for protection against raids if the war really broke out. What is more without proper and organised assistance in every way from the national Government no initiative of the local bodies, however, vigorous, would be successful, and this assistance was not available. Consequently, if there was negligence, it was to be shared by every group of people in the country. But for the time being the cry that the labourites had shirked their duty in respect of protection against air raids was successful. Even early in November the people were everywhere terror-stricken. The war clouds had been lifted no doubt one month earlier but still the people, though heaving a sigh of relief, were still too conscious of the danger they might have faced. When therefore the Conservatives raised the cry that the labourites had not minded their business in this respect, they became unpopular. The rejoinder of the latter, though perfectly true, could not remove the crust of prejudice that had already been created.

It was because of the raising of this extraneous issue the labour party could not secure as good results as it might have expected. Of course in Greater London (the suburbs of London which are outside the jurisdiction of the London County Council), the Conservatives and the Liberals could make no headway. In these boroughs the labourites have attained an enormous success but in other places either they have held their own or lost ground. They could not win new ground. The success of the Labour Party in Greater London are explained by the excellent organisation which has been created by Herbert Morrison in these areas and which in London has been responsible for labour victory in the last two successive elections. Victory in elections is due very largely no doubt to the principles and programme of a party and to the personality and clean record of the candidates but it is in normal cases due to a greater extent still to the organisation of the party in the area. If Mr. Herbert Morrison's skill and ability can be extended to other areas, labour victory in those places also may be taken as certainty. It is this hope which may reconcile the labour party for the time being to the loss of control over half a dozen boroughs which it has sustained in the last election.

THE NOVEL IN TELUGU LITERATURE

PROF. V. N. BRUSHAN

(Wadia College : Poona.)

FICTION is a rather late arrival at the highway feast of advanced Andhra Literature. It was not till the 'nineties of the last century that the novel came into existence as a separate branch of literature. The reason is partly due to the belated development of prose which, though in use in Telugu literature from early times, came into active vogue only in the 15th century. That and the succeeding century produced outstanding prose works ; and from thence onwards prose developed as a vehicle of literary expression with such rapidity and popularity as if its secret desire was to make up for its late advent.

As has been said above, it was in the third quarter of the nineteenth century that fiction made its first appearance in Telugu literature. That was a period of stir and stress in the Andhra province. The Brahmo Samaj Movement of Bengal found many enthusiastic followers in Andhra, and a trenchant campaign of social reform was set on foot. Prominent among the crusaders may be mentioned Sir. R. Venkataratnam and the late lamented Rao Bahadur Kandukuri Viresalingam Pantulu. It was an absolutely arduous work that they undertook ; but they rolled uphill the stone of determination with such sincerity and steadfastness that their efforts began to bear fruit ere long. With the aid of both tongue and pen the two pioneers spread wide the new social gospel and sowed the seeds of awakening.

Sir. R. Venkataratnam was a Professor of English and Viresalingam Pantulu a Pandit in Telugu. So, whereas the former's appeal was limited to the English-educated few, the latter's extended to the Vernacular-knowing many. By profession a teacher, the Rao Bahadur was already a Knight of the Pen-service. He therefore found no difficulty in using literature as a sluice for social propaganda. Essays, stories, plays, burlesques and novels—he wrote in profusion—all with the dominant idea of popularising the tenets of the new social reform movement. His novels, though not many, served to create a

vogue for fiction. The novel, practically unknown in Telugu literature till then, was eagerly welcomed—by writers as an eloquent medium for artistic instruction, and by readers as an art-form of exquisite entertainment. Thus, to Viresalingam Pantulu, the patriarch of public life in Andhradesa half a century ago, goes the credit of freeing language from many of its traditional trammels, of using literature as an instrument for social reform and commonweal, and of originating new varieties of Telugu Composition including the Novel form.

Contemporaneously with Viresalingam Pantulu, there came into prominence another crafts-man of fiction—Chilakamarty Lakshmi Narasimham Pantulu by name. Unlike the Rao Bahadur who coupled literature with propaganda, Chilakamarty is a pure literary artist. In his hands the Telugu novel acquired great prestige, power and popularity. Of his several novels some are translations, some adaptations and some original. They are all written in the classical style so dear to traditionalists and pandits of orthodox schools of thought. The historical background, the massive structure, and the numerical profusion of his novels, has rightly earned for Chilakamarty the honour of being hailed as the Sir Walter Scott of Andhra Fiction. Chilakamarty is happily still in our midst ; but having grown weak with age he seems to have once forever put by his magic pen.

In the childhood of the present century the Telugu novel received further impetus from the *Andhra Pracharini Grantha Nilayam*. Venkata Paravateeswara Kavulu, the ' joint poets,' turned their attention from poetry to fiction, and produced dozens of novels. They established the above named concern with several patrons and subscribers, and the organisation worked successfully for about a decade. Almost all the novels in this series are translations—mainly from Bengali. The general criticism levelled against these is that they are neither faithful translations nor clever adaptations, but gross travesties of the good originals. The accusation, though strong, is not baseless. The Publishing House promised its subscribers a definite number of novels—generally four a year ; and in order to keep up the contract the promoters had to somehow publish the required number. A thing of art—be it in the field of fiction, cannot be fashioned to order ; much less can it be made a thing of merchandise. Yet, this is exactly what the *Andhra Pracharini Grantha Nilayam* did. Consequently, the level of the novels is rather low, and they cannot be among the permanent possessions of discriminate lovers of literature. But one good result

of this commercial career of the Telugu novel is that it whetted the literary taste of the average reader. The great Telugu classics may or may not have had any attraction for them ; but the man in the street and the woman in the household now desired to read novels, not so much for instruction, of course, as by way of pleasant pastime. Thus, during the early years of the current century the demand for fiction became incessant, and writers readily came forward to supply it. On account of all these causes, novel-writing became somewhat of a paying profession, and it was the only one to become so !

From the time of the Partition of Bengal to the emergence of the Non-co-operation movement—is perhaps the most 'crowded hour' in the brief history of the Telugu Novel. But it certainly is not true to the poetic equation of 'an age without a name.' The period between the two great political upheavals was one of prolific 'fiction-mongering' in Telugu literature. The period saw the sudden rise of several novelists who were only too ready to exploit the awaiting market. But not one of these can be said to have achieved anything imperishable or even substantial. It is no exaggeration to say that almost all the novels produced during the period are either translations or adaptations, or worse still, surreptitious importations from other languages. Let alone originality, even the fundamental rules of good translation are violated. The novels of Kowta Sri Rama Sastry and Sri Siva Sankara Sastry are among the few exceptions. But by the majority the art as well as the technique of the novel seem to have been thrown to the winds ; and the translators seem to have forgotten that the task of translation is as exacting as original work itself ! The novelists simply laid their hands on the popular novels in other languages, and with breathless, nay, indecent haste, grafted them on the soil of our literature. Backgrounds that have no bearing on our surroundings, characters which in no way claim kinship with our interests or ideals, actions that are utterly alien to our common experience, and idealisations that are beyond the extremist limits of our imagination—it is these that the novels of this period of pseudo-literary resurgence have given to the public. Many master-minds and many languages have been laid under contribution. Important Indian vernaculars like Bengali, Marathi and Hindi, as also the English literature—proved to be fruitful sources for our novelists. Originality as such was smothered ; or if anybody pretended to have it, it was in the words of

Dean Inge, 'unconscious plagiarism.' Translations and adaptations became the order of the day, and they passed off for novels of surpassing literary value ! It is true that translations of masterpieces from other literatures enrich the literature into which they are done ; but they should not be the be-all and end-all of writers' ambition. The craze for translation worse than the crime of base imitation, stifles the creative impulse of literary artists.

With the advent of the Gandhian era in 1920, a new chapter, I think, has been opened in Telugu literature in general. Writers have become self-conscious and creative-minded. There has been a deliberate attempt to try and produce as far as possible works of original worth. In poetry, criticism, drama and short-story—the new creative impulse has been much in evidence. The Telugu novel has benefited by this new phase. The voluminous *Mala Palli* of Sjt. Unnava Lakshmi Narayana, artistically designed and nobly executed, is an outstanding achievement. Branded for the last one decade with several governmental persecutions, the novel, thanks to the Congress regime, is just now coming into its own !

A few years back the Andhra University announced a handsome prize of Rs. 750 for the best novel by contemporary writers. It was a welcome experiment, and several writers entered the lists. Finally, the award was divided between Sjt. Adivi Bapirazu and Viswanatha Satyanarayana. Both these are among the few good writers of contemporary Andhra. The *Hima Bindu* and *Narayana Rao* of Bapirazu, and *Veyyi Padagalu* and *Ekaveera* of Viswanatha are not merely good original novels but definite solid contributions to modern Telugu fiction. Viswanatha is perhaps the most prolific of all Telugu writers today, and has, more than anybody else, touched and enriched our literature in many ways. The remarkable thing about him is that he has touched nothing that he has not adorned !

Besides these two, there are other novelists too, who, by their spasmodic efforts, have shown promise of better work to come. But, the short-story rather than the novel, seems to be the fashion of the day. While the number of good novelists can be counted on one's fingers, the short-story writers are as plentiful as asparagus in May. It would be a pity if modern Telugu Literature allows the short-story to supplant the novel. The novel is a great literary instrument and can be wielded for great purposes. In spite of its fifty years' background, the novel in Telugu literature, it may be said in conclusion,

is still in its swaddling clothes. It is incumbent on the enthusiastic Andhra ' gods of the pen ' to nurture it in the best manner possible so that it may " grow deeper and deeper in beauty and strength " and ere long reach the mid-summer meridian of manhood !



[*Note.*—This article was originally written at the request of Prof. N. V. Godbole of the Victoria College, Gwalior, to be of help to him in his thesis on "The Novel in India." The article has since been translated and incorporated in "Marathi Kadambari"—by Prof. N. V. Godbole, and Prof. P. V. Bapat—published in May, 1938.]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PARA- MOUNTCY LAID DOWN IN BUTLER COMMITTEE REPORT AND SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH'S VIEWS CRITICISED

PROFESSOR K. K. BHATTACHARYYA
Allahabad University.

IN criticising the Article of Sir William Holdsworth in the October issue, of 1930, of the *Law Quarterly Review* I shall be deemed to be criticising the legal, juridical and constitutional aspects of the matter relating to Paramountcy laid down in Butler Committee Report.

Sir William Holdsworth, K.C., is a most distinguished jurist. He was a member of the Butler Committee, otherwise known as the States Enquiry Committee. In the Butler Committee Report the members of the committee did not take into full consideration the arguments presented by Sir Leslie Scott and his four colleagues, all the five being distinguished jurists and lawyers themselves, which they presented before the said committee. Sir William Holdsworth thought it fit that in the *Law Quarterly Review* he would present the Legal and Constitutional aspects of the question fully and our expectations have not been in vain. But I do not see eye to eye on all points with Sir William Holdsworth. When a man crosses swords with Sir William Holdsworth, he must do so with a due sense of trepidation. But I shall fail in my duty if I do not try to make my contribution in the hope that it may be considered by all the jurists and lawyers, to evaluate how far Sir William Holdsworth was right in drawing certain conclusions.

Sir William Holdsworth's views on Paramountcy may be summarized thus:—

- (1) Paramountcy is only a part of the prerogative of the Crown;
- (2) It is a very distinct prerogative;

(3) The political practices, usages and sufferance all go to make up Paramountcy ;

(4) Paramountcy of the Crown is not assignable to anybody as it is of a personal nature.

Sir William Holdsworth therefore so far as the third and the fourth points are concerned has definitely stated that the paramountcy of the Crown must remain where it resides now. I am not inclined to accept this view.

The legal and the constitutional aspects of the question have been gone into in some of the books, but nowhere have the fallacies of Sir Sivaswami Iyer's book, Sir William Holdsworth's arguments and those of the Butler Committee been detected fully. Sir P. S. Shivaswami Iyer's language, in Chapter XI of his book *Indian Constitutional Problems*—a book which had been published before the Butler Committee Report saw the light of the day—states that the treaties were entered into either with the East India Company in the Sovereign capacity acting on behalf of the Crown or with the Governor-General acting on behalf of the Crown. In neither case, according to him, the Crown acted in personal capacity of the King of England only but in the capacity of the ruler and Sovereign of British India and the United Kingdom. Now, there is a good deal of truth in what he asserts.

The argument of Sir William Holdsworth is specious, for the paramountcy which he claims for the King was never due to the King in his personal aspect, but in his political aspect, *i.e.*, as King of England and Sovereign of British India. In other words, the Indian States entered into treaties not with the King as an ordinary person under Municipal Law but with the King under English Constitutional Law and as sovereign of India. So the question of personal relationship must be held to be far-fetched.

Sir William Holdsworth says that it is a prerogative of the Crown, and is a distinct and special prerogative. Furthermore, according to him, customs, usages and sufferance all go to make up the prerogative.

What then is meant by the expression "prerogative of the Crown?" Dicey, in his classical book *The Law of the Constitution*, says: "The prerogative appears to be both historically and as a matter of actual fact nothing else than the residue of discretionary arbitrary authority which at any given time is left in the hand

of the Crown." This classical definition has received judicial approval.

Anson, in his book *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, says: "Some of the powers exercised by the Crown are conferred or defined by statute but some also exist in virtue of custom and common law." In describing the sources of prerogative he alludes to

(a) those prerogative of the Crown which owed their origin to his tribal chieftaincy, (b) his feudal overlordship, and lastly, (c) those attributes with which the Crown has been invested by legal theory.

Alluding to the first source he says: "There is the residue of that executive power which the King in the early stage of the history possessed in all the departments of the Government when he led his people in war, administered their affairs in peace, and was their judge in the last resort." Alluding to the source he says that there are the parts of the prerogative which trace their origin from the position of the King as the feudal chief of the country and as a ultimate land-owner and the lord of every man. Speaking about the third he says: "They are the attributes with which the Crown has been invested by legal theory. Amongst the attributes are that the King never dies, the King can do no wrong."

But nowhere do we find mention of the fact that by virtue of the conquest of India, the King became invested with a special and distinct prerogative, namely, the prerogative of paramountcy.

Let us turn to another matter.

There is a long stream of decisions which point out clearly that there is not a single prerogative of the Crown which Parliament cannot touch, or regulate or even abolish.

In *De Keyser's Royal Hotel* case (1920 A. C. 568), Lord Atkinson laid down the law thus: ".....When such a statute is passed expressing the will and intention of the King and the three states, it abridges the Royal Prerogative while it is in force to the extent that the Crown can do only a particular thing under and in accordance with the statutory provisions and that the Prerogative power to that extent is in abeyance." In the same case Lord Parmoor in his judgment stated the correct law when he laid down: "When the power of the executive to interfere with the property or the liberty of the subject has been placed under Parliamentary control and directly regulated by statute, the executive no longer derives

its authority from the Royal Prerogative of the Crown but from Parliament, and that in exercising such authority, the executive is bound to observe the restrictions which Parliament has imposed in favour of the subject."

Parliament, therefore, by statute, can take away entirely or abridge any prerogative. The Supremacy of Parliament is unquestioned. I use the word *supremacy* advisedly and not *sovereignty*, as it has been shown by Dr. Jennings, in his book *The Law of the Constitution*, page 129, that the word *sovereignty* is associated with politico-theological dogmas.

What does the supremacy of Parliament mean? It means, firstly, that Parliament can legally enact legislation dealing with any subject-matter whatever. There are no limitations except political expediency and constitutional conventions. Secondly, it means that "Parliament can legislate for all power and for all places. If it enacts that smoking in streets of Paris is an offence then it is an offence. Naturally it is offence by English Law and not by French Law."—Dr. Jennings, *The Law of the Constitution*.

Tested in the light of the foregoing observations, the prerogative of Paramountcy can certainly be regulated or abridged or even taken away by Parliament. It follows, therefore, as a corollary that the British Parliament can transfer the whole content of the Paramountcy to the Indian Federal Legislature and in that case there is no impediment, legal or constitutional, in the way of India's attaining immediate freedom, *i.e.*, attaining full sovereign status.

It is really surprising to find that prerogative is not the source of paramountcy, but that the growth of paramountcy has added a new and distinct prerogative to the Crown. There is no warrant for the proposition for creating paramountcy of the Crown as a class apart from other prerogatives. The question may be asked: Since when did the King of England become invested with paramountcy? Was it inherent in the kingship of England, or was he clothed with it without the Parliament's knowing it, the moment the first treaty between an Indian Ruler and the East India Company was concluded, or was it after the Mutiny of 1857 when the Crown assumed direct charge of the administration of British India? Whatever answer is given, the proposition cannot be legally assailed that paramountcy is a prerogative of the Crown standing on the same footing as all

other prerogatives of the Crown do. To hold the contrary proposition, namely, that prerogative is not source of paramountcy but no has added a new and distinct prerogative to the Crown is an untenable legal proposition.

Sir William Holdsworth maintains that customs, political practices, usages—all go to make up the paramountcy. So are the constituent elements of most of the prerogatives looked at from the historical point of view. Therefore, Sir William Holdsworth's argument on this point is not tenable.

Conceding for the sake of argument, though not agreeing, that really paramountcy is a prerogative of the Crown which cannot be regulated by Parliament, it stands to reason that when the Indian States entered into relationship with the East India Company before 1857, or direct with the Crown after 1857, they did not stipulate for all the paraphernalia as to the system of agency for the exercise of Paramountcy, namely that the Governor-General in Council would exercise the paramountcy on behalf of the Crown. According to the Butler Committee Report, paragraph 18, the Paramount Power has been defined or rather described as "the Crown acting through the Secretary of State for India and the Governor-General in Council who are responsible to Parliament of Great Britain." The Butler Committee Report has put the doctrine of Paramountcy under a strain which it can hardly bear. The Rulers of the Indian States only stipulated that they were to render allegiance to the sovereign of England, but they did not lay down the condition that the Secretary of State for India and the Governor-General in Council were to be the agents for the exercise of the same.

In paragraph 67 of the Butler Committee Report it is laid down : "For the present it is a practical necessity to recognise the existence of two Indias and to adopt machinery to this end and we advise that in future the Viceroy and not the Governor-General in Council should be the agent for the Crown in dealing with Indian States. This change will require legislation." Now if the personal relationship existing between the Indian States on one hand and the Crown on the other be correct, then why should it require legislation ? Furthermore, the next question is : Which body is competent to legislate ? To this only one answer is possible, namely, the Parliament. Was the consent of the Rulers of the Indian States necessary for this legislation ? An answer in the negative must be given.

Paragraph 106 of the Butler Committee Report lays down the most ominous proposition : " We recommend that the Viceroy and not the Governor-General in Council should in future be the agent of the Crown in his relations with the Princes. . . . We hold that the treaties, engagements and sanads have been made with the Crown and that the relationship between the Paramount Power and the Princes should not be transferred without the agreement of the latter to a new Government in British India responsible to Indian Legislature."

Paragraph 58 also records the same view. In my judgment there is not an iota of justification for the propositions of the Butler Committee Report laid down above, for when the Government of India Act of 1858 was promulgated, in which the States were placed under the Government of India, their agreement and consent were not at all taken. Furthermore, even when the Act of 1919 was passed, in which the gradual growth of responsible government was envisaged, even then the consent of the Princes was not taken.

It is of importance to refer to section 124 of the Amending Act 52 and 53 Victoria, Chapters 60 and 63, which define India as " British India together with any territories of any native prince or chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty exercised through the Governor-General of India or through any Governor or Officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India." In Section 33 of the Government of India Act, 1919, it is definitely stated that the superintendence, direction and control of the Civil and Military Government of India is vested in the Governor-General in Council. ' India ' in Section 33 clearly means British India as also Indian India. Now, when from the year 1858 down to 1919 it was not thought necessary to take the consent of the Princes to place them under the Government of India Acts, why should it have struck the British Parliament all at once that relationship between the Indian States and the Crown cannot be even slightly modified without their consent ?

It is absolutely wrong to say that the Act of 1935 is not a development of the Act of 1919. In fact, when, in ushering in the Act of 1919, the consent of the Princes was not taken, one is surprised to find why it should have been thought necessary to take such consent, by the members of the Butler Committee and Sir William Holdsworth himself.

Now, it is clear that this attempt to put up insurmountable barriers between British India and Indian India is legally and constitutionally unsound.

Therefore, at this late hour for Sir William Holdsworth to suggest that the consent of the Princes must be taken, is absolutely unwarranted by facts or by law. It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of statutes that we cannot import mistakes or omissions into them ; we must take the statutes as they are. From 1858 to 1919 the Government of India Acts have always meant by the expression 'India' British India and Indian India, over both of which the Governor-General in Council had complete control. To erect a 'Chinese wall' now between Indian India and British India is unjustifiable, and constitutionally and legally untenable. Therefore, since the Rulers of the Indian States are to render allegiance to the British Crown, and since there has been no stipulation as to the agent exercising paramountcy on behalf of the Crown, there would be complete constitutional propriety if the whole content of paramountcy is transferred to the Federal Ministry responsible to the Crown. Even taking the Butler Committee Report and Sir William Holdsworth's views as correct, there is no bar against the agency being changed, namely, instead of the Governor-General in Council becoming responsible to the Crown, the Federal Ministry will be responsible to the Crown direct without the intervening channel, namely, the Secretary of State for India. And thus there is no bar against India's attaining Dominion Status at once.

Now, of course, I do not agree with the legal observations laid down in the Butler Committee Report and by Sir William Holdsworth. The word 'Crown' has always meant and always does mean the King in Parliament. It never means the King as an ordinary individual under the Municipal Law. In the Stepney Election Petition case, it was laid down that allegiance is not due to the King in his personal capacity but to the King in his political capacity, i.e., to the Crown or to the State.

The Butler Committee Report rejects the international and the contractual theories advanced by the five counsel engaged on behalf of the Indian States to present their opinion before the Butler Committee. The Butler Committee and Sir William himself have given the go-by to these theories. They cannot be allowed, therefore, to make much of the contractual theory.

The consensual theory is apparently wrong according to them ; therefore, they should not at all make a fetish of usages, political practices, etc.

I cannot agree with the view propounded by Sir William Holdsworth that "If and in so far as the ministers who govern British India are made responsible to an Indian Legislature, in that event and to that extent they are incapable of acting as agents of the Crown in their relation with the Rulers of Indian States."

Sir William Holdsworth lays stress upon the relationship existing between the Rulers of the Indian States and the Crown as of a very personal kind, and consequently he says that the Crown cannot cede its rights and duties to any other state. If that be so, Sir William Holdsworth is not justified in saying that its existence (existence of paramountcy) depends upon treaties, engagements and *sanads* supplemented by usages and by decisions of the Government of India, of the Secretaries of State embodied in the practices of the Political Department.

Now to whom is the Governor-General in Council responsible for the exercise of paramountcy? The answer is, to the Parliament of Great Britain. To whom were the Government of India responsible for usages and decisions with regard to Indian States? The answer is, to Parliament. To whom is the Secretary of State responsible for his decisions and innovations regarding political practices and usages? The same answer is to be given, namely, the British Parliament. Where then is the foundation for the proposition that the relationship is of a purely personal kind and cannot be assigned?

Matters relating to the affairs of the Indian States have always been laid on the table of both the Houses of Parliament and discussed by the members thereof. Warren Hastings was impeached, amongst other things, for the treatment he meted out to some of the Rulers of the Indian States. Furthermore, the Secretaries of State for India have always issued instructions to the Governors-General or the Viceroy regarding the policy of the British Government towards the Indian States. Even just the other day, on the 27th of March, 1926, Lord Reading, when Viceroy of India, concluded his famous letter to the Nizam with the significant observation that the letter carried with it the sanction of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

Adverting for a moment to paragraph 18 of the Butler Committee Report we find that the Paramount Power has been defined "as the Crown acting through the Secretary of State for India and the

Governor-General in Council who are responsible to the Parliament of Great Britain." Now on clear analysis of this proposition we find that the Governor-General in Council and the Secretary of State for India are responsible ultimately not to the King in his personal capacity but to Parliament and that Parliament means, in British constitutional parlance, the King and both the Houses acting together. Now in my judgment the existence of personal relationship so much stressed on by Sir William Holdsworth cannot stand legal analysis.

The British Parliament, therefore, would be perfectly justified in handing over the whole content of paramountcy to the Federal Ministry of India, unreservedly, without involving itself in any constitutional impropriety or illegality, making the Federal Ministry the final authority for its exercise.¹



¹ Part of a lecture delivered by Mr. K. K. Bhattacharyya, M.A., B.L. (Cal.), LL.M. (Lond.), Barrister-at-Law, Reader of Law, Allahabad University, when he was invited to deliver a series of six lectures, as Extension Lecturer, by the Calcutta University in November, 1936.

PHILOSOPHY IN JOHN KEATS*

M. TAHIR JAMIL, M.A.

II

TRUE to his resolve, and full of hope and high spirits, Keats embarked on his mission to find a solution to the enigma of life, and gave to the world his longest poem, "*Endymion*." That the poet was by no means satisfied with the achievement is quite clear. In the preface, he frankly enumerates the chief defects of the poem and apologises for its "mawkishness" by explaining that at the time of its composition he was passing through that period of life in which "the soul is in a ferment, the character undecided, the way of life uncertain, the ambition thick-sighted." Yet it was a grand experiment which gave confidence to the young poet. "In it," as he wrote to Hessey on October 19, 1818, "I leaped headlong into the sea, and thereby have become better acquainted with the soundings, the quicksands and the rocks, than if I had stayed upon the green shore, and piped a silly pipe, and took tea and comfortable advice." He had written it "without judgment," and had felt the uncertainty of his powers in the achievement of his goal, but his future works were to avoid this pitfall and he would henceforth write "with judgment."

In spite of its imperfections and defects, the poem may be regarded as a definite work of promise. It shows the poet's power of imagination with its wonderful capacity to create beauty to excess. Like Wordsworth's "*Prelude*" and Shelley's "*Alastor*" it is the story of the progress of a human soul in pursuit of an ideal, failing to attain the serene heights of the former, and differing from the latter on account of the happy ending to its hero's quest. Endymion does not waste his life in idle dreaming like Alastor. He passes through many trials, but by keeping himself close to the "kindred points of heaven and home," he achieves his aim. There are many stray thoughts, obscure passages, and confused issues, but the thread of a general metaphysical argument runs throughout the narrative, and gives it completeness and a well-rounded conclusion. Many critics have been misled by its "feasts of dainties" and "langorous

* Continued from the last issue.

delights" into the error of calling the poem "poor unrelieved, unmanly sensuousness."¹ The cooler criticism of a later generation, however, finds in the story not a series of fantasies but "a spiritual allegory,"² which is profound, though confused. The main theme of the poem, as most of the critics now admit, is the career of the Human Soul to perfection. It has been narrated with the freshness and inspiration of youth. Through inexperience the undisciplined genius of the poet meanders into the pleasures of sensuous beauty, and uses the "cloying language" of lovers in the ecstasy of human love, yet pleasure is eventually spiritualised, refined, and elevated to the sublimity of the ideal. In the words of Hancock: "It preserves the warmth of bodily pleasure while consecrating it to the service of the soul."³ Glimpses of the ideal very frequently haunted his mind. In moments of inspiration he felt that he held the key to the mystery of the universe and stood face to face with the eternal truth, but had not yet grown wings strong enough to continue the flight. He had so far discovered only the "shadowy outline of the mysterious truth." The details were too meagre for adequate presentation. The result is that the issue is confused and the narrative proceeds in an undefined way. The main purpose is sometimes vague and shifting, obscured by the richness of descriptive imagery. The failing is a legitimate cause of complaint by the critics, but generous allowance should be made for the sins of youthful indiscipline and excess, considering that it was written at an age when normally the senses continue to be more powerful than the mind. It is not as an apology that we point out this fact, but as evidence of the potential greatness of the mind that could rise to such great heights even in a period of comparative immaturity.

The poem opens with a statement of the proposition which Keats sets out to prove in his narrative of Endymion. His early musings have already given us an indication of the trend of his thought. The solution of the mysteries and problems of the world he is gradually beginning to read in Ideal Beauty. He has vaguely felt its presence in every object of Nature, even in her most commonplace things. He has now reached that stage where the vision presses itself upon him with such a forceful clarity that he accepts it as a self-evident truth which is too patent to be denied. He considers it to be ever-present

¹ Alice Meynell: *The Poetical Works of John Keats*.

² J. W. Mackail: *Lectures on Poetry*.

³ A. E. Hancock: *John Keats*, p. 72.

and indestructible. It can never pass into nothingness. Further light on the strong conviction of the poet on this point is thrown by his letter to Bailey written at the time when he was busy with the composition of the poem (November, 1817). There he states: "I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the Heart's affections, and the truth of Imagination. What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth—whether it existed before or not, for I have the same idea of all our passions as of Love: they are all, in their sublime, creative of essential Beauty. In a word, you may know my favourite speculation from my first book (that is, of *Endymion*).¹" The letter serves as a valuable corollary to the poem's induction. It brings out clearly the poet's acceptance of the philosophical creed of his days which did not limit knowledge to human reason and to sensuous experience, but claimed in man the power of intuition that could transcend both these sources. The faith is definite and emphatic, and the poet bases upon it his conception of Love and Beauty which he intuitively believes to be essential Truth. A mind that can correctly perceive Beauty enjoys not only profound delight and comfort, but possesses an inexhaustible source of strength that can counteract all the ills of human life. In the midst of

" . . . despondence, of the inhuman dearth
Of noble natures, of the gloomy days,
Of all the unhealthy and o'er-darken'd ways
Made for our searching,"¹

in the midst of all things that make the world a "vale of tears," Beauty has the ministering power to heal the sorrows of man and administer peace to his distracted soul. Man beholds infinite glories in the temple of universal Nature. Everything that exists seems to him an essential part of his own being, adding to his joy and relieving his sadness. To add to the pleasures offered by Nature, there are works of human imagination and the consolation of immortality which man imagines to be the grand doom of the mighty dead. All these working together move away the pall from his dark spirit, and appeal to him as forms reflecting the transcendent Beauty beyond human ken. They are:

" An endless fountain of immortal drink,
Pouring unto us from the heaven's brink,"²

and become to the soul of man a source of "cheering light" reminding him that what he beholds is merely a reflection of the Ideal. It is the

¹ "*Endymion*," Book I, 8-11.

² "*Endymion*," Book I, 25-26.

pursuit and realisation of this fitting ideal that is assayed by Keats in this poem in the form of a fable of olden days retold.

As Mr. Murray has rightly pointed out, "Endymion is a poem about Love."¹ It is the career of a soul in love with the Ideal Beauty and the poet follows it through all the stages. The Beauty that Endymion loves is not the Intellectual Ideal of Shelley's *Alastor*, an abstract idea leading its devotees to no measure of success due to his alienation with his kind. In spite of his passionate devotion and irksome toil, the hero of Shelley dies in the effort, without ever coming nearer to the goal during his life on earth. The case is different with Endymion. The object of his love is not a vision or an idea, but a real object, the Moon in all her argent glory. His soul is dazzled by her translucent brightness, his heart is thrilled to its very depth, and his being appears to him to be commingled with the spheres of the Moon. The passion, once excited, is sublimated in the course of pursuit, and is transferred from the Moon to the goddess herself, appearing in his dream in the physical form of a human being, the "completed form of all completeness," and the "high perfection of all sweetness," the symbol of which is contained nowhere on earth.

The poet has covered two stages of progress. The sense of Beauty aroused by natural objects is not only humanised but idealised, though it is not the latter element that the poet wants to emphasise at this point. He believes in the physical passion of love and gives full play to the "sensuality" of his imagination. The vision, however, does not last long, and when the hero awakens into the world of reality he is a distracted and a miserable being. The alluring scenes of Nature that once used to charm him now appear to him most distressing, and even repulsive:

".....all the pleasant hues
Of heaven and earth had faded: deepest shades
Were deepest dungeons; heaths and sunny glades
Were full of pestilent light;.....
.....If an innocent bird
Before my heedless footsteps stirr'd, and stirr'd
In little journeys, I beheld in it
A disguised demon, missioned to knit
My soul with under darkness."²

¹ J. M. Murray: "Keats and Shakespeare," p. 27 ff.

² "Endymion," Book I, 689-70.

To the frenzied brain of the lover their glory and splendour appear in different light. They stand like tempting obstructions to divert his attention from his soul's desire, and are, therefore, repulsive to him. Nevertheless, he has not forgotten those moments of highest joy he had in communion with Nature, moments when his soul felt emancipated from the bodily chains and like a floating spirit, used to merge "into a sort of oneness" with the spirit of Nature. Those were moments of spiritual pleasure which becked

" Our ready minds to fellowship divine,
A fellowship with essence; till we shine,
Full alchemized, and free of space."¹

The experience is that of a mystic, and Keats felt that it was an inspired passage. In his letter to Taylor (January, 1818) he says: "When I wrote it, it was regular stepping of the Imagination toward a truth." But such visitations come very seldom to Keats, nor can they be very helpful to humanity in general. Keats rightly believed that our needs demanded a more active creed than that. The leaven of the human element was necessary to reach the final stage of refinement. Self had to be completely destroyed in order to help the soul to ascend higher. To achieve this there are

" Richer entanglements enthrallments far
More self-destroying, leading, by degrees,
To the chief intensity: the crown of these
Is made of love and friendship, and sits high
Upon the forehead of humanity."²

Friendship and love, essentially connected with humanity, are the most important aids to the transfiguration of the soul. Friendship is the elementary step that leads to love, and when its highest point is reached, self is destroyed and the soul is nurtured on this very destruction. All selfish considerations are swept away, and the lover desires to live in and for his love alone. Worldly pursuits, even ambition for true fame, are quenched by that passion, so complete is its hold over the human heart.

¹ *Ibid.*, 786-789.

² *Ibid.*, I, 805-810.

" Ay, so delicious is the unsating food,
 That men, might have tower'd in the van
 Of all the congregated world,

 Have been content to let occasion die,
 Whilst they did sleep in love's Elysium " ¹

In the opening lines to Book II, the poet prizes its " sovereign power " above the deeds of heroism, which, he says, become " cool, and calm and shadowy, through the mist of passed years," while tender episodes of love " are things to brood on with more ardency."

Love, the deliciousness and permanence of which has been so celebrated by the poet in a number of places in the poem, is evidently the impassioned love between a man and a woman. Keats is never afraid to own that. With his sound Platonic insight he finds the roots of the most universal love in this intimate and physical relationship, and believes that " it might bless the world with benefits unknowingly." It has a necessary function in the plan of the universe. It is a biological truth that cannot be ignored without betraying an entirely unreal view of human nature. But Keats does not stop there. He passes from the animal to the spiritual, from the passion of love to the wisdom it teaches. He uses the descent into the common elements of life to gain a freer ascent towards the goal aimed at through a clearness of view resulting from such an experience. He knows that the best way to master the actual is to transcend it. He studies the eternal value of things and events, and points out to us the ever-widening vista of spiritual possibilities. The entire force of the argument in the poem is turned upon this escape to the ideal. In the words of Endymion :

" Now, if this earthly love has power to make
 Men's being mortal, immortal ; to shake
 Ambition from their memories, and brim
 Their measure of content ; what merest whim,
 Seems all this poor endeavour after fame,
 To one, who keeps within his steadfast aim
 A love immortal, an immortal too." ²

The passion of Endymion is not for a mortal being, nor it is only for the shadow of a dream. On the contrary, his restless spirit has espied

¹ *Ibid.*, 824-830

² *Ibid.*, I, 862-858.

a "hope beyond," and cherishes an immortal love far above the earthly objects of a human desire. It has bathed his spirit in a new delight, so that he "can see nought earthly worth" his "compassing," and stands a stranger in the midst of things which have lost interest for him. He exclaims :

"Now I have tasted her sweet soul to the core,
All other depths are shallow : essences,
Once spiritual, are like muddy lees,
Meant but to fertilise my earthly root,
And make my branches lift a golden fruit
Into the bloom of heaven : other light,
Though it be quick and sharp enough to blight
The Olympian eagle's vision, is dark,
Dark as the parentage of chaos."¹

But this aloofness cannot aid him in his quest. Success lies not in isolation. He must unfathom and understand the mysteries of the earth, sea, and air :

"He ne'er is crowned
With immortality, who fears to follow
Where airy voices lead ; so through the hollow,
The silent mysteries of earth, descend !"²

The journey is irksome and the solitude oppresses him, but the thought of the "sweet end" always sustains him in moments of dejection :

"..... he felt assured
Of happy times, when all he had endured
Would seem a feather to the mighty prize."³

There are occasional glimpses granted to the adorer when the "known unknown," from whom his "being sips such darling essences," presents itself to him and he languishes to abide with it eternally, but it cannot be. He has not yet progressed far enough to be in a position to enjoy the bliss eternally. He must continue his "journeyings,"

"In gulf or aerie, mountains or deep dells,
In light, in gloom, in star or blazing sun,"⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, II, 905-913.

² *Ibid.*, 211-214.

³ *Ibid.*, 590-592.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 94-95.

wherever Beauty dwells, and must learn to worship it in all its manifestations, because, as the poet has already said, it is Beauty's torch that kindles the flame of Love, and is the only Reality throughout existence.

There is also another important lesson to be learnt by Endymion before he can reach the consummation of his love. He must realise the fact that complete absorption in a lonely search after the ideal, cut off from the world of humanity, cannot lead him to the goal. He must cherish fellow-feeling for the human race and sympathise with it in its affliction. His own sufferings have prepared his heart to feel for the woes of others as twin brothers in the common destiny. When he hears the bitter laments of Alpheus and Arethusa over their enforced chastity, he weeps and prays Cynthia to release them from their pain. He is also moved to pity with the sad story of Glaucus, and brings about his salvation and the resurrection of many others. Again it is not the physical charm of the Indian Maid that lures him from his devotion to the Ideal, but he "falls to pitying her and from pitying into loving her."¹ The powerful elements of human sympathy is strongly at work here. Endymion, who has so long wandered in search of the mysteries of heaven and earth, is now truly laden with the burden of the mystery. He knows that his Ideal is heavenly, placed far beyond the stars, but he also knows that :

"There never lived a mortal man, who bent
His appetite beyond his natural sphere,
But starved and died."²

He finds the mortal appeal irresistible, and beholds in the stricken Maid the miseries of the human race, which he feels to be his task to share and to lighten. It would not be infidelity to his Ideal because the "all-embracing capacity of soul" can hold both. And so he exclaims :

"Goddess! I love thee not the less: from thee
By Juno's smile I turn not—no, no, no,"³

but

"For both, for both my love is so immense,
I feel my heart is cut in twain for them."⁴

¹ Sidney Colvin: "John Keats."

² "Endymion," IV, 550-552.

³ *Ibid.*, 94-95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 98-99.

This was the lesson that Shelley's Alastor had not learnt, and consequently met a disastrous fate. It is only through the real, in which the lover finds the counterpart of his glorified vision, that the Ideal can be achieved. But here Endymion goes too far. In the ecstasy of newborn passion his soul loses all self-possession, and completely surrenders itself to the powers of Love. His over-heated brain even abjures the former pursuit of the Ideal. He vows to remain contented, in love and peace, with his sweet Indian. He says that he has been too long duped by phantoms, and in a fit of desperation, as it were, exclaims :

" I have clung
To nothing, loved a nothing, nothing seen
Or felt but a great dream ! Oh, I have been
Presumptuous against love, against the sky,
Against all elements, against the tie
Of mortals each to each, against the blooms
Of flowers, rush of rivers, and the tombs
Of heroes gone ! Against his proper glory
Has my soul conspired." ¹

He bids adieu to his " daintiest Dream " which claimed his vast love, but he will not love it on earth any more. Here he wants to seize the perfect bliss which his human love can yield to him. The moment is not one of disillusionment, but of momentary lapses into naturalism. For a short time it takes possession of his thoughts. But the Maid frankly declares that she cannot be his love. She is frightened that if she does so, both of them may be committed to vengeance—they may die. It is a warning to the youth, who, by a swift decay, is running the risk of being devoted wholly to the earth. It would mean the ignominious failure of the soul which would be eternally lost, and the wise words of the Maiden re-awaken the numbed consciousness of Endymion to the sense of devotion to the Ideal. He does not deny the real nature of earthly deceptions which go by the name of pleasures among men, but re-asserts his faith in the ideal. He realises that " if impiously an earthly realm " he takes, he will never see the nobler pleasures of the soul. With this self-abandonment the knowledge dawns upon him that the Ideal and the real are the same, and devotion to the former is ultimately the worship of the latter. Love is, thus, spiritualised from

¹ *Ibid.*, 640-648.

its moral state, "by some unlook'd-for change," and the soul achieves a complete fusion with the "essence," a complete union with the Divine. Here Keats has achieved not only a reconciliation between the earthly and the heavenly, but has reached the height of the transcendental conception of Love and Beauty. They are recognised as the "heaven, that spreading in this dull and clodded earth," gives "it a touch ethereal." The poem suffers much from confused uncertainty, lack of sustained reasoning, moments of doubt and misgivings, and occasional lapses into the sensual. These are defects to be deplored, but the poet has succeeded on the whole, in keeping up the idealistic aspiration of the hero. There is a good deal of "half-seesings," and many thrills of exaltation which show a genius struggling for mastery. There are frequent suggestions of an ideal world, and the doors of heaven seem to open for the flight of the spirit. Escaping from "dull mortality's harsh net" it peeps into its "home ethereal" beyond the "fragile bar" of its material environment. The lesson of "*Endymion*" may be thus summarised in the words of Sidney Colvin: "Let a soul enamoured of the ideal once suffer itself to forget its goal, and to quench for a time its longing in the real, nevertheless, it will be still haunted by that lost vision, amidst all intoxications, disappointment and lassitude will still dog it, until it awakes at last to find that the reality which has thus allured it derives from the ideal its power to charm—that it is after all but a reflection from the ideal, a phantom of it."¹ It is the highest point of the transcendental philosophy that puts infinite trust in the capacity of the human soul and something akin to "mystical faith in will and action." We shall see more of this later.

"*Isabella*," "*The Eve of St. Agnes*," and "*Lamia*," the three complete stories that followed, are the new venture of Keats into the realm of the supernatural. There exists in them an atmosphere of charm, superstition, and wonder, a touch of the fairy-land, but the poet's chief interest lies in depicting the human emotion of love in its different phases. In "*Isabella*" the representation of the immortality of love has been kept in the foreground. "Love never dies, but lives immortal Lord," is the truth of which we are constantly reminded in the poem. With Lorenzo, who is now only a shadow, "upon the skirts of human nature dwelling alone," the passion of love is not dead. His spirit watches with gladness the increasing paleness of his

¹ Sidney Colvin: "*John Keats*," p. 104.

lady, languishing in love, and feels "a greater love through all my essence steal," as the ghost remarks. It implores her to

"Go, shed one tear upon my heather-bloom,
And it shall comfort me within the tomb."¹

Love is the great bridge that is supposed here to span the gulf between the living and the dead, and triumphantly transcends physical limitations.

If Lorenzo on the other side of existence still seeks comfort in love, Isabella too is devoted and sincere. She waits long for his return, and when the vision proves true, her love is not dethroned, but finds consolation in moistening her sweet Basil with tears evermore. That becomes the main purpose of her existence, the only passion of her heart, making her forget everything else about herself. The poem is full of tenderness and touching pathos. It holds before us an example of self-effacement where two souls are completely united in love. While the one that has been released from the turmoil of an earthly life awaits to be united in eternity, the other, left behind, feeds the "sacramental fire" by complete absorption in thought.

"*The Eve of St. Agnes*" is a story based upon the superstitious belief that a maiden could see her absent lover in a vision if she performed certain religious rites. Consequently, the poet has kept up throughout the poem an air of holiness. He takes good care that Love does not lapse into lust. The fire of love burns in the gentle heart of Madeline, but it is chastened by the sanctity of the evening and her cheerful expectation of the "Agnes' dream." The picture of the lady in the midst of her fervent prayer, with the moonbeam playing upon her, is the most beautiful representation of beauty and love in their innocence and sacredness:

"She seem'd a splendid angel, newly drest,
Save wings, for heaven."²

Her purity of love, and freedom from "mortal taint" spiritualises her very being. In the case of Porphyro it is the sensuous love of sex, as we have seen in *Endymion*, but it is not the baser passion of sensual pleasure. It is the fulfilment of his physical and spiritual cravings without giving way to the grossness and selfishness of carnal enjoyment.

¹ Stanza XXXVIII.

² Stanza XXV.

His love is more sublimated as he kneels down by the side of Madeline's bed for the peaceful enjoyment of Beauty in all its holiness. It has the purity and sanctity of a religious rite, and impresses us most strongly with the holiness of Love when the passions are silenced, and man is raised above himself. The bed is his shrine of Love where the goddess sleeps, and he, a "famished pilgrim," seeks there his haven of rest "after so many hours of toil and quest." When the poem closes, it leaves on the mind of the reader a sense of the triumph of Love over petty human jealousy, strife, and hatred, and of undefined supremacy even over the unplumbed mystery of death.

"*Lamia*" is the last of the poems that mingle the supernatural with the natural to bring about a greater effect. Gods and men all obey the great religion of Love allured by the sweet apparition of Beauty. Hermes leaves his seat amongst the Olympians to woo his fairy maid upon earth, while *Lamia*, even in her serpent-body, has been languishing for the love of *Lycius* whom she had beheld in one of those visions when her soul extended beyond its prison-house and could dream of all it listed. Unwary *Lycius* falls a prey to the deceptive charms of the serpent-lady, lives for a time happy and contented in the mansion of love and luxury, upreared by the magic spell of *Lamia*, is smothered by the very richness of love and its pleasures, and forgets everything else. But the world of reality, the external world, forces itself upon his attention, and brings about the disenchantment and destruction of the glory of phantasm by the appearance of *Appolonius* on the occasion of the nuptial feast. This, in brief, is the story of the poem which has lent itself easily to many allegorical interpretations. To some it is "the antagonism of reason and pleasure, of science and imagination,"¹ while to others it shows the futility of the pursuit of selfish enjoyments cut off from the cares and miseries of our fellow-beings. A life of such one-sidedness is foredoomed to dismay and destruction. As we know, Keats was at this time passing through that period when "the soul is in a ferment, the character undecided, the way of life uncertain, the ambition thick-sighted." So far he has been declaring in favour of love and the imaginative creation of Beauty. He had said in the "*Endymion*" that "a thing of beauty is a joy for ever," had celebrated the supremacy and sanctity of love in "*The Eve of St. Agnes*" and had given it an immortality

¹ Robert Bridges, in *Essay on Keats* in the *Poetical Works of the poet*, edited by L. Binyon, p. XXXI.

in "*Isabella*." But now he felt the claims of reason, philosophy, and science pressing themselves upon his mind as opposed to the rich luxury of imagination, and the passionate delight derived from the senses. In the conflict Keats clearly sides with "the enjoying aspects of life" with the help of imagination, and denounces philosophy as blind and cold. It strips things of their charm and wonder, and reduces them to the level of the commonplace. Hence his most forceful denunciation of philosophy in the well-known words:

" Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy ?
.....
Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine."

A similar mood of disgust is expressed by the poet in the following lines:

" It is a flaw
In happiness to see beyond our bourn—
It forces us in summer sky to mourn,
It spoils the singing of the nightingale."

In both passages Keats expresses his sense of unmitigated horror at the loss of "simple, unquestioning joy" as soon as the spirit of inquiry intrudes. He deplores it because it occupies the mind with the question of how, why, and wherefore, instead of permitting it to suck unrestrained joy by the enjoyment of Beauty in itself. It substitutes criticism for appreciation, and destroys the sense of reverence and wonder which helps the development of personality.

We must warn ourselves here against the danger of reading in these words a sweeping generalisation against all forms of knowledge or a "cheerless and chilling negativism" as Hudson calls it.¹ Nothing could be farther from the mind of the poet than such an idea. He was, on the contrary, beginning to think of the importance of knowledge, and was devoting himself to its acquisition. His letter to Taylor best reveals his great intentness "to get knowledge, to get understanding," which he regarded as the only way to attain to the Truth. He has realised that the road to the immortal peak of Poesy,

¹ W. H. Hudson : "Studies in Interpretation," p. 61.

that he aspired to reach, "lies through application, study, and thought," and he determines to pursue it. With such a devoted attitude towards knowledge it is idle to suppose that Keats expressed in the passages quoted above "a cheap and unilluminating repetition of a rather superficial idea, fit enough for Lamb to toss as a gibe against Newton in studio talk after supper."¹ Nor is the attitude "in fundamental antagonism to the traditions of enlightenment and the scientific spirit of his time," as Hudson supposes it to be. Keats condemns that spirit of science that despises subjective elements, bars all possibility of new experience, kills every sense of mystery and wonder, and re-writes the verse:

"Twinkle, twinkle little stars,
I do'nt wonder what you are ;
You're a cooling down of gases,
Forming into solid masses."²

What Keats means by the knowledge which he intends to acquire is neither "the mere information of facts," nor hair-splitting logic, but a grasp of truth and reality. "An extensive knowledge is needful to thinking people—it takes away the heat and fever: and helps, by widening speculation, to ease the Burden of the Mystery," wrote Keats to Reynolds on 3rd May, 1818. Reason was to co-operate with imagination and take away the "heat and fever," but was always to be considered as a subordinate faculty. He, therefore, enunciates in *Lamia* the transcendental creed of knowledge which declared the supremacy of intuition in the quest for truth. He believed that the extent of knowledge should not be circumscribed within the limits of intellect. Its realm extends far beyond, in the faculty of human imagination which transcends both experience and reason. It takes the mind away and beyond the physical order of things to the intuitive conception of absolute Beauty as Platonic "Ideas." Rationalistic limitation and complete want of emotion Keats condemns in Apollonius, who in his

"..... impious proud-heart sophistries,
Unlawful magic, and enticing lies,"⁴

¹ Sidney Colvin: "John Keats"

² W. H. Hudson: "Studies in Interpretation," p. 34.

³ Quotation from Mr. S. A. Hammond's paper read at the British Social Hygiene Congress held in London in 1935, and which the writer of the present article attended.

⁴ "Lamia," II, 285-286.

has no eyes for Beauty, and no appreciation of wonder and of Love. To him everything must be proved by rule and line, or should not exist at all. He is the unemotional and impersonal spirit of analysis that destroys a thing in the vain endeavour to understand the secret of its making. Such an unappreciative way of thinking, such a matter-of-fact and unimaginative interpretation of life, excludes every vision of beauty, as it is "destructive of artistic unities and poetical interpretations."¹ It deprives us of ennobling emotions and spiritual satisfaction, and is certainly impious and unlawful. In the eyes of Keats for whom Beauty was a religion, and Love a law, such an attitude was an intolerable sacrilege. His greatest desire was to preserve the mystery of that charm which imagination creates and around which it loves to play. Even in the "*Ode to Psyche*," written a few months before, where Keats deals exclusively with "matters of the mind," and "is worshipping the spirit of the intellect with such appropriate offerings as the 'working brain' and 'thought,'"² he turns, instinctively as it were, "to let the warm love in," because he does not believe in the exclusive pleasures of thought. He had realised, as Arnold says, the real and vital relation that exists between beauty and joy, and beauty and truth, and believed that to feel Beauty was a better and richer source of knowledge than to understand how we come to feel it. He is "willing to linger among imaginative happiness ... rather to wander in uneasy search after perhaps troubling certainties."³ Mind was to start on its journey, aided by sense, passion and imagination, but an approach to the truth of Beauty could be made neither with the help of analysing intellect nor in the language of the laboratory. It required "a taking off the shoes from our feet," and a casting off of the ordinary restraints of understanding in favour of the mystical evidence of the heart which gives the true value of things. "When we come to human life, and the affections," wrote Keats, "it is impossible to know how a parallel of breast and head can be drawn; it is impossible to know how far knowledge will console us for the death of a friend, and the ill 'that flesh is heir to.'" Imagination, on the other hand, brought the truth home to our heart "invested with sublime emotion." It raised the mind by making the show of things conform to the sublime standard

¹ Hastings's *Encycl. of Religion and Ethics*, article by J. A. Thomson, on "Science."

² J. H. Roberts: "*Poetry of Sensation or of Thought*," P. M. L. A., p. 1137.

³ A. Symonds: *Introduction to the Poetical Works of John Keats*, p. xxii.

set by the soul, and did not like reason make the soul conform to the standard of things. The selection that Kests has made is in conformity with the highest principles of culture. It conceives things in their eternal aspect, and surveys them together in all their parts and stages, and in their true relations.

(To be continued)



FEUDAL MANNERS IN SHAKESPEARE

DR. M. M. BHATTACHERJEE, M.A., B.L., F.R.S., PH.D.

FEUDALISM was responsible for a special system of training for the youth. This system continued longer in England than in any other European country. Its main feature was the apprenticeship of boys of high families as pages in the households of noblemen. This began in their seventh year, and lasted for a period of about 7 years, on the termination of which they were promoted to the rank of squire. Pages were trained by squires in games and physical exercises like wrestling, boxing, running, riding, etc., but they had all to do personal service to the lord. Squires carved in the hall, handed in plates, served wine, followed by varlets or pages bearing the dishes, supplied water to the guests to wash their hands with after dinner, made the bed for the lord, helped him to undress at night and to dress in the morning, supplied him with arms in the lists and groomed the horses. Literary education did not figure prominently in this system which was more concerned with physical labour, personal service and manners.

The duties of the page formed the subject-matter of hand-books on manners and table-courtesy. These had their origin in the writings of the Church Fathers and ethical wills composed by Jewish and Christian writers during the Middle Ages, and were produced copiously later in France, Italy and Germany.¹ English courtesy-books were mostly written during the fifteenth century. Some were translated from Latin, like *Stans Puer ad Mensam* and *Babees Book*, and inspired indigenous works like Russell's *Boke of Nurture* and Hugh Rhodes *Book of Nurture*. Feudal ideas of training have left their mark not only on English life and habits, but also on the plays of Shakespeare who was undoubtedly influenced by the Renaissance.

Shakespeare was certainly a voracious reader, but it is unlikely that he should have read books on table-manners, meals and conduct of his days, except in rare cases. They were uninteresting, and most of them had no contemporary popularity. But the rules contained in them were borrowed from customs observed

¹ *Modern Language Review*, Vol. V, p. 145, and Rossetti's *Italian Courtesy-books in* EETS, 6, pt. 2.

in the households of noblemen, churchmen as well as lay peers, and in course of time they came to be accepted by an increasingly large number of cultured people. Those who had shaped their life and conduct in the light of these principles, were very likely to inculcate them upon their children. It is probable that traces of "Courtesy," such as they exist in Shakespeare's plays, are the product, not of his studies, but of his contact with contemporary society. He was in touch with Pembroke and Southampton, and had some opportunity of observing high life. In addition, Shakespeare is believed to have been a Groom of the Chamber in the reign of James I. Grooms of the Chamber had to do all sorts of work—to light the fire, cleanse and sweep the room, fetch and warm the clothes, make the bed, etc. Whether Shakespeare, as "Groom of the Chamber of His Majesty," had to do any of these duties, is not known. But he had certainly the opportunity of observing the practice that was followed in these matters.¹

The duties of the chamberlain are detailed by Russell in a separate chapter of his *Boke of Nurture*. Making the bed for the lord and helping him to undress are included in them,² and are referred to as such in Shakespeare. The "lord" in the guise of a servant says to the astonished Sly, now in a night-gown,

"—wilt thou sleep? we'll have thee to a couch
Softer and sweeter than the lustful bed
On purpose trimm'd up for Semiramis."³

The page had also to help his lord to dress in the morning, and he had to come and kneel down before him, and ask what sort of dress he wanted to wear. Russell suggests the language to be used by the page:

"Syr, what robe or gown pleseth it you to were today?"

The basin or ewer full of water must be kept ready for the lord to wash his hands in when he left the privy⁴ or when he finished his

¹ There is no document available to prove Shakespeare's appointment as Groom. But this may be due to the fact that the Lord Chamberlain's Warrant-Books for 1603-1628 were lost. See E. Law, *Shakespeare as a Groom of the Chamber*, p. 21.

² *Boke of Nurture*, II. 920-925 and II. 955-968.

³ *The Taming of the Shrew*, Ind. ii. 87-89.

⁴ *Boke of Nurture*, I. 913.

The servant in the Induction says to the "transformed" drunkard Sly:

"Will't please your mightiness to *wash your hands*?"
(Servants present a *cwer*, *basin*, and *napkin*)¹

Before the lord retired for the night, it was the chamberlain's duty to make the chamber ready. Says Russell:—

"Locke that ye have the *bason for chambur* and also
the *urnalle*
Redy at alle houres when he wille clepe or calle."²

In the *First Part of King Henry the Fourth*, the second carrier says that this is not done in the inn at Rochester, and points out what evil consequences follow:—

"Why, they will allow us ne'er a jordan, and then we leak in the chimney; and your chamber-lie breeds fleas like a loach."³

The page was to receive the lord when he came back after a ride or hunting, hold the stirrup, lead the horse away and take off the master's boots. A picture reproduced from a mediæval book in Russell's *Boke of Nurture*, shews the page taking off a knight's boots. In *The Taming of the Shrew*, Petruchio shouts at the gate of his house, on his arrival just after his marriage:

"What! No man at door
To hold my stirrup nor to take my horse?"⁴

A little later he asks one of his servants to remove his boots:

"Off with my boots, you rogues! you villains!
.....you pluck my foot awry." (strikes him)⁵

He beats him on the flimsy pretext that he could not do the work properly.

Carving was an important part of table courtesy. Skill in it was a sign of good breeding. In *Love's Labour's Lost*, Berowne, commending the courtly finesse of the French lord Boyet, remarks,

"He can carve too, and liap: why, this is he
That kiss'd his hand away in courtesy."⁶

¹ Ind. ii. 76.

⁴ IV. i. 117-18.

² *Boke of Nurture*, ii. 971-972.

⁵ IV. i. 141, 144.

³ II. i. 20-22.

⁶ V. ii. 324-25.

Russell gives elaborate rules of carving different kinds of meat, fish, etc. Wynken de Worde's *Boke of Keruynges* is also important in this connection. Shakespeare's acquaintance with some of the technical terms is obvious. According to Wynken de Worde, the special word applicable to the carving of deer is "break" ("breke" is his spelling). Other words which mean the carving of other kinds of meat, are also given in his work. "Break" means "to split up" the meat with the help of two fingers and the thumb only, without the use of a knife. Shakespeare uses this word in connection with "capon" which means a chicken as well as a love-letter. When Berowne's letter to Rosaline is handed over to the Princess by Costard, she says,

"Boyet, you can carve;
Break up this capon."¹

Carving is well-known to Boyet, the fashionable courtier, and he promptly replies

"I am bound to serve."²

Love-letters generally were folded so as to look like chickens. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Antony thus rebukes the Queen of Egypt when she permits Caesar's messenger to kiss her hand:

"—you were a fragment
Of Cneius Pompey's",—"³

Whiter suggests "broken meat" as the correct reading in place of "fragment." "Broken" would obviously have the same meaning here as it has in books on carving.

Hens had to be carved, both according to Russell⁴ and Wynken de Worde,⁵ by the plucking off of wings. "Furst, unlace the whynges" says Russell; "Capon or henne of grece, lyfte the legges, than the wynges," writes Wynken de Worde. Probably a new method was coming into vogue in Shakespeare's days, viz., scalding the chicken with hot water so that the skin

¹ *Love's Labour's Lost*, IV. i. 54-55.

² *Ibid.* IV. i. 56.

³ III, xi. 117-18

⁴ *Boke of Nurture*, l. 420.

⁵ *Boke of Keruynges*.

with the feathers might come off easily. In *Timon of Athens* there is a reference to this :

" All servants. Grammercies, good fool : how
does your mistress ?
Fool. She's e'en setting on water to scald
such chickens as you are." ¹

Chaucer alludes to this practice in his *Romaunt of the Rose* and Steevens quotes from "*The Old Law*," *Cupid's scalding-house*.

Some of the dishes recommended by Elizabethan writers on table-manners are referred to in Shakespeare's plays. *Eggs and butter* (not the modern eggs and bacon) were possibly the usual breakfast in many families, and "*The Household Book of the Fifth Earl of Northumberland*" shews that this was the case at least in this Earl's family during Lent. Puritans looked upon the practice as Popish. Falstaff remarks that the Prince has not even as much 'grace' "as will serve to be prologue to an *egg and butter*." ² The Chamberlain of the Rochester Inn informs Gadshill that the carriers "are up already and call for *eggs and butter*." ³ *Beef and mustard* with the promise of which Grumio tantalised Katherine in *The Taming of the Shrew*, ⁴ are mentioned in Russell's *Boke of Nurture*, ⁵ *oysters* of which Falstaff was so fond and which he wanted to open with his sword, are commended by Russell as having the potency of "renewing" man's health, ⁶ and *vinegar* which Falstaff would have with prawns is described as specially good sauce by Wynken de Worde. One whole section is devoted in the *Boke of Nurture* to *baked meats* which the rich Capulet wanted to provide for his aristocratic guests at any cost. ⁷ *Dates and quinces* were believed to sharpen the appetite, and Russell recommends "dates in confite" and asks people to "bygyn your mele" with "quinces and peris." ⁸ The Nurse in *Romeo and Juliet* is therefore anxious to bring to the notice of her mistress that *dates and quinces* are wanted 'in the pastry.' ⁹ The efficacy of dates in pastry is also hinted at by Cressida when, in spite of the praises of Pandarus, she says of Troilus ; "Ay, a minced man : and then to be

¹ II. ii. 68-71.

² *I Henry IV*, I. ii. 20-21.

³ *I Henry IV*, II. i. 62.

⁴ IV. iii. 28.

⁵ I. 838.

⁶ I. 822.

⁷ *Romeo and Juliet*, IV. iv. 5.

⁸ *Boke of Nurture*, II. 825-26.

⁹ IV. iv. 2.

baked with no date in the pie, for then the man's date's out." ¹ Almonds are often mentioned in books on meals, and *marchpane* finds a place in the menu in *Romeo and Juliet*.² Indigestible things are forbidden by Russell, and he gives a list of "fumositees." Meat in some forms is indigestible, *e.g.*, when it is fried, or raw.³ Petruchio thus complains against the mutton which he rejects:—

"—'twas burnt and dried away,
And I expressly am forbid to touch it.
For it engenders choler, planteth anger;" ⁴

Service at table was very important from the view-point of etiquette. Elaborate formalities are laid down for it in courtesy-books. Fruits were stored in the pantry and the spicery, and meat dishes were prepared in the kitchen by the cook. The man responsible for service was called the 'sewer.' When he asked the cook and the pantryman, dishes were served up by them and brought by the surveyor and marshalls out of the kitchen and the pantry. They probably deposited them on the dresser, and the 'sewer' next set them on the table for the master and his guests.⁵ Food was eaten generally from square wooden plates called trenchers in which it was put on the table before the guests. In Shakespeare the 'sewer' or 'seruer' appears as the *servingman* or the mere servant. In *The Taming of the Shrew*, Petruchio's show of anger in Act IV, Sc. I, gives an idea of the system of cooking and service in the sixteenth century.

"Pet. What's this? Mutton?

First Servant. Ay.

Pet. Who brought it?

First Servant. I.

Pet. 'Tis burnt; and so is all the meat.

What dogs are these! Where is the rascal cook?

How durst you, villains, bring it from the dresser,

And serve it thus to me that love it not?

(Throws the meat, etc., at them)

There, take it to you, trenchers, cups and all."

¹ *Troilus and Cressida*, I. ii. 267-68.

² I. v. 9.

³ *Boke of Nurture*, II. 357-380.

⁴ IV. i. 167-68.

⁵ 'Office of a Sewer' in the *Boke of Nurture*.

In *Romeo and Juliet*, servingmen with napkins appear in the hall of Capulet, and are angry with the 'boys' who had not cleared the hall of "the joint stools," the "court-cupboard" and the trenchers in which they had served the meals, so as to make it ready for the dancers and the musicians who are waiting. Servingmen had to see to it that plates were not stolen, and in this very scene one of them says to another, "Look to the plate." Nares suggests that frequent changes of trenchers at the table were a sign of luxury and of good manners. Potpan in Sc. V had probably to remove these after every course, and hence he is referred to as "shift-a-trencher" and "scrape-a-trencher." In *The Household Book of the Earl of Northumberland*, the trencher is mentioned as the plate usually used by rich people. Antony rebukes Cleopatra

"as a morsel, cold upon
Dead Caesar's trencher." ¹

When Timon drives the friends of his better days out of his house, in an outburst of disgust and indignation, he calls them "trencher-friends."² The underlying idea again finds expression, though in different language, in "His friend that *dips in the same dish*" ³ and in these lines:—

"—The fellow that
Sits next him now, *parts bread with him*, and pledges
The breath of him in a divided draught," ⁴

Bad cooks, according to an old adage referred to in Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie*, were recognised by their habit of licking their fingers. This is what probably suggests the response of the servingman to Capulet's orders, "Sirrah, go hire me twenty cunning cooks—" "You shall have none ill, sir, for I'll try if they can lick their fingers."⁵

Dishes had to be covered before being taken to the dining-hall. Detailed rules on this point are given in the pamphlet entitled *How to serve a lord*. Russell describes how loaves should be cut into equal portions, a towel "two and a half yards long" should be folded in a special manner, the loaves should be put in the middle of the folds "bottom to bottom" and a wrapper put on

¹ III. xi. 116-17.

² *Timon of Athens*, III, vi. 100.

³ *Ibid.* III. ii. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.* I. ii. 47-48.

⁵ *Romeo and Juliet*, IV. ii. 3-4.

the top, to be removed only in the presence of the master.¹ The pamphlet *Ffor to serue a lord* lays down: "Be it remembred that evermore at the begynnyng of grace the covertour of brede shall be avoyded and taken away." It was the covered dishes that misled Timon's friends to expect a sumptuous feast, when they were bidden to his banqueting-hall for the last time.

"Sec. Lord. All covered dishes!

First Lord. Royal cheer, I warrant you.

Third Lord. Doubt not that, if money and the season
can yield it."²

The Marshal and the usher knew accurately the rules of precedence. They arranged the seats accordingly, and helped the guests to take their seats at the banqueting-hall. The *Boke of Keruyng* says, "The Marshall and the vssher muste knowe all the estates of the chyrche, and the hyghe estate of a kyng, with the blode royall," and gives the order of precedence, beginning with the Pope and ending with the esquire and his equals. Russell's *Boke of Nurture* and the anonymous pamphlet *The Ordre of going or sitting* reproduce almost exactly the same list. An Archbishop or a Duke might, if he so desired, dine alone. Obviously an unmannerly person would be given a separate table and would not be permitted to sit with others. Hence Timon says of Apemantus: "Yond man is ever angry. Go, let him have a table by himself: for he does neither affect company, nor is he fit for it indeed."³ It is probably the host who is described as the "chief person" and the "principall soverayne" in the pamphlet entitled *Ffor to serue a lord*, and he has a prominent seat. Lennox refers to this when in the famous banquet-scene he tells Macbeth:

"Here is a place reserv'd, sir."⁴

There is a reference to the order of precedence in the few words of welcome with which Macbeth receives his guests:—

"You know your own degrees; sit down;

... .. at first and last

The hearty welcome."⁵

¹ *Boke of Nurture*, II. 210-26.

² *Timon of Athens*, III. vi. 52-54.

³ *Ibid.* I. ii. 29-32.

⁴ *Macbeth*, III. iv. 47.

⁵ *Ibid.* III. iv. 1-2.

Lady Macbeth (now the Queen) also adverts to the same convention when she asks the guests to leave the hall as Macbeth is unwell:—

“ — at once, good night :
Stand not upon *the order of your going*,
But go at once.”¹

At his last meeting with his false friends in his banqueting-room, Timon tells them:—

“ Each man to his stool, your diet shall be in all places alike.
Make not a city feast of it, to let the meat cool ere we can agree upon
the *first place* : sit sit.”²

Clearly, there is a reference here also to the order of precedence usually observed in seating arrangements at banquets. There were rules governing even the formation of the funeral procession. The order of the procession is laid down in the pamphlet *A Funeral in Popish Times*, and directions about its paraphernalia in another pamphlet entitled *The Ordering of a funeral for a Noble Person in Hen. 7 time*.³ The description of the funeral procession as given in the First Quarto of *Hamlet*, is different from that given in the Second Quarto. In the latter, there are these few words, ‘Enter King and Queen, Laertes and the Corse.’ The order of procession as given in the Folio partly resembles that in the first pamphlet mentioned above, and mentions the priests and the mourners.

Names of some of the wines mentioned in the *Boke of Nurture* are found in Shakespeare. The sweet wines ‘*bastard* and *malevesyn*’⁴ are cases in point. *Methoglin* and *wort* were names of wines made from herbs, which were in use in Elizabethan times and are mentioned in other works besides Russell’s. They are mentioned in Shakespeare⁵ too, besides sack,⁶ ale⁷ and beer.

¹ *Macbeth*, III. iv. 118-20.

² *Timon of Athens*, III. vi. 69-72.

³ They are both published in EETS 88, 8.

⁴ Called “brown bastard” in *I Hen. IV*, II, iv. 27, and “brown and white bastard” in *Measure for Measure*.

⁵ Changed into malmsey, as in *malmsey-nose knote* in *II Hen. IV*, II, i. 39.

⁶ *Love’s Labour’s Lost*, V, ii. 234.

⁷ *The Taming of the Shrew*, Ind. ii. 2 and *Twelfth Night*, II, iii. 160.

⁸ *Ibid.* ii. 1.

Rules of conduct and behaviour in the courtesy-books were mostly based on considerations of prudence. They do not appear to have had any ethical foundation. The object of the page was to please his lord in every possible way, and bearing or speech which could cause the slightest annoyance to him was forbidden. *Stans Puer ad Mensam*, the *Babees Book*, the *Boke of Nurture*, etc., contain almost identical rules about speech and behaviour. They are not important, but a few of them had apparently come down to the days of Shakespeare and left their traces in his plays. For a servant it was improper to stare about or to laugh¹ wantonly in the presence of his master.² In *King Lear*, the disguised Kent is extremely irritated by the smiles of Oswald, and snaps, "Smile you my speeches, as I were a fool?" His mentality is inexplicable except on the supposition that, though in disguise, he has not been able to forget that smiling is improper on the part of a servant in his presence. In *Twelfth Night* Malvolio's smiles give similar offence to Olivia. She has an idea that "he is sad and civil, and suits well for a servant with my fortunes,"³ and feels disgusted when he appears smiling, and exclaims :

"Smilest thou?"

I sent for thee upon a sad occasion."

The haughty and ill-tempered Lear has always been accustomed to absolute humility on the part of his courtiers and servants. He cannot stand the attitude of Oswald when he protests against his abusive words, and stares him full in the face :

"Do you bandy looks with me, you rascal?"

(Striking him)

Some of the books on manners were intended not for rich men's pages, but for young children in ordinary families. They had no connection with feudal institutions, but contain homely instructions, concrete and straightforward, without any intellectual subtlety, on matters affecting everyday life. Domestic economy, respect for superiors, friendship for equals, marriage, household duties, etc.,

¹ *Babees Book* l. 68, *Stans Puer*, l. 7.

² *Stans Puer*, l. 20 ; *Babees Book*, l. 94.

³ III. iv. 5-6.

form their subject-matter. Apart from subtle observations on life and profound remarks on character, there is in Shakespeare a large mass of homely admonition. The great dramatist might not always have been led by dramatic necessity to make use of it, and this should never escape the notice of the critical student. Polonius' advice to Laertes was put within quotation-marks in the First Quarto. Shakespeare's intention might very well have been to indicate that the wiseacre was merely repeating what might be called copy-book maxims—platitudes already familiar to people as common sayings or the teachings of conduct-books :

“ Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried,
Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel,
But do not dull thy palm with entertainment
Of each new-hatch'd unfledged comrade.”

The instruction contained in the above passage has no connection with the trend of the story, but its banality brings into relief the character of Polonius. It may be paralleled by this passage from *The Good Wyfe Wold a Pilgremage* :—

“ Change not thy frend all day for no feyre speche ;
A trusty frend ys good I-fonde, who-so may hyme reche,
Yfe anny fortun fall amyssse, then may he be thy leche,
Yfe he fynde the in anny wronge, then meyst thou wyne
his wreche.”

Another piece of advice given by Polonius to Laertes—

“ Neither a borrower nor a lender be :
For loan oft loses both itself and friend”—

may be paralleled by the following :—

“ Borow thou not, if that thou meye,
For drede thi neybour wyll sey naye ;
Ne take thou nought to fyrste,
Bot thou be inne more bryste.”¹

Mothers in olden times were the instructresses of their young daughters,

¹ *How the Goode Wyfe taught hyr Daughter.*

and they sometimes frankly warned them against dangers which youth invites. The mother in one old poem tells the daughter :

" Alle the men be not trew
That fare speche to thee can schew.
For no couetys, no *giftys* thou take ;
Bot thou wyte why, sone them for-aske ;
For gode women, *with gyftes*
Me ther honour fro them lyftes,
Those that thei wer All trew
As any stele that bereth hew." ¹

The admonition in the first two lines of this extract looks very much like Laertes' advice to Ophelia concerning Hamlet's offer of love—

" For Hamlet, and the trifling of his favour,
Hold it a fashion, and a toy in blood."

This advice is later repeated in different language :

" —if he says he loves you,
It fits your wisdom so far to believe it
As he in his particular sot and place
May give his saying deed—"

Polonius' warnings to his daughter against temptation,

" Admit no messenger, receive no *presents*"—

resemble those sounded at the end of the above quotation.

It was in pursuance of her father's advice that Ophelia returned the tokens she had already received. Polonius' advice to his son—" Give thy thoughts no tongue "—is quite the same as that of another wise man to his :

" And, son, thi tonge thou keep al-so,
And tell not all thynges that thou maye,
For thi tonge may be thy fo ;" ²

¹ *How the Goode Wyfe taught hyr Daughter.*

² *How a Wyse Man taught Hys sone.*

In matters of dress, Polonius did not want Laertes to be inexpensive, but only expressed himself against gaudiness :

" Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy,
But not express'd in fancy ; rich, not gaudy : "

A tract entitled *How to rule one's self and one's House* lays down a stricter rule in this matter—" In Apparell, neyther curious nor costly." Sir Walter Raleigh thinks that Polonius might have taken his cue from the remarks on dress in Bk. I of Hoby's *Courtier*.



THE TURKISH WOMAN IN HISTORY*

L. C. MOUSELL

Consul for the Turkish Republic in India

BEFORE I speak about the high and honourable place the young Turkish Republic has given to womanhood, I would like briefly to review the consecutive periods of the Turkish woman's life in history. This little study will indicate that equality of rights—which Turkish men and women enjoy to-day, is not unusual but a restoration of a former status. We shall also see that so long as the Turkish family and Turkish social structure were free from foreign influence, the Turkish woman was always an active participant in every social movement.

This subject was investigated by the famous Turkish Sociologist Ziya Gökalp, and his investigations produced many proofs of the rights which women enjoyed in the old Turkish civilization. For instance, he clearly states that the birth of a baby girl in an old Turkish family was not considered to be a dreadful or a dishonourable event as it was with the Arabs.

Some 20 years ago, certain Turkish inscriptions, which are known as the ORHUN, were discovered in either Mongolia or Siberia. These inscriptions give a very clear picture of the life, customs and form of government of the Turkish nation very many centuries ago. The ORHUN has a very great bearing on the customs and traditions of the Turkish woman and will serve as proof that the Turkish woman has always enjoyed a considerable amount of freedom.

(1) In the ORHUN inscriptions the two following expressions are always mentioned together: "The Sovereign who continues the State" and "The Queen who knows the State."

(2) An order beginning with the statement: "The King orders" was not obeyed, unless it was put in the form of: "The King and the Queen order."

(3) Foreign diplomatic envoys were not brought before the King if he was alone. They were introduced to the royal couple with the King standing on the right.

(4) Women performed the same services in governing and commanding as men. In times of war, or at meetings and other social activities, women always stood beside their husbands.

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(5) Guardianship in the family was not reserved to the father alone. The mother participated too. A widow was the only guardian of her young child and the sole manager of her house.

(6) Evidently, her social activities in various fields could not have been possibly reconciled with the many systems of isolation such as the harem, the "pess" and the "yasmak." In the old days, Turkish women attended social meetings with uncovered faces.

The few examples given above show the active part women played in society.

The famous Arab traveller, Ibn-i Batuta, who visited Anatolia in the fourteenth century, bore witness to the fact that the old Turkish family kept its character in places where it had been free from foreign influence. In his book about his journey, he mentions women as always seen in the company of their men, receiving their guests together.

The traveller furthermore describes the prestige and dignity of these generous and virtuous women who met him. He records his impressions of his visits to the Turkish city of Kopek as follows: "I was amazed by the respect shown to women. They are certainly considered as superior beings to men." In another passage he adds: "As to tradeswomen, they too were respected. I saw one of them riding in a carriage. She wore a bonnet adorned with jewellery and peacock feathers. The windows of the carriage were open and the woman's face was seen. Another woman, escorted by her maid, was exchanging sheep and milk for perfume. The men who accompanied their wives were taken for their servants. The husband was clothed in a sheepskin mantle and wore a similar cap on his head."

These lines reveal that women were not only equal to men, but enjoyed a more respected place in society. After a detailed study of Turkish life in Eastern Turkestan, Grenar, another traveller in the East, describes his astonishment at seeing women's prestige, in the following words:—

"Contrary to the conventions that exist in other parts of Asia, here the betrothed know and see each other, before getting married, and are usually the children of the same village."

So far, I have dealt with the old Turkish family unpenetrated by foreign customs and influences, which, as we shall see later, became the very factors which reduced woman's power and left her in a most deplorable condition, as an object excluded from all worldly activities.

In the Persian and Byzantine empires, which were then the most civilised states of the epoch, women were considered as mere slaves. During this epoch, in which women were deprived of all possible rights, Islam's attempts to liberate them from this shameful position is certified by Mohammed's own words, such as: "Woman is the equal of man and the other half of society," "He who respects his wife's rights is a benevolent

Moslem," "Paradise is under the mother's feet," and also by the confidence and respect he had for his own wife, Hatice.

The Turks, who, as a mass, accepted Islam in the tenth century, and who later conquered the Persian and Byzantine empires, were gradually being influenced by these two civilizations. Their ideas about women changed and took on new aspects. Let me add that this influence remained superficial and never reached the masses of the population. For instance, among the nomadic tribes, as in villages, the old Turkish family system remained unchanged, whereas in larger cities the old system evolved into the Purdah system, which continued for a long time during the Ottoman reign. Some characteristics of this type of family culture were the following:—

(1) Woman was excluded from public life. She was only allowed to read certain ethical books. The woman of yesterday, who in every social and political movement stood beside her husband, was now obliged to live quietly and isolated from all worldly activities. Her frequent outgoings were looked upon with contempt and, similarly to the closed shutter of her house, she was required to cover her face, when outside, with a thick and wide veil to which various names were given—"ferace," "Carsaf," "pece." Even the tips of her fingers were not to be seen.

(2) The young girl had to wait behind the latticed windows for her future husband, whom she was not permitted to see before she became his wife. When a girl reached maturity, her father offered her to the suitor he thought best. A man who wished to marry had to describe the type of a girl he wanted only to his women relatives, who, without delay, called on families having daughters of age. These guests were called "goruqu." It was the duty of a girl to appear before such guests in her best apparel and do her best to please them. If both sides agreed, the girl's hand was asked by the "Will of God," and she was married. After marriage she was to obey her husband and consecrate all her person to him, and in return he was to lodge her and feed her. This shows that marriage, far from being a means of mutual understanding, was just the opposite.

(3) It was legal for a man to have four wives. It is not difficult to imagine the contrast between such a family atmosphere and that of a real home, as well as the dangers that threaten the physical and mental development of a child in such an environment.

(4) The bonds of marriage were easily dissolved by the male who, without the intervention of the law courts, divorced his wife with the mere utterance, "I divorce you," no matter whether he said it consciously or under the influence of alcohol. In return the wife had no right to object, but obeyed and accepted her misfortune with patience and in silence.

(5) Heritage was not equally divided: men had always a certain advantage over women.

(6) Marriage was an economic event. The bridegroom offered his wife some goods, either in the form of silver money, or horses, dresses and slaves. Aside from these goods which were given before marriage, the bridegroom also promised to pay a certain sum of money after marriage. It is seen that this form of union which the Arabs adopted from older generations spread throughout Islam, thus making marriage a religious and an economic contract.

(7) The married couple had a very limited out-of-door life together. A woman who went out with her husband was not well-looked upon by others. Nowhere in public could men and women join each other in the same place. There were compartments reserved for women where they sat unseen by men. Even till the end of the Great War, women were exposed to sharp criticism if they were seen wearing short "Casafs" (the veiled costume).

The necessity to veil the girls before their teens was becoming an obstacle to education, because the teachers they were to meet in secondary schools, after their primary education, were men. The object of the foundation of the first normal school for girls was to meet this problem and train women to teach. On the opening day of this school, General Saffet gave a speech about the importance of educating women and pointed out that this could only be possible after the foundation of such an institution.

In older times, certain orders which were issued, from time to time, fixed the colour and length of women's dresses, limited the opening at the neck and prevented them from being seen in public on feast days. During the reign of Selim the Third in 1807, certain civil officers were appointed to see that these orders were carried out, and in the case a dress-maker was caught selling prohibited fashions, she was to be hanged in front of her shop.

In 1908, the commencement of the constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire, the most important factors in bringing about this change were the schools. Thousands of women took advantage of the opportunity to visit these schools and thus educate themselves, and their mental education produced an immediate change in men's attitude towards them. They were respected and regarded with more care. The "harem," which until then was indispensable in the family, began to disappear.

As to the life out-of-doors, this too reached a turning-point. The thick dark veil that screened the woman's face from the world, grew thinner day by day, and her awkward "Carsaf" evolved into a smarter apparel. This development was noticed only in very few cities and here again was limited only to a particular class.

As has been previously said, woman's condition during the Ottoman regime had nothing to do with the old Turkish civilisation, and it, therefore,

did not exist in the villages and mountains where women continued to live according to their traditional customs. There they worked with their men, and in agricultural districts, where they had to work in the fields, they were completely unveiled.

The conservative groups did not regard very optimistically this emancipation, which came in with the Constitution and put forth many reasons against it. The Constitution, however, mentioned nothing concerning women, and no matter how far they had gone with their liberties, they still had no legal right to emancipation. The Turkish woman had to wait for the Kemalist period to win her liberty and equality.

THE TURKISH WOMAN IN THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD

The woman of the national war of independence did not content herself with remaining the sister, the wife or the mother of the heroes. Such women as fought side by side with their sons, husbands and fathers are a rarity in history. They proved to be a real support during this war and gave all their help to defend the fatherland.

The women in the cities were only a moral support, whereas, during the hard days, the Anatolian women went to the front, carrying munitions on their shoulders and leather bags containing their last crops, in other words, food for the troops. In cities women were not inactive. They attended meetings, as a result of which many of them enrolled in the Army. A Turkish journalist wrote some time ago:—

"In the year 1921, we were going to Ankara through Inebolu. As we were crossing the solitary roads of Anatolia, the silence of the night was suddenly broken by a distant noise. Anyone who was in Anatolia during those days can understand the fear which such a noise would create among travellers in a country where there was no security. This was the creaking of wheels, as a vehicle approached us, and we saw in it a young girl of twenty, driving two oxen. I shall never forget her brave countenance and her gentle smile when I asked her where she was going. "To the front," she calmly answered. The vehicle was full of munitions, and we now understood why the wheels were making this dreadful noise. The scene filled us with shame and inferiority. We asked her whether she was not afraid to go at midnight on these solitary roads. She shook her shoulders and smiled saying: "What should I fear; the mountains or the roses?" We continued asking: "Have you any relatives fighting?" Upon which she added: "My father, my brothers and my fiancé are all gone, the enemy is at hand, why should we wait?"

There stands on the Ulus Square, in the centre of Ankara, a large statue, one aspect of which shows a woman of bronze with a cannon-ball

on her back. This woman as the symbol in bronze of the Anatolian woman who fought in the war of independence, and will carry an unforgettable remembrance to coming generations.

It is true that during war time women's liberty was not being discussed and not even being thought of. But this was only natural, for at a time when the public goal was liberty and national defence alone, a discussion of this nature would have proved futile and useless. The conservative groups would have easily affected the minds of the public and readily induced the ignorant masses to continue their negative ideas about women. It was only after complete victory, and even before the signing of the treaty of Lausanne, that important steps were taken to decide about woman's future, and what she should be. The first step to wake up the public and train it to think in a different way regarding women was taken during the journey which the great Ataturk made in 1923. The great chief, who passed through Imit, Bursa and Balikesir on his way to Ismir, addressed the people as he passed through their towns, and among the various subjects he took up, he emphasized the subject of women. He said: "If a social group made of men and women contents itself with the progress and education of only one sex, that group is weakened by half. A nation aiming at progress and civilization, must not neglect to consider this point.

"Woman's primary duty is motherhood, and higher culture will only be attained by the education of future mothers. The Turkish nation is going to be strong, and their absolute need to-day is the higher education of our women. They shall be instructed in every field of science and receive the same degrees as men. Men and women will walk together in all paths of life and help each other.

"Let us study the situation in Turkey as it is to-day. We shall see two phases, one where women plough the fields with men and ride to neighbouring villages to sell their eggs and hens and corn and the other buying what they need, return to their villages and assist their husbands and brothers in their various occupations.

Here are a few last words: "Our mothers have done their best to educate us; but what we need hereafter are men with a different mentality and culture, and this will only come through future mothers. These are and will be the foundation required for the maintenance and continuation of the independence and honour of the new Turkish nation."

(Izmir, February 8, 1924.)

On the occasion of the anniversary of a victory (August 28, 1924) the Ghazi said: "Talking about civilization, one point I would like to stress is that the basis of progress and power is family life. Trouble in the family will be the simultaneous cause of social, economic and political calamities. It is necessary that the male and female elements which make

a family should share their equal and natural rights ~~to~~ to perform their duties."

Only sixteen days after the speeches of the great Atatürk a group of jurists met to work on the Civil Code, which produced the greatest revolution in the life of the Turkish woman. On the 27th of August, 1925, the Ghazi made another speech at Inebolu. "The foundation of social life," he said, "is family life. There is no use talking about things which you already know, but I shall tell you briefly what I mean. I have noticed during this journey, not in villages but in small towns and cities, that our women were tightly veiled. I can imagine how difficult it must be for them to breathe in such warm weather behind such thick covers. Friends, I realize that such cautions are the results of our chastity and care, but nevertheless, of our egoistic nature as well. Our women are not less intelligent and less reasonable than ourselves, and provided they live up to our moral standards and are given the knowledge of our national character, there can be no further necessity for such sheer egoism. Let them reveal their faces to the world. Let them study the world with their own eyes; there is nothing to fear in that.

"Friends, I repeat again: do not fear this change which is an indispensable means to reach a higher end."

This speech, which announced to the nation the emancipation of women, also declared that it would constitute one of the most important principles of the Republic.

Atatürk's speeches aroused happiness and hope all over the country, with the exception of a number of old fashioned people who did not like to see in these words a key to woman's happiness. The feeling was restricted to a very small group.

In 1926, the Civil Code was enacted. It gave back to woman her lost rights, and the Turkish family took a new step towards rebuilding itself.

Women did not wait for this law to change their mode of life. They were already through with the harem and the veil, and were again active in social work. This law only protected them in their houses and announced their equality of rights with men. I will sum up in four paragraphs the most important aspects of this law:—

(1) In spite of quick social developments, there was no law to limit the number of women a man could marry. The Civil Code ordered monogamy, and regarded as illegitimate any other marriage. In place of a woman whose self-respect was crushed through centuries, there was now a dignified and honourable woman—an equal mate of her husband.

(2) The form of marriage changed; it became a civil matter and lost its religious nature. Whereas in the latter form the declaration of a man in

the presence of an "imam" and the faint voice of the young girl answering behind the door were sufficient conditions for marriage, the Civil Code obliged the marrying couple to be present in front of civil authorities and give their joint consent.

(3) Important changes were made in the question of divorce. Until now divorce was decided by man alone. Now it is together with all its causes in the hands of the law, and trifles are not considered reasons enough to break up the family ties.

(4) The law of inheritance applies equally to man and woman.

After the introduction of the Civil Code, women progressed enormously and in a very short period. Many women were seen following step by step the activities of men. Women worked in various fields, schools, medicine, law, banking, economic institutions and government. This quick development showed immediate results and was readily felt in the national life of the young Republic.

No political rights were yet accorded to the fair sex, but the fervent co-operators whose aim was to raise and cultivate women in every sense, so as to bring them to an equal level with men, had already decided to give them more responsibilities. This is why there was no necessity to strive for such rights as women in different countries have done. British suffragettes had much trouble in winning their political rights, and in France women have not yet been able to obtain them.

To strive for rights was, as I said before, not necessary against a government which by itself was working for women's liberty and prestige.


Four years after the Civil Code was published, the National Assembly decided to give women the right to elect and be elected as members of the Municipal Council. The woman-citizen proved her capacity and worked with irreproachable zeal in these councils. In 1935, it was furthermore decided to give women the right to represent their fellow-citizens in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as the right to vote—as a result of which twenty women deputies took their seats in the National Assembly. There is no difference any more in political and civil rights between men and women in Turkey. Rights are common to all citizens.

Nothing is yet decided about military service. On a visit to the Girls Normal School the Great Leader Atatürk said: "There should be no difference between the rights of men and women, and from this point of view there also must be no difference in their duties and responsibilities, and in case of need we must count upon them for the performance of their national duties. This is the only way to maintain equality in a democratic country. We cannot say that the physical and mental conditions of women are obstacles for such a service, because Turkish history has seen many examples of women who defended their country in times of war. Even

though the problem of military service for women is out of the question for the time being, our girls must still be educated and prepared along these lines. National education of this nature should prepare our girls for service at any time, holding as the main principle the defence of our national interests."

Turkish women were aware of the fact that they would not be excluded from the opportunities of deciding the country's future, and that such rights would only be the fruit of their deeds. We can see to-day women doing every sort of work, from the simplest jobs up to service in the Assembly. They are engaged in scientific as well as technical work, and show no less aptitude than men. Although of recent growth, the results obtained have kept improving and promising better for the future.

While the modern Turkish woman is taking part in the industrial, scientific, political and artistic progress of the country, the brave villager is incessantly working in her village, and with untiring efforts, forms a beautiful and loving model of self-sacrifice and devotion to her modern sisters who are engaged in so many occupations, and to-day I may say the Turkish woman has won for herself, with the help of the Ghazi and the Government of the Republic, that freedom which has placed upon her shoulders the same responsibilities as the men are shouldering to advance the progress of the young Republic.



D'ANNUNZIO

DR. MARIO CARELLI

University of Rome.

WHEN towards 1880 a lad seventeen years old published a small volume of poetry, many critics raised their voice in Italy to salute in him a new poet endowed with the brightest artistic gifts. And it was really so, although those critics could not yet guess which proportions his artistic creations were likely to assume. The classical poetry of the time was nurtured on the Muses and the nymphs in which one could not plainly name the beard and had to call it the *honour of the chin*. The long Italian tradition of closed metres and forced rhythms was still obtaining in our country when French and English poetry had already trod freely in the path of reality and Germany had been ablaze with the new fire of romanticism. But it had grown old and weak. Three great poets of the century worked in that classic tradition. The first, Ugo Foscolo, raised it to a new splendour alive with the enthusiasm of a man for whom the glorious shadows of the past are never dead. The second was Giacomo Leopardi, who kept of it the outward and inward simplicity, the charm of a thought and an expression so full of human experience as to condense in fourteen verses what would take hundreds of lines to another poet. The third, still living at the time in which D'Annunzio began to write, was Carducci, master of D'Annunzio himself, a poet never rising to such heights of evocation as Foscolo, never so startlingly deep in thought as Leopardi, but a consummate artist who through his long study of the ancient and modern masters was about to achieve what was necessary to the next artistic resolution: I mean the blend of old and new, the creation of a new language in which the new ideas found adequate expression in the old words, thus revived with new senses.

This was the literary background on which D'Annunzio began to work. His first merit as an artist was to open Italy to the world around her. There was something stale, a stifling atmosphere in

¹ A lecture before Post-Graduate Students at the Calcutta University, 11th November, 1938.

our country. He threw himself with all the fresh forces of his youth into the study of all the foreign literatures. With Latin and Greek he had already been familiar since his years spent in a Tuscan high school. He learnt French, English and German, nourished himself with the great Russian novelists, got a smattering of Sanskrit in the Rome University and was able to follow, through a good translation, the drift and the sound of the Vedas and of the Indian epics. He became such a master of French that in his later years he wrote dramas and poems in that language, which range among the masterpieces of French literature.

In these first years of untiring studies and absorption his personality is not yet defined. The young poet writes and writes. Odes, sonnets and romances are born in which you can easily say that these verses are inspired by Corducci and those are translations from Greek, that this strophe is but an adaptation from Flaubert or Baudelaire and that this novel could bear the signature of Dostoievski. You can often charge him with plagiarism in many unexpected passages that gave him fame. Sometimes his translations are so independent, so original and new that nobody would say they are translations. His literary education was so tremendously vast that many skilled critics never smelt the theft. And was it really stealing? It was perhaps rather this: that the other writers studying foreign literatures store within themselves what they get in a slow process of assimilation, while D'Annunzio had to write. It was a form of fuller assimilation for him to see other people's creations bearing his name. He immersed himself deeply in those foreign psychologies and enriched thus wonderfully his kaleidoscopic mind.

His first years had coincided with an affectation of pagan sensuality in lyric poetry, and he contributed to it by his juvenile verses full of images of carnal beauty and love. To this kind of inspiration belong his first compositions as *Primo Vera* (The First Truth) and *Canto Novo* (New Song). These poems are of no great value, but something of that formal and sculptural elegance will stick to his poetry and remain in it as a permanent acquisition.

The native country of D'Annunzio is one of the most interesting in Italy. Placed at the same latitude as Rome, but on the other side of the Appennines, on the Adriatic sea, mountainous Abruzzo belongs for its customs and dialects to Southern Italy. But its life has preserved something very old and mysterious that you cannot find in

any other country in Italy. In the legends, popular beliefs, agricultural rites, customs, religious ceremonies, there is still something of the old Roman civilization that Christianity has not been able to destroy. Moreover, there is something prior to the Roman civilization itself. There you come across some ceremonies and customs not only foreign to the Christian spirit, though they have taken a Christian appearance, but also to the Roman spirit which was utterly practical, juridical and rather sceptical. In Abruzzo you still find fortune-tellers and snake-charmers, wizards and witches. This spirit of worship for the huge natural forces that often escape human judgment, that pantheistic sense of unity with the mysterious powers living everywhere and giving to life a shade of fatalism and a light of heroism is always present in D'Annunzio and could find only a partial expression in the formal classicism of his early youth. In the narrative prose of his later years he fully satisfies these tendencies inherited from his country.

Moreover, the realistic school dominating in Europe at that time had influenced his prose towards an outward clearness and a careful description of things which found also response in his Mediterranean nature fond of whatever appears clear and definite. Thus were born *Le Novelle della Pescara* (The Stories of the Fisher) and *Le Vergini delle Rocce* (The Virgins of the Rocks). But they were still tinged with provincialism, as their argument never exceeded the humble life of his native region. He wanted now a prose of broader scope and fuller humanity which could take him to the battle-field of the great European narrative. His love for Russian literature helped him. *Giovanni Episcopo*, a novel of some two hundred pages written runningly without division into chapters, tackles the most subtle problems of the European middle-class psychology. There is still a great simplicity and a slow, terrible progression towards a climax of anguish and folly that reminds the reader of Tolstoy's *Kreutzer Sonata*. And the same naïve simplicity of youth is to be found in another psychological novel, *L'Innocente*. Later on, his prose begins to turn pompous and artificial, beautiful episodes are alternated with pages stuffed with the pride of a useless erudition, his persons are no more living in this world but in an atmosphere artificially fostered with the dreams of an exalted phantasy. So are *Il Piacere* (Pleasure), *Il Fuoco* (Fire), *Forse che sì, forse che no* (Perhaps Yes, Perhaps No) and some others.

But let us come back to his poetry. After the pagan fashion, at the end of the last century another fashion began to invade European and chiefly Italian poetry. The poets of the new school are named *crepuscolari*, i.e., the "dusky ones." D'Annunzio's poems are now peopled with fashionable ladies with melodious voices and ensnaring, deep, mysterious eyes. There are gloomy gardens shaded by very old trees and garlands of deep coloured flowers, almost silent fountains and large, ancient gates. The sun is never shining, but glittering through the foliage, or darkened by vague clouds, or disappearing in the bloody glow of a sad sunset. People never say what they think, but suggest, sigh, begin to speak and break suddenly away. D'Annunzio soon became a master in this kind of poetry and pushed it to its furthest consequences, helping it to die. But something of this style too always stuck to his personality, and matured into an elusive and refined subtlety which enabled him to speak of everything indirectly and gave him a great power of suggestion. And the process of deliverance from the old decayed forms is now over. To achieve it the new poet has to follow many fashions, to listen to many strange voices, to change many times his own skin: but at last his mind will be ripe, his hand firm. He will find himself again.

The *crepuscolare* period of D'Annunzio's activity was chiefly fostered by his life in Rome. Rome was very quiet at that time, and her *tempo* was beaten by the old Roman gentry, which now has almost disappeared from the stage. Old palaces, full of rich tapestry, classic and famous paintings, would often receive the young brilliant poet. His life there was delightful and easy. He went with his hosts to hunting parties in the country and dances in the evening in the princely halls. In his previous life in Abruzzo and Naples, he had never been accustomed to such a luxury. He let himself ensnare in the mellow Roman life and his popularity increased. The softness and the scandals of that world, to which he actively contributed, gave to his poetic talent an amazing skill in describing luxury and riches.

Later on, daringly launched into an immoral life, attacking and being attacked with the utmost violence, master of a big fortune, flattered by high connections and the love of every woman that encountered him, sure of his bright destiny, he will make of the thought of Nietzsche his own philosophy. He firmly believed in the Superman, laughed at the current prejudices and liked to startle

everybody by his own behaviour. He maintained that moral limits of social restraint are made only for those who are weak or foolish enough to bow to these laws, and that the man who has attained his inner freedom has a right to overstep every barrier and to impose his own law on himself.

This Nietzschean period of D'Annunzio's life is reflected in some dramas and romances of his, for instance, *Il Ferro* (Iron) and *La Città morta* (The Dead City). Another drama, *La Figlia di Jorio* (The Daughter of Jorio) is considered in Italy as one of his most perfect works, almost free from every mannerism, deeply inspired by the life of his own at Abruzzo.

Also from his love of Nietzsche D'Annunzio will retain something throughout his whole career. All that is bombastic in his work reminds us of that stage, which perhaps has been more harmful than useful to him. Many of his books are stuffed with groundless symbolism, loaded with intricacies and riddles. Very often he simply played for effect. He created some myths about himself and drew around them some recurrent motifs which at least seem meaningless. To his leaning towards Nietzsche must be ascribed many of his extravagances.

Out of all the loves of his youth, two great passions remain to dominate his art: the classical world, which now he is able to see and to treat outside the old patterns, as if it were to-day's life, yet possessed of a tone of fatality and solemnity unknown to-day; and the Italian life, the life of our country when it was not yet united but still showed many of its present characteristics, the life of new Italy heir of the Roman and medieval spirit and ready to take her place again among the great powers in the world. Christianity he never felt deep in his heart. His classical dramas like *Phœdra* show the lightening pride of a woman who breaks all the fetters of the human feelings and conventions and seeks her immortality in that of the elements which will absorb her after her death. *Le Martyre de Saint Sébastien*, written in glamorous French, shows the certainty of deathlessness of the Christian hero conceived as a Roman soldier, strong and unconquerable rather than loving and forgiving. The same spirit is in both. That Christianity brought anything new to mankind he never clearly saw.

His outstanding work as a lyrical poet is embodied in the several books of *Le Laudi* (The Praises), an old Christian title employed by

St. Francis for his marvellous hymn of thanksgiving, and now taken again by D'Annunzio to express his rather sensual than spiritual enjoyment in everything, his love both of the formal and of the formless, of the living and the inanimate. It is perhaps too radical to say that his poetry is spiritless. True, if you take one poem and try to translate it in a foreign language, you lose more than half of its beauty. Kabir and Tagore can be read and appreciated even, for instance, in an Italian translation from English. D'Annunzio would fade away and wither if you only attempt to put him into French, which is perhaps the language most near to his mood. But in listening to one of these charming masterpieces, embroideries of ideas and sounds in which none prevails on the other, airy constructions of dazzling images that strike you at every step with the wonder of an unexpected and perfect beauty, you are right in asking yourself whether you are confronted with a mere mystification or perhaps rather with a new kind of poetry which you cannot find in any other literature. It was a slogan of his about himself that he attained perfection when his culture and his sensuality met. And one could reinforce the argument saying that his whole life was a combination of the two. But it would not be fully true. From many features of his life one is induced to believe that he was little more than an exceptionally skilled craftsman. He did well in everything he did: was a perfect sailor, a consummate rider, could plough keeping the furrow as straight as few peasants can, knew everything about jewellery, perfumes, cooking, dressing, ship-building and what not. Some critics have gone so far as to doubt his sincerity as an "interventionist" in 1915 and as a soldier in the Great War. As a matter of fact, even there he changed his dress as frequently as possible and was an officer in cavalry, Alpines, simple infantry, and air force. But his Fiume enterprize is above any discussion. Those who were with him when he captured the Italian city, denied to Italy, against the will of the Allied Powers and of the Italian Government, know that he risked his life many times. When he flew on Vienna alone with the only purpose of dropping there leaflets inviting the Austrians to surrender, without bombing the town, he exposed his own life again. And these are not the only occasions. His help given to Italy in the war was, besides being incalculable, sincere and disinterested.

Both as a man and as an artist he was one of the most rich and strange geniuses who ever appeared on the face of earth. He can,

to a certain extent, be judged negatively, his work may be minimized and criticized, but nobody can deny that he was a man and an artist of the highest rank, who turned into gold everything he handled, and traced a very deep furrow in the present Italian literature, giving immediate and shining expression to every stirring of his own heart and of that of his people.



THE KOMS OF MANIPUR

MINENDRANATH BASU, M.Sc., F.R.S.

Department of Anthropology, Calcutta University

THE following notes represent a study of certain aspects of the life of the Koms of Manipur. Field work was done in the Autumn of 1934. My principal informants were Lunjakhei, a Kuki of Manipur and assistant to the State Lambu ; Tokeison, the headman of the Kairup village, and few other male and female Koms of the Kairup village.

My obligations are many : to late Dr. P. Mitra who encouraged me to take part in the excursion arranged by the University of Calcutta ; to Mr. T. C. Das, Lecturer, Calcutta University, for his generous and constant help in collecting field materials and for reading the first draft of the manuscript ; to Prof. K. P. Chattopadhyay for his kind help and valuable suggestions ; and lastly, to my friends who accompanied the party and to my informants for their co-operation which alone made the field work fruitful.

Introduction

The Koms are a Kuki tribe found in the state of Manipur. Etymologically the term " Kom " means the turban of cloth which in ancient times it was the custom for the Koms to wear round their head. They are a brachycephalic, platyrrhine and medium statured people. The hair is black, coarse and wavy with a tendency to straight. The beard and moustaches are scanty. The cheek bones are prominent, the eye-slits are straight but sometimes oblique as well though the Mongolian fold is not traceable. The skin colour is variable from dark brown to yellowish tint.

Origin

The Koms of Manipur do not claim to be the original inhabitants of the place. Our informants say that they came from the south, but the location of the exact place is unknown. One of our infor-

nants says that somewhere near the Lushai hills was their original home.

Language

They speak the Kom language of Kuki-Chin group of Tibeto-Burman family though the lingua franca is old Maithei language.

Distribution

They are distributed all over the states, their chief centres being the following villages :—Kairup, Korengta, Kaibung, Sonpanjai, Thajo and Thugo.

Birth

When labour pain comes on, the men leave the hut, as their presence is believed to hinder delivery, and only a few adult women of the village remain. The woman who acts as midwife must be an old one. Sometimes oil is rubbed and massaged round the waist of the woman to facilitate delivery. There is no special room for confinement. She gives birth on the floor of the main hut. The woman who acts as midwife, does not take anything.

When a baby is born, all the members of the family remain unclean for 5 days. They must not cultivate, must not touch loom, plough, spear and such other agricultural or hunting implements, or must not cut any tree for that will injure the baby. The members of such family must not go to another village. On the 6th day the nails of the mother, the baby and all the members of the house must be pared, after which all have to bathe in a river or spring near by and are regarded as ceremonially clean and allowed to resume their ordinary life.

Naizhu is the ceremony that takes place on the day of birth of a child. No male member takes part in this ceremony, but the women of the village who attended her at the time of delivery, join. The women drink *Zu* (country-made liquor), dance and make merriments. This ceremony takes place in one of the neighbours' house in the night.

Neiteishona or the name-giving ceremony takes place 7 days after the child's birth. This ceremony takes place at the house of the

baby. In the morning all the villagers, men and women, old and young, join. If the man to whom a child is born, is poor the villagers simply drink *Zu* and go away. If he is rich, he kills one pig and several fowls and feeds the villagers. Of course *Zu* in large quantity is consumed. Both men and women go on dancing during the whole day. The ceremony continues from morning to evening. At the time of the ceremony the grandfather or the eldest male member gives the name to the baby.

Marriage

The Koms are divided into a number of classes called *Phungs*. Marriage within the *Phung* is strictly prohibited.

Marriage is generally adult though on very rare occasion infant marriage occurs. The parents of the couple settle the marriage. In the absence of the father the mother arranges it.

Cross-cousin marriage is the rule in Kom society. When a Kom boy is old enough, he first of all finds out whether he has any maternal uncle's daughter. If any man refuses to marry his maternal uncle's daughter, he shall have to pay a fine of one *mithan* and two bottles of *Zu*. If the mother's brother's daughter be too young to be married, the bachelor shall have to pray for permission of the maternal uncle to marry another woman.

Parallel-cousin marriage is absent. The practice of junior and senior levirate or the custom of marrying the deceased husband's younger or elder brother is in vogue. A man can marry his elder brother's widow but he must not marry his elder brother's wife, if she be divorced by his elder brother.

Marriage by exchange is unknown in the Kom society. But marriage by service is practised. In this case a man has to serve his father-in-law for three years. Marriage by purchase is also prevalent among them.

Polygamy, though not generally practised, is not unknown. Polygamy is sometimes indulged in by the wealthier families.

Marriages are generally arranged by parents of the parties concerned. The father of the bridegroom goes to the house of the bride with a pig and one bottle of *Zu* and offers them to the bride's father. If the bride's father accepts the gifts offered, he is supposed to agree to a marriage proposal between his daughter and a son of the offerer of

the gift. Of course, the bride's father is at liberty to refuse any such gift and that would be counted as his refusal of the marriage proposal. However, if the bride's father gives his consent to the proposal by accepting the offering, there is generally held a prolonged discussion between the bridegroom and the bride's father regarding the bride price. The bride price is variable. Generally it consists of one *nithan* and two bottles of *Zu*, payable by the bridegroom's father to the bride's party. Usually it is paid on or before the marriage ceremony. But in special cases where the bridegroom's party is unable to pay at the time of marriage, the payment of the bride price may be postponed to a later date.

Marriage generally takes place in the month of 'Kalentha' (June) which is the harvest season. There is no fixity of marriage date; it may take place on any day of the month. Though marriages are rare in the months other than 'Kalentha,' there is no strict prohibition to that effect and when there is a case of elopement marriages actually take place in any month of the year and on any day of the month. The marriage ceremony always takes place in the morning time and the accompanying merriments continue for 2 or 3 days consecutively.

Early in the morning, on the day of marriage, the groom's father and his maternal uncle along with the groom and his friends proceed to the house of the bride's father, who receives them cordially. The 'Mako' or the village priest is called in and he makes some divinatory experiments previous to the ceremony. Generally, the 'Mako' takes a fowl and standing with his face towards the east cuts off the neck of the bird and subsequently throws it off on the ground. If the two legs of the fowl remain in contact with each other at the time of the death of the bird, it is taken to be a good indication and it is believed that the pair would enjoy a happy and lasting conjugal life. If, however, the two legs of the creature are separated from each other at the time of death, it is regarded as a bad sign, because it is believed to indicate that the union would be unlucky and the pair would separate from each other in no time. In case of an evil omen as stated above the impending marriage ceremony is either stopped for good or postponed to a later time.

The marriage ceremony itself is very simple; it consists of the bride, and the bridegroom drinking *Zu* together, while the other guests both male and female indulge in dancing, singing and other sorts of merry-making. The mother of the bride or some other old female

relative of the bride brings in a large pot of *Zu* and places it in the middle of the house. She then offers two sucking pipes one to each of the pair. They are then asked to drink *Zu* by means of their pipes from the *Zu* pot, both the bride and the groom sucking together. This is regarded as the essential part of the marriage ceremony, and once it has been done the couple is regarded as married. The father of the bride receives all the guests with much cordiality and offers them refreshments. If he be a rich man, he will kill a buffalo, and a number of pigs on the occasion. But if he be poor, he will simply honour his guests with a cup of *Zu*.

After the marriage festival which may continue for 2 or 3 days, the bridegroom with the bride comes to his father's house. But very soon the new couple will establish a new independent house in the village.

Funerals

The Koms bury their dead. The dead body is wrapped in a piece of new cloth and is placed on a bamboo stretcher of about 5 ft. \times 2 ft. The grave is dug by the male members of the village. The dead body is then placed in the grave with the bamboo stretcher below and earth is piled up on it. If a man dies, the following articles are given along with him in the grave:—

- (1) Clothes,
- (2) Tobacco pipe,
- (3) Dao,
- (4) Spear :

and in the case of the females:—

- (1) Clothes,
- (2) Bangles,
- (3) Spade,
- (4) Tobacco pipe,
- (5) Basket.

In both cases (men and women) some pigs and fowls are sacrificed at the time of death. The spleens and lungs of the pigs are buried along with the dead ; sometimes one or two eggs of hen and rice are also buried. The hen sacrificed at the time of the death is put on the

grave. The idea is that when the spirit goes on its journey to the land of *Patken* (God), it may be attacked by the spirits of the animals and beasts which he killed during his life time. The spirit of the animal sacrificed at the time of death is supposed to accompany him to the other world. The basket is given along with the woman for carrying anything on the journey to Heaven which she might divide among the spirits of her dead relatives who are awaiting in the other world. The eggs and rice that are buried are also taken to the other world, which are shared by the dead with his dead relatives.

The conception of the other world is very simple. It is the same as that on the earth. They have got similar duties and social customs. If the husband dies first, then the spirit must wait high up in the sky, until his wife dies. After her death both will unite in Heaven. The same thing happens if the wife dies first.

There is no fixed place for burial. The dead are generally buried in the south of the courtyard of the house. The women take part in the funerals but pregnant women are not allowed to join.

All the members of the family of the deceased and his relatives through the father's line up to the third generation are considered unclean for 3 days. On the 4th day they go to the nearest stream with their *Khulakpa* or the headman of the village. They there pare their nails and bathe and are henceforth ceremonially clean. Then on returning home they arrange a feast. All the villagers both men and women join. They dance and sing throughout the whole day. They do not observe any annual memorial ceremony.

There are no separate rites for females—married, unmarried or widowed—and for the children. Abnormal deaths such as death from snake-bite, killing by tiger, suicide, etc., are also treated in the same way as a normal one.

The Koms generally do not raise any memorial stone over their grave but in some special cases as, for example, if a man be a well-known hero or if he kills many beasts in his life time, they sometimes raise a memorial stone, and figures of beasts are carved on that grave stone, with the help of 'chembei' (dao).

SOME ASPECTS OF OUR SCHOOL EXAMINATIONS *

K. K. MOOKERJEE, M.A., B.T., Dip. Sp. Eng.,
Lecturer in Education, Calcutta University.

EXAMINATIONS in some form or other have become an abiding feature of our educational system. As our schools (let me restrict my references to Secondary schools alone, leaving out the other institutions, higher and lower)—as our schools have been constructed after the English pattern, so has the system of examination, particularly the final examination at the end of the school course, been an adaptation from English original. The Matriculation examination, serving, as it does, as the entrance examination to the University, reflects the ideal of the University rather than of the schools. The Terminal (including Annual) examinations of all classes except the highest two are of an independent character. The examinations of the two Matriculation classes, internal as they are like the Terminals, are made more or less to fall in line with the final external examination (Matriculation).

Criticism of 'Examinations' in general and of external examinations in particular, has been growing in variety and volume. It will not be proper, even if possible, to ignore all the criticisms and go on complacently with the fashion.

Examinations may be internal or external (as already referred to). Internal examinations are those that are conducted by the teachers themselves as a means "of promoting the ends of sound instruction" or for the purpose of class promotion at the year-end; while those conducted by an outside authority are described as External examinations. These latter are held for other purposes, e.g., for entrance to the University as in the case of 'Matriculation,' and for admission to public services or professional courses. External examinations are of two distinct types, viz., 'Competitive' and 'Qualifying.'

Competitive examinations—intended as they are simply as a means of selection or of elimination, I may say—"are not meant

* Being an address delivered before the Examination Section of the XIVth All-India Educational Conference, held in Bombay in December, 1938.

directly to subserve the purposes of education." "Their indirect influence on the work of some schools, however, is very great, but, unfortunately, it is pretty generally acknowledged to be pernicious." Under 'Qualifying examinations' may be included the Matriculation examination, and the internal examination for class promotion and the 'Test Examination' for selection of candidates for the Matriculation examination. (Selection by 'competitive test' and selection by 'qualifying test' may be distinguished by saying that in the former success is determined, pre-determined rather, by the quantity of requirement, while in the latter it depends upon the quality of attainment.)

Again, the means of examination—whether internal or external, competitive or qualifying—may be spoken words (Questions and Answers) or written, or a combination of both; hence *in point of form*, an examination may be *oral* or *written* or *mixed*.

I propose to confine my treatment to the internal examination for the purpose of class promotion and the external examination for the purpose of entrance to the University, which, I believe, will fairly suffice for the main object of the present discussion.

The *internal examination* in question is conducted by the school teachers themselves by means of questions set by teachers of the particular subjects in particular classes or, as it happens sometimes, teachers of those subjects in higher classes who are expected to possess an adequate knowledge of the standard of the class to be examined. The Headmaster, as a general practice, looks over the question papers and, if necessary, gets them revised in order to make them sufficiently conform to the standard, before the questions are actually employed for examination. Under such conditions, there is likely to be maintained a close relation between teaching and examining, and such being the case, there is very little danger of the 'test' being unreal in character or pernicious in effect. These examinations, therefore, are plainly free from most of the objections, to be considered presently, which may be raised against those conducted by external examiners, except so far as they are influenced, however indirectly, by the standard of the latter. The practical harm, if any, of this system, due, to any extent, to defect in the framing of questions or in the awarding of marks, appears negligible when we consider that the Headmaster does not regard the marks obtained by an individual pupil as the sole criterion of his fitness for promotion.

One particular defect is noticeable in the current system of these internal examinations. Examination of the lowest class is mainly oral, except in case of such subjects as Handwriting and Drawing, and some portion of Arithmetic. Higher and higher up the oral form makes room for the written form, till even in the middle forms the oral is entirely replaced by the written. This is inadequate and injudicious so far as the 'language' subjects are concerned. Indeed, it may not be so in respect of the classical languages which are supposed to be 'dead,' and it is not remarkably so in respect of the 'Mother-tongue' of the pupils; but it is certainly and emphatically so in respect of the second living language, English, which forms an important part of our curriculum. The ability to speak English and to understand spoken English remains untested, the importance of which is slowly, but surely, gaining ground.

Coming to the subject of the external examination, I mean, the Matriculation examination, we are at once confronted with the immense volume of criticisms levelled against public examinations. It will be worth while to consider some of these criticisms, so far as they touch our Matriculation examination. But before dealing with such criticisms it will be useful to understand more clearly the character of the Matriculation examination.

The Matriculation examination, though external, is a qualifying examination similar in purpose to the internal examination for class promotion. As the latter is intended to judge the fitness of a pupil for going up to the next higher class, so the former is intended to judge the fitness of a pupil to go up for collegiate studies just above the Matriculation stage. Along with this 'qualifying' purpose, there is another purpose, albeit secondary, that guides both these examinations, viz., 'measuring the result of instruction' and promoting the ends of instruction. (It may be noted that what may be considered 'secondary' in the above two cases is the primary, nay, the sole, purpose of the ordinary class examinations employed by the teachers as a teaching device during the course of their work.) There is yet another purpose, a tertiary, I may say, which has lent somewhat of a competitive character to the above examinations. Students successful at these examinations are placed in order of merit, and prizes and scholarships are awarded to those who reach certain positions in the order. And "when the candidates at qualifying examinations are placed in order of merit, and schools and universities have to rely upon examinations

in the award of scholarships and prizes, distinction between these and competitive examinations, to some extent, vanishes, since the spirit of competition may then become keen even in these, at least among the best candidates."

The Matriculation examination is thus an external qualifying examination which has to subserve the purposes of education and, at the same time, is to a certain extent competitive in character. Besides, we know, it is entirely written. Now, these features of the examination have to be remembered while we are to consider the criticisms of examination and see how far they apply to this system. Dr. Dukes says that "in a large proportion of instances an early scholarship is positively harmful to the individual child." Raymont admits that "*Competitions* for scholarships do a great deal of mischief; physical, by at least occasional instances of over-pressure; intellectual, by the encouragement of harmful precocity, especially when premature specialization is also involved; and moral, by forcing to the front the element of material reward." But he says: "Still, it is difficult to see how such examinations can in practice be superseded."

I believe, 'scholarship' or 'place' provides an excellent stimulus for bringing out, very often, the best in the student; provides, directly or indirectly, material support in his or her future studies and career; and, regard being had for the fitness of the individual pupil (on the side of the parents or the teachers) and for the quality of test (on the side of the examining authorities), the system may be retained to advantage.

Edward Thring wrote contemptuously of "examiners, who come fresh from their books to judge the work of the practical worker with all its varying factors, award praise and blame in total ignorance of those varying factors, and report this to the amateur power above, which knows still less." *This criticism of external examinations generally is irrefutable, and it applies very much to our Matriculation Examination.* I say, very much, but not fully; because paper-setters include some persons connected with teaching, though not exactly of school children, and among the paper-examiners whose views have certain influence upon the shaping of future 'questions' are being included a larger number of school teachers, particularly as a result of the advocacy of different Teachers' Associations and Organisations. In my opinion, which I state without elaboration, the

presence of an element of 'external examiner' is wholesome, stimulating and preventive of degeneration, and, for the matter of that, necessary.

The effects of examinations in general, because their effects differ widely according to circumstances, cannot possibly be rightly judged. "The abstract question, whether the tendency of examinations is good or bad, does not in reality admit of an answer." R. H. Quick, himself an experienced examiner, supposed that there were "instances in which care for the examination developed into care for the subject of examination," but added that "these cases are so rare that they may be neglected." But I believe, *much depends upon the quality of the examination*. The more carefully it is designed to encourage the formation of healthy mental habits, and the more confident pupils and masters feel that the best kind of preparation will "pay" best in the examination room, the less will be the mischief done by anxiety to succeed.

Examinations, all the same, must be regarded as a means rather than an end in itself. The Matriculation examination is more a test of memory and expression than of judgment and appreciation. To take one example: in English, questions are set on 'Substance' and 'Essay,' and so-called critical questions on the subject-matter of the 'Selections' are an equally predominant feature. The passages set for substance are often too hard, and when students failing to understand the theme must yet write a substance, expression cannot be judged. 'Essays' are often beyond the range of the students' comprehension, and a common practice is for them to memorize a number of 'possible' essays from the Bazar Essay Books just 'to take a chance.' The questions on the subject-matter of the text, miscalled 'critical,' (and there should not be critical questions for the young Matriculation candidates) are generally of the nature of questions (given with answers) in the Bazar Note-books. Here also 'cramming' is widely encouraged, and examination becomes a mere test of memory; so much so that I have often felt, not without pain and disgust, that most of the questions might be easily modified in form into *honest memory test questions* (e.g., quote from memory an essay, on such and such subject; quote from memory the substance or the lesson you get from the poem 'The Council of Horses'; quote from memory the summary of Todd's remarks on the character of the Rajputs, and so on), and yet, in the majority of cases, obtain

the expected answer. Key-books and catechisms, to an enormous extent, have been responsible for neglect of the study of the original, of the author's own language and style, which are calculated to serve as models for emulation and imitation, and students, when they memorize, memorize, oftener than not, expressions of the key-makers in utter neglect of the beautiful expressions of the authors themselves.

The University appears to have realized the prevalence of cramming and of the study of language and literature 'second-hand' and also the fact that the essays submitted by the students do not generally serve the purpose of a composition test. In the syllabus of English (as in Vernacular, in many Indian Universities), provision has recently been made for rapid reading; and books have been prescribed for study, from which questions will be set in order to test 'free composition.' But the key-makers also have been prompt, as is their wont, in taking time by the forelock. Teachers, too, in some schools, have begun to teach these books in their usual manner of 'text-book teaching' in the class and to dictate notes including 'possible' questions and answers. Do these not defeat the very purpose for which the course was intended? And if so, is the University helpless in the matter?

Without dilating upon the subject at any greater length (for defects of the existing system are more or less well known and admitted), let me conclude my discussion with a few definite suggestions already stated or implied in the above:

(i) There should be a closer relation between the teaching and examining functions. (ii) The examiners, especially the paper-setters, should be not only masters of their subject but, as far as possible, be *successful teachers* too. (iii) Questions should be carefully devised so as to have a salutary effect upon teaching, to encourage the study of the right kind of thing in the right kind of way, to discourage learning by rote, to be adapted to the stage of development and attainment of the students and, above all, to be perfectly intelligible. (iv) The schools should do away with the system of holding the Terminal examinations. The most wonderful thing which strikes us is that while reforms are being introduced in the examination system in countries like Europe, America, Japan, and so on, we have been conducting our examinations in schools in the same old and traditional manner. And it is a curious phenomenon that though many of our

Trained Teachers, Training College Professors and School Inspectors are decrying examinations and are speaking of the abolition of the present system of examination, yet actually we have not moved an inch from the old groove ! There are generally *three* examinations held during the year, *viz.*, the First and Second Terminals and the Annual. The result is that practically throughout the year our poor students are obsessed with the thought of the examination, and remain panic-stricken, and ultimately they lose their health as a result of over-pressure of work. They try to do uniformly well in all of these examinations, and they work abnormally hard at the cost of their precious health. There should rather be only one examination in the year, *viz.*, the Annual examination ; the promotion of the pupils shall depend on its results as also on the daily record of the work of each pupil as kept by the teachers concerned. This system is likely to improve the normal class-work and to help the teachers in thoroughly finishing the curriculum. (v) Oral examinations to test ability to speak English and to understand Spoken English should be continued from earlier forms right up to the Matriculation class, (success in this examination may not be made a condition of the ' pass,' but may be recognized in other ways). (vi) All subjects worth teaching should be considered worth examining and yet examination must be regarded as a means to an end, beyond itself. As Edward Thring observes: " We must rise superior to the belief that all education is a race, whereof the examination marks the last spurt and wherein success or failure is the final seal or stamp of work. Let us regard education rather as a wholly beneficial journeying through the delightful fields of learning and examination as an interesting helpful wayside incident and nothing more."

In fine, I should like to say that preparation for an examination, which evidently has an element of the ' unknown,' has an influence, however remote, upon the mind of the youth and it better equips him to face the trials that come in his future life. Hence, examination, in some form or other, must be retained. It should, however, be regarded as a ' bad master but a good servant.'

FILMS AND SCIENCE.

SHEKH IPTAKHAR RASOOL.

The problems of educational reconstruction in our own time are as urgent and as singular as those of the Protestant Reformation. The material circumstance which contributed to the great intellectual enlightenment of that time was the invention of a new instrument for diffusing human knowledge. In our own task of making the world outlook of science an open book we have at our disposal instruments which transcend the limitations of oral discourse. It is a common place to say that the cinema has placed new powers in the hands of educationists but few of them have really grasped what its new powers are. So far the cinema has largely been canvassed as a way of stimulating interest or of conveying in a more vivid and palatable form information which is less attractive when communicated through the medium of print. What we have still to realise is that it can explain many things which many people can never understand at all, if they have to rely on the printed word.

Mathematics.

The greatest difficulties both in mathematics and in those branches of science which rely on mathematics do not reside in failure to assimilate the rules of symbolism. More often they reside in failure to visualise the physical construction, model, or process which the symbols describe. The cinema can bridge the gulf which now separates people who have a good visual imagination from those who have not.

Dynamics and astronomy are not difficult because of mathematics. To the person who finds them difficult they are equally difficult when the mathematics used is of the simplest kind. The limitation imposed upon the communication of knowledge by the printing press is easiest to see if we consider the implications of a well-known class of optical illusions. We all know what happens if you draw a cube in perspective with twelve straight lines and then stare at it for sometimes. After a little while it seems to turn inside out and this happens repeatedly if you go on staring at it. Although this class of optical illusion is commonly mentioned in text-books of physiology and experimental psychology, little of anything has been said about its bearing on education. Every teacher knows perfectly well that many children who can acquit themselves passably in plain geometry experience very great difficulty when they come to solid geometry. There is an inherent ambiguity in flat representations of three dimensional objects. The longer you go on looking at them the more perplexed you get.

The experienced teacher knows that a little play with plasticine and knitting needles will often surmount the first difficulties of visualisation at this level. What the model does for three dimensional objects the cinema would do for the four-dimensional process. Simple harmonic motion, the processions of the equinoxes, the relation of celestial and terrestrial coordinates of a star, wave motions, the trajectory of a body projected in space, are themes which present insuperable difficulties to a large number of people. They bristle with problems for the teacher, even if he only has to deal with

pupils who have a tolerable aptitude for naturalistic studies. With all the resources of stereoscopic cinematography, I believe that a few hours would suffice to overcome visual difficulties which now defeat the ingenuity of the teacher and at best absorb weeks and months of time and effort.

Bacon said that it is unwise to exalt the powers of the human mind when we should seek out its true help. There are many to-day who would have us exalt the minds of leaders with supposedly superior gifts. The task of educationists must be to emphasise the new helps which science has brought to the understanding of common man. Distrust of education and a pessimistic attitude towards the powers of the average citizen in our generation are the seeds of fascism and war. If the cost of one cruiser were applied to providing projectors for our schools and the expense of two battleships were devoted to the production of films for the teaching of science, this generation could witness a greater advance of human enlightenment than the world has yet known. This is one ground for hopefulness in the dark hours through which the world is now passing.

Biology.

The film has certain properties which make it invaluable in a subject like biology.

It can make a record of scenes which most people would be unable to visit, such as remote colonies of sea birds, or wild game in Africa, and of events which need to be waited and watched for, like the special methods adopted by some birds for feeding their young, or the liberation of medusae from the hydroid colony.

Under expert direction, the confused events of reality can be arranged into a logical and artistic sequence as in a book, but with direct visual appeal. A casual visitor to a bird colony would not grasp the significance of most of the events that he saw; an amateur naturalist at the sea side would not obtain a connected picture of the ecology of rock-pools or sand-flats. In this connection the possibility of using micro-cinematography in conjunction with ordinary cinematography is of special importance in biology.

The film, by means of its independence of time, is capable of giving a direct realisation of processes that are too fast or too slow for the eye. A humming bird's flight which we see as a mere blur, can be analysed by slowing-down; and by speeding up, a long and complex sequence of events can be grasped as a single process. This last technique is of great value in biology, where the study of development is so important. With its aid processes such as cell-division or early embryogenesis reveal new points, even to professional biologists.

Where photography can not be used, moving diagrams can be employed in a similar way. The essentials of fertilisation and heredity can be presented with extreme vividness by this means. Again, by replacing the various portions of a photograph in turn by labelled drawings, anatomy may often be better demonstrated than by a single diagram, as in a text book.

Certain types of demonstration can be more effectively shown on the screen than in reality. This applies, for example, to the dissection of small animals.

The main objections raised to the use of films in education are that they encourage a passive instead of an active attitude in those who are being taught, and that they attempt to usurp the functions of the teacher. In this latter respect, however the film is precisely on a par with text-book. If a film

attempts to usurp the function of the teacher, it is a bad film. A good film may relieve the teacher of certain burdens and difficulties, but it should and can provide abundant material for the teacher to use. With regard to the charge that films encourage passivity, this again is only true of bad films. Films can stimulate wonder, excite interest, and provoke curiosity; and such films will be educationally of value. This function of films is prominent in biology, with its wealth of unfamiliar and often microscopic material.

Physics.

In the teaching of physical science the cinema film owes its value to the same basic properties as in other educational applications. The instructional film is an adequate substitute for the physical presence in the classroom of rare, expensive very large, very small or very fragile apparatus. In the demonstration of processes it gives a wide control of magnification and of time-scale. It permits collective and simultaneous viewing which would otherwise be impracticable. It offers, as stimulant to interest and memory, the dramatic devices of repetition, contrast and intercomparison; and it vivifies the applicational aspect by showing full-scale operations in close relations to basic processes.

In the physical and geophysical sciences there is exceptional scope for the use of animated diagrams and models, especially in the realm of mechanistic representation of non-visual phenomena. The radiation from a wireless transmitting aerial and the motion of isobaric system may be taken as examples of this kind. In geophysical teaching the cinema mitigates the difficulties of representing rare or remote natural phenomena—for example, unusual cloud formations and tropical or arctic phenomena. In the mechanical sciences the particular application of the cinema as a recording stroboscope is of high educational value.

Agriculture.

Practical agriculture and agricultural science both utilise, either directly or indirectly, most of the arts and sciences. Since the industrial revolution and increasing proportion of the population has lost touch with the land and indeed with the life and outlook of the countryside.

These considerations clearly show that there are many directions in which films can be of service to agriculture. The films made by agricultural engineering firms show how modern machinery can be used to decrease labour and production risks and to increase the farmer's control of his soil conditions. By means of accelerated representation and highly magnified photography of growth and movement within cells it is possible to teach far more than is possible by normal observation, written descriptions, and still photographs. Few films of this type have been produced even in foreign countries, but there are some which present valuable and suggest infinite possibilities in the field of scientific education and agricultural research.

The inclusion of these films, specially edited, if necessary, in public cinema programmes serve to bring the countryside and its interests before the town dweller, and helps to re-establish understanding between them.

TEACHING CIVICS THROUGH FILMS

SHEIKH IFTAKHAR RASOOL

THE film has two functions in education. Till now its use in the classroom has been largely devoted to illustrations. Its second function is one of exposition, wherein the film develops themes of its own making. Much experiment has been vitiated and much needless controversy has been roused through neglect of this essential distinction.

The conscientious and reflective teacher contends that he has quite enough straightforward teaching to do without occupying himself with every harebrained scheme that comes along. If an addition to his work is proposed then he must be convinced that it is a necessary one. The business of teaching children to read, write and calculate is a serious and exacting business. He is not, therefore, prepared to upset his time-table merely to satisfy the whims of the dilettante film enthusiast. Probably only scientific data provided by one or other of the research committees will provide conviction.

Allowing, as we must do, that our teachers do their job extraordinarily well, we must therefore guard against any unnecessary up-heaval and consequent loss of direction and efficiency. Before we use films in connection with our curricular lessons, we must accept in a large measure the generally adequate curriculum, the normal conditions of the classroom and the normal teaching unit in the lesson.

These conditions immediately make certain demands on the type of film necessary. It must be such that the teacher can maintain the pace of his teaching; it must not appreciably slow down the teaching process. To maintain this pace the film must fit into the unity of the existing scheme of work. It is foolish to present a teacher with a gleaming projector and a short film which does hardly any good.

The Exposition Film

The exposition film, the educational film as we know it, whether silent or sound, is in itself a unity and within the context of its own making adds to the knowledge and presents new experience. The possibilities inherent in this new form of presenting experience have not, to any extent, been developed. Rather, it has been forced to do the work which should more properly be done by a more simple illustration film.

The exposition film has a foreground use, in so far as it lines up with the curriculum. But it transcends the function of mere illustration as it commences to show the perspectives which lie behind the classroom and behind the laboratory. Cinema, with its peculiar ability to gather up individual instances and weave them into a pattern which is identified as much with the aim as with the instance allows the film first to line itself with the particular instance and then to go beyond the instance to the general idea.

The exposition film also proves valuable in connection with the creative work of the curriculum subjects.

New Demands

Now if we look at the curriculum in our schools we find that the so-called progressive schools have swung over from Classics and Pure Mathematics to Applied Science and Vocational Training. In addition we take the surplus workers for whom industry can find no place, and in special classes teach them trades and crafts in the vague hope that commerce will turn a corner and will suddenly find a use for the riveters, plumbers and art printers of our Instruction Centres.

The stock defence of this type of education is that if we train pupils in systematic thinking or dexterous technique in one respect we shall live to witness a transfer of skill when the system or technique is applied to other thoughts or other materials. Thus Euclidian Geometry has been taught in many schools for girls in the hope that by some miracle of transfer they should be able to apply their skill in the mental manipulation of triangles to the less exacting task of raising families. Experimental psychology has now given the lie to this, and that vague transfer, by which educationists have justified so many anomalies, has been exposed, if not as a fallacy, at least as a quite ineliminable factor.

But in avoiding this extreme we must not fall into the cult of individualism, which permitting of no corporate ideal, fosters a conception of independence, both personal and national, in a world where only corporate activity is significant. Individualism has sought the enrichment of personality, but has conceived personality as an individual sensibility and not as a co-operating unit. Children have been detached from the discipline of corporate work and encouraged to 'express' their own native personality. This step has been conceived as a fit preparation for a world where only co-operation in everyday affairs can matter. That personality can be expressed in corporate work has not been allowed any reasonable emphasis and culture has, therefore, been presented as a decorative quality of leisure, and a matter of purely personal sensibility which should not be brought into the cold light of our working hours.

Our task then must be to avoid, on the one hand, an education which provides for a past need or for a contemporary need which will pass away before our children can play a part in it, and, on the other hand, an education which exalts individual personality into a fetish divorced from the needs and demands of the modern world. We must instead furnish sentiments and an apprehension of life, which will render the child adaptable as a citizen in a growing changing world.

The consequences of war and unemployment are making new demands on education, and the tragedy of lack of foresight will be re-enacted if we allow education to apply only to abnormal times instead of providing a basis for healthy social sentiments. This should allow for the development of personality, not merely as individuality, but also in relation to the developing community in which the pupil lives.

Civics and Education

Here Civics comes in as a means of relating the essentials of education to the constantly changing needs of the adult world. Its present status in the schools falls short of this, for the fallacy of educating for past needs still holds sway. So the teacher who wishes to push his teaching of

history, biology and other subjects beyond the 1900 mark is being led into the Civics field in fetters. He is dinned with the word 'Reconstruction' and told that he must make again a world in which the engineers, the technicians and the other employed workers can take their place, or alternatively, he is bade keep them happy till this reconstruction has been made.

And so the teacher sets out on a course of Civics which is rooted in history and politics, and endeavours by a politico-philosophical argument to present the contemporary situation in its historical perspective. Thus he hopes to evolve a conception of Citizenship. Even within these limits the attempts are sporadic and in the hands of a very few enthusiastic teachers.

Isolated efforts to tackle the problem are indicative of a growing desire to organise the material of citizenship teaching. But the best way is through the film which aims to bring alive the real drama latent in every day life. For the sociologist it is the means of bringing alive the people to the people. It has the advantage over the lecture system, or the Classroom system, of providing not merely the best alternative to actual experience, but something which is in itself a complete experience of actuality.

Film is that supple instrument which can not only transcribe and recreate the facts of the time but can interpret the spirit of the time. Film is the instrument with which we may bridge the gap between the technique of the classroom and the new demands of the contemporary essential.



News and Views

[A monthly record of News and Views relating to Cultural and Academic Institutions, Events and Movements in India and outside.]

Wardha Scheme of Education in Bombay

The Government of Bombay have decided to undertake experiments relating to the Wardha Scheme of Education. Three compact areas each comprising of ten to fifteen villages have been selected to start about 20 schools for the purpose. Beginning will be made in June next with the first two standards of primary education.

Information to this effect was given by Mr. L. R. Desai, Special Officer for basic education, at a meeting of the New Education Fellowship held in Bombay in connection with the All-India Educational Conference.

Military Training

The need for the introduction of compulsory military training in all secondary schools and colleges in India was emphasised by a resolution passed at the fifth session of the All-Assam Aided High Schools Teachers' Conference, Mr. Debeswar Sarmia, M.L.A., Chief Whip of the Assam Congress Party, presiding.

Arab Students in Berlin

A report states that over 100 Arab students are at present enrolled in the High School for Politics, one of the Nazi Party academics in Berlin. They receive scholarships from the State, and it is further alleged that they are coached in anti-British propaganda and in pan-Arab ideas and sent to all parts of the world, even to America and England, as well as to Palestine and other parts of Arabia.

Basic Education in Orissa

After a visit by the sub-committee of the Basic Education Committee to various places in the province for the selection of suitable places for the establishment of schools under the Wardha scheme, the Committee at their meeting decided to establish the first experimental schools in the Bari area.

Altogether 25 schools, ten with seven classes and fifteen with four classes each, will be established to serve an area of about 25 to 30 square miles with a population of about 40,000. A teachers' training school will also be established in the area to train teachers in the system. Compulsory primary education for children of school-going age will also be introduced in the area.

Pushtu in Afghanistan and N.-W.F.P.

In view of the recent decision of the Frontier Congress Ministry to introduce Pushtu as the medium of instruction in Pushtu-speaking areas of the N.-W.F.P., it is learnt that similar steps are being taken by the Afghan Government to make Pushtu the future language of Afghanistan. A number of papers and weeklies are at present published in Pushtu but the official language of Afghanistan is still Persian. The main difficulty for the universalisation of Pushtu as a written language and as a medium of instruction in schools, is the absence of Pushtu text-books and the difficulty of Pushtu printing. This difficulty is henceforth to be removed by the Government and the Afghan Ministry of Education has already made arrangements for the publication at Kabul of preliminary text-books for the primary classes. The simultaneous introduction of Pushtu in the schools of the Frontier and Afghanistan will link up these two neighbouring countries more intimately.

Dacca University

The subject of establishing a Faculty of Agriculture in the University of Dacca with the co-operation of the Bengal Agricultural Institute (the foundation-stone of which was recently laid in Manipal Farm) was discussed in a small conference in Calcutta towards the end of January last.

It was attended by two representatives of the Dacca University, two representatives of the Education Department, two representatives of the Department of Agriculture and one representative of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research.

Proposed Medical College for Dacca

It is understood that the Expert Committee appointed by the Government of Bengal to examine the scheme for the proposed conversion of the Dacca Medical School into a Medical College under the Dacca University will soon begin to function.

Primary Education in Kashmir.

Prof. K. G. Saiyidin, Education Director, Kashmir, and a member of the Wardha Education Committee, was going to Patna to attend a meeting of the Bihar Educational Reorganisation Committee.

Asked about the progress of primary education in Kashmir, Prof. Saiyidin said that they were at present training one hundred teachers who would be sent to the new schools to be opened from the next session in July. These schools would be run on the principles of the Wardha scheme.

It is understood that Dr. Zakir Hussain and Prof. Saiyidin will shortly issue a joint statement on the charges made against the Wardha scheme on the platform of the Patna session of the Muslim League.

Vice-Chancellors' Salary

As a measure of economy it is understood that the U.P. Finance Sub-Committee has recommended to the Government that the Vice-Chancellors of the Lucknow and Allahabad Universities should draw a monthly salary of Rs. 500 each. Various departments are being further tapped with a view to effecting further retrenchment in the general cost of provincial administration without impairing efficiency of work.

Hostel for Women at Allahabad

The ceremony of laying the foundation stone of the Women's Hostel, attached to the University of Allahabad, was performed by Mrs. V. L. Pandit, Minister for Local Self-Government, United Provinces.

The Vice-Chancellor said that Allahabad University had recently spent about Rs. 2,50,000 on providing a residence for girl students studying in the University. The University would now be able to provide, with the completion of this hostel, residence for 110 girl students.



Miscellany

A SHORTCOMING OF THE HEGEL-MARXIAN DIALECTIC

There is no finality in creative disequilibrium. The dialectic of revolution knows no ultimate synthesis. Both Marx and his guru Hegel are incomplete, partial and, therefore, fallacious in their philosophical interpretations of the world-process or the evolution of the human Geist (spirit). Their analysis of the societal trends does not reach far enough and is marked by a palpable shortcoming. Hegel's position is entirely fallacious when in his *Philosophy of Religion* (1832) his dialectic stops at Christianity as the terminus of man's religious experiences or discoveries. His logic of evolution has failed to envisage any "creative disequilibrium" after the birth or development of the Christ-cult. Equally imperfect as a guide of cultural evolution is the Marxist thesis in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), nay, in Lenin's *State and Revolution* (1917). The Marx-Lenin hypothesis comes down to the alleged "withering away of the state" and the "proletarian revolution." There are no indications in the Marx-Lenin gospel as to the eventual developments of creative disequilibrium in the realm of the human spirit and the societal achievements after the annihilation or automatic dissolution of the state. The proletarian revolution is taken to be the last word in man's progressive march.

The Marx-Leninian analysis is as unacceptable as the Hegelian. The spirit of man cannot by any means be taken ever to attain its final or absolute stage. The logic of the spirit must have to admit the infinite and unlimited possibilities of new revolutions undoing the shortcomings of the older revolutions. The last term in the series of spiritual progression is not an item of human destiny. It is never likely to come.

Human nature is such that man's welfare is always to be in crisis. There is to be no peace while there is progress and there can be no progress while there is peace. Peace in progress is as great a contradiction in terms as progress in peace. The logic of human history must have to postulate a crisis after crisis, a disharmony after disharmony, the continuous series of conflicts and challenges to the status quo at every so-called synthesis. It is but the privilege of man that his freedom is perpetually in crisis, his democracy is never without a crisis, and that his socialism cannot afford to be without a crisis at every turn.

Lenin's dialectic failed to visualize the crisis after the synthesis embodied in the proletarian revolution. But what he failed as a speculator to foresee or indicate he experienced in his practical life as the architect and statesman of that revolution. The crisis of the proletarian revolution, bolshevism, sovietism, communism or proletarian dictatorship was experienced by him from 1918 to 1921. And so came the creative disequilibrium once more into evidence. And that is embodied in the New Economic Policy of 1922. This is a revolution after the revolution of 1917. It embodies a challenge to the communist synthesis of *The State and Revolution*.

Whatever has been happening in Soviet Russia since 1922 has been in the main but a challenge to that last word, finality or absolute. And this is in keeping with the correct dialectic of progress.

BENGY KUMAR SARKAR

DEMO-DESPOTOCRACY, NEO-DEMOCRACY AND NEO-DESPOTISM

The category demo-despotocracy must not be confounded with the category neo-despotism or neo-democracy. In the present analysis every political form is to be taken as from the nature of the case demo-despotic. Political evolution has to be envisaged as but a series of demo-despotocracies in motion. But no two successive demo-despotocracies are likely to be identical in the contents of the democratic or despotic factors.

In regard to the question of the differentiation of types in polity it should be appropriate to use the language of C. G. Jung, namely, that "every individual possesses both mechanism, extraversion as well as introversion, and only the relative predominance of the one or the other determines the type."¹

The predominance of the democratic factors is well calculated to render the polity relatively democratic while that of the other factors relatively despotic. Although all polities are fundamentally demo-despotic certain will be formally taken as despotic and certain others as democratic. In case, then, a previous despotic type is somewhat substantially modified by the impact of democratic tendencies the type that subsequently emerges would be characterized as neo-despotic. Every category with a "neo" is to be understood as representing a term in a chronological series which is the result of modifications injected into something that went before. Neither neo-democracy nor neo-despotism can, therefore, be identical with demo-despotocracy which is the natural condition of every polity. Neo-democracy is demo-despotic no less than neo-despotism. But each indicates that certain changes have taken place between two points of time. The demo-despotocracies of Bolshevik Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, for example, are to be called neo-despotic (although by all means demo-despotic) because old despotic forms have in these instances been profoundly modified by subsequent democratic features.

The gradualness of realization or the achievement by degrees as a mark of the human destiny is well described by Hocking as follows: "At the basis of the psychology of history must be set the law of slowly increasing sensitivity and discrimination. It is only by degrees that men become self-conscious; it is only by degrees that they become individual persons. History proceeds under a veil of semi-consciousness. The human mind is never fully awake."²

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

SOCIAL-CAPITALISM AS THE FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC REALITY

About the duality or pluralism of every personality we may be convinced from the economic activities also. *Homo Oeconomicus* is neither exclusively capitalistic nor exclusively socialistic. It is interesting that, historically speaking the first Factory Act in England belongs to the almost first days of the factory establishments. The intervention of the state or *étatism* as well as individual liberty in business enterprise has been almost

¹ *Psychological Types* (London, 1933), p. 10.

² *The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and Rights* (New Haven, 1936), p. 39.

coeval. The economic *Gestalt* knows at every stage what may be called *laissez-faire-etatism* or *étatistic laissez-fairism* but never a pure *laissez faire* or pure *étatisme*. This is but another way of saying that economic reality is a series of capitalistic socialisms or socialistic capitalisms from beginning to end. At no point is it possible to detect a hundred per cent capitalism untouched or unmodified by socialism or a hundred per cent socialism supremely indifferent to the impacts of capitalism. Corresponding to the eternal demo-despotocracy of political psychology there is the eternal social-capitalism of economic relations. Neo-socialism and neo-capitalism are also parallel economic categories to match the political neo-democracy and neo-despotism. "Neo" in economic matters has to be understood in the same sense as in political, i.e., with reference to the impacts of time on old values.

We have discovered a more or less allied neo-socialistic *Gestalt* in the economics of Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, although the first is formally known to be antipodal to the other two. It is interesting to observe that *Le Front Populaire* of France under the Leon Blum ministry (1936) likewise inaugurated a socio-economic planning which contentually is nothing but neo-socialism. The social-capitalistic or capital-socialistic structure of France underwent a tremendous transformation towards *étatisme* or state control. *

RENOY KUMAR SARKAR

DUALISM IN LAW

The duality or pluralism of the human *psyche* is likewise equally obvious in the reactions of man to law. The legal sense of man can be analyzed from entirely two different ways. From one standpoint man obeys law because as a moral agent of Kant man's inherent nature compels him to obey it. On the other hand it is possible to argue that law is obeyed because it is imposed upon him by an external sanction, that of the state.

In the ethico-metaphysical analysis of law, it is something uncreated. It exists as a part of universal human conscience and is taught by a natural reason. Or perhaps it exists as a custom among the people. Among the ancient Hindus this kind of analysis is to be found in the *Upanishads*, the law-books of Apastamba, Manu, Yajñavalkya and others. From the European side may be cited the Greek Demosthenes, Plato and Aristotle, the Roman Cicero, Seneca and Gaius, the Teutonic customary law-books and the medieval Church Fathers.

In this conception law is the sovereign authority. The state like everything else is subordinate to law. In recent times Duguit has gone so far as to say that if there be such a thing as sovereignty it must be limited by law (*L'Etat, le droit objectif, la loi positive*, 1901). An equally radical proposition is to be found in Laband's *Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs* (1876) which says that the state can command its subjects in nothing except on the basis of a legal prescription. A more extreme position is taken by Krabbe who maintains that law is the only ruling power (*Die moderne Staatsidee*, 1915).

A diametrically opposite concept of law has likewise been prevalent in human thought for ages. The Hindu Kautalya, Narada, Sukra, Jaimini and

* B. K. Sarkar: "The New Labour Laws and Socio-Economic Planning in France" and "Stalin as the Manager of Leninism No. II," in the *Calcutta Review* for June, 1937 and September, 1938.

Yajñavalkya may be referred to as exponents of the view that law is created by the state. In this analysis law is obeyed not because it is good or just or eternal but because it has been enacted by the state. Among European upholders of this conception are to be mentioned Bodin, Hobbes and Austin. Exponents of this view are naturally believers in the sovereignty of the state. This is the politico-positive theory of law.

It is questionable, however, whether in every instance one can vouch that man is exclusively ethico-metaphysical (Kantian) or exclusively politico-positive (Austinian). To believe that man obeys law simply because of the fear of punishment is as unreasonable as to admit that law would be followed for no other reason than the instinctive reaction to the majesty of law, the call of conscience, the categorical imperative. We shall be more within the region of probability if we accept that the human psyche in general is the theatre of both these drives, the internal as well as the external.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

DVANDVYAS OR CONFLICTS IN THE PSYCHE

Although a thorough-going Hegelian even Kohler in his *Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie* (Textbook of the Philosophy of Law), 1900, admits the existence of the irrational as an element in life and society. According to him history is not a logical process, it is full of irrationality and lapses. "Unreason and brutality operate side by side with wisdom and stability."¹

The dualities or dvandvas (i.e., conflicts), as known in Sanskrit, are observable in every domain of thought and activity. And indeed the history of culture exhibits under most diverse names the polarisms or antitheses of one sort or other, such as have been discovered by philosophers, poets and scientists. For instance, dichotomies like the medieval nominalism and realism, Heine's Platonic and Aristotelian natures, Schiller's naïve and sentimental poetry, Nietzsche's Apollonian dream and Dionysian frenzy, Jordan's active (less impassioned) and reflective (more impassioned), Spitteler's Promethean fore-thinker and Epimethean after-thinker and man of action, Worringer's empathy (feeling-into) and abstraction, and Ostwald's classic and romantic have been described and analyzed by Jung in *Psychological Types*, in order to examine to what extent his own pair of opposites, namely, the extravert and introvert, can be applicable in these historic instances. James's opposites are the following: (1) Tender-minded and tough-minded, (2) Rationalistic (going by principles) and empiricist (going by facts), (3) Intellectualistic and sensationalistic, (4) Idealistic and materialistic, (5) Optimistic and pessimistic, (6) Religious and irreligious, (7) Free-willist and fatalistic, (8) Monistic and pluralistic, (9) Dogmatical and sceptical. We may add here the duality injected into cultural and social achievements by Sorokin, namely, sensatism and ideationalism (although he has also a third item, idealism, which is taken to be a balance between the two).

In regard to all these dvandvas or conflicts and polarities in individual personality or collective character it would be untrue to reality were we to go away with the impression that individuals or groups are characterologically disposed wholly in one direction or other. Jung's position is acceptable

¹ W. E. Hocking: *The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights* (New Haven, U.S.A., 1906), p. 28.

which maintains that there can never occur a pure type in the sense that an individual is entirely possessed of the one mechanism with a complete atrophy of the other.¹

It is questionable if a genuine synthesis or harmonizing of the *dundas* is a fact in individual or societal complex. But in almost every instance a juxtaposition of the polarities or a modification of the one by the other is to be regarded as the feature of universal human experience. Mixtures and amalgams of romanticism with the classical disposition, of sensatism with idealism, the Apollonian with the Dionysian, the extraverted with the introverted are what we generally come across in the character-*Gestalt* of individuals or groups. The monist is as a rule multiplied by quite a few doses of pluralism and *vice versa*. Certain doses of reflectiveness are invariably to be found among the constituents of the activist disposition.

Among the exponents of the leading philosophical "isms," therefore, we find, as Hocking concludes his *Types of Philosophy* (New York, 1929), that not many are "perfectly typical." Spencer, for instance, is not a "pure naturalist," for he believes that "there is a reality though unknowable, beyond or behind nature." Dualism can be ascribed to Plato, and yet he is an idealist because "he describes matter as a certain sort of non-existence." As regards Aristotle, he is a realist by all means and yet his metaphysics is idealistic. And again, "divergent lines of thought go out from Socrates, all claiming their rootage in that great character; and the same may be said for Descartes, Kant, Hegel." In William James, finally, it is hardly possible to find any system. Idealism, realism, pragmatism and mysticism, "all co-existed without achieving a final consistency." None of these thinkers can be contained in an "ism." They defy classification.

Toennies's dichotomy—*Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society)—points likewise to an abstraction. He himself treats this polarity or *dundas* as artificial or even arbitrary. All the forces of "society" remain in close connection with their "community" basis, with the historical forms of living and acting together. He speaks of the epoch of society (marked by the social will of convention, politics and public opinion) as following the epoch of community (marked by the social will of feeling custom and religion). But there is a tendency for the community during the epoch of community to tend towards the society. On the other hand during the epoch of society also the community continues to exist although somewhat in decline so that the "reality of social life" may be maintained.² Here, as in other instances, the empiric or factual reality is an amalgam.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

VON WIESE'S THEORY OF THE STATE

In L. von Wiese's *System der Allgemeinen Soziologie*³ (System of General Sociology) the state is the conceivably most general and empty form of *Zusammenleben* (collective life) such as is established with a long period view. It is a *Gebilde* (social form) in whose empty concave surface

¹ *Psychological Types* (London, 1909), p. 13.

² Toennies: *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 6th ed. 1935), pp. 251-52; L. von Wiese and H. Becker: *Systematic Sociology* (New York, 1933), pp. 21-22, 319-20.

³ Published by Duncker und Humblot, Munich and Leipzig, 1933, Second Edition, 690 pages, Price 20 Reichs marks.

it is possible to place contents the most diverse, varying and capable of development. It is that *Status* which is present wherever the collective life of persons and groups with varying degrees of strength is to be maintained for a long period.

It is, however, conceivable that human beings can live without a state or the consciousness of a state in a *zwangsreichen Gemeinschaft* (Community without force). Besides, even the most extremely developed state of the Incas cannot possibly cover the *ganzen Menschen* (whole man). In modern times also many artists, literary persons, research scholars, business men, and especially women are hardly conscious of the state. It is only during the Great War that the frightful pressure and power of the state came for the first time into the consciousness of such persons. The omnipotence of the state brought about by the war cast them into total confusion and insecurity. The only relief out of this disaster they discovered in the worship of this super-personal *Ungefuhr* (monster).

The preface in von Wiese's treatise bears the date January 1, 1933. The totalitarian Hitler-state was in its birth throes about this time. But the totalitarian states in Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy had long been functioning. It is, therefore, interesting that the treatise makes no reference to the state as flourishing under totalitarianism.

In any case, he is ready to concede that the state is a necessity in order that the struggles between persons of differing natural capacities may be regulated. He does not believe that the struggles may be altogether removed. They can only be regulated. The other side of the shield also is made clear by von Wiese at the same time. Although the state is a necessary institution its *Zwangsgewalt* (power of compulsion) serves to keep the differences between men intact. Besides, it prevents the development of the fruitful inner forces of love and freedom.

DEBOY KUMAR SARKAR

EAST AND WEST IN SOCIAL THOUGHT FROM LORE TO SCIENCE

Harry Barnes and Howard Becker's *Social Thought from Lore to Science*¹ has come out in two volumes: Vol. I.—A History and Interpretation of Man's Ideas about Life with his Fellows; Vol. II.—Sociological Trends throughout the World. In the first of these two monumental volumes a chapter is given over to the social thought of the Ancient Far East (China and India) and another chapter to the Ancient Near East (Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt and Syria). The second volume deals with the sociologists of the twentieth century and contains a chapter on sociological writings in contemporary India, China and Japan, as well as a section on the Turkish sociologists of to-day. These facts are of capital importance in the intellectual and cultural and perhaps also political relations between East and West.

The treatment of Asian thought by Western scholars in the perspective of Eur-American ideologies, even for ancient and medieval periods, was few and far between, except perhaps in Hegelian treatises which wanted dialectically to demonstrate that the East had been but a stage in the evolution of progress whose summit is alleged to be represented by the West. In professionally Orientalist literature ancient and medieval Asia constituted and

¹ Published by D. C. Heath & Co. Boston—Volume I, 900 pages, Volume II, 450 pages.

constitutes naturally the chief topic. And anthropologists, ethnologists or sociologists used as a rule to make a promenade in the East with a view ostensibly to getting an all-world view but really to collecting specimens of primitive and savage life. In any case Eur-American scholarship down to 1905, the point at which Young Asia emerges to assert the claims of Asia's equality with Europe, was obsessed by the conception of nothingness of Asian ideas. We exclude from these remarks the rather ultra-appreciative sentiments of the German romanticists in regard to the Orient (c. 1780-1830).

The highest that Western scholarship was capable of in this line of presenting Oriental thought in a general survey of world-thought is perhaps to be seen in Janet's *Histoire de la science politique* (Paris, 1887), in the background of which work the studies presented by Barnes and Becker should be appraised as embodying a cultural re-making of no mean order. For one thing, although Barnes and Becker are still under the misleading influence of Max Weber's *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*¹ (Tübingen, 1922) in regard to the interpretations of Hinduism and Buddhism, they have tried to be objective enough so as to furnish a humanistic picture of Asia's contributions in the past. In this respect they have had a brilliant precursor in Sorokin whose *Social Mobility* (New York, 1927) and *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, 1928) as well as *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York, 1937) have sought at every point to place old China, India and Persia in the milieu of "insolent Greece and haughty Rome."

Be it observed that Barnes and Becker have gone farther than Sorokin by according a place to modern Asia by the side of modern Eur-America. It is patent that East and West have been deliberately and as a matter of self-conscious scientific discipline placed on the same platform for the purposes of investigation and comparison. It is not necessary to go into details or critically evaluate the results achieved, especially since the authors have depended on secondary sources and reports sent by correspondents. The very spirit is noteworthy pointing as it does inevitably to the expansion of liberalism in American scientific circles engendered to a certain extent perhaps by the incessant demand for equality in diverse fields from the side of Young Asia since 1905. The two-volume work of Barnes and Becker can be regarded as a sign of *rapprochement* between East and West fraught with immense possibilities even in the practical lines and is likely to be followed up by others more intensively as well as extensively.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.

¹ Max Weber's interpretation of Confucianism is also nothing but conventional, as the data in the present author's *Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes* (Shanghai, 1916) would indicate.

Reviews and Notices of Books

Platonic Ideas in Spenser by Mohinimohan Bhattacharjee, M.A., Ph.D.
Longmans.

Dr. Bhattacharjee has already made a name for himself as a student of Spenser by his "Studies in Spenser" which were published some time ago by the University of Calcutta. This new book is part of the result of his studies during a recent visit to the West, and it gives ample evidence of careful scholarship and painstaking and exhaustive research into the large body of Spenserian criticism and also the literature of Platonism and the French and Italian mediaeval poets.

Critics have been considerably puzzled by the blending of the ideas of Aristotle and of Plato in the *Puerie Queen*, partly because Spenser himself set out a scheme for his allegory in his dedicatory epistle to Raleigh which cannot be reconciled with the plan of the poem as it was actually written. This problem is treated in an illuminating way by Dr. Bhattacharjee, who shows how the thought of Aristotle which influenced the poet in his younger days gave place to that of Plato and also of the Neo-Platonists. He also criticises convincingly the views of some of the leading scholars on Book I of the *Puerie Queen*, showing how Spenser blends the Christian idea of Holiness as a moral virtue with the Platonic conception of Reason. In the later chapters he traces the influence of Neo-Platonic ideas in the *Hymns* and the *Amoretti*.

Prof. Emile Legouis in his foreword justly says: "Eastern scholars now bring in trained minds to inquiries and controversies which had till recently been monopolised by the West. For one expects much from their collaboration."

C. S. MILFORD

Narayana Sataka of Vidyakara Purohita with the Sanskrit Commentary of Pīlāmbara Kavicandra (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LXXI). Edited with an English Introduction and Notes by Pandit Srikānta Sarman. Published by Dr. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, Director, Oriental Institute, Baroda. First Edition, 1935. pp. 16+91. Board-bound. Price Rs. 2.

The learned Editor of the work under review states in his preface that his elder brother the late Mahamahopādhyāya Pandit Rāmāvatāra Sarman, in course of his search for Manuscripts of Sanskrit works, had come across at Puri three hitherto unpublished Sanskrit Manuscripts, viz., (1) the Nārāyaṇa-Sataka of Vidyākara, (2) the Bhārataṃpā of Divākara and (3) the Guṇḍicā-Sataka of Cakrapāṇi Paṭṭanāyaka—all in Oriya character. In the introduction, the learned Editor further states that from Divākara's Bhārataṃpā he has been able to gather the following facts about the author of the present work: Vidyākara was a brother of Divākara who flourished in the first half of the 16th century A.D. He composed Nārāyaṇa-Sataka under the patronage of Kṛṣṇa Rāya, a Vaiṣṇava king of Karpūṭa (d. 1530 A.D.) and named it after his teacher and uncle Nārāyaṇa Kaviratna. He belonged to a family of Vājasaneyin Brāhmaṇas of Bharadvāja Gotra of Orissa. His father's name was Vaidyeśvara and his mother was Muktā by name.

The present work is in the form of a Sanskrit hymn composed in honour of Lord Nārāyaṇa and consists of one hundred verses in Śṛṅgharā metre. Some of the stanzas of the Śataka do really exhibit heights of poetical fancy and are superb in construction and depth of meaning. The Sanskrit Commentary of Śrī Pitāmbara Miśra Kavicandra seems to be an old work, though the exact date of the Commentator could not be fixed.

The English Introduction and Notes by the learned Editor are short but illuminating. We hope, the energetic Director of the Oriental Institute of Baroda will undertake the publication of the works of Divākara and Cakrapāṇi as well.

A. S.

Hints on Museum Education—By J. C. Basak. Published by the author at 383, Upper Chitpore Road, Calcutta. 282 Pages. Price Re. 1.

During the last half century considerable changes have been brought about in the domain of educational theories, ideals and methods. That education alone is regarded as perfect which gives the educands *physically* the use of their hands, *mentally*, instills a spirit of research and inquiry in them, and *morally*, makes them see and appreciate the other peoples' point of view. And in my opinion, no other form of education is better calculated to achieve the first two of the above objects, *viz.*, those of teaching the utility of hands and imparting the fact-finding spirit and power of investigation than 'education through museums.'

Museum Education, as the author says, is a somewhat novel idea, especially, in our country. It is the diffusion of general knowledge by means of what are called *Educational Museums*, as distinguished from the existing *Public Museums*. The *Public Museums* are generally the store-houses of objects and relics whose public utility and educative value are very small. They have been founded with a different object. An educational museum, properly so called, on the other hand, should contain exhibits covering all departments of life, with special emphasis on the modern arts and sciences, and important industries and discoveries—all arranged and classified in such a manner that they may be examined at close quarters, and actually handled under the supervision and guidance of a competent guide or instructor.

So far as educational utility is concerned the old and antiquated types of Public Museums have not done much. We can establish Educational Museums in their places. The older type of Public Museums does little more than provide employment to a few and instructions almost to none. Their chief object is the mere display of their stocks, and not imparting knowledge to the visitors. Consequently they do not seek the co-operation of educational institutions, and do they nor consult them with regard to their requirements. And they measure their utility only by the number of their visitors; they take pride in their collection and preservation of arts, crafts, and relics of antiquity, animals, geological and ethnological specimens, and so on. In making these collections, they ignore the claims of the subjects of vital importance such as Eugenics, Maternity, Child-welfare, Dietary, Temperature, Health and Hygiene, etc.

The book under review is an appeal to all educationists, specially the heads of institutions for the establishment of *Educational Museums* at all

important centres of education, as integral parts of schools and colleges. The author has given concrete suggestions based on practical experience for the achievement of the ideal. There is no doubt that the scheme, if put into effect, will broaden the general outlook of our students as well as of other visitors to such museums, and will counteract the evils of *bookish habits* which are so common with our pupils. Education should thoroughly be practical and should concern itself with things of every-day life, such as health, diet, industries and, in general, the world around us.

Another vital problem which engages the attention of our countrymen at the present moment is the spreading of education amongst the *illiterate masses*. And in the pages of this book, Mr. Basak has hinted how an all-round education may be brought within the reach of the masses by means of such educational museums very effectively and at the same time economically. We know very well the modern psychological theory that education can very speedily be imparted by means of *visible representation*. And the writer has described how such Museums can offer ample scope for the training of the visual, tactual and other sensations on the part of the scholars.

The subjects dealt with in a scientific manner and the classification of exhibits for the Museum is exhaustive and based on the latest findings of Educational Psychology. Such educational museums, when materialised, will be a powerful means of imparting education in the quickest possible time and in the most interesting manner. The general get-up and treatment of the book are satisfactory. On the whole it will be instructive and useful both to teachers and to laymen. And all those who are specially interested in the aids to teaching will do well to go through the pages of this valuable publication by one experienced in the art.



K. K. MOOREJEE

Ourselves

[I. The late Dr. B. Ramchandra Rao.—II. The late Mr. R. O. Raha.—III. Career Lectures.—IV. Vernacular under New Regulations.—V. Tagore Professor of Law for 1939.—VI. Facilities of Post-Graduate Study for Indians at Sydney University.—VII. Candidate Selected for Research Scholarship offered by Royal Commissioners for London Exhibition of 1951.—VIII. New Prizes for Girl Students.—IX. Nomination of Ordinary Fellows.—X. Election of Ordinary Fellows by the Faculties.—XI. University Representative on the Board of Scientific Research.—XII. Prabashi Banga Sahitya Sammilan.—XIII. The Indian School Sports Association.—XIV. A New D.Sc.]

I. THE LATE DR. B. RAMCHANDRA RAO

Dr. B. Ramchandra Rao, M.A., PH.D., who had been for many years a Lecturer in Economics in the Post-Graduate Department of our University, passed away unexpectedly at his residence in Vizagapatam on January 18 last at the early age of forty-five. A teacher and scholar of wide repute, he was the author of several works on Banking and Currency, which was the subject he taught in the University. Shortly before his death he had returned from Geneva where he was sent by the University to make a special study of certain economic problems of international importance. His death is deeply mourned in the University by teachers and students alike.

We convey our sincere condolences to the bereaved family.

II. THE LATE MR. R. O. RAHA

Mr. R. O. Raha, M.A., BARRISTER-AT-LAW, University Inspector of Hostels and Messes, died at the Medical College Hospital on Monday, the 16th January last.

Mr. Raha, who was a Christian by faith, had long been connected with the Y. M. C. A. in India, assuming charge of a hostel in 1920 built at the expense of the Indian Association and the Y. M. C. A. to accommodate ex-detenus. Later on, he proceeded to the United Kingdom where he acted for some time as Secretary of the Indian Students' Hostel in London. He also qualified himself for the Bar and, on return to India, practised for a while as an Advocate in the Calcutta High Court, but he soon gave up the profession and joined the Y. M. C. A. once again, being placed in charge of their Delhi

Branch. Mr. Raha afterwards accepted the position of Inspector of Hostels and Messes under the University, which he held until his death. He enjoyed much popularity among teachers and students with whom he had constantly to come in touch as Inspector of Hostels and Messes. The University has lost in him an able officer whom it would not be easy to replace.

* * *

III. CAREER LECTURES

The University Appointments Board has organised a series of 'career lectures' with the co-operation of the leading businessmen of Calcutta to attract young men to commercial and industrial vocations.

The series was inaugurated by Sir P. C. Ray on January 9 last by an address in which he dealt with the position of Bengal with reference to her trade, industry and commerce. It is proposed to continue the series with the assistance of twenty-four experts, Indian as well as European, who will lecture on 'Jute,' 'Coal,' 'Tea,' 'Insurance,' 'Banking' and similar other subjects, often one subject being divided between two speakers so that a better guidance may be ensured.

The object of these lectures is, as Dr. S. P. Mookerjee, the former Vice-Chancellor of the University, suggested when the Appointments Board was organised in 1937, to offer to the students full and reliable information regarding the scope which university-trained youngmen will find in the different industries for their employment.

Printed summaries of the lectures have been prepared, to be distributed before they are delivered, to enable the students to follow them closely. The lectures are being broadcast by the All-India Radio, so that all who wish may enjoy their benefit even when they cannot be present at the meeting personally.

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IV. VERNACULAR UNDER NEW REGULATIONS

The style and form of Vernacular in papers other than Bengali at the Matriculation Examination to be held under the New Regulations will be the subject of discussion at a Conference of Government and University representatives which will meet towards the end of January.

The following gentlemen have been nominated by Government to take part in the deliberations of this Conference :

Dr. W. A. Jenkins, D.Sc., I.B.S.
 Khan Bahadur M. Maula Baksh, B.A.
 Khan Bahadur S. M. Murshed
 Mr. A. K. Chanda, M.A., I.B.S.
 Mr. K. D. Ghosh, M.A.
 Mr. J. Lahari, M.A., B.T.
 Mr. Gulam Mustapha, B.A., B.T.
 Maulana M. Akram Khan, M.L.C.

The representatives of the University on the Conference are :

The Hon'ble the Vice-Chancellor
 Syamaprasad Mookerjee, Esq., M.A., B.L., D.LITT.,
 BARRISTER-AT-LAW, M.L.A.
 Khan Bahadur Tasadduq Ahmad, B.A., B.T., M.B.C.
 Prof. Phanindranath Ghosh, M.A. PH.D. SC.D., F.INST.P.
 „ Surendranath Sen, M.A., PH.D., B.LITT. (Oxon.)
 „ Suniti Kumar Chatterji, M.A., D.LIT.
 Charuchandra Bhattacharyya, M.A.
 Humayun Z. A. Kabir, Esq., M.A. (Oxon.)

V. TAGORE PROFESSOR OF LAW FOR 1939

Sir A. Krishnaswami Ayyar, Advocate General of Madras, was appointed Tagore Professor of Law by the Senate at its meeting held on the 28th January last. He will deliver a course of lectures on "The Law Relating to Statutory and other Powers."

VI. FACILITIES OF POST-GRADUATE STUDY FOR INDIANS AT SYDNEY UNIVERSITY

The Vice-Chancellor, University of Sydney, New South Wales, has conveyed the information that his University has decided to offer free studentships to three Indian students annually for facilitating their Post-Graduate study at the University of Sydney.

Our University has acknowledged the information with thanks and has submitted a copy of the letter received from Sydney University

to the Secretary, Inter-University Board, India, who would hold all correspondence in future on the subject.

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VII. CANDIDATE SELECTED FOR RESEARCH SCHOLARSHIP OFFERED BY ROYAL COMMISSIONERS FOR LONDON EXHIBITION OF 1851

The University has recommended Sreemati Biva Majumdar, M.A., for the Annual Research Scholarship offered by the Royal Commissioners for the London Exhibition of 1851. Mrs. Majumdar passed the M. A. examination of this University in Applied Mathematics in 1933, standing second in the First Class and was awarded the Premchand Roychand Studentship for 1937 for her work in Astrophysics. She is Professor of Mathematics at the Victoria Institution, Calcutta.

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VIII. NEW PRIZES FOR GIRL STUDENTS

Mr. Harendranath Pathak of Baruipur has offered to place at the disposal of the University the sum of Rs. 600 in 3½ per cent G. P. Notes, out of which two prizes are to be awarded annually in the name of his deceased daughter, Jyotsna Pathak, B.A. One of these prizes will go to the candidate who scores the highest number of marks in English at the Matriculation Examination from certain girls' schools specified by the donor. The other prize will be awarded to the female candidate who passes the I.A. examination with the highest number of marks in Sanskrit.

The offer has been accepted with thanks.

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IX. NOMINATION OF ORDINARY FELLOWS

Mr. K. Zacharia, M.A. (Oxon.), has been nominated an Ordinary Fellow of the University vice Mr. Jitendralal Banerjee, M.A., B.L., and has been attached to the Faculty of Arts. Mr. W. C. Wordsworth, M.A., M.L.A., Lt.-Col., E. W. O'G., Kirwan, M.Sc., M.D., I.M.S. and Mr. Birendra Nath Mookerjee, M.A. (Cantab.), M.I.E. (Ind.), have

been re-nominated to be Ordinary Fellows of the University, and have been attached respectively to the Faculty of Arts, the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Engineering.

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X. ELECTION OF ORDINARY FELLOWS BY THE FACULTIES

Dr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee, M.A., B.L., BARRISTER-AT-LAW, D.LITT., M.L.A., and Mr. Jogesh Chandra Chakravorti were elected to the Senate by the Faculty of Arts. Dr. Mookerjee, whose re-election takes effect from the 30th January, has been attached to the Faculties of Arts and Law and Mr. Chakravorti to the Faculty of Arts.

Professor Himadrikumar Mookerjee, D.SC. (Lond.), D.I.C., was duly elected an Ordinary Fellow of the University by the Faculty of Science. Lalitmohan Banerjee, Esq., M.S., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), was duly elected an Ordinary Fellow of the University by the Faculty of Medicine. The new Fellows have been attached respectively to the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Medicine.

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XI. UNIVERSITY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Professor Phanindranath Ghosh, M.A., PH.D., SC.D., F.INST.P., Head of the Department of Applied Physics, has been nominated by the University to serve on the Board of Scientific Research for the Industries Department, which has been recently organised on an experimental basis for a period of two years.

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XII. PRABASHI BANGA SAHITYA SAMMILAN

The 16th session of the Prabashi Banga Sahitya Sammilan was held in Gauhati from the 27th to the 30th December, 1938. Rai Bahadur Professor Khagendranath Mitra, M.A., was appointed a delegate by the University to this Conference.

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XIII. THE INDIAN SCHOOL SPORTS ASSOCIATION

A Provincial School Championship is being organised by the Indian School Sports Association (Bengal) where boys from mofussil schools are expected to take part. The function will take place this month. The sum of Rs. 250 has been sanctioned by the University towards the cost of holding the Championship meeting.

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XIV. A NEW D.Sc.

Mr. Jagannath Gupta, M.Sc., has been admitted to the Degree of Doctor of Science on the strength of a thesis he submitted entitled "Investigations on the Structure of Molecules."

We offer our congratulations to Dr. Gupta.





HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE SIR MICHAEL HERBERT RUDOLF KNATCHBULL,
BARON BRABOURNE, M.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., J.P.

Born
May 8, 1895.

Died
Feb. 23, 1930.



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

MARCH, 1939

LAND TENURES IN SOUTH INDIA

SIR A. P. PATRO, K.C.I.E., Kt.

AT the present moment the subject which is of great importance in the country and which affects the vital welfare of rural population is the relationship between the landlord and the tenant and the incidence of land tax and rent. The system of Land Tax prevails in all the provinces and districts under the Ryotwari Settlement. The latter is known as Ryoti System adopted in the permanently Settled Estates in South India. The Government of the country conferred security of tenure and ownership of the holding on the cultivator of the land and granted him a Patta by which the cultivating ryot had a sort of freehold of the holding contained in the Patta, subject to his regular payment of revenue or land tax to the Sircar treasury. He could not be ejected at will. This is the Ryotwari System. According to Munro's scheme, the cultivated lands had to be surveyed and plotted and each plot or field numbered, and an assessment was fixed on the field which was arrived at with reference to the quality of the soil, nearness of the market and communications, and prices prevailing in the neighbourhood. In a summary way the capacity of the field for bearing the assessment was arrived at. Government divested itself of the proprietary right in the holding, the Pattadar became absolute owner

subject to regular payment of assessment. The Ryotwari settlement was liable to revision under Executive Orders of Government every thirty years for purposes of determining the real assessment corresponding to the rise of prices and improvement of the holding at the expense of Government. Standing Orders of the Revenue Board and the Revenue Code do not make any provision for remission of land tax proportionate to the fall of prices of produce. Remission could at discretion be granted if there was not an anna crop on the land. There was no limit for enhancement at re-settlements, by legislative rules. Executive Orders carried out the re-settlement. The central fact is that the issue of Patta to the cultivator carried with it the interest in the holding.

Permanent Settlement Regulation confirmed the Chiefs of the States they were in possession of even prior to the Mohamedan Rule under which they were in possession even as feudal Chiefs. The Inam Regulations and the Inam Settlement confirmed the right of ownership of the Inamdar in the village or villages. The Inamdars had the right and title before the Inam Settlement and this was only confirmed subject to payment of *shrotriem* and other duties. It should be noted, the cultivating ryot in Inams had no fixity of tenure or permanent occupancy rights till 1935 when Inams were defined as Estates in the Estates Land Act. This affords a key to the solution of the problem in Zamindaris. Prior to the Permanent Settlement, as in the case of Ryotwari Settlement in later years, a rough estimate of the income from the villages in the estate was made for purposes of arriving at *peiskush* payable to the Sircar, and then the whole area under the particular Chief was confirmed, his right and title. There was no estimate of the rent payable by individual cultivators. There was no individual survey and settlement. The total *jamma* of the village was furnished by the village headman. This was not necessary in this case as it was not intended to ascertain the incidence in the sharing system. In the *raram* rents in kind, the individual cultivators were entirely out of the picture. What was cared for was the probable *jamma* of the area and not of the liability of the cultivating ryot nor an estimate of his share of produce. He was, as it were, a serf under the orders of the Chief in the feudal tenure.

3. One of the important factors which influenced the determination of *jamma* was the services rendered by the Chiefs of the area. The Zamindars were to maintain peace and tranquillity in the area and protect the boundaries and to assist the Sircar with their services

with men and money when necessary. The old accounts of the Zamindaris show that they were maintaining a semi-military force. They had even to go with their irregular forces in aid of the Sircar at any time and put down all internal risings and rebellions. From the existing service grants recognised by Government of the day the Patros, Sirdars, Mokhasas; the Doratanams, the Naick and Paick Inams in the Circars, Rajus and Naidu Mokhasas of Kondaveedu or the Palygars in southern parts—all these various military holders were under these Chiefs. In the South, the function of the Zamindar was not merely collection of revenue but mainly the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in and out of their area. This was one of their outstanding functions. This class of Zamindars is different from the Capitalists who purchased Zamindaris and thus invested their capital as they do in Banks. This distinction should always be kept in view.

The country Ballads everywhere—as for example, Bobbili ballads, still current in rural areas by wandering minstrels—narrate the glorious deeds, feats of valour, courage displayed by the Chieftains and followers of the rival Chiefs in charge of the Estates. In the Kimidi, Kallikote, Surada, Ghunsoor, Vizianagaram, Bobbili, Jeypore and Krishna there are Mokhasas and Inams held by the Sirdars, Patros, Rajus, Doras, Naicks for rendering meritorious service to their Chiefs. These Chiefs were the feudal lords since the Mohammadan Rule. They were not created by the Permanent Settlement. It is a misunderstanding of the real situation and ignorance of history to term these Chiefs of Estates as mere rent collectors. In the adjoining Northern districts Orissa Feudatory Chiefs and States still continue. The country south of Rushikalya was more peaceful, while in the north the Chiefs remained as feudal or feudatory States. The British authorities found there was no regular revenue paid by any of the Chiefs in the Southern country, they maintained a large retinue of Sibbendi sepoys, naiks, etc., nevertheless they were held responsible for the Sircar's revenue. They easily showed nil balances and these Chiefs more often defied the Collector. Hence the British agents wanted to enter into a Permanent Settlement with these Chiefs to secure peace and tranquillity in the country and fixity of revenue. The Permanent Settlement created no new rights but only confirmed what the Chiefs enjoyed before under the Mohammadan Rule. The Chiefs were willing to enter into this engagement as they would be free from the oppressive demands of the Collectors and the

Chief would have his own way otherwise. There was no question of the cultivating ryot ever considered in the Scheme. All the forests, wastes and uncultivated lands, irrigation sources vested in the Chief, and the Company's Government gave a *Sannad* in confirmation of the right.

It is the spirit of the Permanent Settlement that we have to take into account. Regulation XXVIII of 1802 did not confer on or consider the rights of permanent occupancy or fixity of rent, much less a permanent settlement of rent payable by the tenant. It would have been very easy to pass a Regulation defining the rights and liabilities *inter se* if it was intended at all and fix the rent payable by the cultivator. Numerous Regulations relating to village organization were passed including the one for Karnams and Patta which could apply to Ryotwari areas as well. The absence of any such Regulation is proof positive that rents payable by ryots were not ascertained or determined in any of the preliminary steps taken before passing Regulation XXVIII of 1802. The Rent Recovery Act of 1869 is an unimpeachable item of evidence corroborating the above position. It is too much to say that the authors were ignorant of the conditions of Permanent Settlement.

Before we discuss this matter further, let us go back to the incidence of taxation in Ryotwari areas. For many years past, public men in India have been pressing for the revision of land assessment and for fixing the same by legislation without recourse to executive orders for re-settlement. The justice of this was conceded and the resolution of the Legislature in Madras, fixing that 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. should be the maximum rate of increase was adopted in 1934; still the amount of tax as it stands in case of districts which were re-settled prior to the said resolution, during the period between 1914 to 1929, is high and oppressive. It was an extraordinary period of high prices for land assessment. Land revenue was a Reserved Subject administered by irresponsible agency. The then Ministers had no effective control. The bureaucratic Government had their own way in spite of protests and censure motions. The prices have now fallen very low, the economic distress is severe in Ryotwari areas, more serious than in some Estates. The justice of the claim for revision of land assessments is further established by periodical occurrence of scarcity and famine, partly due to failure of monsoon and partly on account of heavy assessments made by Government. Life and living

have deteriorated. In the last five or six years Government have been granting remissions of land revenue at the rate of 50 or 70 lakhs of rupees a year. It is well known that the poor ryot receives no benefit under this.

The remission in the case of a five-rupee or ten-rupee Pattadar will be a rupee or two, and it will not go to him probably beyond the Karnam. There are 80% of these who pay an assessment of Rs. 10 or below. The economic enquiries were carried on twenty-five years ago. The book on "Studies in Rural Economics" published by me amply established the urgency of the problem. "Some South Indian Villages" published later by the University and the recent enquiries conducted under the supervision of Dr. Thomas, University Professor, and the report of a Special Officer to enquire into agricultural debts, establish the fact that, taking the Jail diet as a basis for living, the ryots in the Ryotwari villages are not able to secure even that. Times have changed, the power of relieving the situation now rests with popular representatives, it is their first and fundamental duty to take up this work instead of dabbling in ancient usages and practices in a disturbed period of the country to ascertain the rate of rent in 1802. The standard of living has become low and the purchasing power is reduced to a minimum; how could there be rural welfare and rural uplift when the economic outlook of the village is gloomy and despondent? An economic enquiry must precede the rent enquiry. What is the cause or special reason for the drastic or revolutionary policy towards Estates only, when the condition in Ryotwari areas demands more immediate attention? Will this question be taken up immediately?

It is said very often without the least understanding of the economic condition of the ryot that he should improve production of the holding, but that demands the possession of good cattle, improved manure, rotation of crops, easy marketing and cheap credit. How could he secure all these with a debt hanging heavy round his neck and heavy assessment payable to Government at an untimely period of the year when the prices of produce are low at harvest time. Even the old *kistbandhi* period is not changed by this Government. The ryots move in a vicious circle, not the assessment alone. There is also customary expenditure on ceremonies, demoralising practice of *Sahukar* and unemployment during a great part of the year. Cheap money is not available. To him, the rural co-operative societies

are only money-lending agencies run by "intermediaries" for their own benefit. If it reaches the ryot, it is at great sacrifice. To him the co-operative banks are a great failure and to some they are a danger, a temptation to borrow money which they cannot repay according to terms. The present state is also brought about by the ryots' extravagance during the period of boom. During that period he adopted a higher standard of life and living and his needs were multiplied, an artificial standard of life was created, and with the fall of prices of produce the crash came about. He had recourse to credit, debt and interest multiplied and threatened to swallow his holding. Remission of assessment did not materially help him. The application of a uniform method of distribution of remission on a percentage basis contributed little to relieve his economic distress. The economic conditions vary from district to district and taluq to taluq in the same district. Remission, even in affected areas, has not been an abiding relief. Government, therefore, should undertake to fix the principles of land revenue assessment on a permanent basis after making a thorough enquiry by a competent Board. It is distressing to observe that the Agricultural Loans Act and the Land Improvement Act which were amended and rules thereunder were altered to enable a ryot to borrow from Government sufficient to clear his encumbrance and place the land under Government control to discharge that liability within a fixed period, are not carried out by this popular Government. For this purpose a loan of five crores was proposed to be raised. The object was to scale down debt and discharge it. On the other hand, the brief experience under the Agricultural Relief Act has been thoroughly disappointing. The relationships between the debtor and the creditor and the tenant and the landlord were unduly strained by it. Litigation increased. Rural credit has been unnecessarily disturbed. This relation had always been equitably adjusted in many cases before the Act. It is notorious that the ryot has to seek the help of the village creditor or shopkeeper many months in the year to lend him paddy, ragi or cholan, and food grains. This small credit is discounted. One of the effective remedies suggested for the present is to make a permanent settlement in Ryotwari areas and provide means to relieve the cultivator from debt burden while every effort should be made to improve his sound economic position. The periodical re-settlements of districts are almost completed in this Province, and this facilitates revision and permanent settlement of

land tax. The incidence of land revenue in each area must be ascertained beforehand and then a basic flat rate determined because all lands cannot be treated under the same or one principle.

8. The important fact is that Pattadars in large Ryotwari areas are not cultivators. Non-agricultural classes acquired large extents of lands in the villages. The peasant cultivator who toils on the land is one and the fruits of his labour on the land are appropriated by another. Capitalists and money-lenders invested their capital in the land as they invest the same in a bank or industrial concern. Whether or not the peasant cultivator should have a fixity of tenure and fixity of rent in Ryotwari Patta lands and in Mirasi lands is one of the important problems of agricultural relief. The "Intermediaries" seem to be responsible for the state of matters, as they are mostly absentee landlords and do not belong to the agricultural classes. These middlemen profiteers ought to be drastically dealt with.

It is argued that Zamindars were Rent Collectors and are "Intermediaries" and, therefore, they are not "Owners" or proprietors of the Estates. The *peiskush* was fixed on the ascertained income of the villages; therefore, they are entitled to no more than what was calculated before 1802. Under the rough survey for purposes of revenue, the prices then prevailing for paddy rents should be considered. In very few villages there were actual money rents. Paddy and share of produce was the rule which was converted according to prices prevailing at the time. The purchasing power of the Rupee was low. Produce was cheap in comparison. This was how the Government *jamma* or demand was arrived at and had no relation to the payment by individual cultivators. I noted already that the functions of the Zamindar were not merely rent collection because in the unsettled state of the country Sircar revenue was always at stake; the Chief of the Estate, as the feudal lord subordinate to the Sovereign Power, was declared under the Regulation to be the proprietor. The Regulation, while recognising the Zamindar as permanent owner, does not grant permanent or settled rents payable by the cultivating ryot. Many Regulations were passed after that, but no mention was made of the ryots and rent, as this was to be regulated between the Zamindar and the ryot. In 1869, when the Rent Recovery Act was passed by Government, if there were any basis for the present contention, the question would have been considered. The Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 had able and independent advocates of ryots in the Legislature. The whole aim

was to better the condition of the cultivating tenant ; if the question of rates of rent were fixed for ever in 1802, there was no need to pass that Act. Extraordinary intelligence has dawned upon some politicians of the Congress school to raise this plea as a political shibboleth but one who examined and worked the Estates Land Act as an advocate in law courts both for ryots and for Zamindars cannot but be of opinion that it is a fair and equitable adjustment of the relations between the landlord and the tenant, though it is open to certain amendments in regard to procedure.

It may be relevant to state that the ryot or kisan agitation in other Provinces all tend to create reliefs similar to the relationship established in Madras since 1908 under the Estates Land Act. One very important fact which is ignored by the political agitators is that in 1935 the Estates Land Act was amended in order to enable the ryot to apply to scale down the rent due for any *fasli* in accordance with the rates of prices of produce prevailing in previous years or in the neighbourhood. This scaling down will considerably relieve the tenant in the Zamindari area. It is also settled law that both in Inam and Zamindari villages, the cultivating ryot has rights of permanent occupancy which the Kisana in other Provinces are struggling to achieve. The Estates Land Act defined the rights and obligations *inter se* between ryot and Zamindar. The definition of landholder puts the case beyond all reasonable doubt. There are general provisions relating to rates of rent payable by ryots, for enhancement, reduction or alteration of rent, commutation of *caram* rent into money rents, repairs to irrigation sources. When rent is payable on the estimated value of crop, either party may apply for its commutation into money rent and in case of survey and settlement rates could be fixed. All the customary payments were dispensed with. Commutation and settlement of rents were pressed by Zamindari ryots when prices were high and they could easier pay money rent and sell the share of paddy for high prices. Prosperity prevailed. With the fall of prices since 1931, the agitation recommenced and reckless political agitators who have no stake in the country fomented the discontent and the grievances, real and imaginary, were loudly proclaimed for their own ends. Party politics were introduced into the matter and promises were made, thereby creating bitter relations where free and friendly relations prevailed before. Unrest took the place of peace and goodwill in the Zamindaris. Some landholders were not sensible to what

was going on in their midst and did not keep themselves in touch with the people. Want of personal contact with the ryots was one of the causes of unrest. There were absentee Zamindars. There are real grievances in some Zamindaris but not in all Estates. The Estates Land Act makes adequate provision in favour of the ryots. There may be special cases for enquiry and investigation. Rents may be readjusted in such cases as found to be necessary, especially in areas where rents were commuted or settlements made between the years 1914 and 1930. Left to themselves without the intervention of irresponsible political agitators, the relations between the landlord and the tenant would be more easily adjusted where it is necessary. Any revolutionary change is bound to react on the Government and destroy the purpose for which any legislation may now be introduced, because no Party Government will be secure on untruth and coercion.



PHILOSOPHY IN JOHN KEATS

M. TAHIR JAMIL, M.A.

III

THE stage of actual physical sensibility in which Keats loved to ruminate over the pleasures of external loveliness was fast yielding place to a process of deeper insight. Surrounded by thoughts of love and beauty he had lived too long in a passively receptive temperament, like Lycius in the 'purple-lined palace' of mere sense-perception, and had almost forsworn the noisy world beyond. But he had now heard its trumpet-blast, and was turning his attention in that direction. His mind was filled with the thought of sorrow and cares which crowd the life of man. He was faced with dark realities, and was beginning "to distinguish the openings of the dark passages beyond and around." This fact disquieted him intensely and brought him moments of deepest gloom, which stirred his mind to make a sustained effort to understand the enigma of human life and the world. The problem had suggested itself before, but in the sonnet on "*Ben Nevis*" he had given it up as a hopeless task. Man can know nothing about heaven, hell, or earth, he bitterly complains, and all that the

" eye doth meet
Is mist and crag, not only on this height,
But in the world of thought and mental might."

The utterance is 'joyless and uninspiring' but it is not the 'creed' of Keats, as Hudson implies. It is a passing mood which comes to every thinking soul in moments of deep despondency when it sees around it nothing but gloom.

Keats made another attempt in this direction in his sonnet "*To Ailsa Rock*." This time he asked Nature to reveal to him the source of her majesty and mystery, power and eternity, but to no purpose. The *Odes* reflect still more completely the struggle that was going on in the mind of the poet. There were periods of indolence, when, overcome by "the spell of an agreeable physical languor,"

which Mrs. Owen calls "the failure of vitality,"¹ he dismissed the figures of Love, Ambition, and Poesy as phantoms, while at other moments of melancholy he took a highly pessimistic view of Beauty and Joy:

"Beauty that must die;
And Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips
Bidding adieu."²

His study of human affairs had convinced him that the world was full of "the weariness, the fever, and the fret," where everything was undergoing a never-ceasing change:

"Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies;
Where but to think is to be full of sorrow
And leaden eyed despairs;
Where beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes,
Or new Love pine at them beyond to-morrow"³

and where

" . . . in the very temple of Delight
Veil'd Melancholy had her sovran shrine."⁴

All these reflections made the poet feel dispirited. Opposed to the conditions of human life there was operative in Nature a principle of eternal and immutable Beauty. It existed uniformly fresh and happy from the dim past: a type of that Beauty was the immortal song of the nightingale. In spite of the logical fallacy which critics point out here in the poet's argument, the meaning is quite clear. Keats wanted to emphasise in the poem the mad rivalry that exists amongst men of whom one hungry generation treads the other down and enacts its own puppet-show of the moment. The happiness of the bird, expressive of the idea of peace and beauty in Nature, continues in a uniform way. Apparently, the poet is thinking of the discord, struggles, and despair of the age in which he lived, and contrasts the chaos of men's actual life with the content and peace prevailing eternally in Nature. The same idea is emphasised in the "*Ode to Autumn*." By

¹ F. M. Owen: "John Keats: A Study," p. 167.

² "Ode on Melancholy."

³ "Ode to a Nightingale."

⁴ "Ode on Melancholy."

means of "a series of living tableaux" ¹ and the suggestion of the eternal music of Nature, the poet's thought seems to be drinking deep at the very fountain-head of harmony, peace, and happiness, unbroken and unabating, which it finds not within the physical and sensuous limits of enjoyment, but in the contemplation of the omnipotent and ever-present principle of Life and Beauty. This escape into the bright illusory world would have suited a Shelley or a Schopenhauer, but Keats, a matter-of-fact poet, cannot be cheated by such illusions. "Scenery is fine, but human nature is finer," he had written from Devonshire, and so he dismisses here the idle fancy in order to face the hard facts of life.

If Nature made him disconsolate by her contrast with the condition of human life, and philosophy failed to explain the riddle of apparent incongruities, the growing awareness of the realm of Spirit within him was beginning to lighten the burden of the mystery. He had come to realise that man was invested with a power that made him superior to Nature and supreme over the cold hands of Death and Decay. It was the power of the human mind, the divine Intellect in man. "What nature does in the eternal resurrection of her loveliness man can achieve by the creative energy of art." ² He need not, therefore, despair if he cannot escape the ills of life. Keats, like Shelley, has a message of hope for humanity which is equally ennobling and inspiring. Nature cannot offer the balm because her powers are restricted. She can stimulate but cannot create. She is a "hand-maiden not mistress." It is the human mind that rules, and "will is the sovereign." It can call the past pleasures back from the region of sub-consciousness and enjoy them in imagination, in spite of the absence of the external stimuli. It is also capable of higher things than mere indulgence in the enjoyments of stored sense-perception. From the data supplied by Nature, it can construct for itself an idea of truth beyond the sphere of sensuous knowledge, beyond the reach of "satiety, disenchantment, and death," till it perceives harmony existing in apparent discord, the principle of Beauty pervading everywhere. The human mind can thus transform the physical world into "the medium through which man visualises a heavenly logic" ³

¹ A. C. Downer : "The Odes of Keats," p. 65.

² E. De Selincourt : "Keats," a lecture (Oxford Lecture, p. 200).

³ H. I. Fausset : "John Keats," p. 82.

and comes to read the mystery of the universe. Hence the poet exclaims:

" Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone: " ¹

The ideal music, exalted above the region of sense-perception, is the music of " no tone," and appeals " not to the sensual ear," but to the spirit, making us hear the music, as if it were from the transcendental region beyond, keeping alive in us forever the anticipating joy of music unheard but sweet. It kindles " the imagination into a flame of intuitive perceptive activity " ² which reveals the true, eternal Beauty, transcending its sensuous presentation, and discovering intuitively " the spiritual laws of life." Works of art, thus, make an intense emotional appeal to his imagination, conjure up the vision of the entire cycle of human history, with the rise and fall of nations, empires, and civilisations, and make him stand on the brink of eternity with all its sense of infinitude and mystery. The urn becomes a transparent glass of eternity that represents the efforts of man to raise himself above the limitations of life. It leads us from the real to the ideal, from the present Beauty to the Eternal Truth, to the discovery of the secret of existence that lies in the attainment of perfection suggested by its rest and repose. The idea is summed up by Keats in his well-known lines, when in a moment of inspiration he wrote :

" Beauty is truth, truth beauty,"—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know." ³

Mr. Royall Snow's interpretation of the passage as " an out-and-out and passionate declaration for the senses " ⁴ is misleading, as it is based on the erroneous assumption that the poet emphasises here " the poignant transiency of human beauty and passion." ⁵ Admittedly there is an undertone of sadness, yet we are in full agreement with Hancock who regards the lines as the crystallised expression of the

¹ " Ode on a Grecian Urn."

² C. D. Thorpe: " The Mind of Keats," p. 133.

³ " Ode on a Grecian Urn."

⁴ R. Snow: " Hersey concerning Keats;" P. M. L. A., Vol. XLIV, 1929.

⁵ *Ibid.*

poet's "philosophy of idealism."¹ Here the poet contemplates over the spiritual value of Beauty that endures and that has been "caught and crystallised for ever in the eternity of art."² By means of a just enthusiasm for all things beautiful and perfect, and through a proper discipline of the affections, the present and the sensuous yield to the eternal and the spiritual, serving as a ladder from earth to heaven. The poet accepts the imprisonment of the external present, but instead of remaining on the surface, he tries to understand its real meaning, whereby he is at once transported into an enlarged and enfranchised world. It is a wide world which includes the ugly and the tragic as well as the lovely and the pleasant. Speaking of the true poetical character he says: "It enjoys light and shade; it leaves in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated. . . . What shocks the virtuous philosopher delights the chameleon poet. It does no harm from its relish of the dark side of things any more than from its taste for the bright one, because they both end in speculation." Even in the repulsive he will discover some aspect of "universal life-truth," which, if imaginatively contemplated upon, would yield a rich harvest of thought, a fruitful vision of life. He loses himself in the universal, and the past, the present, and the future are merged in the ocean of eternity. Behind the diversities of time and space, always changing and passing, he traces eternal Beauty, not peculiar to any living object, natural scenery, or work of art, but as "something universal, serious, perceived with the whole mind and made by all its activities."³ To Keats, it is this eternal, spiritual reality with which the soul of man is chiefly concerned, the discovery of that "beauty old as new."⁴ Physical objects may be its expressions and individuals may be its agents, but what the poet's vision perceives behind them is the "universal" or the Platonic "Idea" of Beauty which is the only reality. He exalts it far above its objective manifestation, but does not regard it as apart from the reality of man's life and the purpose of his existence. He wants it to be experienced in its eternal aspect so that its "benignant light" may add to the everlasting edification of mankind. It will cast a bridge across the deep chasm that separates

¹ A. E. Hanrock: "John Keats," p. 156.

² M. E. Shipman: "Orthodoxy concerning Keats"—P. M. L. A., Vol. XLV, 1929.

³ A. Clutton-Brock: "The Scholar's Religion."

⁴ *Ibid.*

man from reality, and will soothe and mitigate the contrasted conditions of life. In that spiritual heritage, every human soul should strive to enter, for it is the only truth known and knowable on earth.

Ruskin suggested that in the opening line of "*Endymion*" Keats ought to have called Beauty a "law" and not "joy," but such a statement, considered in the light of the mental and spiritual development of the poet, would have not only been premature, but an affectation. He had not then reached the stage when Beauty could assume perfect supremacy and become a "law." At that time he had outgrown the first stage when Beauty was a luxury that gave enjoyment to the senses, and had entered the second stage which transformed it into an intellectual principle. It was now presented to the mind in a state of repose either through the plastic art, or through the peaceful scenes of nature, out of which it formed its own conception of the Ideal, the eternal Truth. But Keats was to go further in his cult of Beauty-worship. He made it a dynamic power, an eternal law of progress in the universe, and declared in "*Hyperion*"

" . . . 'tis the eternal law
That first in beauty should be first in might."

It was according to this law of evolution that Chaos and Darkness were superseded by Heaven and Earth, and the latter by the Titans who were

" In form and shape compact and beautiful,
In will, in action free, companionship,
And thousand other signs of purer life."

The process, however, is unceasing. As a "fresh perfection" treading on their heels has excelled them, so "another race may drive" the conquerors in their turn to mourn their doom.

What Keats exactly means by Beauty when he makes it not only eternal but supreme over all the forces of Nature, is certainly not physical or external beauty, but the Beauty of the intellect that has the power to attach proper value to things, and view them in relation to their universal condition. "Nothing but the good of life enters into the texture of the beautiful,"¹ and that good aims at reducing the

¹ George Santayana: "Sense of Beauty."

sufferings of life, and establishing a harmony between man and nature, and peace in his soul. Physical loveliness and strength have an importance of their own, but their sway cannot be lasting until they are associated with the power of the mind. That has been the undeniable principle recognised by the law of evolution. Man stands supreme over the powerful forces of Nature through the sublime power of his mind that draws its strength from its divine source. The more he attains to perfection, with the help of higher knowledge, the more divine does his nature become, till there is a beauty born in his soul, which, reflecting itself on everything around it, discovers beauty in all of them :

" . . . Symbols divine ;
Manifestations of that beauteous life
Diffused unseen throughout eternal space,"¹

Such a height cannot, however, be reached if the mind is heir to " the frailty of grief,"

" Of rage, of fear, anxiety, revenge,
Remorse, spleen, hope, but most of all despair." ²

As long as the Titans continued in their divine demeanour, " solemn, undisturbed, unruffled, like high Gods," they lived and ruled, but the moment " actions of rage and passion " began to sway them, as they do

" the mortal world beneath,
In men who die,"³

their defeat was certain. The mind has got to go through these experiences of misery and suffering, but should not yield itself to their control. They are there to help it to get an insight into the real life, and extend its sphere of sympathy and love. They will edify the thoughts, give the mind a grasp over the secret workings of the universe, and impart a touch of Beauty even to sadness. When it is thus purified and ennobled, in a moment of revelation, the " glorious god-like

¹ "Hyperion," Book I, ll. 317-19.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, ll. 885-6.

knowledge " will flood into the soul, like the mighty billows, and make a god of man :

" Names, deeds, grey legends, dire events, rebellions,
Majestics, sovran voices, agonies,
Creations and destroyings, all at once
Pour into the wide hollows of my brain,
And deify me, as if some blithe wine
Or bright elixir peerless I had drunk,
And so become immortal." ¹

This was not the development of a new element in Keats, as some critics suggest, but was a re-iteration of that human element and realism which we have already seen in "*Endymion*." Formerly it expressed the feeling of those moments when the poet agreed to come down from the dream world of idealistic enjoyments to the matter-of-fact world, but now it came to him as a settled conviction out of the clash of love and death. It deepened the human element in him, and made him realise that side of Beauty which owes its origin to sorrow and to pain. The feelings for humanity has grown so intense in the poet that he seeks

" no wonder but the human face,
No music but a happy-noted voice." ²

His heart is unified with humanity as a whole, and while it feels sick of the dark shadows that hover above this world, and the perpetual tragedies enacted in it, he is too much of a realist to indulge in the luxury of an imagined Utopia as a sort of escape from the hard realities of life. Pleasure in isolation is too selfish, and Keats could never desire to enjoy this now. If an escape were possible, he would not have it alone, but would take the world with him to share its peace. " The miseries of the world are miseries to him, and will not let him rest till he has found an explanation of the mystery, a proper place for the ills and ailments of life in the vast and complicated plan of the universe. He does not try to shun the bare facts and indulge in the " embroidery of dim dream," but faces them squarely, and concentrates his imaginative genius upon an effort to understand reality. This he has done in his letter to his brother George, which he wrote in the

¹ "*Hyperion*," Book III, ll. 114-20.

² "*Fall of Hyperion*."

spring of 1819, and where he has given us the most comprehensive philosophy of life that he has formulated after he had seen

"too distinct into the core
Of an eternal fierce destruction,"¹

It caused him unhappiness for the moment, but led to a co-ordinated and sublime outlook upon life and the world. In the letter, the poet first states the fact that "man is originally a poor forked creature subject to the same mis-chances as the beasts of the forest, destined to hardship and disquietude of some kind or other." Perfect happiness he believes to be incompatible with the very nature of things, and should never be dreamt of. "Let the fish Philosophise the ice away," he contends, "from the Rivers in winter time, and they shall be in continual play in the tepid delight of summer. Look at the Poles and the Sands of Africa, whirlpools and volcanoes. Let men exterminate them and I will say that they may arrive at earthly Happiness." It is, therefore, idle for man to look for perfect joy in a world of misery and pain. The argument is the direct and most forceful refutation of the Godwinian doctrine of perfectibility. Keats is too clear-sighted to accept such a delusive hope. On the other hand, he avoids the stoicism of Byron and the pessimism of Schopenhauer. He does not look upon the world as inevitably bad and entirely corrupt. He tells us not to be disheartened, if the thorns of life make us bleed, nor seek an escape "into a subjective region of æsthetic beauty," because neither of these courses can in any way be conducive to our happiness. The first reveals a sickly sensitive mind, while the other will add to the existing misery all the more, for one cannot perpetually live in his self-created visionary world. Keats had a vein of "flint and iron," as a critic has justly remarked, that was strong enough to "bear the buffets of the world."² He strikes the real note of manliness when he refuses to "lie down like a child and weep away the life of cares." Undismayed, he sets himself to a new understanding of the age-long problem.

So long the world had been regarded by the scholastics as a "vale of tears," a place subject to the devil, a place to be shunned in order to receive the divine grace. Keats gives it a new name by looking at

¹ Epistle to Reynolds.

² Matthew Arnold.

it from another angle of vision. His piercing insight was ever alive to the sense of beauty and goodness in everything. He had found beauty in the energies displayed in a street-fight, and grace in quarrels, and had arrived at a reconciliation with the "horrid incongruities" in the life of Nature. Consequently, he could not think of the ills and evils of life as fortuitous events without any purpose. In the "*Ode to Melancholy*" he had discovered the necessary link between pleasure and pain, between joy and sorrow, one a complementary experience increasing the emotional value of the other. In the letter he discovered their use, by regarding this world as a "Vale of Soul-making" where "intelligences or sparks of divinity" grow into Souls by acquiring identities through the medium of a world of circumstances. The "World of Pains and Troubles" is like the school where the intelligence must be developed into a Soul, with the help of the human heart, which "must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse ways" before it can "suck its identity," and gain its place in the scheme of things. The friction he believes to be real, but incidental, which can be definitely diminished "as the world is better known and the will is better educated."¹ It is a grand reconciliation that Keats has effected here, satisfying both to reason and humanity. He reminds us of the tremendous importance of the human mind, a spark of the Divinity, sent out into this world of pain, sufferings, and sorrows, as a necessary condition to fit it for its ultimate destination. It can be through the discipline of this world of misery alone that the soul can gain its power of flight to reach out to the Great Soul. Here, as Bradley remarks, Keats is at one with the main current of the philosophic thought of his day which displayed "an unusually strong sense of the power and possibilities of man or of the mind."² But Keats does not go to the extreme like Fichte, who considered the mind as having the power to create and control the universe. Such a position is the result of the acceptance of an extreme form of subjective-idealism. It dismisses the world, for all practical purposes, as an illusion. Keats denied it in the letter, and accepted the "hardships and disquietudes" of existence as indisputable facts that are neither created nor controlled by the mind. The only way open

¹ G. Santasayn: "Three Philosophical Poets," p. 203.

² A. C. Bradley: "A Miscellany," p. 116.

to man is to accept them as " necessary to the formation and development " of his soul, and to rise above them :

" . . . for to bear all naked truths,
And to envisage circumstance, all calm,
That is the top of sovereignty."¹

This view takes us out of the illusory character of the creeds of the time which had made it fashionable to regard all reality as related simply to man's idea about them. It impresses upon us the fact of the cosmic will as being stronger than our own. Our intellect makes us conscious of its existence, and the experiences of our life constantly bring home to us our relation to the Supreme Will and our dependence upon it. This is idealism, not as crude subjectivism, but as the transcendental philosophy of the will that keeps its serious hold upon the reality, affirming at the same time the noumenal will in which lies the highest phase of existence.

This is the synthesis of all the wisdom and philosophy that Keats had gathered so far, which, according to some critics, wrought his own undoing as a poet. Mr. Elliot asserts that the more Keats strained his mind towards philosophy, the more he cut himself away from the sources of poetic inspiration, which was already failing him before his fatal sickness finally dried them up. He finds in Keats an incapacity to reach the height of philosophy, which was unapproachable for his genius, but towards which his wistful gaze was ever fixed, like a sick eagle gazing at the high heaven, and when he realised that he was unsuited for the task, he ardently longed for the peace of death.² The other opinion is that of Mr. Roberts, who also accepts the view that Keats aspired after philosophy, against his natural predilection for the world of sensation, and eventually found himself lost in the quagmire of speculation, so patent in his unfinished "*Hyperion*" poems.³ While agreeing with both that Keats *did* aspire after philosophy, we cannot accept their gloomy conclusions. As we have tried to show in the preceeding pages, Keats succeeded not only in overcoming the sensationalism of his early days—for, in the words of Prof. Elton, " he was not a poet who rested in sensation "⁴

¹ "*Hyperion*," Book II.

² G. R. Elliot: "*The Real Tragedy of Keats*"—an article in P.M.L.A., p. 315 ff.

³ J. H. Roberts: "*Poetry of Sensation or of Thought*"—P.M.L.A., p. 1129 ff.

⁴ Oliver Elton: "*A Survey of English Literature*" (1780-1830), II.

—but formulated a definite system of philosophy, as noble as he had hoped it to be. His philosophy aimed at due proportion and adjustment in a world highly disorganised on account of its too great emphasis on the one side of existence only, and reminded us of that peace and happiness that a perfect order of things could yield. He meets the demands of the conditions of his age for a practical view of life, but gives us, at the same time, a vision of complete and satisfying peace in serene Beauty. There are suggestions and glimpses of ideal harmony, but the most characteristic thing in him is that he frequently chooses "to descend again to common sense and to touch the earth for a moment before another flight."¹ He was a prophet among the poets like his great contemporaries, but a more humanist prophet than the rest, because he brought his philosophic mind and spiritual insight to an understanding of the world of reality. Others, in moments of inspiration, used to be swept away by the wave of emotional pantheism, and indulged in too much of subjective thinking, but Keats, in the manner of a true transcendentalist, concerned himself less with the mystic union than with the nature and capacity of man himself. He took a comprehensive view of the claims of both worlds, and succeeded in effecting a union of the two. This is what gives force and authenticity to his utterances. His mind soars beyond the utmost limit of the horizon, far into the vast, misty empyrean, yet is fully conversant with the "giant agony of the world." He refuses to sit down and weep over the cruelty of fate and the "base-ness of mankind," like "a tedious mourner and a boring pessimist,"² but presents to us the possibility of a perfect scheme of things in its continuity and completeness. He reminds us of the process of evolution which is as much in operation in the intellect of man as in the mechanical and physical world. Man is always developing latent faculties, but while his attention is commonly limited to his increased power over the material world, Keats has his eyes fixed upon the eternal, and desires in the race an aptness and capability in that direction as well. The power of perceiving and appreciating Beauty is man's heritage by birth, but it is a latent capacity awaiting development like other potential faculties. The task of civilisation consists in helping us to attain to a higher type of life by making Beauty a real part of it, and by fostering in us, through the contemplation of the

¹ George Santayana: "Poetry and Religion."

Beautiful, that consciousness of spiritual freedom in which pettiness, strife, and misery pass away and we grasp the world as a unity. It was the mission of Keats to lay stress upon the importance of æsthetic culture from this point of view. He allays the discord in our minds by awakening our æsthetic sense, so that we may find the harmonies of existence in the coherence of its parts, and rise above its apparent imperfections and our selfish interests, to a frame of mind in which we may see things perfect and see them whole. He has shown us how we can rise to complete perfection through Beauty, which is its clearest manifestation, and which offers a firm basis for the reconstruction of Society and, Art, so that they may come to resemble more closely that kind of Reality to which we aspire.



A PEDAGOGIC EFFUSION *

PROFESSOR P. C. GHOSH, M.A.

Presidency College, Calcutta

THE inspection of a college does not mean now-a-days for the associate Inspector merely a pleasant trip at University expense. He is expected by the authorities, who select him, to make a formal speech before the students on some topic of academic interest. When, therefore, the call came to me to visit your college with one of my distinguished old pupils, the present Inspector of Colleges, I was in a quandary on realising the additional responsibility. My chief difficulty was to find a suitable subject which might appeal to you all, from the youngest cub of the First Year—I mean no offence, I use the word as Boy Scouts use it—to the finished gentleman of the Fourth Year Class. I have my favourite topics to be sure. I should have liked, for instance, to speak on some chapter of ancient or mediæval history, European or Indian—the modern is too near to stir my imagination. But thanks to the plan hitherto pursued by our University, History can be and too often is put by the majority of students on the list of neglected subjects. I should have also liked to talk on one of my heroes, literary or historical—everybody has his hero, good or bad; even the child has his engine-driver, the embodiment to him of tremendous power. But I could not fix upon any of my favourites who might interest all of you equally. As a Professor of literature, I might be expected perhaps to spin a fine cobweb of literary criticism with the warp and woof of -ism and -ity, and to discuss before a gaping audience whether a particular poem was classical or romantic in spirit. Unfortunately, I have no turn for metaphysical niceties, and such discussions send a shudder through me. Moreover, in term-time I hardly find leisure to collect my thoughts on a subject, which does not come within the orbit of my strictly professional studies. Robert Southey was once explaining to a Quaker lady how his time was entirely filled with work: reading Portuguese while he shaved, studying Spanish for an hour after breakfast, and then reading and writing till dinner. "And friend, when dost thee think?" came

* An address delivered at Victoria College, Cooh-Bihar, on the 31st January, 1932.

sharply from his fair visitor in her peculiar Quaker dialect. This question have I often put to myself, and the reply from my inner self has almost always been: "Seldom or never." After a good deal of fumbling for a suitable subject, I at last thought of one on which I felt I was privileged, as an old man, to talk and talk glibly, with an air of assumed authority, though not without some trepidation. I thought of giving you some fatherly or grandfatherly advice, which I fancied might be of use to you. The trepidation I just spoke of arose from a sense of my own shortcomings, specially as I thought that there might be among my listeners some readers of *The Merchant of Venice* who, tickled by my earnest exhortations, might be tempted to quote at me Portia's withering remark hurled at her handmaid: "Good sentences and well pronounced! It is a good divine that follows his own instructions." It was, however, open to me to plead that the very defect in my title gave me a sort of faint courage to pursue my suit. My mistakes and failures might warn you to keep to the right path. A teetotalter is not necessarily a more effective speaker at a Temperance Society meeting than a drunkard on reflection. The author of *The Imitation of Christ* says very wisely: "Search not who spoke this or that, but mark what is spoken."

What I should like to impress upon you at the outset is the need for cultivating a true sense of discipline. Discipline is what makes a 'disciple,' a learner, a seeker after knowledge. It is his essential virtue. The etymology of the word points to it. Order, self-control, reverence for law—all that is connoted by the English word 'discipline'—is essentially connected with learning, teaching, knowledge, which are the senses in which the Romans used their word, 'disciplina.' We talk of loyalty—loyalty to our king, loyalty to our friends, loyalty to our teachers, loyalty to our family. What is this loyalty but law-abidingness, which is another name for discipline? The Greek historian Herodotus tells us that when Xerxes, the Great Monarch, as the Greeks called him, invaded Greece, he could not bring himself to believe that a small number of Spartans could even think of opposing his mighty host, specially as they were, according to the report brought to him, free men with no master to lead and control them. To this scepticism of the Persian monarch, a Spartan exile in his camp, named Demaratus, replied: "Though they are free, they are not in all respects free. Law in their master, whom they fear more than thy subjects fear thee. What he commands they do." This

law-loving, law-abiding spirit is the first condition of fruitful college life. It makes life itself worth living. I do not like to be censorious, but now-a-days I see a sad breaking-in of waters on all sides, bringing desolation and ruin upon us; and unless strenuous efforts are made to dam up these waters, our national life will be submerged for ever. The foundation of disciplined life must be laid early. When I speak of discipline, I do not mean any measure that may be adopted by men in authority to keep someone in check, much less that cold, loveless, though at times effective, method, which has kept alive to this day the dreadful memory of that formidable French drill-master of the time of Louis XIV. I mean by discipline that wholesome restraint which one can learn to keep over oneself, and through oneself over others. This true discipline manifests itself in self-control, in mutual co-operation and sympathy, in considerate regard for one another's rights and feelings. Remember you are all members of a college, of a *collegium*, where you are "collected" or "chosen" to form a society for the pursuit of a common end, a society in which, as my old master, Mr. H. M. Percival, said, "mind should be bound with mind in sympathy and love, which alone can put a soul into college corporate life."

I would next urge upon you to cultivate a spirit of seriousness and enthusiasm in all your undertakings. What strikes me most painfully is the intellectual and moral apathy noticeable in many a young man today. I say 'moral,' because this apathy affects character in its larger aspects. Enthusiasm makes work bear fruit, and gives life its value. The Greeks understood the matter well when they coined this word (*enthousiasmos*). Enthusiasm is the state of being possessed by a *theos*, a god, with an exalting or ecstatic effect. It is better to be possessed even by a devil than not to be possessed at all. On a dark plain on the confines of Hell, Dante saw the miserable plight of those who had lived on earth 'without blame and without praise,' mixed up in that dismal region with a wretched crew of those angels who had neither rebelled against nor remained faithful to God—unfortunates, who, in the scornful phrase of the poet, 'never were alive.' Beware of such a fate. The curse pronounced upon the Church of Laodicea is upon such men: "I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot. So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth." This lack of enthusiasm betrays an anæmic condition of the soul, a fatal disease. But with no disease is the principle

of "will cure" so effective as with this. Your intellectual doctors may help you with occasional prescriptions, but remember that the will in the patient to live is, as has been well said, the doctor's best ally. "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might," says the Preacher in the Old Testament. You will do well to ponder over an incident in Homer's *Odyssey*. In the eleventh book of the epic, the hero, Odysseus, arrives at the entrance to Hades (the land of the dead) and beseeches the departed spirits with vows and prayers. He sacrifices some sheep, pours their blood into a trench he had cut, 'a cubit every way,' and 'lo! the spirits of the dead that were departed, gathered round him.' You too are engaged in similar propitiatory rites; you too, like Odysseus, have to invoke the mighty spirits of the dead, if you realise the true nature of your work. But the dead will not come to your call unless you pour out your heart's blood and offer it to them.

But this attitude towards work cannot come unless you have learnt to enjoy it. "There is nothing better," says the Preacher in the Old Testament, who in his two hundred verses has put some of the wisest things ever said, "than that a man rejoice in his works, for that is his portion." Seek delight, *anandam*, in your work as students, for that is your portion here. Then and then only will your labour bring forth fruit. Too often we do our work under compulsion, as a joyless task imposed upon us by a hard taskmaster, from fear of being punished if we neglect to carry it through, sometimes even from a desire to do the fashionable thing rather than from an impelling sense of inner enjoyment. Too often are we moved by a mechanical rather than a dynamical impulse, as Carlyle would put it. Work done this way may not altogether go in vain, but there will be no joyous harvest to gather. The inner compulsion is what gives work its abiding value. Cicero records of Xenocrates, a disciple of Plato and one of his successors as President of the Academy, that when someone asked him what his disciples had learnt, he replied: "To do that of their own accord which they might be compelled to do by law." Happy indeed is the teacher who can say this of his students!

I shall now speak of a condition essential to success in any undertaking. Get early into the habit of regularising your work. Exercise strong control over the roving tendencies of the mind. Beware of the curse of Reuben: "Unstable as water, thou shalt not excel." Do

a thing by bits, but do it systematically, steadily, something every day rigorously set apart for it. Spasmodic activities leave one weaker by reaction. "Half an hour set apart every day," says John Morley, "may enable one to finish in four days, say, twelve books of the *Iliad*, or the entire *Æneid*." Judged by our standard, he might be thought to have filled the half-hour too full. But something surely could be done in a half-hour, and if systematically pursued, would amount to a solid achievement at the end of 365 days. The celebrated painter, Apelles, never let a day go by without drawing something. "Nulla dies sine linea" (Not a day without a line) was his motto.

If there is anything for you to do, set to work at once. In the words of the greatest poet-philosopher of Germany, "Do the duty that lies nearest you." The paper-weight kept by Ruskin on his table bore the plain and emphatic motto: TODAY. Correct the ruinous habit of procrastination, the habit of putting off your duties till tomorrow (the word means this literally). "The flighty purpose never is o'ertook Unless the deed go with it." Do not look in the calendar for auspicious days. As Hector says in the *Iliad*, "the gods send favourable omens every day," and the best of omens is our soul's good. We generally hope to begin a better life on some ever-receding future date. "Every first of January" is to be, as Stevenson puts it, "a remarkable turning point in our career." In that entertaining book, Pepys's Diary, we read under the date 27th February, 1661: "I called for a dish of fish, which we had for dinner, this being the first day of Lent: and I do intend to try whether I can keep it or no." Next day, the 28th, there is a characteristic confession: "Notwithstanding my resolution, yet for want of other victuals, I did eat flesh this Lent, but am resolved to eat as little as I can." Do we not in the same way make and break our vows and find ready excuses for our backslidings? Form your resolutions after careful self-examination, and having once formed them, resolutely try to keep them. Otherwise each tomorrow will find you worse than you were the day before.

Turning from these general observations, I should now like to speak on what concerns you more immediately as students of literature. How to get the best of your reading is an imperative question, which must be tackled. You read poetry, you read prose, you read drama (logicians will please pardon me this cross-division), you read many other things, which are neither poetry nor prose nor drama. These are

called books merely because they are printed, their names filling a thick catalogue of *biblia a-biblia*, of books that are no books. Of the better class, you read books which are of the informative kind, you read others which are of the inspiring kind. De Quincey would classify them under "literature of knowledge" and "literature of power." To borrow a famous statement of Bacon, which has been rightly criticised as being somewhat spoiled by its gastronomical imagery, there are books which are to be merely "tasted," not worth being read through. There are books, again, which are to be "swallowed," to be read through, but not worth much time and labour being spent on them. But there are books—there are not many such—which should be "chewed and digested." These are a fat pasture for the soul. Your intellectual caterers set before you this varied fare. "Welcome: fall to" is their word. Would there were competent and reliable 'sewers,' such as attended at a king's meal in the past, tasting and placing only palatable and harmless dishes on the table and rejecting suspicious and insipid items from the menu.

I have neither the time nor the capacity to give you on the spot an exhaustive or authoritative discourse on the most profitable way of reading literature. What little I have to say I shall preface with a few words of warning. And my first warning is: Keep out of your mind that ugly bogey of EXAMINATION—for a good while at any rate—when you read a masterpiece. Read it at first to enjoy it by yourselves, in seclusion, undisturbed by critics and commentators. A small glossary of unfamiliar words and only a page or two introducing the author and his work are all that may be needed at this stage. I have often thought that what usually goes before in the annotated editions of a classic, should have come right at the end and been pinned up until the text had been gone through more than once.

It matters little if you do not take in the meaning of all that you read for the first time. When, for instance, one listens to the words with which Othello enters his bedroom on that fatal night, or to his last speech begun in a tone of ominously subdued calm and suddenly rising to a pitch of alarming frenzy, or when we breathlessly watch poor Lear bending over the body of Cordelia, his mind tossing between despair and hope, or when our mind rocks on the delightful cadence of that noble specimen of prose put into the mouth of Hamlet, when we read such moving passages, should we pause to enquire into

the significance of the phrase "Promethean heat," or to ascertain the botanical character of that Arabian gum-tree or find out by historical or geographical research whether the correct reading was "base Indian" or "base Judean" or "base Egyptian"? These intellectual diversions might come, if come they must, in an idle hour much later, but not before we have lost ourselves in the poetry of the passages. First let us feel and enjoy the charm in its totality, and then the cool, critical business of scrutinising the elements of the total effect might follow at long last.

It is no doubt essential to realise fully the poetical and contextual associations of every telling word, to distil its essence to the last drop. For the right appreciation of a poem, its poetic technique has also to be grasped, the appropriateness of words (like Milton's use of 'lodged' in his sonnet on his blindness—'And that one talent which is death to hide Lodg'd with me useless'), the imagery often cameoed in a single word (as in the word 'sift' in that line in Shelley's *Cloud*: 'I sift the snow on the mountains below'), even a punctuation mark (as in Lady Macbeth's reply to her husband's timid, 'If we should fail') should demand careful attention for an æsthetic appreciation of the poet's art, which, in the fine phrase of Meredith, "springs imagination with a word or phrase." But such an appreciation is a slow process gathering force with every fresh reading of the poem. And a good poem as every other noble work of art does not reveal its secret except after long and devoted wooing. Your Mona Lisa must hang on the wall before your eyes, maybe for years, before she may condescend to unfold to you the secret of her winsome smile. Let your mind open itself gradually to the intellectual, emotional, imaginative appeal of the work of art you may have taken up for study, as a bud opens to the genial warmth of the morning sun.

I have just made a passing reference to the critics of literature. My next warning is with respect to them. Pray do not misunderstand me. I gratefully acknowledge the value of the services rendered by them. Even the worst among them may produce a good effect indirectly, by rousing one into opposition. My point is that these critics should not be called in before their time, as they too often are, and that, when called in, they should only be admitted as partners in a high debate. In the first stage of your reading a classic, keep your books of criticism on a very high shelf out of your reach, and do not take them down until you have read the original for yourselves

sufficiently well to be able to form an opinion of your own. Quite frequently am I asked within a week of my first meeting a Shakespeare class, "Sir, what books of criticism shall we read on this play?" And the only answer I give to this question is a silent look, which is enough to silence the enquirer. What Emerson says about books generally is specially applicable to critical works. They are "the best of things, well used; abused, among the worst." In one of his prose fragments, entitled "The Interpretation of Nature," Bacon speaks of "those profound interpreters and commentators, those methodical compounders and abridgers, who spend their wits to deprave the wit of the original master and aspire to the second prizes and think that a borrowed light can increase the original light from where it is taken." When you have to deal with such stuff, you cannot do better than follow the example of Gibbon, who says: "After glancing my eye over the design and order of a new book, I suspended the perusal until I had finished the task of self-examination; till I had resolved, in a solitary walk, all that I knew or believed, or had thought on the subject of the whole work, or of some particular chapter: I was then qualified to discover how much the author added to my original stock, and if I was sometimes satisfied by the agreement, I was sometimes armed by the opposition of our ideas." This in the language of Emerson would be "creative reading."

Carefully note Gibbon's phrase, "armed by the opposition of our ideas." Never accept a statement, be it even a bare statement of facts without challenge. You will be amazed to find how sometimes even usually careful writers go wrong in such matters too. Do not be dazzled by a great name. There is no "hero-worship" in the domain of literary criticism. As Emerson rightly says, "the love of the hero may corrupt into worship of his statue; then instantly the book becomes noxious, and the guide a tyrant." Do not imitate the example of the disciples of Pythagoras, whose "Ipse dixit" (He—the Master—himself said it), they thought, was a sufficiently convincing answer to all enquiry and criticism. To what absurd length deference to authority may go is shown by a story about the astronomer-monk, Christopher Scheiner. When he discovered some spots on the sun, through his telescope, he reported the discovery to the Superior of his Order. And what was the reply he got? "I have searched through Aristotle," wrote back the Superior, and can "find nothing of the kind mentioned; be assured, therefore, it is a deception of your senses or of

your glasses." What cruel sacrifices have not been offered in the past to the demon of Authority ! Did not Galileo have to live the life of " a prisoner to the Inquisition, for thinking in astronomy otherwise than his Franciscan and Dominican licensors thought? " To you I say with all the emphasis I can command: Get out of the habit of consulting your oracles before you have thought out the matter for yourselves, and when, on consultation later, the oracles deliver themselves, do not regard them as infallible.

When I spoke of critics, I remembered only the better sort, and kept out of all consideration the miscellaneous tribe of fantastic theorists, who, in the scornful language of Bacon, " spend their wits to deprave the wit of the original writer," and of second- or third-hand retailers of other people's wares—" keysmiths," if I might use this expressive term, whose manufactured articles too often open no locks, but break a good many that might otherwise have been opened. I might fill a volume of goodly size with the lucubration of such people with reference to Shakespeare alone. That huge pantechicon van, popularly known as the Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, is overloaded with such lumber. The editor of *Hamlet* in that series, however, unaccountably omitted to include a remarkable discovery made in the year One thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, by a General Traffic and Freight Manager of an American Railway, that the hero of that play was not a man but a woman in disguise, in love with Horatio, and quite naturally indifferent to poor Ophelia. The discoverer was rewarded with an LL.D. by an American College. In 1904 came another startling discovery that Ophelia was the mother of a child, but not by Hamlet, a discovery important for understanding the play. The discoverer was a medical man named Creighton. Another critic, this time a German named Krieger, found in 1930 the early history of Luthernism in that play. The man Hamlet is an abstract -ism—Luthernism. You may remember that Hamlet refers to " a certain convocation of politic worms " making a " diet " of Polonius. And did not Shakespeare know that Luther had attended the Diet of Worms in 1521, some eighty years before he wrote the play ? What he did not know was the correct German way of pronouncing " Diet " and " Worms," and this ignorance helped him to the punning allusion. Human ingenuity could not go further than what this critic displayed. I disdain to make more than a passing reference to the alarmingly growing number of Freudian psycho-analysts, who

believe that they have at last discovered the secret cause of Othello's mad jealousy and of Hamlet's melancholy irresoluteness.

But such Bedlam fools only amuse you by their antics. There are others of a more pretentious kind, who irritate you by their meaningless cant. No truer words were ever uttered than those which Laurence Sterne put into the mouth of his Tristram Shandy: "Of all the cants that are canted in this canting world, though the cant of hypocrisy may be the worst, the cant of criticism is the most tormenting." Such people profess to set up sign-posts, which more often misguide than guide the literary wayfarer. Shakespeare, who was also great as a parodist, seems to have prophetically anticipated this present tendency in literary criticism, when he made Polonius give an exhaustive list of dramatic types current at the time: "Tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral, scene individable, or poem unlimited." Similarly with these critics, this writer is 'a Transcendentalist or Intuitionist in Ethics, a Pantheist in Religion, an Absolutist in Politics.' In this poem they find the flavour of Romanticism, in that there is the spirit of Classicism. Here there is a touch of Romantico-Classicism, there you have Classico-Romanticism. Such is the staple of a good deal of what passes as literary criticism now, and young students are 'so befetished with the bobs and trinkets' of such criticism (to borrow again an expressive phrase from Sterne) that they repeat this jargon like parrots and fancy they have said the last word on a poem and its poet. These -isms have not done anybody any good. 'Labels,' as John Morley well remarks, 'are devices for saving talkative persons the trouble of thinking.'

Rid your mind of all such cant. What really matters is the original work itself. 'The play is the thing.' Tune up the strings of your mind to the right key so that they may respond to the varied touches of the master's hand, which seeks to bring out

all harmonies

Of all the plains and of the skies,
Of the forests and the mountains,
Of the many-voiced fountains ;
The choicest echoes of the hills,
The softest notes of falling rills,
The melodies of birds and bees,
The murmuring of summer seas.

I sometimes wonder how ever one can think of pausing to dissect into critical slices a lovely poem, when, as the first effect of reading it, one's blood should tingle all over with quivering delight. Such a person reminds me of the callous 'fingering slave' of Wordsworth's poem, 'who would peep and botanise Upon his mother's grave.' The first effects of reading a masterpiece should be almost electroscopic in sensitiveness and too thrilling for such cold critical operations.

Goethe said: "If thou wouldst understand a poem, thou must go with the poet to the poet's land." A willing suspension of disbelief, a perfect abandon, a free play of the imagination must be there in the reader. "The voice which is the voice of my poetry Without imagination cannot be heard," says Wordsworth. It has been well said: "Art relies, for its full effect, upon what the spectator brings with him." You should be willing and imaginative enough to sit with one poet, 'in embalmed darkness,' listening to the nightingale 'singing of summer in full-throated ease,' and share his ecstasy and delight. Here is another sitting in dejection, all alone, on a sandy beach, with 'the lightning of the noontide ocean flashing' round him, watching the sea's 'untrampled floor with green and purple sea-weeds strown,' seeing 'the waves upon the shore, Like light dissolved in star-showers, thrown,' and listening to a tone arising from the 'measured motion' of the waters before him. 'How sweet,' cries he, 'did any heart now share in my emotion!' It is for you to respond eagerly to his passionate call. Let us stand in reverential silence, and watch a son place a wreath of choicest flowers on his father's grave: "There dost thou lie, in the gloom Of the autumn evening. But ah! That word, *gloom*, to my mind Brings thee back in the light Of thy radiant vigour again!" With regard to such utterances the voice of cold criticism is hushed. Well might the spirits of the dead poets say to those who are impervious to the irresistible appeal of good poetry: "We have piped unto you and you have not danced; we have mourned unto you and you have not wept."

I should like to draw your attention next to an important consideration. Be it prose or be it verse, a good deal of its appeal is through the ear. In verse more than half its charm depends on the witchery of its music. The infinite modulations of the human voice, answering to the varied play of emotions, in a dramatic dialogue, are

audible only to the trained ear. "Lectio" or reading was rightly given the first place in the study of literature by the Greeks and the Romans. But this art is sadly neglected by the majority of our students. Many either rattle through their recitations or affect a disgustingly sing-song, tremulous tone which must make the Muse of Poetry shudder through all her limbs. Imagine one reading with a sentimentally quivering voice: "Twinkle, twinkle, little star, How I wonder what you are!", thinking that one's voice, calling upon the star to twinkle, must itself be tremulous! Quintillian, the famous rhetorician, denounces the recitation of verses 'degenerating into sing-song or effeminate modulations,' and quotes a remark made by Gaius Caesar,* when he was a boy, apparently made to a fellow student, who was reading some verses: "If you are singing, you are singing badly; if you are reading, you are singing." I have often heard the entrancing verses of Shakespeare, Milton, Shelley, Swinburne, read much in the same way as a grocer in our country reads his *Ramayan*, when he rests from his day's labour. You quote approvingly Tennyson's praise of Milton as the "mighty-mouthed inventor of harmonies, God-gifted organ voice of England." But how many of you have realised for yourselves the justice of this remark? How many of you have felt the effect of the solemn opening of the first book or of the third book of *Paradise Lost*, or of the description of Chaos in the second book, or of the prayer of Adam and Eve in the fifth? If you know how to read these passages, you cannot fail to feel the music winding through the majestic lines "in linked sweetness long drawn out," which is the poet's own description of organ music in the church. Shakespeare knew the value of effective elocution. He gives us, through Hamlet's mouth, his own views as to how actors should recite their parts. I wish you heard it from one of the most celebrated of Shakespeare actors of our time, Forbes-Robertson, whose recitation of the piece has been recorded for the gramophone. I quite realise the difficulties that we, Indians, are faced with in the matter of such correct elocution. It is almost impossible to eradicate the defect arising from these difficulties. I can only offer a sugges-

* Quintillian simply has "C. Caesar," Gaius Caesar (*Inst.* I. vii. 2). It may be questioned whether he refers to Julius Caesar or to Gaius Caesar, poet and orator, both of whom had Gaius as their praenomen. Cicero frequently refers to Julius Caesar as Gaius Caesar. But judging from the context, one might venture to conclude that Quintillian had in mind the orator rather than the dictator. In two other passages preceding this (*Inst.* I. v. 68; I. vii. 84.) he refers obviously to the orator under this name.

tion as a partial corrective. And it ought not to be difficult for the authorities of any educational institution to accept it. The gramophone should be pressed into service. Good recitation records by well-known elocutionists are procurable at a small cost. How largely their use has entered into the educational scheme of every civilised country except ours, will appear from a perusal of Mr. Thomas Beach's "Modern Language Teaching and Learning with Gramophone Records and Readers." Every educational institution in our country should possess the necessary apparatus for giving its students such a delightfully instructive treat. Is it not a treat, and a rare treat, to listen, as often as you desire, to Forbes-Robertson, Ellen Terry, Beerbohm Tree, Sybil Thorndyke, John Barrymore reciting from Shakespeare, John Drinkwater and Henry Newbolt reciting their own poems, Ripman, the phonetician, reading from standard writers of prose, or Professor Evans lecturing on Twentieth Century Poetry?

I am afraid you may be getting tired, and I shall not detain you longer than may be required to consider two more points of great importance. Practise reading with a pencil in hand, and go on making marginal summaries and comments of your own. Keep also a commonplace book in which you may transcribe striking passages, poetry or prose, from the books you read. But the best commonplace book is your own mind. Make it a storehouse of beautiful gems of thought and expression. Memory (*Mnemosyne*) was with the Greeks the mother of the Muses. Most great men were remarkable for their memory. Milton must have had a prodigious memory—almost every phrase in his writings done after his loss of sight bears testimony to his wide reading and retentive memory. Macaulay's feats of memory are proverbial. Once while crossing the Irish Channel, he was not allowed by the captain of his boat the use of a light to read by. He threw himself on a deck-chair and consoled himself by reciting the first two books of *Paradise Lost*, which was, as he afterwards said, as good as reading them. Ruskin knew almost the entire Bible by heart, and the grace and rhythmic beauty of his style was derived in no small measure from what has been rightly called "the noblest monument of English prose." In early systems of education memory was given a high place. The Greek boy had to know his Homer and the Roman lad his Vergil by heart. The average Persian (*Irani*, as he would prefer to call himself now) can quote freely

from Hafiz and Sa'adi ; and we in our country are familiar even in these degenerate days with scholars of the older type, who can recite verbatim texts and their commentaries. In the public schools in England, the day's lesson begins with the boys reciting from memory the set portions of the appointed books of Greek and Latin verse. If your mind is well stored that way, you will prove a formidable adversary for anybody to cope with, and what is more, you can never be left alone with the harpies of the mind. Those glorious utterances of comfort and strength and pure delight made by the master spirits of the world will flash, like the daffodils of Wordsworth, upon the mind within, which is the bliss of solitude.

I shall now end with a few observations on another important matter. It is generally complained that our young men do not give adequate attention to the practice of writing. As a rule they write bad English ; and it is often pleaded as an excuse that English is a language foreign to them. I admit the truth of the complaint, but do not accept the plea. A foreigner has undoubtedly formidable difficulties lying in his way. He cannot be expected to write with that familiar ease and in that delightfully daring manner which is natural to the educated native. But I firmly believe that it is within the reach of any intelligent man to acquire the capacity of writing the least bad style in any foreign language, if only he exerts himself in the right direction. If a student writes bad English, his Bengali composition too would, on inspection, be found equally bad. What really matters is not nationality but a proper linguistic sense, a careful study of good models in earlier years, a habit of clear thinking, above all, a strong will to do the right thing. I knew a Persian lad from Samarkand, who wrote and spoke English with perfect ease after only three years' practice. An Italian girl whom I met in the house of an English friend, gave me a surprise when she told me that she was Italian, her English was so perfect and without the least taint of foreign accent ; and two years before I met her, she spoke only Italian. An Italian friend of mine speaks and writes English with fluency, though when he had landed at Bombay five years before I met him, he had no English in him. I have been shown English essays written by German lads after only a year's practice, which would do credit to many a graduate of our country.

The real defect in our system of teaching English here lies in the mistake we make in trying to teach it through high class literature

right from the earliest stage. You cannot learn a living language so. It is quicker and better learnt through the ear than through the eye. Actual and familiar contact with men, whose mother-tongue it is, is the best teacher. But conditioned as we are, this is but an idle dream. Matters, however, could be to a large extent improved by giving young boys in the first stage to read little primers and story books, written by Englishmen for use in England by English children, nursery tales and rhymes, and by calling in the aid of mechanical apparatus like the gramophone. I do not believe in teaching a foreign language through lessons adapted only to a setting familiar to the young learner. Little primers for teaching French to English boys have a French colouring throughout. I would say to a young learner of English: Make an early and familiar acquaintance with these unpretentious little books designedly written for little ones in simple English of everyday use. At a later stage read a large number of modern plays. Standard writers of an earlier date can wait until a good foundation has thus been laid. In writing your themes, be sure you have something to say. Arrange your thoughts. Never make an attempt at fine writing. Do not use two words when one may do. Exercise the strictest control on a tendency to be rhetorical. In your composition exercises, cut out the passages you consider to be fine with a merciless pen, revise your draft over and over until all your purple passages look rather drab. Then in all probability you may have attained the correct style. Remember always that the best style is the simplest and direct expression of thought—thought clearly and sincerely worked out previously in the mind. Study the best models of clear and simple and effective expression, but do not hope to imitate the masters. We can never wield the club of Hercules. R. L. Stevenson, of course in his experimental stage, "played," as he says, "the sedulous ape" to a great many stylists, before he developed that charming style of his own. But he was a genius. We shall only injure ourselves by imitating his method.

I must now say good-bye to you. But before I sit down I will only say that whatever you put your hand to, do it for the pleasure of doing it. Remember that "though the success of the market is in the reward, true success is in the doing." If the reward does not come, if you feel disappointed at your merits not being adequately valued in terms of Rupees, annas and pies, you may console yourselves with the thought that the world does not always reward its best workers. In

the memorable words of the Persian poet, Hafiz, "Too often are the withers of an Arab horse wrung by the pack-saddle, while we behold a gold chain dangling round the neck of a silly ass."

Let me conclude by repeating to you some of the noblest words that ever sanctified human lips, words which were uttered in this sacred land of ours centuries ago, but which, to our shame be it said, sound unfamiliar to our degenerate ears. The Hindu University of Benares has done well in adopting a part of this, the oldest charge to disciples on record, as the Vice-Chancellor's charge to graduates at the Convocation : *सत्यं वद, Speak the truth. धर्मं चर, Walk thou in the Way of Righteousness which sustaineth thee. स्वाध्यायान् मा प्रमदः, Let not thy mind wander away from thy studies. सत्यान् न प्रमदितव्यम्, Swerve not from the truth. धर्मान् न प्रमदितव्यम्, Let not thy feet wander from the Way of Righteousness which sustaineth thee. कुशलान् न प्रमदितव्यम्, Be not remiss in doing things that make for thy good. धृष्ट्या न प्रमदितव्यम्, Neglect not to acquire spiritual wealth. आचार्यप्रशिक्षणात्मां न प्रमदितव्यम्, Be not unmindful of what thou hast already learnt and of what thou hast to teach. देवपितृकर्मात्मां न प्रमदितव्यम्, Slacken not thine energy in acts of piety towards the gods and thy forbears. मातृदेवो ऽव, Regard thy mother as thy deity. पितृदेवो ऽव, Be thy father as a god unto thee. आचार्यदेवो ऽव, Revere thy preceptor as thou wouldst a god. अतिथिदेवो ऽव, Honour thy guest as if he were a god. यानि अनवयानि कर्त्तव्यानि तानि सेवितव्यानि, नो ईतराणि, Whatsoever things are blameless, those shalt thou do ; act thou not otherwise. प्रददा देवम्, Whatsoever thou wouldst give, give it in a spirit of reverence. अप्रददाह देवम्, Give it not in a churlish spirit of irreverence. प्रिया देवम्, Give in a measure proportioned to thy means. ह्रिया देवम्, Bestow gifts with a humble heart. विद्या देवम्, Have fear lest thou shouldst wound the feelings of him unto whom thou givest. संविदा देवम्, Give in a spirit of friendliness and love."*

Listen now to the prayer of the disciple : *शरीरं मे विदर्शय, May I keep fit in body. जिह्वा मे मधुमत्तया, May my tongue drop words sweet as honey. कर्णमां कुरि विश्रवम्, Precepts many may mine ears be open to receive. ह्यशो जनेऽहसानि, May good fame among men be mine. श्रेयान् ब्रह्मोऽहसानि, May I rise superior to the worldly rich. अबतु माम्, Give me thy protection, O Lord! अबतु ब्रह्मरम्, Protect thou my preceptor too.*

I do not know of a more elevating prayer for both teacher and taught than this : *सह नो वद, May men speak well of us both. सह नो ब्रह्मवर्चसम्, May we both feel within us the divine afflatus. सहचार्य*

করবারই, May the strength needed for acquiring wisdom be ours.
 তেজস্বি নাবলীভবজ, May what we have studied together shine forth in
 all its glory and strength. যা বিঘ্নিবারই, Let not the mind of either
 of us be sullied with rancour and malice. ও শান্তি, শান্তি, শান্তি, Peace
 be unto all.

I thank you for the patient hearing you have given me. In his
 treatise on Moral Duties (*De Officiis*), Cicero sums up the qualities
 which best can win a good name for a young man, as "*modestia
 cum pietate in parentes, in suos benevolentia*," sobriety of behaviour,
 accompanied by a loving and dutiful regard for parents and goodwill
 unto his own. May that good name be yours !



EVOLUTION OF HAMLET'S PERSONALITY

DR. MOHINIMOHAN BHATTACHERJEE, M.A., PH.D., P.R.S.

IT has been remarked that in *Hamlet* two incongruous elements have been brought together, which could not possibly be harmonised—the personality of the Prince and the story of which he is the central figure. The latter is coarse, while the former is polished. One is traceable to legendary times, while the other is the product of the sixteenth. One belongs to the Iron Age, while the other is the outcome of the Italian Renaissance. According to one critic, “Shakespeare could not make a psychologically or otherwise consistent play out of a plot which retained a strictly barbaric action, while the hero was transformed into a super-subtle Elizabethan.”¹

It is the personality of the Prince that distinguishes Shakespeare's drama from other revenge plays of the Elizabethan Age, which resemble it closely in respect of their plots, and each of which might have been its prototype. The *Spanish Tragedy* of Kyd, Marston's *Antonio and Mellida* and *Malcontent* belong to this category and may be regarded as having exercised some influence—however distant and slight it might have been—on the composition of *Hamlet*. Antonio, who is pressed for revenge by the ghost of his father Andragio (in *Antonio's Revenge*, second part of *Antonio and Mellida*), reminds one of the Danish Prince. The Duke in *Malcontent*, who pretends madness and speaks poignant truths, does the same. Like Hamlet, Hieronimo feigns madness, procrastinates, thinks of suicide but desists, is a writer of verse, arranges a dramatic entertainment, gives directions to the players and discourses on comedy and tragedy. He meets his end in avenging the murder of his son, as Hamlet died in his effort to avenge his father's murder. But the personality of Hamlet raises Shakespeare's play to quite a different plane of literary creation.

It not only constitutes the dramatic unity of the tragedy, but is responsible for its mysterious and undefined charm which is without a parallel. Neither the Danish History of Saxo, nor even Belleforest's *Histoires Tragiques* leads the reader to expect a drama with

¹ J. M. Robertson, *The Problem of Hamlet*, p. 74.

a unique appeal like the tragedy of the Prince of Denmark. If its sources were to give any indication, it should have been a mere typical revenge play, and in the end Hamlet should have waded through the blood of his uncle to the throne. And this is exactly what happened in the original story. Had Shakespeare been only a Senecan, *Hamlet*, having its sources in Saxo and Belleforest, would have been a pseudo-classical tragedy. Sententious speeches would have been far more important than action, and horror and bloodshed would have been its main *motifs*. If, again, contemporary Italian novels—so much in vogue in Elizabethan England—had obsessed Shakespeare, machinations of villains, secret poisoning, treachery and betrayal would have been its most noticeable features. As it is, in Shakespeare's play the personality of the Prince—in its mysterious suggestiveness and profundity—stands out above all other appeal.

It is impossible to fathom the mystery which has been intensified by contributions from a variety of sources. The stages of its growth can only be noted. The evolution of Hamlet's personality from its germ in Saxo to its mature bloom in Shakespeare, is interesting study, but is a pretty vast subject. Just one aspect of it will be dealt with here, *viz.*, the transmutation of the barbaric and unscrupulous Amleth into the brilliant and charming Prince of Denmark.

Part of the charm of Hamlet may be traced to the infusion of the Renaissance ideal of courtesy. This had been popularised in England by translations of Italian courtesy books, and specially by Hoby's *Courtier*. The latter had attracted the admiration of men like Ascham, Harvey, Sidney and the poet Spenser whose *Fairie Qucene*, Bk. VI, is an allegory of the virtue of courtesy. This Renaissance ideal was in the air, so to say, in Elizabethan England, and Shakespeare had breathed it in. Its trace in *Hamlet* may be brought out by a comparison of Shakespeare's hero with Saxo's and Belleforest's, and of the two portraits of the Prince as painted in the two Quartos.

The First Quarto of *Hamlet* is regarded by some as Shakespeare's first draft of the play, and the Second Quarto as an improvement on it. Others, however, think that the latter represents the completed work of Shakespeare, and is based on his autograph manuscript, while the former is only a piratical reprint of it, extremely mutilated. These views are partly suggested by different interpretations of the declaration on the title-page of the Quarto of 1605, which,

however, makes it clear that the Second was intended to supersede the First Quarto. The "true and perfect coppie" might have been the "enlarged" version—the product of revision and elaboration by the dramatist (of his work as published in 1603). It might also mean Shakespeare's first and complete draft, the abridged or mutilated version of which had come out in 1603. Revision and recasting were common in Shakespeare's days, while an abridgement of a play to half its original size, with changes of the names of some of its principal characters, is rather unlikely, though a slight pruning is quite possible. If, therefore, it is true that Shakespeare revised his earlier work in the Second Quarto, the result of the revision has been to introduce those touches and to emphasise those attributes of Hamlet, which were suggested by the Renaissance ideal of personal excellence.

In the *Cortegiano*, which was the most popular hand-book of Renaissance courtesy, mention is made of comprehensive culture, including interest in poetry, painting, music, etc., physical beauty, skill in handling arms, sense of honour, wit, gift of speech and popularity as the necessary qualifications of a courtier. Capacity for noble love and sincere friendship is also insisted on. Hamlet in Shakespeare is rich in all these, while his prototype in Saxo and in Belleforest hardly reveals any trace of them.

It is conceivable that Shakespeare had modelled the Prince on the hero of the *Ur-Hamlet*, which he is believed to have had before him when preparing his first draft. As Kyd's play has been lost, Shakespeare's obligation to his predecessor can only be a matter of conjecture. But from what is known of him and his work, the conclusion is irresistible that Kyd had hardly any sympathy for the culture of the Renaissance, and that his hero, like Hieronimo in the *Spanish Tragedy*, only delighted in bloodshed and revenge. If, as the Cambridge editors suggest, portions of the old play "are still preserved in the Quarto of 1603," which represents Shakespeare's first draft, they cannot possibly bear on those qualities of Hamlet which have made his personality so attractive. These, therefore, must be Shakespeare's own contribution, suggested by the ideas of personal excellence transplanted in England from Renaissance Italy.

Saxo belonged to the twelfth century, and it would be futile to look for traces of culture in his hero, which were inconceivable in his own age. Belleforest's work belonged indeed to the sixteenth century, but it closely followed Saxo's. It, however, represents his temptress as the

Prince's lover, and mentions his "overgreat melancholy." Shakespeare follows Belleforest on these two points, but with some reservation. Love in the latter is the ordinary earthly passion. Hamlet's love of Ophelia is more refined, and certainly elevates his character. The Renaissance amorists regarded such love as the mark of a noble soul. It is the subject of the impassioned speech of Bembo in Book IV of the *Cortegiano*, and of the discourses of many other courtesy books. "I lov'de Ofelia as deere as twenty brothers could," declares Hamlet to Laertes on the burial-ground (Q. 1). This noble love is to be contrasted with the vulgar passion of Amleth (as mentioned in Saxo), and is set in relief against the dark background of the Queen's adultery and incest. The poignant speeches of Hamlet to Ophelia, prompted by his mother's misconduct, also bring into prominence his conception of true love.

Saxo's Amleth, as much Belleforest's, is a cruel and unscrupulous prince stung by the thought that he has been deprived of his rightful inheritance by his wicked uncle who has also seduced his mother, and Amleth's chief object is to occupy the throne. If this involves the punishment of the seducer, it has to be inflicted. He deliberately simulates madness to achieve his end. In Belleforest's *Hystorie of Hamblet* the prince says: "Seeing that by force I cannot effect my desire, Reason alloweth me by dissimulation, subtilities and secret practises to proceed therein." He waits for his chance, and when he has it, he cruelly burns down the whole palace with all its inmates, though his uncle is not there, only to weaken his support. He next kills him, and mounts the throne. In the First Quarto, Hamlet's desire for revenge is given greater prominence than his ambition for the throne.¹ In Shakespeare Hamlet once checks his temptation of killing the King when he is at prayer. Whatever may have been his reason this time, he has already made up his mind not to take any step against the King before confirmation of the Ghost's story. This means putting off his opportunity of mounting the throne, and actually his tragic end deprives him of it altogether. The mental attitude of Hamlet is what Castiglione would call *honesty*. "In this is comprehended the goodnesse, the wisdom, the manlinesse and temperance of the mind and all other qualities that belong to

¹ J. D. Wilson, *What Happens in Hamlet*, p. 121.

so worthy a name" ¹ Contrasting Hamlet's irresolution with Laertes's brilliant impetuosity, Prof. Dover Wilson remarks: "In the field of action Laertes puts him utterly to shame. But decision and determination do not make *character*, though the world thinks so. There is also nobility and generosity, *honour* and *integrity* of soul, and in this sphere Hamlet shines "like a star i'th' darkest night" against the base iniquity of his opponents." ²

There is nothing common between Amleth and the Prince of Denmark except a little subtlety and desire for revenge. "All the differences of motive between Shakespeare and Saxo depend on their different conceptions of the prince's character, Amleth being quite sane and quite resolute and Hamlet neither." ³ Hamlet is, as Ophelia says, a *courtier*, *scholar* and *soldier* at the same time. He is a student of Philosophy in the University of Wittenberg, a skilled swordsman and an accomplished youth who would be an ornament of any court. He is—to use an expression rendered familiar in later times—a scholar-gentleman. Neither Belleforest's nor Saxo's Amleth has any pretension to such distinction. Hamlet as a soldierly scholar-gentleman is only a replica of the Renaissance courtier. Says Castiglione: "Beside goodness the true and principall ornament of the mind in every man are *letters*." "I returne again unto our courtier whom in *letters* I will have to be more than indifferently well seen, at the least in those studies which they call *Humanity*." Again, "Neither should I want the examples of so many excellent captains of old times, which all joined the *ornament of letters* with *proweesse of armes*." The courtier has also to be conversant with the classics, history and other branches of knowledge.

Hamlet's portrait in the First Quarto is retouched in the Second. There are undoubtedly in the latter a more profound contemplativeness and a greater dramatic propriety in the Prince's character. For example, his scepticism and hesitancy, just noticeable in the First Quarto, intensify in the Second, while the reason for scepticism is given as theological doubt. Being about half the size of the Second Quarto, the First contains only in an abbreviated form those 'passages of mingled

¹ *The Courtier*, Bk. I.

² *What Happens in Hamlet*, pp. 275-76.

³ Introduction to *The Tragical History of Amleth Prince of Iuland* by Saxo Grammaticus, tr. O. Elton.

philosophy and imaginative eloquence which, elaborated in the Second, give the drama its distinguishing note.' But the personality of Hamlet too has here been made more brilliant and more impressive and hence more attractive to the modern mind. For example, Claudius's description of Hamlet as "*our chiefest courtier*" appears for the first time in the Second Quarto.

Claudius's tribute to Hamlet's *nobility of soul*, of which he is eager to take full advantage in his conspiracy with Laertes, is sincere and well-deserved :

" Most generous and free from all contriving."

But this line is introduced for the first time in the Second Quarto. Hamlet's goodness shines forth again in his feelings towards Laertes as revealed towards its end. " That is Laertes, a very noble youth," he exclaims to Horatio, as he notices him in the funeral procession. The line does not occur in the First Quarto. Hamlet's apologies to his opponent before the duel are also fuller and more sincere in the Second than in the First Quarto.

Aristotle's and Cicero's thoughts on friendship had strongly appealed to Renaissance writers who glorified this virtue as they glorified love. Castiglione thinks that a courtier cannot do without it, and writes: " Without this perfect friendship men were much more unluckie than all other living creatures"¹. Undoubtedly one of the few delightful features of *Hamlet* with its gruesome and revolting surroundings—treachery, espionage, lust and bloodshed—is the bond of affection between the Prince and Horatio. Saxo as well as Belleforest mentions a foster-brother who informs the hero of the King's plot to tempt him through a girl. The transformation of this informant into Horatio reveals the influence of Renaissance courtesy on Shakespeare. Friendship exists only between people of like nature. Hence the mere acquaintance develops into Hamlet's fellow-student in the University, sharing his thoughts and feelings, brave, sceptical and generous like the Prince. There is indeed some obvious difference between the two, and this is why Horatio is a foil to Hamlet.

Horatio as friend is seen to better advantage in the Second Quarto. The magnificent lines in which the Prince expresses his sincere appreciation of his character appear only here (III. ii. 63-74 of current text). Again, Horatio's recognition of Hamlet's love and solicitude for him,

¹ *The Courtier*, Bk. I.

comes out in two lines which are also introduced here for the first time:

" I do not know from what part of the world
I should be greeted, if not from Lord Hamlet."

Hamlet's intellectual culture—fostered, no doubt, by his residence in the University—is revealed in his depth of insight and literary taste. As Rosencrantz says, he takes "such delight" in dramatic performances, and is keenly interested in the players. He is apt at literary work too, and can possibly compose a play—at any rate, he composes a passage and inserts it at the appropriate place in the play which is going to be staged. Castiglione says: "There arose . . . from time to time, not only in Tuscane but in all Italy, among gentlemen brought up in court, in armes and in lettere, some studie to speake and to write more finely than they did in the first rude age when the turmoil of the miseries that rose through barbarous nations, was not as yet quieted." The poems recited by Hamlet now and then (during his pretended madness) may in some cases be traced by scholars to old ballads, but some of them, at any rate, are intended to appear as his own improvisation.¹ As originally conceived, Hamlet had indeed a poetic temperament, but his power of versification is expressly mentioned in the Second Quarto. Horatio remarks, after the play is over: "You might have rimed." Cultured men, according to Castiglione, were expected to have some proficiency in writing verses. He says: "Let him (the courtier) much exercise himself in poets, and also in writing both rime and prose."

Oratory was considered a great accomplishment in the classical age. Its revival was only to be expected during the Renaissance, and the art of speaking with proper pronunciation, pause and emphasis and without gesticulation, is recommended by Castiglione to the courtier. The latter requires "a good voice, not too subtil or soft as in a woman: nor yet so boisterous and rough as in one of the countrie, but shril, clear, sweete and well-framed with prompt pronunciation and with fit manners and gestures . . . with a moving of the eyes that may give a grace and accorde with the wordes." Says Guazzo: "It is much in my opinion to keepe a certain majesty in the gesture which speaketh as it were by using silence . . . yet hereby is required such a moderation that a man with too little be not immovable like

¹ The poem in his letter to Ophelia is certainly his own composition.

an image, neither with too much, too busy like an ape—the pronunciation be neither too swift nor too slow—lastly, *the voice* must be neither faint like one that is sick . . . *neither shrill nor loud* like a crier. One should avoid a player-like kinde of lightness and see the *woordes agree to the gesture*”¹ The influence of these admonitions may be traced even in the First Quarto in Hamlet's advice to the players: “Pronounce me this speech trippingly on the tongue as I taught thee, etc.” In the Second Quarto a few more lines are introduced, emphasising the value of appropriate and natural gesture, *viz.*, “Let your own discretion be your tutor. *Suit the action to the word, the word to the action* ; with the special observance, that you o'er-step not the modesty of nature ; for anything so over-done is from the purpose of playing whose end . . . is to hold, as it were, the mirror up to nature.” The importance of elocution is made more distinct in these lines. They are not wholly a comment on contemporary acting.

Italian courtesy includes love of fine arts like music and painting. In the *Courtier* there is a lengthy discussion on the relative value of painting and sculpture. Painting includes drawing which helps military officers to prepare plans of the enemy's fortifications, etc., but the brush and the canvas help people to appreciate the beauty of human form, its symmetry and proportion—“the beauty of lively bodies, and not only in the sweetness of the phisiognomie, but in the proportion of all the rest as well in men as other living creatures.”² Hamlet's reference to the portraits of his father and uncle even in the First Quarto shows how keen his appreciation of human form and “phisiognomie” is :

“ See here a face, to outface Mars himselfe,
An eye, at which his foes did tremble at,
A front wherein all vertues are set downe
For to adorne a King, and guild his crowne . . .
Looke you now, here is your husband,
With a face like Vulcan,
A looke fit for a murder and a rape,
A dull dead hanging looke, and a hell-bred eye.”

The alterations in the passage in the Second Quarto suggest a keener aesthetic sense in the Prince in consonance with his more impressive

¹ *Civil Conversation*, tr. G. F. tie, Bk. III.

² *The Courtier*, Bk. I.

personality in it. *Grace* is mentioned by Italian writers on courtesy as an undefined source of beauty, and Hamlet says to Gertrude :

" See what a *grace* was seated on this browe :
Hyperions curls, the front of Jove himselfe,
An eye like Mars, to threaten and command . . .
A combination *and* a form indeed—"

What distinguishes painting from sculpture is the use of colours which provide a veritable feast for the eye. Castiglione describes rapturously the firmament itself as a superb painting: " The ensigne of the world that we behold with a large skye, so bright with shining starres, and in the middest, the earth, environed with the seas, severed in partes with hilles, dales, and rivers, and so decked with such divers trees, beautiful flowers and herbe, a man may say it to be a noble and great painting, drawen with the hand of Nature and of God." The pictorial sense which underlies this passage, may be paralleled by that in Hamlet's famous speech to his schoolmates in the Second Quarto, which, curiously enough, is almost similarly phrased, and which is one of the finest prose pieces written by Shakespeare: " This goodly frame the earth seemes to mee a sterill promontorie; this most excellent canopie the ayre, looke you, this *brave* o'er-hanging firmament, this majesticall rooffe fretted with *golden fire*, why, it appeareth nothing to me but a foule and pestilent congregation of vapoures." In the First Quarto the passage is shorter and has hardly any artistic merit unconnected with the trend of the dialogue :

" —this great world you see contents me not,
No nor the spangled heavens, nor earth nor sea,
No nor Man that is so glorious a creature."

Skill in fencing was regarded as a much-needed accomplishment of the courtier. It was an important form of physical exercise too. Castiglione would expect him " to have understanding in all exercises of the body that belong to a man of warre . . . to be skilful in those weapons that are used ordinarily among gentlemen." Italy's influence is to be seen in the origin and growth of a special literature on duelling in England. " Material from Muzio's *Il Duello* appeared in an unacknowledged translation as *Vincentio Saviolo his Practice* (1565). The second book of this was in turn abridged as *The Booke of*

Honour and Armes (1590)."¹ Italian influence is further noticeable in the weapons latterly used in duels in Elizabethan England. Rapier and dagger were the two Italian weapons which came into use there in the sixteenth century in place of the English national weapons like the sword and the axe. Prof. Dover Wilson mentions that at the time when *Hamlet* was staged, three varieties of sword-play were possible: "sword-and-buckler-play, the old English fashion of fighting with the short broad-sword in one hand and light target in the other; single rapier-play . . . and thirdly, rapier-and-dagger-play. At the end of the sixteenth century English methods had given place with persons of fashion to the rapier-play imported from abroad, and the sword-and-buckler men were regarded as out of date. Single rapier, moreover, was less favoured at the moment than rapier and dagger." Hamlet and Laertes played with these two weapons. That proficiency in fencing was recognised as a courtly accomplishment in Elizabethan days, is more clearly brought out in the Second Quarto than in the First. The report of Laond's admiration of Laertes's swordmanship by the King (in about 10 lines), appears for the first time in the Second Quarto. The Courtier who is sent as an emissary by the King to lure Hamlet to the fencing-match (named Osric in the current text) has really no prototype in the First Quarto. "The Braggart Gentleman" is hardly a tempter, and really corresponds to the Lord who in the Second Quarto comes to summon Hamlet to "attend him (the King) in the hall." Though just a sentence or two regarding the wager (included in the speeches of the Courtier in the Second Quarto) is put into his mouth, he does not "praise the excellence of Laertes with his weapon, in order to excite the envy of the Prince." The Courtier in Q. 2 praises Laertes as "an *absolute gentleman* newly come to court, full of most *excellent differences*, of very soft society . . . *the calendar of gentry*." This encomium and the attributing to him of perfect swordmanship 'in which bee's unfellowed,' show the value attached to fencing in the play.

In Q. 1 the match is briefly described, and is a comparatively tame affair. In Q. 2 the circumstances are showy, and the stage-setting more attractive. The King makes a pompous speech, and

¹ J. E. Mason, *Gentlefolk in the Making*, p. 49.

² *What Happens in Hamlet*, pp. 275-80.

when Hamlet wins the first bout, trumpets sound, Claudius drinks to his health, and canon are fired in his honour. This is certainly "the most thrilling climax to the most thrilling play of all times."

Hamlet's fondness for swordsmanship and his skill in it are also brought out more clearly in Q. 2. Here, more than in Q. 1, the King emphasises how the Prince grew envious of Laertes when Lamond described the latter's perfection as a fencer. When Horatio drops a hint in Q. 2 that he might lose the wager, Hamlet replies: "I do not thinke so; since he went into France, I have bene in continual practise." The King also expresses in Q. 2 his confidence in the ultimate victory of Hamlet when he has seen his performance for a while with his own eyes. After the second bout he speaks out: "Our sonne shall winne." This may be "well-simulated glee," but it is Hamlet's scoring that prompts it. Laertes's 'poisoned sharp' has not as yet been able to touch Hamlet, and when he tells the King, "My lord, I'll hit him now," the latter 'doubts his capacity to pass Hamlet's guard,' and rejoins, "I do not think't."

Wit was not a characteristic mark either of the Philosopher of ancient Greece, or of the Roman Orator; but it was regarded as an accomplishment in Renaissance Italy, and Castiglione thinks that the courtier 'shall never want merry conceites to provoke' laughter.¹ The Italian author is here referring to pleasant humour which is the salt of conversation. In Hamlet, who is of an abnormal and almost a pathological mental condition, it reveals itself as mordant wit. Belleforest's Amleth as well as Saxo's may come in here for comparison with the Prince, for there is a superficial resemblance amongst them in this respect. But really the Amleths are wordy and ambiguous, without the intellectual depth out of which humour or wit issues. None of the two has any occasion to speak except on matters connected with his design to fulfil his revenge, and his equivocation is meant only to screen him against the King's spies. Hamlet's character is many-sided, and there is full scope for his brilliant wit and mental powers. These are shown to better advantage in the Second Quarto than in the First.

According to Castiglione a courtier should possess qualities which win the affection of common people. "By virtue of his many qualities the courtier getteth him a reputation, specially among the multitude unto whom a man must sometime apply himself."²

¹ *The Courtier*, Bk. II.

² *The Courtier*, Bk. I.

Hamlet is a more popular figure in the Second Quarto than in the First. In the former Claudius tells Laertes frankly that one of the reasons why he could not proceed against the Prince for the murder of Polonius, is

"—the great love the generall gender beare him,
Who, dipping all his faults in theyr affection,
Worke, like the spring that turneth wood to stone,
Convert his Givens to graces—"

This passage has no parallel in the First Quarto, and nothing corresponding to it appears in Saxo or in Belleforest. But apart from blind admiration for Hamlet hinted at in it, the people felt real attraction for his manners and courtesy which were the objects of their emulation. This is emphasised in the Second Quarto. Ophelia's celebrated estimate of Hamlet is more briefly expressed in Q. 1 than in Q. 2. As against

"The courtier, scholler, souldier, all in him.
All dasht and splinterd thence—"

the Second Quarto has this passage:

"O what a noble mind is heere o'rethrowne!
The courtier's, souldiers, schollers eye, tongue, sword,
Th' expectation, and rose of the faire state,
The glasse of fashion, and the mould of forme,
Th' observ'd of all observers, quite quite down . . .
That unmatcht forme, and stature of blowne youth
Blasted with extacie."

The last passage together with the King's speech to Laertes, has certainly the effect of modifying Shakespeare's original conception of the personality of Hamlet.

PLAY

M. N. BANERJEE, M.A.

Banckī

THERE is apt to be a good deal of loose thinking about the term "Play." Most of us look upon it as something frivolous and childish—a blind unpurposive activity serving at best as a mere relaxation from the serious occupations of life with its strain and tension. But rightly understood, it is no simple phenomenon. It has a significance, very wide and deep. It will be found that it is the one dominant note of the Universe, the great Demi-urge of life itself. A school of Indian Philosophers and thinkers has tried to solve the eternal Sphinx-riddle of the creation of the Universe by attributing it to Divine play. The One Supreme Reality, timeless and changeless, chooses to be many and in a mood of sportive dalliance, unrolls this vast cosmic panorama in Time and Space, with its pansy hues, its ever-renewed and ever-renewing rhythm and melody. Divine creative activity, with its eternal process of self-differentiation and its ceaseless pattern-weaving of changeless Being into ever-changing becoming, has thus its roots in the play-spirit. Similarly, all the highest human activity which is a reflection of and akin to Divine activity is also marked by the spirit of play.

Psychologists have put forward various interesting and important theories to explain the native tendency to play in man. We have, first of all, the Schiller Spencer theory regarding play, that it is a mere formless discharge of a surplus of energy. More important is the anticipatory teleological theory, first adumbrated by Malebranche and later developed by Karl Groos, emphasising the essence of play to be its biological utility, in that all play in men anticipates the future activities of their adult lives and prepares them for the serious business of manhood. Then we have the reminiscence theory of Professor Stanley Hall, according to which, in play, "the child is not so much rehearsing the serious activities of his own adult life as barking back to and recapitulating those of his remote ancestors." Lastly, we have what we may call the Cathartic theory of play, according to

which play provides an outlet for the discharge of pent-up instincts and emotions which cannot find sufficient direct expression in life.

Now a study of the various theories referred to above, which are complementary rather than contradictory, will reveal to us the complex and momentous nature of the phenomenon of play. It will be brought home to us that play is no mere aimless or formless discharge of energy but is joyful, spontaneous, creative activity, in which man finds his fullest self-expression. It is a free natural unfolding of inner impulses. It is an activity which, to borrow the paradoxical phrase of Kant, is "Purposive without any purpose," i.e., it is something pursued spontaneously for no end beyond itself. It is enjoyed for its own sake and is its own reward. From this, however, it must not be taken that it is entirely aimless. It has a direction and a purpose, and an ideal to be pursued and realised. But the purpose is self-imposed and the ideal self-prescribed. The fact of the matter is that in play the liberated human personality becomes so inseparably inwoven with the purpose or ideal that the goal is lost in the pursuit, the end in the means, the player melts into the play and the music goes on, ringing out the rhythm of perfect freedom and joy.

The essential features and characteristics of play may be stated as follows:—

- (1) A feeling of freedom and spontaneity ;
- (2) Self-forgetfulness of the individual, followed by complete absorption in the activity in hand ;
- (3) Functional delight, the gratification derived from the play, is immediate, being inherent in the activity itself.

All good play taps abundant stores of psychic energy—the entire gamut of connative resources which, pooled and mobilised, lead to the greatest efficiency in all mental effort. Man's highest achievements have been reached in the spirit of play. The greatest geniuses are those that have brought to bear upon their work the same forgetfulness, the same go and abandon, the same complete identification with the activity in hand, that the play spirit signifies. In fact, to achieve anything of solid and permanent value we must cultivate the cult of "Peter-Pantheism." Emerson, with his intuitive vision and calm luminous wisdom, hits off the true inwardness of the play spirit even in the higher planes of life when he says: "The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory,

and to do something without knowing how or why . . . ' A man,' said Cromwell, ' never rises so high as when he knows not whither he is going.' "

In the sphere of art, the play spirit is best exemplified. To be a successful actor, the real key to success lies in forgetting himself in the identity of the rôle—the actor should merge body and soul into that of the character assumed and feel thoroughly to be the personality of the would-be or the would-have-been character which he or she represents.

Similarly, the play spirit permeates man's highest ethical activity also. One cannot attain the highest degree of moral perfection, if one were merely to react to the inhibitive pressure of a censorious monitor. " Merely intellectual assent to the categorical imperative produces ethical theory, only a volitional consent to the moral ' ought ' produces stereotyped goodness," but it is the unconditional surrender by the whole personality to the ' ought ' of moral values that produces true morality—morality that is creative. Moral activity to be worth the salt must be performed joyfully and spontaneously with a minimum of external compulsion and restraint.

Lastly, the play spirit dominates and includes all the workings of the new spirit in education. Thoughtful educationists all insist that the whole of education should be conducted in the spirit of play, the ' play-way ' being the formula which sums up the modern spirit in education. The Montessori method with its " didactic apparatus " and " sensory gymnastics," the Heuristic method of Prof. Armstrong, seeking to " put the pupil in the position of the discoverer and to give him the elation of ' some watcher of the skies when a new planet swims into his ken,' " the Project method stressing the need of problematic acts being carried to completion in their natural setting, the Dalton plan with its assignments and contract system, are the many and various attempts made by the educationists to seek a universal method of education based essentially on the ' play-way '.

Thus, we will have, by now, realised something of the complex and momentous nature of the phenomenon of play, its subtle ubiquitousness, permeating every department of human activity, every walk and endeavour of life. It is through play alone that man discovers himself and is enabled to live creatively, growing ever into the rich fullness of his being.

MEANING OF TRUTH IN PRAGMATISM

DHIRENDRA N. ROY, M.A., PH.D.

THE use of the conception of "truth," as Dr. Schiller says, is a habit peculiar to man. We use the word often, indeed, but when asked what it really means we find difficulty in defining it. Any attempt to express the meaning of truth by a mere synonym has not yet proved successful. Its meaning has sometimes been hinted at by reference to its opposite falsity, and by contrast with good and beautiful, which similarly possess antithetical predicates in the bad and the ugly. The meaning of truth, therefore, needs more than a word; it needs a combination of meaningful words into a phrase expressive of a complete thought, or more logically, a proposition.

There has always been some controversy among philosophers in their attempt to give an exact meaning to truth. To the naïve unreflective mind it simply means the agreement of thought with thing or, as Mr. Baillie puts it, of the object-as-it-is-for-consciousness with the object-as-it-is-in-itself. Such a "representative" or "copy" theory, as it is called, is not accepted by many thinkers, inasmuch as it makes facts out of would-be facts prior to knowledge. The object-as-it-is-in-itself is a mere abstraction, and, therefore, cannot present itself before the act of knowing. The theory faces more and more criticisms when it takes for granted "an independent reality to which thought is supposed to correspond" in a more or less passive way and when knowledge is made simply a "faithful transcript" of nature.

To avoid this difficulty some thinkers have taken shelter in subjective idealism and sought truth in the region of thought alone. Instead of correspondence, they have made consistency or internal coherence of ideas the real test of truth. According to this view, then, even the vision of an air-castle is true, if it fits in with the ideas already held true in us. The value of this consistency theory, however, lies in the realization that there is an inner side of truth, that reality can only be comprehended through experience and that "truth cannot be described as an external relation between propositions and reality" as the correspondence theory would advocate.

Another class of thinkers tried to avoid the correspondence theory by discarding the dualistic conception and introducing a theory of absolute monism. They made truth a synonym for reality or ultimate reality as Mr. Bradley would like to put it. "Truth," says he, "is the whole universe realising itself in one aspect."¹ Such a conception seems unjustly to narrow the meaning of truth by tying it up with a certain subtle system of metaphysics. Truth is, indeed, understood from the logical standpoint as a result of rational thinking. Monism, no doubt, has a peculiar bearing upon deep human insight on account of the mind's inclination toward unification, but it becomes almost impossible for the people to reduce all into "the one," denying even a shade of pluralism whatsoever.

Besides these correspondence, coherence, and monistic theories of truth, there have been some other theories with less philosophical basis, such as authoritarian and intuitive theories. As regards the former, there have always been some minds that have a disposition to vicarious speculation and to bearing upon external authority. Truth, according to this class, consists in conformity with scriptures of some kind. The Christian belief in the infallibility of the Bible and the scholastic slavery to Aristotelian thought may serve as typical examples of the authoritarian doctrine of truth. Intuitionism, on the other hand, propounds a theory according to which self-evidence is the criterion of truth. The difficulty in this theory is that self-evidence is not always sufficient in determining truth. Propositions are often self-evident and yet not true. What is self-evident to one may not be so to another. That is why Dr. Schiller, referring to intuitive truths, has curtly remarked that "geniuses, ladies, and lunatics are particularly prone to them."²

Nevertheless, all these theories have been holding their ground among world thinkers as well as those who do but very little thinking. Some have gone to one extreme of rational thinking and have couched truth in a language extremely obscure, while some have gone to the other extreme of irrational belief in an authoritarian doctrine verging on religious superstition. This has brought about a sharp cleavage between the thinkers and the unthoughtful, the former taking pride in a sort of intellectual aristocracy, the latter descending into a realm

¹ *On Truth and Copying*, "Mind," April, 1907.

² *Formal Logic*, p. 226.

of human automata. The cult of intellectualism has reached its zenith in some dry dialectic and has afforded a callous comfort to many an obscurantist who seems to acquire a virtual monopoly of all distinctions that a real philosopher can possibly deserve. It has created such a vast difference between philosophers and ordinary people that the latter have been forced to maintain a studied indifference to any philosophical inquiries, leaving them as suitable occupations for idle speculators. Under such circumstances as these certain thinkers have come out with a new idea to rehabilitate the human relationship in the discussion of the truth concept and to remove what they consider to be a scarecrow from the field of human thoughts. Their aim seems to be directed to making philosophy common property and to emphasising its social side. This kind of philosophy has appeared all of a sudden as a reaction against extreme intellectualism in order to emphasise equally the head and the heart and to bridge over the gulf of human thoughts. It has its fundamental difficulties, as any other system has, but it has its good side too. It holds a prominent place among recent philosophical movements and is known all over the civilized world as the pragmatic theory of truth.

This theory of truth forms the central point of the pragmatic movement. It concerns itself not so much with the noun "truth" as with the adjective "true,"³ perhaps with a view to making the idea clear in a concrete way. It speaks of "truth" not in the abstract, for any abstraction is repugnant to the pragmatist, but of "truth" expressing the qualitative value of our ideas.⁴ It is enough for our present purpose to proceed to examine the several meanings of "truth" in pragmatism, and in this we shall limit ourselves to the three chief representatives—James, Dewey, and Schiller.⁵ They take up certain beliefs or ideas or propositions and then speak about truth by referring to what we say about them. Such a method of approach has its inevitable difficulty which has made the theory often rather cumbersome. As it is, however, not my present purpose to attempt any criticism of the pragmatic theory, it is better to find out only the common characteristics of truth as propounded by the three

³ James later changed the word "true" to "truthful" to satisfy his critics. See *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 225.

⁴ In the language of James, truth is a "property of our beliefs and opinions."

⁵ "Pragmatism, as the theory is generally understood, rests in the main upon the work of the three men, Prof. James and Dewey of America and Dr. Schiller of Oxford." Caldwell, *Pragmatism and Idealism*, p. 3.

great philosophers of our age—characteristics which constitute the meaning of truth in pragmatism. There are, no doubt, divergences in the details of this theory of truth, but there are also some important points of agreement among them which form the common characteristics. We may classify these characteristics into four distinct aspects:

1. The Functional or Teleological aspect. Truth is that which satisfies a need. To satisfy a need means to be useful. Usefulness is generally the criterion of the good. This is why, perhaps, all of them like to associate the word "true" so often with the word "good." "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, too, for definite assignable reasons." * Ideas, to be true according to Dewey, must needs be useful. For him the "effective working of the idea and its truth are one and the same thing." Schiller, too, was in no way less explicit when he said: "Seeing that everywhere truth and falsity depend on the purpose.....we begin to perceive.....that the predicates 'true' and 'false' are not unrelated to 'good' and 'bad' for good and bad also have reference to purpose." †

2. The Inductive and Experimental aspect. Pragmatic philosophy is pre-eminently a rebellion against the prevalent *a priori* philosophy of the extreme idealists. "To banish the abstract from philosophy so far as possible and to substitute for it the individual concrete in the interest of clear thinking has been one of the great and excellent aims of pragmatism." ‡ "The links of experience sequent upon an idea which mediate between it and a reality, form, and, for the pragmatist, indeed, are, the concrete relation of truth. Such mediating events make the idea true." § "Truth is an experienced relation of characteristic quality of things and it has no meaning outside of such relation." ¶

The deductive way of reasoning is not to be adopted, for it adds nothing to knowledge. "The essence of any case would not be copying, but the enrichment of the previous world." †† It does not stop by simply turning away from abstract thoughts to objective experience. For, as Schiller points out, "experience is experiment. i.e., active." †‡ "All truths must be verified to be properly true." †††

* William James, *Pragmatism*, p. 76.

† *Studies in Humanism*, p. 152.

‡ Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?*, p. 64.

§ William James, *The Pragmatic Account of Truth*, *Philos. Rev.*, XVII, p. 11.

¶ John Dewey, *Experimental Theory of Knowledge*, "Mind," XV, p. 305.

† William James, *Meaning of Truth*, p. 80.

†† *Studies in Humanism*, p. 191.

†‡ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Our beliefs are to be tested by their satisfactory workableness. The pragmatists have persistently adhered to their loyalty to the inductive and experimental method of attaining truth. James calls only those ideas true which "we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify."¹⁴ Dewey goes farther and says: "From this (pragmatic) point of view verification and truth are two names for the same thing."¹⁵ There seems, however, some divergence between James and Dewey, for the latter makes actual verification essential to truth, while James thinks that verifiability is quite sufficient. "The quality of truth," says James, "obtaining *ante rem*, pragmatically means, then, the fact that in such a world innumerable ideas work better by their indirect or possible than by their direct or actual verification. Truth *ante rem* means only verifiability."¹⁶ Thus the old *a priori* method of truth-finding has been given up for the inductive and experimental method.

3. The Additive and Evolutionary aspect. One characteristic of the pragmatists is their vehement opposition to any absolute character of truth. They ridicule the idealist conception that truth is truth and it has nothing to do with time and space. Since Spencer and Darwin, many are thinking of everything in terms of evolution. Dr. Schiller has devoted one full chapter to the "Making of Truth" in his *Studies in Humanism*. An idea, or what he calls "claim," becomes true through verification. "Truth we conceive to mean everywhere not duplication but addition; not the constructing of inner copies of already complete realities, but rather the collaborating with realities so as to bring about a clearer result."¹⁷ "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events."¹⁸ John Dewey, in his brilliant essay on the *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* has clearly shown that truth is not something absolute but is constantly in the making through a process of evolution. The great interest of these philosophers in facts has led them to formulate some principle which will constantly add to our knowledge of truth. They all emphasise the observation of facts and this leads them to compare their ideas with them. Their ideas are then to be verified, and if in the process of verification they give satisfactory consequences, then these ideas are true. The truth of the pragmatists is like the

¹⁴ *Pragmatism*, p. 201.

¹⁵ *Mind*, Vol. XV, p. 305.

¹⁶ *Pragmatism*, p. 220.

¹⁷ William James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 60.

¹⁸ William James, p. 201.

Herbartian "real" which comes in contact with the "reals" already in mind and is admitted or repulsed according as it harmonises itself with them or not. Facts of experience have already given us some true ideas which are every moment demanding new facts to insure and enrich their property. It is, no doubt, a stimulating conception of truth which makes people gather facts to add to the knowledge of truth.

4. The Pluralistic aspect. The pragmatists' love for facts and interest in human affairs naturally encourage a pluralistic tendency in the conception of truth. It is called by James a "corridor theory" which opens up all the gates of truth and gives our ideas proper evaluation. It is not that they want to reduce all our ideas down to some irreducible one, but it is to test each idea by the facts of experience and accept, reject, or modify according as it fits in with the previous truths which we have accepted through the same process. The pragmatists' doctrine of verification and of the becoming of truth necessarily implies a pluralistic conception. That is why James says that "our account of truth is an account of truths."¹⁹ "That truth means truths," says Dewey, "that is, specific verifications, combinations of meanings and outcomes reflectively viewed, is, one may say the central point of experimental theory."²⁰ Dr. Schiller, though he says that "all truths must be verified to be properly true," has not, however, entirely thrown down "The Truth" idea. He makes recognition of both "a truths" and "The Truth" when he says: "By a truth we mean a proposition to which this attribute 'true' has somehow been attached, and which, consequently, is envisaged *sub specie veri*. The Truth is the totality of things to which this mode of treatment is applied or is applicable whether or not this extends over the whole of our experience."²¹

There are some other aspects of minor importance which may be derived directly or indirectly from the above classification. Of them, for example, "utility" or "satisfactory consequence" may be mentioned as constituting some criterion of truth. But the phases like these two are well involved in the first and the third aspect of the theory.

On the whole the pragmatic conception of truth seems to be an extremely radical view toward empiricism and humanism and looks with considerable disdain at the abstract thoughts of the idealists.

¹⁹ *Pragmatism*, p. 204.

²⁰ "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," *Mind*, Vol. XV, p. 305.

²¹ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 144.

SEX AND MARRIAGE IN THE DOON DISTRICT

D. N. MAJUMDAR, M.A., PH.D. (CANTAB.)
Lucknow University

THE various conditions under which man and woman come together to love, mate and produce children must be considered to be of great interest not only to the sociologist but to the average normal man, in whatever type of society we may find him. Courtship, love and mating in any society are influenced by the way the sexes face one another in public and in private as well as the economic co-operation that is demanded of them. The different forms of mating that we find in primitive or advanced society, should be studied with reference to the social milieu for their interpretation is only possible when we know the conditions under which the people live and the form of intercourse that is allowed to the sexes. In discussing the forms of marriage, we find that they differ from society to society and from one economic stage to another.

Monogamy is as old as human society but that it is not the only kind of marriage is sufficiently clear from the religious and sacredotal literature in all parts of the globe including the Bible. Polygyny is found in every society unless it is banned by legal enactments. But that polyandry is also a possible arrangement many of us do not know. Polyandry provides for the marriage of a woman with more than one husband just as polygyny provides for the marriage of a man with more than one woman. Polygyny is a very common institution among the lower cultures—it is found among the primitive tribes of India, Africa, Australia and New-Zealand. It is practised by the Mahomedans and till recently was a customary form of marriage among certain castes of the Hindus. With the growing individuality of women and the changed economic conditions of the day, polygyny, it appears, has a limited rôle to play in future.

Polyandry, though far more restricted than polygyny, is still being practised in various parts of the world. It is found among certain American Indians, the Eskimos and among the tribes of the Alaskan coast of North America. It is found among the South Sea Islanders, in the Malay Archipelego, and the island of Lancerot, but rarely reported

from Madagascar. It is found among the Wahuna (Babima) of East Africa. In Tibet it was and still is the traditional practice. From Kashmir to Assam, among the mongoloid people, polyandry is commonly reported. The Todas and Kotas of the South practise this form of marriage. In Ceylon polyandry is said to have been common but was suppressed by the sixties of the last century. It was also said to have been practised in Arabia Felix, and from mythological evidence it appears that it was frequently resorted to by the Aryan-speaking peoples. Westermarck says that polyandry is generally confined to non-Aryan-Tibetan or Dravidian tribes or castes, the first a mongoloid people, and the second speaking some branch of the Dravidian family of languages.

Polyandry is usually of two kinds, one is known as matriarchal, the other fraternal. The Tibetans and other mongoloid peoples practise the fraternal type of polyandry where the husbands are related as brothers, but among the Nairs the husbands were not necessarily brothers. Among the Todas and Kotas, the husbands may not be brothers but usually members of the same clan or persons of the same generation.

From the distribution of polyandry it appears that it is not a primitive or savage institution. The Tibetans and other mongoloid people are not primitive, nor were the Nairs who till recently practised this form of mating. It has been suggested by the evolutionary sociologists that polyandry is an important phase in the development of the institution of marriage. Marriage, according to them, has evolved from a stage of promiscuity. Morgan postulated an elaborate scheme of hypothetical stages of human social progress from a supposed stage of consanguine or Malayan family based on the supposed intermarriage of brothers and sisters in a group, to Punaluan or Hawaiian family founded upon the supposed intermarriage of several brothers, own or collateral, to each other's husbands in a group; Syndasmian or pairing family founded upon the marriage of a male with a female under the form of marriage but without exclusive cohabitation, to patriarchal family or the marriage of one man to several wives and finally to monogamian family founded upon marriage between single pairs. According to Morgan, therefore, no fewer than fifteen normal stages in the evolution of marriage and the family must have preceded marriage between single pairs and of the family itself in the modern sense of the term. McLennan says that polyandry must be regarded as a

modification of and an advance from promiscuity. According to these evolutionists, the matriarchal form of family organisation is prior to the patriarchal. In the matriarchal form, the mother's family designation is given to the children as the latter live with the mother and the mother's brother becomes the habitual guardian of the family. Husbands in matriarchal society are only visitors and do not wield any authority over their children. But many matriarchal societies allow the husband to live independently with his wife by setting up separate establishments within the matriarchal group and though land is passed on from mother to daughter, certain kinds of property may pass from father to son. The next step would be for the father to pass on his own name to the children, so that the children get their affiliation not to the mother and her family but to the father. The final stage is reached when land is also passed from father to son with provisions, perhaps, for the maintenance of the daughters. Thus patriarchal society may grow out of the matriarchate through a long process of transition in which the different features of the patriarchal society are gradually acquired and handed on to the children. To-day most of the advanced societies are patriarchal no doubt, but a large number may be called maternal-paternal, for the features of both the types of family organisation are found in them.

In the matriarchal stage of family organisation paternity is doubtful and not important either. As the children get the affiliation of the mother, as property passes from mother to daughter, as woman lives in her own house, it does not matter if the father is not known.

In the Nair form of polyandry, which is usually known as of the matriarchal type, a woman may have a number of husbands who may or may not be related. So long as a woman lives with one of her husbands, the other husband or husbands cannot have any marital rights over the wife. In the Toda and Kots form of polyandry, the husbands are brothers or clan mates, so also among the Tibetans and other Mongoloid people who practise polyandry. Amongst the Tibetans several brothers share one wife and the wife comes to live with the husbands. If, therefore, paternity is not certain among the Nairs or among those who follow the matriarchal type of polyandry, the line of paternity at least is certain amongst those who practise the fraternal variety, though the actual father is not known. Besides, biological fatherhood is one, sociological fatherhood is another. That is how all

polyandrous societies possess some conventional method of ascertaining fatherhood.

It is at best doubtful if matriarchate is prior to patriarchate and societies which are matriarchal are not primitive either. Even the lowliest of tribes are patriarchal and we cannot postulate any such scheme of social development. Polyandry also is not practised by all primitive groups as we have already noticed, it is absent among many savage tribes. It appears among peoples who have flocks and herds or who practise agriculture and who cannot be described as primitive. Besides, monogamy is found present among the most savage of the tribes and it is doubtful if monogamy has evolved in the way it has been suggested by the evolutionists.

The origin of the institution of polyandry should be explained with reference to the social background in which it flourishes. I propose to describe below the relevant facts relating to this institution among an Aryan-speaking people living in Jaunsar Babar which will throw light on the origin of this institution.

Perganna Jaunsar Babar is included in the Chakrata sub-division of the Doon district. It is inhabited by Rajputs whose occupation of the present domicile dates back to comparatively recent times. These people are usually tall, handsome, fair complexioned, possess long head, vertical forehead, fine or leptorrhine nose, hazel eyes with a sprinkling of blue, curly hair and other features well cut and proportioned. The women are also comparatively tall, slender and graceful and possess very attractive appearance and extremely jovial disposition. From all points of view they appear to belong to the Indo-Aryan stock and have, it appears, maintained their purity to a considerable extent. The mongoloid people in the neighbourhood—the Gharwalis and other hill people—have not influenced their physical features to any great extent. They are conscious of their superior lineage for they affiliate themselves to the Pandavas of Mahabharata fame and are indeed proud of their polyandrous custom, as they say, it was the usual practice among their progenitors, the Pandavas.

Their houses are made of substantial timber in picturesque surroundings with the small terraced fields in front, so that the greenness of their fields lends unusual charm and colour to their villages. The villages are situated in valleys or on slopes of hills but never on top of hills. Winter is usually severe on the hill tops

and sometimes continual snowfall and cold blasts make living on the higher altitudes difficult and dangerous to the extreme. They are very fond of the sun and take advantage of it as best as they can. The houses are built in such a way that they may get the maximum period of sunlight. The villages are built by the side of hill springs. The small terraces available for cultivation are intensively cultivated so that skilful manuring and irrigation are features of farming in these regions. Water for irrigation is usually brought to the terraces from rivulets through small Kuls or channels skilfully cut on the rocks. The houses are grouped together but each stands on its own grounds though they are very close to one another. Timber and stone supply the building material for these houses and iron is seldom used. Each house has three to four storeys but each storey is about 6 ft. or so high, just enough to allow a man to stand erect. Usually one whole storey is used by a family as bed room, it is a long one without any partition and all the members of the family sleep at night in this room, in order, as they say, to keep the room warm enough. Considering the cold climate of the country and the danger of keeping fire burning in the timber houses, the explanation does not seem very unlikely.

Life is not very easy in these cold regions. The small terraces have to be carefully worked, the yield is not always as expected, nor is it sufficient for the needs of the family. Cattle and sheep have to be kept; grazing cattle and sheep on the slopes of hills and in higher altitudes keeps the men busy during the major part of the day; carrying dung and manures from the grazing areas to the terraced fields needs exacting labour; shearing of wool, spinning and weaving have to be done by themselves; marketing of produce and barter and exchange transactions require co-operative efforts, while ceremonial undertakings and festivals require joint efforts and voluntary subscriptions to the common pool. Thus life in Jaunsar Babar is full of hardships though there are occasional thrills to make it worth living for.

Jaunsar Babar people live in joint family. A group of brothers live together with one, two or more wives under the same roof, the brothers sharing the wives in common, without any exclusive right of any brother to cohabit with any one wife. The children are maintained by the family and there is a conventional way of ascertaining fatherhood among them. The eldest born child is fathered upon

the eldest brother, and the next child on the second, and so on. If four brothers have two or perhaps one wife between them and four or five children are born, and one of the younger brothers marries again, the children remain with the woman and the latter cannot go to the younger brothers but must live with the elder, but children are entitled to equal shares from the four brothers which are paid to the elder. If they separate, the elder brother bears the expenses of their marriage.

Customary laws of inheritance make the eldest brother receive the lion's share of the property in case of partition. According to the laws of inheritance in force, property is divided in the following way: After deducting one thing of each kind and one field for *Pitans*, viz., on account of seniority, and half of that field, viz., *Kanchoo*, for the youngest, all the rest are divided equally among them. The family house in Jaunsar Babar belongs to the eldest brother, the garden belongs to him, the crops are his, the cattle and sheep are owned by him and the wife and children, and their maintenance and control are his. He is the governor of the family and his brothers accept his rule and authority without grumble. Cases have been found when a younger brother has rebelled against this social and economic monopoly, has forced the elder brother to a partition of the family property or to the granting of exclusive right of cohabitation with a particular wife, but inasmuch as he has gained in his individuality, he has lost in prestige in the society and very often his wife has deserted him afterwards. It may sound strange to a capitalist society, but it is a fact that if a man happens to be the only son of his parents, he stands little chance of securing or keeping a wife, for a wife would not care to live with one man as she would have to do much work for the family. He must, therefore, find out his cousins or collaterals before he decides to marry and settle down.

The phenomenal poverty of the people and difficulty of leading independent existence in these cold regions, make partition of property extremely uneconomic. Co-operation between villagers and members who constitute the family group is indispensable not only for maintenance but also for protection against organised theft and robbery. Big families, on the other hand, are most conducive to securing a living than small ones. On one occasion I asked a group of Jaunsaris, why they still prefer to continue their polyandrous practices when their neighbours, the Gharwalis, have abandoned them. I was told that they did not envy the Gharwalis. The latter left their homes

due to the disintegration of joint family. Previously land in Gharwal was measured in acres, then by roods, then by poles, then by yards and feet, till they all left their village and are to-day distributed all over the country as domestic servants. The Jaunsar Babaria loves his home and does not want to repeat the experience of his neighbours.

We have already said that polyandry in Jaunsar Babar is of the fraternal type. Thus in the village Jadi which we investigated, we found that the number of married males was four times that of married females. Granting that some of the married females have gone to live with their parents, the proportion of married males to married females may be taken to be 3:1. This disparity in the distribution of the sexes does not by itself explain the prevailing type of marriage, viz., polyandry, for such a sex ratio in other parts of the world has led to celibacy, to prostitution or to homo-sexual practices as well as polyandry. Westermarck has shown that there is no absolute correlation between paucity of women and polyandry. There must be other causes besides.

A few cases of polyandrous marriages may be of interest in this connection. Hariram, *Sadar Seana* (Headman of a group of villages) of village Jadi, has four brothers, the youngest of whom, Nain Singh, is about 35 years of age. He with his brothers owns 9 acres, 3 rood and 5 poles of land, 14 cattle and 88 sheep and pays Rs. 8 as *Malguzari*. He is, therefore, quite substantial and the richest in the village. Hariram married Gonga and paid Rs. 60 as bride-price. She proved to be barren and after 4 years she was divorced and Hariram got back Rs. 20 from her next husband. He married Jimuti the second time and paid Rs. 20 as bride-price. Jimuti was found to be suffering from sexual diseases and was divorced without demand of any part of the dowry back. He married Ashadi next and paid Rs. 50, the latter was a divorced woman but after a couple of years she died without leaving any issue. The fourth marriage was with Pirudi for whom he paid Rs. 12. Pirudi is living in the family and has produced three children. The fifth time he married Bipu who has one son, Chetaram. The last marriage was with Pusuli for whom Hariram had to pay Rs. 120 as dowry. She was divorced thrice before she was married by Hariram and does not possess any issue. Thus Hariram has married six wives in succession and between 4 brothers they have 4 sons.

Narayan, son of Hariram (for he is the eldest of the sons, and

thus was fathered upon Hariram, the eldest brother), lives with his brothers and has similarly married 3 wives. For the eldest wife, Nagu, he paid Rs. 12, but Nagu died without any issue. His second wife was Bardai, who also was paid Rs. 12 as bride-price. She produced two daughters and was divorced. The third wife, Chankeri, was paid a dowry of Rs. 120 as she was married after her second divorce. She has two sons living. Narayan's eldest daughter, Posu, was first married to Jowar Singh, who paid Re. 1 as bride-price, but Posu was divorced and the second husband had to pay Rs. 240 to Jowar Singh as dowry.

Madan Singh has two more brothers, Narayan and Ajmeru. He with his brothers possesses 4 acres, 1 rood and 30 poles, 8 cows and 44 sheep and pay a *Malguzari* of Rs. 5-14. Madan paid Rs. 2 as bride-price and married Bardoi and has 4 issues by her. For the next wife he paid Rs. 12, but after two years he divorced her and realised Rs. 60 from the next husband. The third wife, Asuji, had to be paid Rs. 12, but she also was divorced after a year and fetched Rs. 100. The fourth wife of Madan, Jamni, for whom he paid Rs. 12, has not had any issue yet. Thus in this family 3 brothers have married 4 wives and have 4 children between them.

Amar Singh with his 4 brothers has married three wives. For the first wife, Injali, he has paid Rs. 50, as she was divorced before. After a year she was again divorced by Amar Singh and the latter received back only Rs. 8. Next he married Jhani and paid Rs. 10 as dowry. She also was divorced after a couple of years and he realised Rs. 8 from her second husband. The third wife is Ratu who is living with the brothers and for whom he had paid Rs. 50. They have a son by the present wife, named Mansingh. Amar Singh with his brothers owns 2 acres, 1 rood and 26 poles of land, 10 cattle and 36 sheep and he pays a high *Malguzari* too. Thus in this family 3 brothers have one son.

Instances like these can be multiplied to show the rate of bride-price, the frequency of divorce, the number of wives per family and the number of children per family. It appears from our investigations in Jaunsar Babar that, usually, the number of marriages is no indication of the plurality of wives, for seldom a family has more than two wives simultaneously living together with the group of brothers as husbands, the marriages are usually in succession. The divorce of a wife is followed by another marriage. It is a further fact that the number of children in a polyandrous society is very low, for 4 to 5 brothers between them possess 3 to 4 children and sometimes less. Besides, there is a

preponderance of male children. If the ratio of males to females in this area is so high, then the preponderance of male children is sure to aggravate the situation. Another important fact that one gathers from these investigations is the number of barren women. Usually the husband waits 2 to 3 years to see if the wife produces any child ; if she fails, she feels that she is not much wanted in the family and thus she seeks a new home. If she is not wanted in the house, if she is lazy or suffers from sexual disease which is a frequent complaint in these parts, or if she is guilty of some grave social crime, such as her unwillingness to cohabit with the eldest brother so long as he remains in the house, she is divorced and the next husband of the woman has not to pay any big dowry either. But if she wants to leave her husband herself and if she does not suffer from any disease or has already proved her fertility, the husband usually demands an exorbitant price from her fiancée and this amount must be paid by the latter if she is to marry him. In such a case, the larger the number of divorces a woman goes through, the higher the bride-price she fetches, for the bride-price must provide for compensation to the previous husband and his family.

It is easy to marry a girl of 13 to 14 and sometimes one need not pay any but a nominal bride-price, but a woman who has been divorced twice or thrice, fetches a handsome price. A woman of 45 in Bangar village with 4 divorces to her credit, was married by her fifth husband on payment of Rs. 285, which may sound ridiculous when a girl of 15 or 20 can be married on payment of 20 to 30 rupees. Investigations have shown that this woman has given one or two issues to every family she was married to, and as children are very much desired by the people, a woman who has proved her fertility is at a premium. Considering the number of barren women, a woman who produces a child in one family, is desired by other families, so that she chooses to change her husbands whenever opportunities present themselves. Besides, with four to five husbands to cater for, her attentions may not be fixed on any ; thus her change of family does not produce any great psychological reaction which one would normally expect in a monogamian family. There are other reasons too. In Jaunsar Babar a woman has two standards of morality to conform to—one in her parents' house, one in her husbands'. In her parents' house, she is allowed every kind of license. It is possible to believe that when guests come to a family in Jaunsar Babar, hospitality allows that grown-up daughters of the family, married or unmarried, should cater

to the comforts of visitors in every conceivable and inconceivable manner. But a married girl in her husbands' house must behave, must be faithful, and strict vigilance is kept on her movements by the family group as well as by the village. It is during ceremonies and festive occasions that custom allows the wife to go back to her parents' house and take advantage of the other standard of morality.

We know that the larger the number of social contexts into which an institution fits in, the greater the number of interests it fulfils. *The longevity of an institution or a trait depends, therefore, on the number of interests it stimulates.* The institution of polyandry has survived in Jannsar Babar as it still fulfils a variety of purposes. The origin of an institution may be due to one or many causes. Polyandry, we know, may be the consequence of a disturbed balance of the sexes; for example, where there is an excess of male population, polyandry may result but by no means always does. Economic conditions engender social habits. Property considerations among the Tibetans, Todas and other groups are perhaps responsible for polyandry. The custom of hypergamy under pre-control conditions leads to destruction of female children and a consequent shortage of females may result in polyandry. In Jaunsar Babar, polyandry appears to be a borrowed institution. We have already distinguished Jaunsaris from the mongoloid people in the neighbourhood. They represent an Indo-Aryan stock which through many vicissitudes of fortune, has come and settled in these parts. As it happens with all invading people, they were at first scantily supplied with women and for a time before they could breed enough women to form a *jus connubi*, they perhaps took to indigenous women who belonged to mongoloid stock. But the sex ratio among their neighbours in their present domicile did not favour a large-scale miscegenation. Whether nomadism leads to a reduced incidence of female births or not, the Doon district where these people live has always recorded a lower ratio of females to males. The mongoloid people of the area, even before the Jaunsaris arrived on the scene, were polyandrous. Even to-day in Jaunsar Babar, there is an excess of male to female population and unless the balance of the sexes is restored, polyandry will remain for long as the popular form of marital relationship. But if Jaunsaris have borrowed this institution from their neighbours, they have given a mythological interpretation to disarm all objections against the practice. For even to-day the Jaunsaris defend polyandry on the ground that their progenitors, the Pandavas of epic fame, practised this institution and that they are proud of it.

PROHIBITION IN MADRAS

DR. H. C. MOOKERJEE, M.A., Ph.D.

Head of the Department of English and Fellow, Calcutta University; Member, Legislative Assembly, Bengal; President, All-India Conference of Indian Christians.

SOMETIME about the middle of last year, I received by post a pamphlet on Prohibition, the writer of which after pointing out in detail the difficulties which stand in the way of introducing this measure in our motherland, insinuates that Prohibition as introduced by the Congress Government of Madras is a failure. The orders of the Madras Government are that palm trees may be tapped if the vessels used in collecting the juice are coated inside with an amount of lime sufficient to prevent fermentation. The writer's view is that this rule is being broken extensively with the result that toddy is used as widely as before and further that the officers of the Prohibition Department are condoning this systematic defiance of Government orders.

I must confess that as an ardent Prohibitionist, I was greatly discouraged when I read this pamphlet. It had emanated from what I considered a responsible quarter and I was shocked at what at the first sight appeared to be downright dishonesty on the part of the Madras Government controlled by a set of people for whom I had hitherto entertained nothing but the greatest admiration and the highest respect. I, however, determined to reserve my judgment till I had ascertained by personal enquiries how far the charges brought against the Madras Government were true. My opportunity came when I was invited to preside at the All-India Conference of Indian Christians which met at Madras on the last two days of the year which has just come to an end.

During the two nights and one day taken up by the journey from Calcutta to Madras, I had the opportunity of coming into contact with at least half a dozen highly educated gentlemen of South India—Natives of Andhra Desa, Tamil Nad, Kerala, Travancore and Cochin. I inquired of all of them what they thought about the success of Prohibition in Madras. All of them were unanimous in stating that the experiment had proved an unqualified success.

I was not, however, content with what I had heard from my fellow travellers and immediately after my arrival at Madras, I established contact with a number of educated, cultured and economically prosperous Indian Christians who also gave me glowing accounts of the beneficial effects of the introduction of Prohibition. After our Conference had finished its sittings, I enjoyed exceptional opportunities of coming into social contact with my Hindu brethren, both Brahmin and Non-Brahmin, as also some Muslim gentlemen occupying very high positions. These too were equally enthusiastic in their praise of the action of the Congress Cabinet. It is a matter of common knowledge that there are differences of opinion on certain matters between the Brahmins and the Non-Brahmins in South India. I was gratified to find that whatever their differences in other directions in this one matter there was absolute unanimity.

My next step was to test the accuracy of the reports I had received by trying to ascertain the true facts from people who had actually taken part in the campaign and who were still interested in the work. I had in my audience in the various addresses delivered at Madras during my stay there, Intermediate, Degree and Post-Graduate students. In the College of Physical Education, I found students belonging not only to the Madras Presidency but also others hailing from such widely separated and distant parts of India as Punjab, U.P., Bihar, Bengal, Assam, Bombay and the Central Provinces. Some of these students who had taken an active part in making the campaign against toddy such a success spoke very highly of the efficient organization created through the energy and the public spirit of the Hon'ble Mr. Rajagopalachariar, the Premier of Madras, and the Hon'ble Mr. V. I. Munuswami Pillai, the Minister in charge of Excise. Some of the students I met have their homes in Salem or in adjoining districts. The evidence of all classes of students led me to the conclusion that the experiment at Prohibition has been eminently successful. The evidence of two students who had taken part in the enquiry made by Dr. P. J. Thomas, Head of the Department of Economics, Madras University, was very valuable as they had tried to assess from a scientific point of view the effects of Prohibition on the economic condition of ex-drinkers in Salem district.

It took me nearly a fortnight to gather my data and other relevant facts which I shall now place before my readers so that they may be

in a position to understand the technique evolved, the propaganda methods followed and the moral and economic results achieved by this notable experiment in the social organisation of such a large area as the district of Salem.

PROHIBITION IN SALEM—ITS DIFFICULTIES

Of all the provinces in India, the Madras Presidency in years previous to the introduction of Prohibition, enjoyed the unenviable reputation of deriving the highest percentage of its revenues from Excise. This amounted to as much as 27·1 per cent of the total provincial revenues in 1934-35. Then, again, among all her districts the district of Salem was notorious for its drunkenness. When the Congress came into power, the Hon'ble Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar, who had lived in this district over a quarter of a century, selected it for this noteworthy experiment. In the course of an interview he granted to me, he explained that this was the reason which had impelled him to select Salem. His contention is that if he can demonstrate to the world that it is possible to introduce Prohibition in a place like Salem where every village, hamlet and hut has its own cluster of palm trees which may be tapped easily for toddy without much fear of detection, then it would be easier still to introduce Prohibition in other parts of India where the conditions for success are more favourable.

The district of Salem has an area of about 7,100 square miles, it contains more than 1,800 villages and thousands of hamlets, the population numbers more than 2½ million souls of whom nearly 7½ lakhs were in the habit of using excise articles mainly in the form of toddy. Enquiries made at that time revealed that the expenditure on drink before the introduction of Prohibition ranged from 24 to 32 per cent of the total earnings of the addicts. Some of them spent as much as 50 to 70 per cent of their earnings on drink as against 15 per cent in Britain. These figures alone are sufficient to prove what a boon Prohibition has been to the people of this district as also how difficult its introduction in an area where palm trees are to be found in their lakhs. It has further to be stated that the excise revenue derived from this district only was a little over Rs. 13 lakhs per year all of which had to be sacrificed with the introduction of Prohibition.

One of the first conditions of success in any undertaking of this type is the possession of self-confidence, the ability to foresee the difficulties to be faced and the capacity to call into existence an organisation adapted to cope with these difficulties. The Madras Congress Cabinet set itself to the task of solving this problem. I propose to show how it was solved.

TECHNIQUE OF PROHIBITION

According to my information, the Madras Government was able to make such a success of its Prohibition campaign mainly because it had succeeded in carrying the people along with it. The business of detecting violation of the excise laws is no longer confined to the Excise Department only. A special Prohibition staff has, of course, been employed but their work is supplemented by the ordinary police, village officials and Taluq, that is, Sub-Division and even Village Prohibition Committees. In addition to these measures for the prevention of offences against the excise laws, propaganda is carried on through Prohibition Committees and other similar non-official organisations.

As ex-drinkers on account of the absence of stimulants to the use of which they had been accustomed for years, find the evening hours very depressing, the Madras Government has popularised various devices to brighten village life. Many kinds of amusements such as bhajans, street dramas, songs, dialogues and rural sports and games have been organised. Great emphasis has been laid on the last of these as they provide an interesting spectacle for ex-drinkers and benefit the younger generation by implanting in them early in life an appreciation of the value of physical fitness, of the team spirit and of the pleasure and profit derivable from healthy sports.

I was privileged to deliver addresses on two separate occasions to the students of the Y.M.C.A. College of Physical Education, Saidapet, Madras. I was also the guest at one of the lectures of Mr. N. K. Mia, who is an Indian Christian like myself. I met the members of the staff as well as the students and thus enjoyed exceptional opportunities to make enquiries about the work done by the staff and students of this institution in the campaign for Prohibition. Soon after Prohibition had been introduced, Mr. H. C. Buck who has been Principal of this institution for the last twenty years

or so and the Vice-Principal Mr. P. M. Joseph, made an offer to the Premier to send out trained instructors from their college as volunteers during the vacation to hold instructional classes in rural sports and games in the interior of the district. This offer was immediately accepted by S_j. Rajagopalachariar. With Government sanction and financial assistance, a Summer School was held in May last at Rasipuram, an important centre in Salem district, where 60 students from adjacent villages were trained in indigenous rural games as well as in some inexpensive western games. I was informed by one of the student-volunteers that these youths were either Local Board teachers, co-operative workers or members of physical culture associations. The Summer School lasted for one month and it appears that after their return home, these young men have introduced the games they learnt in their own villages. During the period of training, classes were also held at some of the villages situated close to Rasipuram with the result that their inhabitants were fired with enthusiasm for physical training.

Such was the success achieved at the Rasipuram centre that the Madras Government sanctioned the opening of four other similar schools in different parts of the district and made a grant of Rs. 3,320 in order to meet the necessary expenditure. Altogether about 250 students have been trained so far and as they come from widely scattered centres, it is expected that in time the gospel of physical fitness will be preached and taught all through Salem district.

It must, however, be stated that though emphasis is laid principally on the teaching of sports and games the curriculum of these schools also provides instruction in village uplift work. Every day two hours' instruction is imparted on subjects like co-operation, agriculture, cattle-rearing, bee-keeping, etc. After the Summer School, a rural exhibition was held at Rasipuram where there was a special section for products of village industries such as pottery, carpets, hand-woven fabrics, etc. The next rural exhibition was held at the second centre Dharampuri. This was organised on a more ambitious scale and drew very large crowds. I was informed that in this exhibition, there was a special women's section which attracted a good deal of attention and interest.

The co-operative societies have also joined in the campaign. They distribute *kundi* boxes which are opened once a month when the collections are credited to the respective accounts. This day called

the " Thrift Day " has gradually grown into something like an institution. One of the usual entertainments provided on thrift days consists of rural sports and games in which the local boys take part. Announcement of the thrift day is made in advance. Depositors bring their *hundi* boxes to the office-bearers for collecting the savings. Games follow after this business has been finished. In this way pleasure and thrift are combined.

Physical Culture Associations have existed for years in all the towns of Salem district. Since the introduction of Prohibition, the members have been visiting the villages and giving displays. These not only provide entertainment for the ex-drinkers but also encourage village youths to develop strong and healthy bodies.

CONDITION OF TODDY TAPPERS

From figures supplied by the Excise Department, it appears that there were about 9,000 toddy tappers in the district of Salem at the time Prohibition was introduced. The Madras Government felt that unless some steps were taken to find some kind of employment for these people some of them might be tempted to continue toddy tapping and would thus frustrate, at least partly, the campaign against drink. A Special Development Officer was appointed to start co-operative societies for sweet, that is unfermented and therefore non-alcoholic, toddy. The members were trained to manufacture jaggery, that is, molasses out of the sweet juice. By the end of December, 1937, that is after 3 months' hard work, these co-operative societies sold about 20,000 lbs. of jaggery at the approximate price of Rs. 1,000. I was informed that nearly 85 per cent of the old toddy tappers are now members of the 60 odd co-operative societies.

At the Congress Exhibition held recently at Madras, I saw specimens of jaggery varying in colour from dark to very light brown manufactured from both palm and cocoanut juice. I also found that sugar candy manufactured from the sweet juice of palm trees was being sold extensively in the local market and also sent to other parts of India. Fairly successful experiments conducted by the Madras Industries Department have proved that the manufacture of jaggery from cocoanut juice can be undertaken profitably provided its price does not fall to a considerable extent. As unlike palm trees which can be tapped for juice during certain months of the year only, cocoanut trees can be

tapped all the year round, these experiments have opened the way to the introduction of a new cottage industry which is likely to yield a steady though small income to the tappers. I was also informed that the Industries Department is approaching large consumers of jaggery and sugar such as confectioners, manufacturers of lozenges, etc. so that they may meet part of their requirements from the co-operative societies formed for the production and sale of these articles. So far as the tappers who have not joined the sweet toddy co-operative societies are concerned, my information is that some have left the district, others who possess land are devoting their whole time and energy to cultivation, while some who are landless are working as coolies.

It thus follows that Prohibition as introduced by the Madras Government has not only put an end to drunkenness but is also responsible for the initiation of a new cottage industry which will give continuous employment to thousands of poor people. The authorities are of opinion that the former tappers who were in the habit of consuming large amounts of toddy will not suffer economically if they take to sweet toddy tapping. Any loss in their total income will be more than made good by abstinence from their old drinking habits.

EFFECTS OF PROHIBITION

The implementing of Prohibition in Salem district is in the hands of the Collector, Mr. A. F. W. Dixon, I. C. S. It cannot be said that, at the beginning, he was very much in favour of this measure. He has submitted from time to time official reports on the working of the Prohibition Act in the district. I shall commence by very briefly referring to the results obtained after three months' experiment lasting from October to December, 1937.

With regard to the change in the condition of home life Mr. Dixon said, "All information received goes to show the beneficial effects of the Act on the home life of drinkers. Domestic quarrels of the more violent sort have practically ceased and the condition of the women and children has markedly improved; there are a good many cases reported of heavy drinkers who have lost their old cravings, whose health and general condition have greatly improved." So far as the economic condition of the people is concerned, he has observed, "improvement in the standard of life is most marked in regard to the quantity of food consumed. Drinkers and their families now get

generally a good evening meal, whereas formerly they often went without anything to eat." In the matter of its effect on industrial labour, Mr. Dixon quotes the Managing Director of the Rajendra Spinning Mills, Limited, Salem, who said, "Most of the workers had been very irregular in their attendance whereas one month after Prohibition had been enforced, the attendance became regular. Before Prohibition quarrels were frequent in the nights and the Managing Director never got an undisturbed night's rest. He had frequently to get up and pacify the fighting labourers. These quarrels have now ceased and they are leading a better life; production has increased and expenditure decreased. Prohibition is particularly beneficial to the women in the mills. They were sickly, dirty and clad in rags. Now every woman has two or three saris, most of them petticoats and 50 per cent of them wash daily. Their financial position has also improved. They have redeemed their jewels which they mortgaged due to extravagance. Children are better clad and cleaner. Dwelling houses have improved, and lights have been introduced into houses which were formerly unlit." The Collector sums up his impression of this great social experiment in the following terms "Viewing generally the effect of Prohibition on the lives of the people, I am convinced, after three months' experience, that Prohibition is proving a great boon to the poorer classes in this district. Leading as they do a hand-to-mouth existence, they simply cannot afford the expensive luxury of drink, which used to reduce the small earnings of the labouring classes to a miserable pittance, quite insufficient for the proper maintenance of a family. Drink brought misery in the shape of domestic unhappiness, insufficiency of food, and crushing debt. Already in thousands of homes in the district conditions have changed to a remarkable extent. Domestic brawls have ceased, a sufficiency of food is available, and the grip of the money-lender has relaxed."

I shall next refer to the report submitted by the Collector of Salem on the working of the Prohibition Act in his district in the nine months between October, 1937 and June, 1938. The first noticeable feature in this report is the tribute paid to non-officials for their co-operation. In this connection he observed "Special efforts were made to secure the co-operation of non-officials and the task of the police has been rendered much easier by the widespread co-operation and assistance rendered by them." After referring to the providing of amusements and counter-attractions such as sports and games,

bbajan parties and radios for the ex-addicts Mr. Dixon continues, "The most noticeable effects of Prohibition on the lives of the people are the absence of street brawls and family squabbles, improvement in the food-supply, particularly at the evening meal, increased care for cleanliness and the childrens' welfare, reduction in indebtedness and generally a more hopeful outlook." He concludes his report in the following terms: "Prohibition has now almost become a normal feature of district administration. The memory of drink except close to the borders, is fading and even the insatiable addict is beginning to find the journey across the border for an occasional carouse an expensive and unsatisfactory affair. The villagers have by now become quite accustomed to the new order of things. Considering the population of the district and the number of former drinkers, it is safe to say that the number of persons who now consume illicit liquor in this district is negligible. Illicit drugs are still coming in, but there are reasonable prospects of considerably reducing smuggling in the future."

Mr. Dixon's last words are worth quoting as they unmistakably show the amount of success achieved within the nine months referred to above. He says "The success of the Prohibition campaign has indeed exceeded the expectations of even some of the most astute opponents of the movement. Meanwhile, no relaxation of preventive action or slackening of control can be permitted. As yet I see no reason to anticipate that permanent success will not reward the efforts of those official and non-official Prohibition workers many of whom have laboured hard to make the movement a success."

FINDINGS OF MR. C. JAGANNATHA CHARI

Mr. C. Jagannatha Chari, of the Department of Economics, Annamalai University, was specially deputed to study and report on the working of the Prohibition Act in Salem. From evidence he gathered at Salem he infers that though the average man is not a wilful addict to drink, he slowly drifts into the habit. According to him, Prohibition has undoubtedly improved the moral, social and economic life of the 7 lakh ex-addicts in Salem. He defends the Madras Government in the following terms: "The common opposition to Prohibition is based on the plea that it reduces the Government's income and makes fresh taxation inevitable. The loss of excise revenue amounted to Rs. 13

lakhs. A similar sum was required for introducing Prohibition, but, when it is emphasised that India is almost entirely an agricultural country, a third of whose population consists of a landless class addicted to drink, the acuteness of this drink evil is surely to be better realised and the boon its abolition confers is bound to be appreciated."

FINDINGS OF DR. P. J. THOMAS

A survey of the economic results of Prohibition in Salem district was undertaken by Dr. P. J. Thomas, Professor of Economics, University of Madras, at the request of the Madras Government. A prominent member of the Cabinet told me that this step had been taken in order that the enquiry might be conducted by an expert on strictly scientific lines and also because it was felt that the findings were bound to be dependable and would be received with greater respect if they emanated from an unofficial source above any suspicion of bias. I understand that Dr. Thomas was assisted by a number of his research scholars. His report was published in Madras about the third week of December. I shall content myself with quoting only one sentence from it in which reference is made to improvement in family life in the following terms: "The social and moral effects of Prohibition have been remarkable; in particular the position of women and children among the working classes has substantially improved."

At the annual sessions of the Indian Statistical Conference which met at Lahore early in January, this year, Dr. Thomas dealt with the economic results of Prohibition at Salem in detail. Referring to the change in the normal diet of ex-addicts he said: "There have been significant changes in the patterns of consumption. Under food, the most striking increase has been in tea. Among certain classes the use of milk, curds and ghee has also increased. Among others, meat and fish are now more in demand. The consumption of cereals has not increased very much; among factory labourers, cereals now account for a smaller proportion of the total expenditure on food than formerly." So far as improvement in domestic utensils, household furniture, etc., is concerned, Dr. Thomas observed: "Among other noteworthy changes are the replacement of earthenware pots by brassware, use of cots and quilts and a large increase in the cinema habit. A most encouraging item is the purchase of books by urban labourers." The last sentence I shall quote gives an admirable

summary of the whole situation. He says: "Most of the money formerly used for drink has been diverted to the purchase of food, clothing, and other consumable goods. Among workers in certain organised trades, nearly 50 per cent of the amount went to food, 8 to 10 per cent to clothing and 6 per cent to amusements. Between 22 to 24 per cent went for the purchase of brassware and ornaments and for repayment of debt."

EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION

I understand that as a result of the introduction of Prohibition at Salem, the Madras Government has incurred a reduction in its revenue to the extent of about 26 lakhs about 50 per cent of which represents the excise revenue sacrificed and the other 50 per cent the expenses for maintaining Preventive staff, Development officers, etc. This loss of revenue had no effect in checking the extension of prohibition in the presidency. Prohibition had been introduced in Salem on the 1st October, 1937. Just one year after, it was introduced in the districts of Cuddapah and Chittoor. The campaign was opened at Cuddapah on the 1st October, 1938, by Sri Jut Rajagopalachariar. One of my most valued new friends I made at Madras who, by the way, is a non-Brahmin, has supplied me with a copy of the speech made by the Premier on that day from which I am tempted to quote just one sentence. "To-day is the 70th birthday of Mr. Gandhi. We are celebrating his birthday in Cuddapah and Chittoor, by closing arrack and toddy shops. This is the best way of celebrating his birthday. Last year we sent him birthday greetings by closing down toddy and arrack shops in Salem district. This year we are sending him greetings telling him that Cuddapah and Chittoor districts have gone dry. Many more birthdays of Mr. Gandhi may be celebrated in this manner and may he live to see the last district in our presidency go dry."

PROHIBITION IN CHITTOOR DISTRICT

In his report on the first month's working of the Prohibition Act in his district the Collector, Khan Bahadur Javada Hussain, stated as follows: "The vast majority of the people hail Prohibition as a real boon. Even the few addicts who find themselves deprived of drink within easy reach will, no doubt, consider this a blessing as

the craving wears off. Women specially welcome Prohibition," he concluded by saying that Prohibition in his district was definitely succeeding.

Early in January, 1939, the Prohibition officer in charge of Chitoor district stated that prohibition had already proved an unqualified success. At present grave famine conditions are prevailing in the district of Chitoor. This is why in spite of the introduction of Prohibition, no definite economic improvement is noticeable in the homes of the labourers and peasants. It was also pointed out to me that in spite of the prevailing scarcity, its ordinary evil consequences such as thefts and burglary are totally absent in this district. What little savings are effected by Prohibition are being used for meeting household expenditure.

Government is arranging to open rural uplift training classes in important centres of the district such as Madanapalle, Palmaner, Chandragiri and Chitoor and it is expected that the workers trained there will be able to make Prohibition still more popular and successful.

PROHIBITION IN CUDDAPAH DISTRICT

The Collector of this district, Mr. V. S. Hejmadi, I.C.S., is also of opinion that Prohibition has become a success. The fullest possible co-operation is being obtained from non-officials. The villagers have helped Government in introducing Prohibition in their district. Prohibition Committees in different villages have been brought into existence and various counter-attractions have been organised. These consist of reading news from Telegu newspaper by people residing in the villages every evening, holding sports in the evenings and having bhajan parties at night.

The problem of providing some remunerative occupation for tappers, who are driven out of employment in this district is not a very difficult one. Most of them are agriculturists with some kind of handicraft to fall back upon. There are very few who are landless and these again can easily be provided with land if they apply to Government for this special privilege.

POPULARITY OF PROHIBITION

Prohibition has come to stay at least in the Madras Presidency. Just before I left for Calcutta, I was informed that the Municipal

Council of Mangalore at its meeting held on the 9th January, 1939, had passed a resolution requesting the Madras Government to prohibit the sale of toddy on Saturdays and of arrack, that is, country spirits made from rice, on Saturdays and Sundays in order to restrict the drinking of alcoholic beverages. With this end in view, it recommended that shops selling toddy and arrack situated within the municipal area and within a radius of three miles of the Municipality should be closed by Government order on these two days every week.

My information is that this is a repercussion of the step taken by the Bombay Congress ministry which has promulgated similar orders for the benefit of the industrial labour of the city and island of Bombay. As a result of this step, the consumption of country spirit has been reduced in these areas in Bombay to the extent of nearly 70 per cent. It is the experience of the Bombay Government that it is on pay day and the day after that the largest amounts are spent in such an unproductive or rather positively injurious way. If the temptation to spend money in this undesirable way is removed by closing the shops on Saturdays and Sundays, the poor and ignorant people are left free to spend it in clearing the dues of their grocers and in buying the necessities of life.

Then again, the request to the Madras Government is on a line with the action taken by the Municipality of the small town of Kasur situated at a distance of about 35 miles from Lahore. It appears that under the provisions of the Punjab Local Option Act, any Municipal Committee can enforce Prohibition within its own area by passing a resolution to that effect provided that two-thirds of the municipal voters support the resolution at a referendum. The total number of municipal voters of Kasur last year was 12,784. On the 31st March, 1937, this matter was put to the test when 8,818 participated in the voting of whom 8,816 were in favour of introducing prohibition and only 2 against.

These two instances taken from such widely separated places as Mangalore in South and Kasur in North India have been referred to merely to prove that if the people are left to decide the matter themselves and if the choice is left to the country at large, there is little doubt that we would have Prohibition. What is now required for the success of the campaign against drink and drugs is that no pressure in any form should come from outside, that in this very

important matter so vital to our spiritual, moral, intellectual and economic improvement, we should be absolutely left to ourselves, to decide whether we should have Prohibition or not and if the country demands it, the different provincial governments which as popular governments are supposed to be the servants of the people, should implement their orders or, if that word is unpalatable, the desires of the people. Consideration of the revenue which may have to be sacrificed should not be allowed to influence any government in any decision regarding this very important question.



DAWN OF THE NEW AGE IN INDIA

UPENDRANATH BALL, M.A.

INDIA is a land of many religions. Streams of various cultures have poured into the country through various channels and at different times. These cultures still exist in their original purity, some have been transformed by their contact with other streams of thought and practice. The people in their desire to organise themselves into a nation are feeling the necessity of evolving a common culture which would satisfy their intellectual and moral aspirations. But the social and historical background is not very helpful for such a process. We are today bound by several common links. The railway and motor transport has reduced the distance which used to separate one part from another. The radio has brought us closer together and electricity is constantly at our service to forge new points of contact.

Politically India is throbbing with new life. The impulse of liberty and self-expression has awakened in us a new consciousness. Our intellectual curiosity has led many an adventurous mind to explore unknown regions of science and to speculate into the mysteries of the universe. The apathy and indifference which overpowered the Indians towards the close of the eighteenth century have been dispelled and we witness now all around us a vigorous endeavour to raise India to the level of other progressive nations.

In the eighteenth century the old empires and kingdoms toppled down one after another. The process continued down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The fall of the strongly established political entities produced a moral degeneration. People lost faith in their culture and religion.

In their period of depression the social and religious practices assumed many ugly features. When the stream of life is retarded there are formed pools and eddies helping the growth of useless weeds. Even the unnecessary and meaningless things are considered very important. Institutions and practices which never appealed to rational minds are resorted to in despair as very vital to society. The trifling and the unimportant accretions of the periods of weakness engage the

greater attention of the people. Any deviation from the trodden track is looked upon with disfavour and in fact the distinction between the fundamental and the superficial, between the vital and the unessential is lost sight of. A drowning man clings to a straw when he is in the midst of a great crisis of life. When the Indians were deprived of their political freedom they clung to their social and religious institutions with all their strength. Failing to adjust themselves in affairs of state they fell back upon whatever they could call their own, and which they could maintain without interference from the ruling authority.

The second half of the eighteenth century was in fact a period of great darkness for India. The old Hindu culture had lost its vitality, the Moslem culture was in discount and the European culture was suspected. People in their eagerness to conserve the practices of their forefathers tried to fortify themselves behind the barriers which they had raised in their defence against the encroachment of the more powerful forces. In their political impotency they became reactionary in their social and religious affairs. They forgot their old traditions, they did not care to apply their reason and got themselves involved in a great confusion of ideas in their bewilderment.

There grew up difference among the people in their everyday life, in their social and religious practices; they began to pay their homage to different deities and respect to different scriptures and teachers. Thus developed an internecine war between religions and creeds. The votary of each creed in his eagerness to promote its interests lost sight of the psychological and historical factors of those institutions. The proverbial frog in the well does not know anything beyond its environment. A new world is revealed to it when it is brought out of its narrow residence. It cannot believe that there is anything beyond the well. The knowledge of a vaster region does no doubt give it joy but at the same time it feels a sort of pain in parting with its old ideas. There are others who would not give credence to the existence of anything else beyond their narrow cells even when they are brought out of them. A great deal of courage and patience become necessary to break through this inertia.

The minds of the Indians were suffering from a chronic atrophy since they lost their political freedom. They raised their prayers for a change. They tried to forget their defeats in an ecstasy of spiritual fervour. New religious movements of love and devotion came to soothe their bleeding hearts. But life of man does not grow in compartments.

Religion cannot grow apart from social freedom, and society loses its springs of activity unless it has the power to adjust itself in all its spheres. Religion, society and corporate existence as a political entity grow side by side. The religion of the fallen is marked by fear, cupidity and avarice. The free on the other hand look upon the object of their adoration with love and approach Him with trust. In the economic distress or pestilential epidemics the slave community approach the Terrible with a prayer to desist from an expression of His anger. But the free people would develop within themselves the power to remove these calamities, utilise to the full the gifts of the merciful Father and co-operate with Him in organising a new order of society where the spirit of love and mutual aid would gradually increase.

On the downfall of the Mughal Empire India stood dismembered and the petty States which raised their heads were governed by tyranny. The common people had no share in shaping the policy of these states. Men occupying positions of influence or clever in statecraft used to sell their ingenuity for sordid consideration of pelf and power. No high motives influenced their activities. The landlords and the country gentry extracted as much as they could from the peasantry. They neglected to protect their dependents and were anxious to increase their own possessions by any means. On the other hand the foreign merchants wanted to employ their newly acquired political influence in the interest of their material gain. They tried to control the cottage industries and internal trade in a way prejudicial to the Indians. The attempt to help the Indians failed disastrously and the hold of the foreign merchants became tighter. India became a slave both politically and economically. In these circumstances the religious aspirations were twisted to suit the interests of the priestly classes and the social life degenerated. The situation was manoeuvred by the crafty people to whom nothing was too mean and nothing so precious as he could not sacrifice. Religion was pulled down from its high pedestal and made to serve the greed and avarice of the priest.

The function of religion is to inspire man with hope and to create in him a desire to serve others. The service of man is the best expression of a religious life. But when religion is invoked to deprive women of their precious life or to rob others of their life and property or to put an end to the life of the newly born daughter then certainly the sense of religion must have undergone a profound

change. It was very often on the occasion of religious performances that the wildest orgies, drinking of intoxicating liquors and drugs, and various forms of immoralities were indulged in. In their social relations one class was set against another, the division was made acute by severe rigidity of caste rules, and the weak and poor were degraded to the lowest level. Even the touch of some classes was considered a sin. Women were used as no better than beasts and chattels. There was a custom called Kulinism in Bengal by which a man of the higher caste thought it a pride to have married a number of wives. In some cases the men used to keep a regular account of his marriages which were a source of income to them. The girls were accepted in marriage only when a large amount of money was paid to the bridegroom. After the marriage again these estimable gentlemen left their wives to the care of their parents and used to visit them whenever it suited them. In these circumstances it was impossible to expect a normal state of things. Evils of all sorts undermined the social fabric.

To raise India from such a morass was a herculean task. It must be said to our great relief that the organisation of society does not depend upon the narrow and limited resources of man. There are other forces at work to uplift the downtrodden and the lowly. The *Bhagabat Gita* has emphatically declared that whenever Religion is overcast with shadows and evils raise their heads, God creates himself. This is nothing else but the statement of the natural law of Providence. Whenever we are oppressed with unbearable heat a sudden burst of storm brings us relief. The burden of sin and sorrow is relieved by the grace of God. The increase of evils brings into operation the redeeming features of reforms. The poet has sung: "When it will dawn the vessel of thy mercy will carry me beyond the seas of troubles." The redeeming hands of our Father are always ready to receive us whenever we would cry out in agony for his help. He sends forth new inspiration and new resources to help us out of our difficulties. The door has to be knocked and it will be opened. He waits for the knocking. Otherwise He feels that his unsolicited blessings are not appreciated. The gifts earned through labour and industry are more precious than free gifts.

The dream of a new India, an India conscious of her rightful position in the comity of nations was a noble dream. In the dark days of India it was felt by a noble soul. This great dreamer plunged deep

into meditation ; he put himself in communion with the Infinite Being who pervades equally the land, water and the ethereal region. His heart throbbed with a new passion of love and service. The local limitations and the conventions of society could not stand in his way. He dived deep into the ocean of learning of the ancients ; he gathered precious gems from the unfathomable deep and lost himself in the ecstasy of a new vision.

India to him was a land of great possibilities. The old weaknesses he was resolved to remove and he wanted to irrigate the land with streams of new vitality. He raised his protest against the evils which were undermining the national life. His labours in the field of social reform bore ample fruits. The helpless widow who was forced to burn herself on the funeral pyre of her dead husband found in him a friend. Through his advocacy of her cause the orthodox Pundits came to her rescue. The starchy Christian lent the support of the State authority. The course of events in India underwent a great change. The erstwhile weak and helpless Indians began to feel that they could set their own house in order if they put forth their exertions earnestly and sincerely.

In the field of social and political activities he attempted to awaken the national consciousness of the people. Our political degradation is the result of our apathy and indifference. If we really will to be free no power on earth can keep us in bondage. We are not free because we lack the will to be free. The British Government curtailed the liberty of the Press by an ill considered Regulation. The public opinion was not sufficiently strong to enter a protest against this reactionary measure. Rammohun Roy was not daunted by the threats of the Government. He could not enlist the co-operation of more than six of his fellow-countrymen in objecting to this Regulation. But he was confident of the justice of his cause. He appealed to the Supreme Court not to register this document. But the Court was there to register the decree of the Executive. It did not enter into the merits of the case. Rammohun did not give up the cause as hopeless, and ultimately it was left to another Governor-General to remove this obnoxious measure from the Statute Book. Rammohun felt that once freedom's battle was launched it would go on increasing in strength till it achieved the goal. He was not afraid to be in the minority. It requires great courage to stand against the current opinion. But those who dream of great things see through the screen

of temporary mists which darken the vision. They see something which ordinary persons fail to perceive. The men of faith possess an uncommon insight and unusual perseverance. They are not daunted by the frowns of the little gods who are responsible for most of the social and national ills. The leaders of his own community did not spare their efforts to discredit Rammohun before the public. But he was convinced of his mission and he knew what he was about. He was drawing the programme of national reconstruction.

The deep love which Rammohun cherished towards his God and his country gave him sufficient strength to stand against all opposition. The clear light within him pierced through the encircling gloom. The conflict of ideals and the imminent danger to the Indian system of education by the onslaught of European culture produced a reaction. The old educational institutions could not retain the loyalty of the people and there was no arrangement to organise a new system in which the ideals of the East and the West could be combined. The Indian system had lost its normal vigour. It was confined mainly to the priestly class. Nobody could earn his livelihood by following the indigenous system. There was very little of scientific approach to the problems of life. The main idea behind the system was submission to authority. Mind was not free to probe into the deeper mysteries according to the dictates of reason. Blind faith was insisted upon as the safest course. This was the state of things in the Western world before Francis Bacon propounded the inductive method. New inventions and new ideas have revolutionised the intellectual and moral outlook of the Europeans. They have discovered new lands and new truths and expanded the horizon of human activity. Man is realising himself more steadily than he could do in the earlier period. He has ceased to be a victim of the natural forces and he is dominating the resources placed at his disposal.

In place of awe there is now an indomitable desire to bring under control the energies released by nature. The oceans do not now divide the world. The different parts of the world are bound together by cables and by radio and air service. The conception of the brotherhood of man is no longer a mere speculation. It is a reality and it is expressed through various channels. The nations meet together not only to discuss their problems of boundaries and trade relations but they are bound by invisible bonds of intellectual and moral co-operation. Man is not a helpless creature subject to

the freaks of fortune. He is a moral being competent to shape his life according to ethical principles. He is bound up inextricably with the fabric of the universe which is being governed by the laws of the Great Moral Governor.

The development of the moral consciousness has lifted man from his helpless condition. The mutual relations between the members of society have correspondingly improved. Woman has acquired for herself a position of honour and dignity. She is no longer a mere plaything. She directs the machinery of civilization by the hands with which she rocks the cradle. She has been promoted to her rightful place as the equal and comrade of man. She has been admitted to every sphere of life and she has acquitted herself splendidly wherever she has been tried, in government and politics, in industrial and social life and in fine art and intellectual pursuit.

When we look around India of today and compare the present with the India of a century ago we are struck with the great progress made in this period. The material benefits that she is enjoying now have not come by mere accident. They are the results of the persistent labour and unceasing devotion of the pioneers. Indian Philosophy had lost its vitalising influence and was confined to the intellectual exercise of the schoolmen. People had forgot science and were satisfied with the tricks of the quacks. They dared not approach the Western science or attempt rational thinking lest the sanctity of their pagoda was thereby reduced. Even the Moslems were reluctant to come near the English schools.

It is very often remarked that India has greatly suffered from the system of education advocated by Macaulay. The people have been denationalised and they have lost the capacity to think for themselves. But what was the condition of things before this system was introduced? Did the temple of learning in those days generate in the heart of the Indians the spirit to protect themselves from the attack of foreign influence? Why did the people fall easy prey to the foreign invaders? Why did they fail to maintain their economic freedom? The fact is the system could not save us. It must be said to the credit of the modern system that it has stimulated our curiosity in the secrets of nature. Every cultured man in these days try to understand the meaning and significance of his religious and social practices. The learning of the ancient Indians was free from the influence of

meaningless convention and was directed to the solution of the actual problems of life. But that was not the case in the eighteenth century. The cultural life of that period was in the lowest level.

There was a necessity of evolving a system in which the heritage of India would be developed and at the same time the contributions of other peoples would be cheerfully welcomed. India would grow stronger by the ready co-operation of friends from all lands. Rammohun Roy was impressed by the progress achieved by the Europeans in philosophy and science. By his studies in the ancient classics of the East he felt that the old freedom of thought could be revived and the culture of India could be enriched by enlarging the knowledge of his countrymen in the methods of accurate thinking and scientific research. With the help of David Hare he laid the foundation of the New Learning in the country. Here again he was confronted by the opposition of the orthodox leaders of the Hindu community. The association of Rammohun in the work of education was considered as objectionable. But he had the vision of a new synthesis in which Eastern philosophy and Western method of approach through observation and verification should meet. He organised his own Vedanta College for the purpose and started a school for giving English education in addition to Vernacular.

The new education not only brought the young men in contact with Shakespeare and Milton but they felt a new impulse by the speculations of Locke and Hume and the discoveries of Galileo and Newton. They began to compare the thoughts of the Greeks with those of the Indians, studied Arabic along with Persian. Euclid appeared to them in a new garb and Vedanta ceased to lead them to illusion. Socrates and Vedanta led them to self-introspection and the study of the natural science with Anatomy and Physiology taught them the art of self-improvement. The old fatalism lost its force on the approach of the clear light of rationalism. The affection found its expression in the movement for social service. In the light of Vedanta the relations between man and man changed. The powerful and the privileged felt it a greater honour to serve than to exploit. The charity took the form of loving ministration to the needs of fellowmen. Schools and hospitals cropped up to bring knowledge to the ignorant and to minister unto the physical troubles of the diseased. We find institutions for the orphans, lepers and the blind. The

natural calamities like flood, famine, earthquake and other disasters draw forth volumes of ready service. People have given up the old spirit of helpless surrender into the hands of the inevitable. There is a strong will to grow, a keen desire to adjust our own affairs and to re-organise life according to the dictates of reason. They have begun to think socially and greater sacrifice is found to-day in the service of the country and the fellow-citizens than in the past. Patriotism, love of country, service of fellow-creatures proceed on the careful observation of the students of history and of the modern physical, psychological and social sciences.

The talk now everywhere is a comprehensive plan of life. There should be no separation between love and knowledge, worship and service. Their value is increased by combination. Mental and moral forces produce deep and unquenchable spiritual hankering, and the search of the True, the Good and the Beautiful has awakened the latent currents of the mind and the heart. Science serves religion and the religious emotion leads man to the search of truth. The streams of life issuing from different directions have met together in the modern national awakening. Men of all persuasions now recognise the services rendered by Rammohun Roy who almost single-handed shaped the Ideals of New India. Be it a social question or a political problem, an educational programme or religious endeavour everywhere we see signs of a robust optimism. The erstwhile despair of the weak and the helpless has given place to hope.

At the root of all this lies the indomitable faith in the goodness of God who is the Father of the universe, and who is giving us food to eat, water to drink and the air to breathe. This faith in the Fatherhood of God leads to the realisation of the brotherhood of Man. Man is endowed with divinity in whichever circumstance he may be placed. We have to recognise this divinity and to open out before him the vista of a new life in which there is no death and no pang. If religion can do that then it becomes effective, otherwise it remains a catalogue of dead formulae. To maintain the spirit of true religious endeavour we need love and service as great contributories. The votary of the new religion brings to the tabernacle an offering of a pure heart and a ready acquiescence in what is good and noble in man. Here he meets with pilgrims from all lands and all creeds. One current of devotion runs through the hearts of all. When we see God everywhere and in every soul we hear His sweet name

chanted from every throat. In whatever language man expresses his devotion he is voicing forth the common aspirations of man. The comparative study of religions has revealed man in all his simplicity. The differences have melted away and we hear all around the deep chorus of a universal song.



“ THE PLACE OF EXAMINATIONS IN THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS ”

MR. BHUIAN MD. ABDUL KADDUS,

Asst. Master, Jamalpur Govt. High School, Mymensingh

MUCH discussion has taken place lately about the rôle which examinations should play in the educational system. Many people maintain that the majority of examinations are not reliable tests either of ability or of educational attainments. They point out that most examinations, including Matriculation and University Degree Examinations merely test the ability to memorise and set down a given body of facts. “Cramming,” they maintain, is an evil which adversely affects the educational process. Instead of steadily perfecting himself in his knowledge of a subject, of making intellectual and spiritual progress, the student's education is periodically interrupted. He has to memorise, in order that he may “disgorge” them on paper, a host of facts, many of which are of purely academic value. The student, too, tends to take a short sighted view of things. If he is successful at examinations, he may tend to measure his educational progress by them, to rest on his oars, and cease from striving. If, on the other hand, he does not possess the “Examination temperament” he may become discouraged and give up the quest for knowledge.

There is a great deal of truth in these criticisms, yet it is very probable that the examination system will be continued in spite of them, for lack of a better method of assessing educational progress.

Another criticism, which has been directed against the examination system is based upon the actual assessment of value. It has been pointed out that no two examiners agree about the marks which should be allotted to an examination answer. The great difference of opinion in this respect, has been actually proved experimentally. Thus we see that examination marking often depends upon subjective factors, upon their personal idiosyncrasy of the examiner, even though he be very honest in intention.

Obviously then it is desirable to devise some method of testing which will eliminate, as far as possible, these subjective factors. The

examinations themselves, too, should endeavour to bring out the originality of the pupil, to test his grasp of a subject and his ability to utilise facts as an illustration of principles, and not merely his painfully and mechanically acquired familiarity with a set of facts.

For this reason a much more extensive use of Intelligence Tests have been recommended. Intelligence tests, it is pointed out, do not set out to test acquired knowledge, but innate ability. Furthermore, the marking of them is objective. There are definite answers required. They also admit of comparisons being made with the work of children in other parts of the country since "norms" are usually available.

An Intelligence Test by itself, however, is not adequate. It does not reveal "Slackers," intelligent children, perhaps, who, for some reason or other, have not been taking an interest in their work. It does not test progress in the work of the class. It should be combined with tests in school subjects and serve to act as a corrective to the result of these. Furthermore, Intelligence Tests cannot be used to much advantage after the age of fourteen.

They have, however, been utilised in the north of England and other places, in scholarship examinations for children of 11 of years age. Dr. Godfrey Thomson has devised his "Northumberland Tests" for this purpose.

Generally speaking, an examination for young children, should test acquired knowledge as little as possible. It is criminal to expect young children to waste hours memorising facts most of which are dead lumber, unrelated to anything vital in their own lives.

The first ten years of a child's life at school should be free from formal examinations. The teacher should be able to assess the children's work, if assessment be necessary, from personal observation, from oral work, and from the inevitable small Tests, which are given in the course of the year.

At about the age of ten, however, the child is transferred to a different type of school. In America no examination is necessary to sort out the sheep from the goats. Every child passes on automatically to the High School or Junior High School. In England, however, an examination is set and, on the basis of this, the limited number of free places in Secondary schools is allotted. It seems rather drastic that a child's whole career, his entire after life, should thus depend upon an examination lasting a few hours.

Obviously a reform is necessary. That there should be such an examination is perhaps essential, but the child's previous school work, his general development should also be taken into consideration.

This, then, is the first peak in the examination system. At the Secondary school, the child becomes used to examinations. They come upon him at the end of every term, and often tend to overtax his strength, unless he, very wisely, decides not to pay too much attention to them.

The next and possibly, most important, peak, is the Matriculation Examination, the passing of which is deemed essential for many careers. This is taken about the age of 16 and is followed later, by the Universities' examination.

It is at this stage that examinations become very important. Nearly every thing that is taught in the school is modified by the demands of examiners. Set books are read, a very definite programme of work is laid down, the harassed teacher attempts to bring all his pupils "up to the scratch." The educational aim, the perfecting of the moral, intellectual and physical life of the pupil, is lost sight of altogether. Every thing is subordinated to the purposes of the examinations, Unintelligent drudgery results, and real progress is hampered.

At the University too, the student is subjected to a rigorous examination system. He is, however, comparatively free, at this stage, and is not harassed by external authorities to the same extent as at school. In place, however, of term examination system, upon which his work is based, a series of fortnightly essays, might be a better index of his ability and progress.

It seems that, on the whole, there are three periods in the individual's life when some kind of examination is necessary. (1) The age when he leaves his elementary school, in order to embark upon a Secondary course. (2) The age when he leaves school altogether, either for some trade or profession, or for the University, and (3) the conclusion of every year at the University.

(1) The pupil's ability to attend a Secondary school should not be assessed entirely upon the results of one examination. Much improvement has taken place, however, in recent years in connection with this examination. The introduction of intelligence tests was a progressive step.

(2) The entire curriculum of the later years of a Secondary school should not be subordinated to the Matriculation Examination. A much broader and more humane view of the educational process should be taken.

(3) Greater attention should be paid to essays and individual work of the student, and less to term and degree examinations.

The introduction of these reforms would be much towards widening and improving the educational system of this country.



News and Views

[A monthly record of News and Views relating to Cultural and Academic Institutions, Events and Movements of India and Abroad.]

Bombay University

Mr. Rustom Pestonjee Masani will, it is understood, be appointed Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University vice Mr. V. N. Chandravarkar, with effect from April 1.

Medical College for Dacca

A Committee to consider the ways and means for establishing a Medical College for Dacca recently met at Dacca and held four meetings. The following distinguished persons constituted the Committee:—

Chairman—Major-General P. S. Mills, Surgeon-General of Bengal.
Members—Dr. R. C. Majumdar, Vice-Chancellor, Dacca University.
Lt.-Col. T. C. Boyd, Principal, Calcutta Medical College.
Dr. M. N. Bose, Principal, Curmichael Medical College.
Lt.-Col. Mallia, Supdt., Campbell Medical School.
Dr. P. De, Professor of Physiology, Calcutta Medical College.
Dr. J. C. Ghose, Professor of Chemistry, Dacca University.
Major R. Linton, Civil Surgeon of Dacca.
Khan Sahib Maizuddin Khan, Deputy Superintendent, Dacca Medical School.

They visited the Dacca University laboratories, the Dacca Medical School and the Mitford Hospital.

The Committee discussed the proposed scheme for the institution of a Faculty of Medicine in Dacca University in all its bearings and appointed a Sub-Committee to work out the details of the scheme. They propose to meet again either at Dacca or at Calcutta as soon as the scheme is ready.

It is reported that the Committee have been favourably impressed with the scheme.

Dacca University

It is reliably understood that a conference recently held in Calcutta with representatives of the Dacca University, Bengal Government and other bodies recommended the starting of a Faculty of Agriculture in Dacca University from 1940.

Educated Unemployed at U. P.

The United Provinces Government are reported to be considering a number of schemes for the relief of the educated unemployed of the province. It is now proposed that they should be given subsidies to start poultry farming, fruit-growing and small-scale industries and if this proposal is accepted funds may be raised from the public for supplementing Government resources.

In this connection it will be recalled that the Government are already giving subsidies to young men taking to Industrial careers. But such assistance as is given at present is not considered to be adequate.

Studies in England

The Government of Assam have appointed a Provincial Advisory Committee, with headquarters at Gauhati, to assist Indian students proceeding to England and to supply them with information as to educational facilities and social conditions.

Munich University

A sensation has been caused in Catholic circles by the announcement that the Government have closed down the Catholic theological faculty of the Munich University. The reason is alleged to be that the students, acting on instructions from Cardinal Faulhaber's office, boycotted lectures of a professor appointed by Herr Rust, Minister of Education.

The time for closing was conveniently chosen as Cardinal Faulhaber is in Rome attending the Conclave. He is expected to hurry back to try to adjust the matter.

Primary Schools for Girls

Mian Abdul Haye, Education Minister, Punjab, announced at the District Teachers' Conference at Muzaffargarh that the Government had decided to start 200 new primary schools for girls in rural areas.

A central normal school to train women teachers would be established at Sharaqpur in Sheikhupura. The curriculum would include teaching of domestic arts and sciences.

The scheme forms part of a five-year rural reconstruction programme initiated by the Government last year.

Annamalai University

There was a dramatic development in the situation at Annamalai University when a general strike was declared by the students consequent on the refusal of the Vice-Chancellor to revise orders regarding the expulsion of six students in connection with the strike of last November. Some students met recently in the railway premises and resolved to wait on the Vice-Chancellor and appeal for the admission of the expelled students.

The Vice-Chancellor saw two representatives of the students. After hearing them, he said that he could not revise original orders which were

passed in consultation with the professors. The students thereupon gave an ultimatum and declared a general strike.

Military Training

Military training of young men in Assam is urged in a resolution given notice of by Mr. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharyya, M.L.C. The resolution will be moved in the forthcoming session of the Legislative Council which commences on March 9.

The resolution recommends to the Government that early arrangements be made for military training on the lines of the University Training Corps to all able-bodied students of the Earle Law College and all the arts colleges in the province and that the Central Government be moved to arrange, as early as possible, for military training of all the men in Assam. It is also recommended that the men selected for such training be given the same allowances and privileges as recruits in the Indian Army.



Miscellany

THE HOBBS SOCIETY OF GERMANY

In 1938 (April) the 350th birthday of Hobbes (1588-1670) was celebrated by an international conference under the auspices of the *Hobbes Gesellschaft* at Kiel (Germany). The President of the Hobbes Society, Baron Cay von Brockdorff, referred to the appreciation of *Hobbesism* in the middle of the eighteenth century by D'Alembert, Diderot, Condillac and other French thinkers as well as to the influence exercised on Frederick the Great of Prussia by the French translation of Hobbes's work known as *Les devoirs de l'homme et du citoyen* (The Duties of Man and the Citizen).

It may be added here, *en passant*, that Hobbes's influence on German thought has been steadily growing since the publication of Toennies's *Hobbes: der Mann und der Denker* (Stuttgart, 2nd edition, 1912). Toennies made good use of Hobbes in his *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, i.e., "Community and Society" (1st edition, 1887) as well as in *Einführung in die Soziologie* (1931) and *Geist der Neuzeit*, "The Spirit of the Modern Age" (1936). One should not fail to observe, however, that Toennies was a believer in democracy as well as in socialism.

In the Conference at Kiel Hobbes is described by Carl Schmitt (Berlin) as the unconfused spirit (*unbeirrter Geist*) who knew how to think daringly to the end of the fear of man for life and as the genuine thinker of a political reality. John Laird (Aberdeen), author of *Hobbes* (London, 1934), says that Hobbes should have a lively influence upon the ideologies of all Europe as well as upon the thought of his own country.

G. P. Gooch (London) observes: "England has had three political thinkers of the first rank, Hobbes, Locke and Burke. Hobbes was the Englishman to ask fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of the state." In Charles Appuhn's (Paris) estimation Hobbes is a precursor of Comte as having attempted two centuries before the great Frenchman *la constitution d'une sorte de physique sociale* (the constitution of a kind of social physics). Although Hobbes was a partisan of *pouvoir absolu* (absolute might) he was an *libérateur* (a liberator) because he introduced the sciences of man and human affairs into the system of the sciences of nature. Baron Seillière (Paris), author of *L'Imperialisme démocratique* (1907), calls Hobbes one of the most remarkable precursors of Nietzsche and says that following the advice of Diderot he has read and commented on Hobbes's work throughout life.

In the paper entitled *Hobbes und Indien* for the same conference the present author points out that Hobbes's emphasis on the passions and emotions in human nature agrees with Manu's dictum that *durlabho hi sucinarah* (rare is the man that is good by nature). Besides, the Hobbesian "state of nature" is identical with the *mataya-nyaya* (logic of the fish) of Hindu *Artha* and *Niti* philosophy. In both these contributions Hobbes is as valid to-day everywhere on earth as he ever was.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

KUCZYNSKI AND THE NEW POPULATION SCIENCE

R. K. Kuczynski's *Methods of Measuring the Balance of Births and Deaths*, a paper for the International Congress of Population, Rome, 1931 and *The Balance of Births and Deaths* (Washington, D. C., first volume, 1929, second volume, 1931), as well as Dublin and Lotka's paper on the real growth rate in the *Journal of the American Statistical Association* (September 1925) have served to focus attention on age-groups, differential fertility, marriage-curves, etc. The study of growth rate is placed on new foundations. Indeed a new population science, so to say, is started by the thesis that, analyzed according to age-composition, the death rate is higher than the birth rate even in those countries where a relatively high birth rate is to be seen (e.g., Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, England and France).

It is on this Kuczynskian conclusion that the cry, *Sterben die Weissen Völker?* (Are the White Races Dying?), is raised by Burgdoerfer in Germany. It is to be observed, however, that not all the white races are in the condition described by Kuczynski.* For instance, the growth rates of Italy, Spain, Lithuania, Portugal, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia are quite high. It is the Latins and chiefly the Slavs that exhibit the high rate as contrasted with the Teutons (the so-called Nordics). Hence arises a special problem for the Nordics.

It is with reference to this situation that the Italian demographer, Corrado Gini, adumbrates his theory of the "parabola of evolution" and asserts that European races are exhibiting senescence with the exception of the Italians and the Slavs. Gini's paper entitled "The Birth and Revival of Nations" is available in *Population* (Chicago, 1930), which contains, besides, papers by Naau (Japanese), Baker (American) and Kuczynski. Gini believes that it is possible to rejuvenate some of the dying races by infusion of blood from new, but ethnically not very remote, races.

According to Kuczynski's *Population Movements* (Oxford, 1935) the enormous growth of the white population—from 155 millions in 1770 to 720 millions in 1935—is due exclusively to a decrease of mortality. The greatest reduction in mortality has taken place in the age composition (0-5). But the number of infants under 1 and of children between 1 and 5 in the entire population is small. Therefore for the entire population the reduction in mortality cannot be considered to be great, although "crude" death rates seem to indicate a great reduction. The correct birth rates are to be computed by showing the average number of girls born to a woman who lives through child-bearing age (15-45). In Northern and Western Europe 210 girls used to be born on the average per 100 women in 1880. In 1933 the figure was 20. The index (*gross reproduction rate*) came down thus from 2.1 to 0.9.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

HOCKING'S CO-AGENT STATE

William Ernest Hocking's latest work is *The Lasting Elements of Individualism* (New Haven, 1937). In Hocking's analysis John Stuart Mill, although a champion of liberty, turns out essentially to be an exponent

* Kuczynski and Burgdoerfer have been discussed at length by the present author in *Ekater Dharma-Dantist O Arthashastra* (The Wealth and Economics of Our Own Times, Vol. II, 1938).

of social utility, whereas Karl Marx, although the prophet of the socialistic reconstruction of the society, is an ardent lover of man's inherent rights as an individual. The "incompressible individual" is Hocking's ideal. But, on the other hand, he wants also the will to an active social unity. This latter is being furnished by modern despotisms of the bolshevistic and fascistic types, says he. But they have served at the same time to extinguish the individuals. What is needed is a "co-agent state" which will act as the individuals' responsible agent but at the same time promote and develop their conscience.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

THE ARISTOCRACY IN COMMUNISM

As a renegade from communism F. Borkensu discusses in *The Communist International* (London, 1938) the swing of the Comintern from extreme left to extreme right, especially since 1935. The communistic philosophy is no longer to be treated as a spectre haunting Europe because it has committed itself to the support of capitalism and conventional democracy, says he. The communist parties of all countries have been derived numerically less from the factory workers than from other classes. They are not mass parties of the proletariat. It is the "labour aristocracy," and the *intelligentsia* that constitute the leading factors in communist organizations.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

THE STRENGTH OF DEMOCRACY

Donald Tyerman, writing on "The Strength of Democracy" (*Lloyds Bank Ltd. Monthly*, London, 1939, December), observes that the bare record of the last hundred years in England is sufficient to dispel the suspicion that parliamentary government is incapable of wide-flung administrative effort, or of directing industry, commerce and finance. In practice democracy has proved to be no less State-minded than dictatorship.

To-day there is very little business which is not regarded as "affected with a public interest," and the State has accordingly assumed powers to direct and assist. The State owns printing works, arsenals, ordnance factories, naval dockyards and breweries in Carlisle and Pretoria, while at the same time running a postal, telephone, telegraph and banking business. In addition the Government operates several "layers" of services. There are first of all the social services, inaugurated in almost every instance by private charity and voluntary endeavour, but beyond the resources of unofficial bodies as soon as the question came of serving the entire people—basic services upon which the character of life and livelihood in a modern community depends, because very few people could provide these services for themselves: public health, public assistance, education and slum clearance.

The second layer is made up by what we might call the essential services: water, gas, electricity, transport, posts and broadcasting—services which cannot be left to the competitive operation of the profit motive.

Essential industries, trades upon which the life, livelihood and security of the people rest, constitute the third layer of State services operated by various methods of "remote" control. Farming, for instance, has almost always been a Government pensionary, because of the vital importance of food in time of war or in the absence of foodstuffs from abroad. To-day an array of marketing schemes, quotas, guaranteed prices and import restrictions show that the arms of the State are more sheltering than ever. New industries like beet sugar production and civil aviation, again, are assisted by direct financial aid from the Government. Tramp shipping in time of need is subsidised, while overseas trade is fostered and aided by trade facilities and export credits. Indeed, outstanding among the State's industrial functions are the salvaging and reconstruction of essential trades in depression and difficulty.

Thus the State, though parliamentary, is almost ubiquitous. Even in the holy of holies of liberal England—the City of London, which resisted the Kings of the past—the Government is supreme now-a-days. Treasury guidance is mostly implicit and agreed, but it rules the roost. The Treasury and the Bank of England work hand in hand. The Exchange Equalisation Fund dominates the foreign exchange market. The Foreign Investment (Advisory) Committee supervises all long-term foreign lending, and "perpetuates rather than checks" Government control.

Broadly, then, the characteristic English attempt to institute State supervision and control without abandoning the healthy stimuli of private enterprise, competition and private risk-bearing has created a State very different from the *laissez-faire* fiction which is so often contrasted disadvantageously with the controlled economies of their countries.

According to Tyerman, then, England's parliamentary system is a credit not a debt: it is possible for far more of the necessary organisation to be done voluntarily and by agreement than in almost any other country; and a stream of criticism from the Opposition and the Press is a salutary incentive.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

CAMPAIGN AGAINST BIRTH CONTROL IN ENGLAND

A growing section of the economic, sociological and political thought in England is taking keen interest in the causes and remedies of depopulation. A. M. Carr-Saunders, author of *World Population* (Oxford, 1936) and other works on demographic problems, is convinced that the British people is heading towards extinction on account of small families, i.e., birth control. War against birth control is commencing on all sides.

The new population science is based on the postulate that depopulation is a likelihood and that it cannot be combated by mere reduction in the death rate. What is imperative is an improvement in fertility. This is the fundamental message of Kuczynski and it is emphasised by him in a chapter of *Political Arithmetic* (London, 1938). This is a work by several authors under the general editorship of Lancelot Hogben.

According to Enid Charles and Pearl Moshinsky a correlation is observable between low fertility and a high percentage of employed women. Higher fertility prevails in metal industries and agriculture. In D. V. Glass's analysis marriage rates and real wages are found to be related between 1851 and 1934.

Propaganda to combat birth control has been assuming considerable proportions. In *The Menace of British Depopulation* (London, 1937) G. F. McCleary seeks to mobilize the ideas of the new population science among the masses and the *élites*. Another work of the same class is *The Population Problem* (London, 1938) edited by T. H. Marshall.

In this book Kuczynski points out that the Russian population would grow up to 650 millions by 2000 A.D. while that of Northern and Western Europe would go down to 150 millions. Again, the British population in the British Empire, 55 millions at the present moment, would be reduced to 45 millions fifty years hence and to 37 millions in the next twenty-seven years while the non-British population of the Empire would rise from 18 millions of to-day to 87 millions. Later, the British population may be extinct in the British Empire.

For Australia, New Zealand, U. S. A. and Canada Arnold Plant suggests that unless the trend of the birth rate is reversed, migration alone will not make possible the development of these regions. As for Great Britain he would recommend an active encouragement of immigration of young persons and more educated persons.

H. D. Henderson wants the system of family allowances introduced in England. Unless, however, ideas unsympathetic to large families are removed, mere family allowances will not counteract depopulation.

I. H. Marshall is convinced that economic assistance alone is not enough to check depopulation. The large family movement has to be rendered fashionable. The three-child instead of the two-child family has to become the ideal of the British people in order to save it from extinction.

In this connection it is worth while to observe that the measures adopted by the Governments in Italy, Germany and France in order to promote large families have been examined by D. V. Glass in the *Struggle for Population* (Oxford, 1936). He is convinced that these measures have hardly succeeded in their objects. The will to large family is considered by him to be more important than any repressive measure of the State against birth control or any economic subventions granted by it.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

At the Ninth International Congress of Philosophy, Paris (July, 1937) which is also described as the Descartes Congress because of the tercentenary of Descartes celebrated by the Congress participants a large number of papers is given over to the discussion of legal topics. A resumé is offered by Emile Brehier on the basis of Vols. X-XII of the Reports of the Congress. These three volumes are given over to *la valeur, les normes et la réalité*.*

Plachy conceives a sort of juridical Kantianism. He is interested in the investigation of a priori or permanent conditions of the given norms. On the other hand, Prochazka believes that it is not possible to justify one norm without reference to another. Now one given norm can be deduced from several justifying norms. There is, therefore, quite a great ground for indetermination.

* "L'Etat présent de la philosophie d'après les Travaux du Congrès Descartes" in the *Revue Philosophique* (Paris), January-February, 1938.

This method of analysis assumes existing norms. But how to introduce the norm when one does not have anything but facts to begin with? This is the objection made very often against those who identify the norm with a fact. Don't they thereby deny the very notion of law? It is to this that a reply is given by Davy. He shows the individual not as anterior to the society but arising out of it. It is the life in society which postulates and produces the attribution, to the individuals who are its agents, of a normal value without which the play of significances and of honour (conditions of this life) would not be conceivable. The individual is not found invested with these rights in order to submit them to the caprice of his own will but in order to re-create them by making them this time pass through his conscience.

Morrow thinks like Duguit that law can and should come entirely out of the norm conceived as an imperative order. The necessities of the enterprise in common explain all. "Orderliness normally seems to arise with something like spontaneity out of situations in which co-operation is involved." Horvath argues in the same positivistic although somewhat different manner to the effect that reality and value are both abstractions. They exist together and law is nothing but the social objectivation of the simultaneous perception of the thing perceived and the rules valued.

All the contributors to the Descartes Congress appear to be interested exclusively in positive law. Natural law seems to have been entirely ignored. Horvath, however, mentions it as something like a Kantian category. It is a regularity or invariable structure of perception but not a transcendental object. But according to Sauter it is a transcendental object. Everybody who ignores *Naturrecht* (natural law) as the source and highest norm of all positive law, says he, has no means in his hands by which this cultural domain, namely, law can be separated from other cultural domains or from power and force. Natural law, according to Sauter, is not made up of simple postulates or categories of right. It is that eternal dynamic, nay, revolutionary, element which impels us always to attempt assimilating the prevalent legal system to what is felt to be the obligatory ideal of justice. Brehier considers this attitude to be Platonic. Krus also exhibits this Platonic idealism but he combines it with the relativism of Protagoras. A value comes always out of evaluation. But the evaluation is just when one prefers what produces an advantage.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION

The interpretation of the British constitution as furnished who by Barker believes in the influence of the Anti-Cabinet¹ as a factor in political synthesis or compromise is, like that of Bagehot in the *English Constitution*, a performance in philosophical dialectic and is liable to challenge by those who do not go much in for classic conceptions of life and society. A challenge may be offered, for instance, from the position of Harold Laski, who in his *Parliamentary Government in England* (1938) unearths a more radical antithesis than that contemplated by Barker. This antithesis, as demonstrated by Laski, is the have-nots of British society, the unpropertied, who find themselves in an attitude of antagonism to the property-owners, the

¹ "The Cabinet and the Anti-Cabinet in the British Constitution: Synthesis" (*Calcutta Review*, March 1938).

capitalistic class. These proletarian masses are much more effective than the conventional Anti-Cabinets. And since they are legally enfranchised, it is quite possible for them to organize, start a civil war and institute dictatorship. The failure of the capitalistic bourgeoisie to submit to the exigencies of the times can lead to the establishment of a dictatorship, as Laski has already suspected in *Democracy in Crisis* (1933). The future of parliamentary institutions in England, says he in 1938, depends on whether the voters be prepared to accept or reject in so many words the socialist transformation of the economic foundations of British society.

Laski's diagnosis of the situation is perhaps too radical and metaphysical for the British masses, used as they are to factually neo-socialistic ideologies prevailing in the atmosphere. The British synthesis for to-morrow is not to be found, however, in the snug and comfortable viewpoint of Barker's about compromise and continuity somehow consummating themselves in the British society. The synthesis is to come out of creative disequilibrium crying from house-tops for larger and larger doses of political power and economic prosperity for the proletariat.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR



Reviews and Notices of Books

Revolutionary Portugal (1910-1926)—By V. de Braganza-Cunha. James Clarke & Co., London, pp. 282...VII.

General Carmona rules Portugal to-day as a military Dictator. He has been in power since 1926 when General Gomes da Costa effected a military *coup d'état*. How Gomes da Costa was quietly sent to Azores and Carmona became the head of the State is a matter of history. The dictatorship replaced not an autocratic monarchy but a democratic republic. The house of Braganza went to voluntary exile in 1910 and the monarchy fell without a struggle after an armed rising in Lisbon. King Manuel II, the last ruler of his dynasty, had little political or administrative experience. He was unexpectedly called to the throne when his father Dom Carlos and the heir-apparent were assassinated by a revolutionary gang. Dom Carlos was by no means an absolutist. He stood by the constitution of his country as long as practicable and reluctantly granted exceptional powers to his last prime ministers under exceptional circumstances. As J. L. Garvin says "king Carlos was murdered not for his faults but for his virtues; not for the follies and sins of his previous career, but for the gallant and resolute patriotism he showed at the last. We can now realise that the Monarchy was doomed by his assassination." The revolution of 1910 succeeded not through any intrinsic merit or strength of its own. Admiral Candido dos Reis, the revolutionary leader, committed suicide to escape the penalty of failure. His followers despaired of success, but the resolution of one man saved the day. Machado dos Santos, a young naval officer, refused to own defeat and continued the fight. The regular army was paralysed by the cowardice and indecision of its commanders and monarchy fell without a blow in self-defence. Machado dos Santos, however, did not want to seize power for himself. A provisional government was formed with Prof. Theophilo Braga as its head and a republic was proclaimed. That was in 1910. It was this republic that came to an end in 1926 after a chequered career of sixteen years. There is no satisfactory account of the Portuguese revolution in English and the volume under review is intended to remove this long felt need.

The author is a Luso-Indian publicist with royalist sympathies. He analyses the causes of the revolution and its failures with ability and insight. The Portuguese have a peculiar mentality. The nation occasionally goes mad. The causes vary from time to time. It is the Jesuits to-day, the Jews to-morrow. Seventy-five per cent. of the people are illiterate and a parliamentary government hardly suits a country where the majority of people are by nature apathetical to any political movement. That is why the Marquis of Pombal could with impunity defy the ancient laws of his land and that is why a military Dictator could so easily overthrow the republic he served. The revolutionary leaders were impractical doctrinaires, they drew their inspiration from revolutionary France and borrowed their political dogmas ready made from French text-books. They wanted a republic not because they had any definite grievance against the monarchy but because the monarchy failed to cope with evils inherent in the national character of the Portuguese. Under the republic, therefore, the old evils were further aggravated and what little political stability existed under the

monarchy totally disappeared. Six different cabinets came to power and fell in a single year and political chaos ensued. It was under such circumstances that General Carmona appeared on the scene and did away with the republic in the name of law and order.

Sr. Braganza-Cunha rightly complains that the Dictator has unreasonably encroached on personal liberties and has done away with the cherished rights of the Colonists. But it is difficult to minimise the services rendered by Dr. Salazar to his country and people. When I visited Portugal in 1926 the economic depression was at its height. I did not handle a single metal coin. A large amount of paper money was in circulation and the national debt was steadily on the increase. A balanced budget was regarded as an impossible miracle but Dr. Salazar's ingenuity has converted a chronic deficit into a steady surplus, the national debt is being gradually wiped out and the financial position of Portugal is to-day as safe as that of any country in Europe. Before he assumed the portfolio of national finances Dr. Salazar occupied the chair of Economics at the ancient University of Coimbra. It is seldom that a Professor of Economics makes a good Finance Minister.

A good bibliography and an index would have added to the value of this interesting volume. There are some printing mistakes, *e.g.*, Henry IV for Henry VI on p. 164, which are not very serious. The author never misses an opportunity of upholding the traditions of India, his native land.

S. N. SEN

Are Religions Identical—By Haricharan Mukherjee, B.L., Deoghar.
Pages 191. Price Rs. 1-8-0.

The object of this book is to show that the religions of the world, though apparently different, are in the main identical. To bring out the fundamental identity of religions, the author discusses such themes as the belief in the existence of God, creation of the world by God, distinction between virtue and sin, salvation, the process of initiation, the necessity of initiators and components of religion, the Scriptures, and the need of prayer or Divine worship for securing real happiness. He has, however, omitted the subject of "Heaven and Hell" for reasons which, he thinks, it was better not to state. According to him, all religions of the world agree on these points, although there may be minor differences of forms and expressions with regard to these and other matters. He has also discussed some other subjects like miracles, sectarianism, idolatry, transmigration, knowledge and predestination with a view to determine their real meaning and place in certain religions. He concludes with a criticism of the rationalism of free-thinkers and of the process of conversion from one religion to another.

While the object of the book is quite commendable, the author's way of attaining it is not so satisfactory. It is on the basis of inadequate historical data that he makes the sweeping generalisations that all religions agree in accepting the beliefs in Gods' existence, God's creation of the world and the like. But these beliefs are absent in some religions, especially in Buddhism and Jainism. So also the ideas of salvation, initiation, worship, etc., may be present in many religions. But the actual conceptions of these rites and processes are so very different in different religions that it is hardly possible to identify them in the face of such strong points of divergence.

In fact, the author has to admit that different prophets are God's men who 'work for the same cause at different times under different circumstances and probably, therefore, under different shapes.' So also, the different religions may be said to be different forms and expressions of man's union with the Supreme Being, or different ways of attaining this consummate goal of human life. The legitimate conclusion that may be drawn from the evidence of history is that all religions lead to the same goal, and not that they are identical. Still, the author should be given all credit for drawing our pointed attention to the fundamental unity of all religions in this age of religious disputes and dissensions.

S. C. CHATTERJEE.



Ourselves

[I. The Late Lord Brabourne.—II. Financial Help for Research in Synthetic and Indigenous Drugs.—III. Adkarkhondra Mookherjee Lecturer for 1937.—IV. Seminar Scholars for the Students' International Union, Geneva.—V. Social Hygiene Congress, London.—VI. American Academy of Political and Social Science.—VII. The National Planning Committee, Bombay.—VIII. Mr Jehan Van Manen.—IX. Tagore Law Professor for 1939.—X. Indian History Congress.—XI. St. Clement Ohridianaj University, Sofia.—XII. Coates Medal for 1937.]

I. THE LATE LORD BRABOURNE

It is with a profound feeling of sorrow and regret that we record the untimely demise on the 23rd February last of His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Sir Michael Herbert Rudolf Knatchbull, Baron Brabourne, M.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., J.P., Governor of Bengal and Chancellor of this University. We were deeply distressed to learn on the 18th February that His Excellency had been operated upon for an obstinate malady and on the following Thursday we were astounded by the tragic news that His Excellency was no more.

We mourn the death of a Chancellor who was the inheritor of the best traditions of British culture and nobility. Great as an administrator, gifted with a high sense of duty and with the rarest of virtues—courage, prudence and sympathy—he was greater even as a man, a fact which has been amply borne out by his sincere words and deeds. Bengal was fortunate at a critical juncture in her history to have at the helm of her affairs a man who understood her and was understood in return. It is now a little over a year that His Excellency assumed charge of this province and of his office as Chancellor of this University, and in such a short time did he become so popular that his loss is universally felt to-day as a personal one. Few will forget the spectacle of the melancholy crowd that kept pouring in at St. Paul's Cathedral to pay its tribute of respect and affection to the mortal remains of a much loved Governor who was every inch a gentleman, not to speak of the immense procession which followed the bier to its last resting place at St. John's Church.

It would have been a happy day for Bengal, and for this University, had he been spared a few years more to live and work in this country.

But fate has decided otherwise, and we deeply grieve to realise that a valuable life has been cut short all too soon. Our heart-felt sympathy goes out to the good Lady Brabourne and members of His Excellency's family in their great bereavement.

As a mark of respect to the honoured memory of His Excellency, the meeting of the Senate fixed for the 25th February stood adjourned till the 18th March, 1939. The following resolution which was moved from the chair by Dr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee, in the unavoidable absence of the Vice-Chancellor due to illness, was carried in solemn silence, members of the Senate present standing :—

"The University of Calcutta places on record its profound sense of sorrow and loss at the sad and sudden demise of His Excellency Lord Brabourne, Governor of Bengal. In him, not only has the country lost an able administrator, a great statesman and a true friend, but the University has lost a beloved Chancellor whose warm and sympathetic interest in the University and all that concerned its welfare will be ever cherished by it with the liveliest feelings of gratitude.

The University tenders to The Lady Brabourne and the members of her family its deepest sympathy in their great sorrow."

II. FINANCIAL HELP FOR RESEARCH IN SYNTHETIC AND INDIGENOUS DRUGS

The Managing Agents of The Lister Antiseptics and Dressing Co. Ltd. have offered to place at the disposal of the University the sum of Rs. 1,000, to be utilised in the course of the current year for carrying on investigation in Synthetic and Indigenous Drugs under the supervision of Dr. J. C. Bardhan. The offer has been accepted with thanks and a scheme submitted in this connexion by Dr. Bardhan has been sanctioned.

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III. ADHARCHANDRA MOOKHERJEE LECTUREE FOR 1937

Professor Birbal Sahani, D.Sc., F.R.S., who was appointed Adharchandra Mookerjee Lecturer for 1937, will deliver his lectures

on the 6th and 7th March, 1939, on "The Himalayan Flora—Past and Present" at the Asutosh Hall of our University.

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IV. SEMINAR SCHOLARS FOR THE STUDENTS' INTERNATIONAL UNION, GENEVA

The following gentlemen have been nominated by the University for appointment as Seminar Scholars by the Students' International Union, Geneva, Switzerland and New York:—

Anil Chandra Ganguli, Esq., M.A., B.L., C/o. Secretary,
Y. M. C. A., 112, Gower Street, London.
Nripendranath Chatterjee, Esq., M.A., Jesus College, Oxford.

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V. SOCIAL HYGIENE CONGRESS, London

Our University has sent its good wishes to the Social Hygiene Congress, which will hold its ninth biennial session in London at the British Medical Association House in July this year.

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VI. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Our University has sent its good wishes to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, which will hold its forty-third Annual Meeting on the 31st March and the 1st April, 1939, to discuss the question, "Dictatorship and the Americas."

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VII. THE NATIONAL PLANNING COMMITTEE, Bombay

A Questionnaire has been submitted by the National Planning Committee, Bombay, which will be considered by a committee consisting of the following gentlemen:

Professor Meghnad Saha, D.Sc., F.R.S.
 „ Phanindranath Ghosh, M.A., PH.D., SC.D., F. Inst. P.
 „ Jnanendranath Mukherjee, M.A., D.Sc.
 „ Jitendraprasad Niyogi, M.A., PH.D.
 Dr. Mahendranath Goswami, M.A., DR. ES SC.
 „ M. Quadrat-i-Khuda, D.Sc., (Lond.) D.I.C.

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VIII. MR. JOHAN VAN MANEN

Mr. Johan Van Manen, C.I.E., has been renominated an Ordinary Fellow of this University.

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IX. TAGORE LAW PROFESSOR FOR 1939

Dr. P. K. Sen, M.A., LL.D. (Cantab.), BARRISTER-AT-LAW, sometime Judge, Patna High Court, has been appointed Tagore Law Professor for the year 1939. He will deliver a course of lectures on "Penology."

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X. INDIAN HISTORY CONGRESS

The next session of the Indian History Congress will be held in Calcutta under the auspices of this University.

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XI. ST. CLEMENT OKHRIDSNAJ UNIVERSITY, Sofia

Our University has conveyed its good wishes to the St. Clement Okhridsnaj University of Sofia on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary to be held in May this year.

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XII. COATES MEDAL FOR 1937

Lt.-Col. G. C. Maitra, L.M.S., I.M.S., has been selected by the Board of Adjudicators for the award of the Coates Medal for the year 1937.

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

Latest Publications

- The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge** (A critical study of some problems of Logic and Metaphysics), by Dr. S. C. Chatterjee, M.A., Ph.D. Royal 8vo pp. xix + 421. Rs. 5-0.
- Sangitiki** (in Bengali), by Mr. Dilipkumar Ray. D/Cr. 16mo pp. 292. Rs. 2-0.
- Bankim Parichaya** (in Bengali) D.F'cap. 16mo pp. 212. As. 8.
- Patanjali Yoga Darsana**, Royal 8vo pp. 731. Rs. 5-0.
- The Successors of the Satavahanas in Lower Deccan**, by Dr. Dineschandra Sircar, M.A., Ph.D. Royal 8vo pp. xv + 417. Rs. 6-0.
- The Spirit of Indian Civilization**, by Dr. Dharendra Nath Roy, M.A., Ph.D. Demy 8vo pp. 296 + xxiv. Rs. 2-8.
- Emerson: His Muse and Message**, by Rao Sahib Dr. Ramkrishna Rao, M.A., L.T., Ph.D. Demy 8vo pp. 313 + xii. Rs. 3-8.
- Principles and Problems of Indian Labour Legislation**, by Dr. Rajanikanta Das, M.A., Ph.D. Demy 8vo pp. 282 + xiv. Rs. 2-8.
- Upanishader Alo** (in Bengali), by Dr. Mahendranath Sircar, M.A., Ph.D. Demy 8vo pp. 147. As. 12.
- Bangla Bhasa Parichay** (in Bengali), by Dr. Rabindranath Tagore. Demy 8vo pp. 192. As. 12.
- A Grammar of Arabic Languages**, $5\frac{1}{2} \times 7\frac{1}{2}$, pp. 282. Rs. 1-4.
- The Fundamentals of Analysis**, by Prof. F. W. Levi, Dr. Phil. Nat. Royal 8vo pp. 60. Rs. 1-4.

Books in the Press

MARCH, 1939

- 1 History of the Bengali Novel, by Prof. Srikumar Banerjee, M.A., Ph.D.
- 2 The Problem of Minorities, by Dr. Dharendraanath Sen, M.A., Ph.D.
- 3 Jubilee French Course, by J. Buffard, Esq.
- 4 The Evolution of Indian Industry, by Dr. Rohinimohan Chaudhuri, M.A., Ph.D.
- 5 Santhal Insurrections, by Dr. K. K. Datta, M.A., Ph.D.
- 6 Sree Krishna Bijay, Edited by Rai Bahadur Prof. Khagendranath Mitra, M.A.
- 7 An Introduction to Indian Philosophy by Dr. S. C. Chatterjee, M.A., Ph.D. and Dr. D. M. Dutt, M.A., Ph.D.
- 8 General Catalogue of Bengali Manuscripts, edited by Mr. Msnindramohan Bose, M.A.
- 9 Patas Sangit, edited by G. S. Dutt, Esq., I.C.S.
- 10 Courtesy in Shakespeare, by Dr. Mohinimohan Bhattacharyya, M.A., Ph.D.
- 11 Studies in Tantras, by Dr. P. C. Bagchi, M.A., D.Litt.
- 12 Krishi-Bijnan, Vol. II, by the late Rai Rajeswar Dasgupta, Bahadur.
- 13 Bharate Karu Silpa, by Mr. Asitkumar Haldar.
- 14 Prasthanabheda, by Madhusudan Saraswati, edited by Mahamahopadhyay Gurucharan Tarka-Darshana-tirtha.
- 15 Vyaptipanchaka, by Pt Anantakumar Tarkatirtha.
- 16 Bharitiya Banasubhadhir Parichaya, by Dr. Kalipada Biswas, M.A., D.Sc. and Mr. Elkkari Ghosh.
- 17 Journal of the Department of Letters, Vols. XXXI and XXXII.
- 18 Nyayamanjari, edited by Pandit Panchanan Tarkabagis.
- 19 Sree Chaitanyas Chariter Upadan, by Dr. Bimanbehari Majumdar, M.A., Ph.D.
- 20 Collected Published Papers, by the late Mr. Hemchandra Dasgupta, M.A., F.G.S.
- 21 University Questions for the year 1931.
- 22 Khandakhadyaka, Sanskrit Text, edited by Mr. Prabodh-chandra Sengupta, M.A.
- 23 Translation of Pali Literature and Language, by Dr. Batakrishna Ghosh, Dr. Phil., D.Lit.
- 24 Siddhanta Sekhara, Vol. II, by Pandit Babua Misra.
- 25 Calendar, Part II, 1929, Supplement 1936.
- 26 Old Persian Inscriptions, by Dr. Sukumar Sen, M.A., Ph.D.
- 27 Some Historical Aspects of the Inscriptions of Bengal, by Dr. Binaychandra Sen, M.A., Ph.D. (Lond.).

The work is an English translation of the commentary of Medhatithi on the Institutes of Manu. The two editions that had already been published, *viz.*, one by V. N. Mandlik and the other by G. R. Gharpure, being considered avowedly defective on account of a hopeless muddling of the text, Dr. Jha collected manuscripts from various places; and, with the help of these manuscripts, made out an intelligible text, and then proceeded with the work of translation.

- Vol. I, Part I—Comprising Discourse I and 28 verses of Discourse II. Royal 8vo pp. 266. 1920. Rs. 6.
- Vol. I, Part II—Comprising verses XXIX to end of Discourse II. Royal 8vo pp. 290. 1921. Rs. 6.
- Vol. II, Part I—Comprising the whole of Discourse III. Royal 8vo pp. 304. 1921. Rs. 6.
- Vol. II, Part II—Comprising Discourse IV. Royal 8vo pp. 208. 1921. Rs. 6.
- Index to Vols. I and II. Royal 8vo pp. 148. 1922. Re. 1-8.
- Vol. III, Part I—Comprising Discourses V and VI. Royal 8vo pp. 278. 1922. Rs. 6.
- Vol. III, Part II—Comprising Discourse VII and the Index to the whole of Vol. III. Royal 8vo pp. 206. 1924. Rs. 7.
- Vol. IV, Part I—Comprising a portion of Discourse VIII. Royal 8vo pp. 252. 1925. Rs. 8.
- Vol. IV, Part II—Comprising Discourse VIII and Index to Vol. IV. Royal 8vo pp. 238. 1926. Rs. 7-8.
- Vol. V—Comprising Discourses IX to XII. Royal 8vo pp. 709. 1926. Rs. 12-8.

Manu Smriti, Notes, by the same author.

